A vertical yellow wireframe chain graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of several interlocking rings.

(Casper, Dfinity, Hotstuff, Pili, Pala...)


# Streamlet: Textbook streamlined blockchain protocols

Elaine Shi  
Cornell

Joint work with Benjamin Chan

# Blockchain

(a.k.a. state machine replication, consensus)



# Blockchain


(a.k.a. state machine replication, consensus)

## Consistency:

Honest nodes agree on log

## Liveness:

TXs are incorporated soon



# Blockchain: A 30-year-old Problem

YAHOO!<sup>®</sup>  
facebook




NetApp



Solr  
eBay<sup>®</sup>  
Rackspace<sup>®</sup>  
UBER

# Cryptocurrencies brought consensus to a large scale



# Proof of work



**Enables permissionless  
consensus**

Proof of work



Proof of work



Proof of stake



Rely on **permissioned**  
consensus

Proof of work



Proof of stake



# Blockchain

Every round  $t$ , node  $i$  outputs *longest final* log denoted  $\text{LOG}_i^t$

► **Consistency:** for any honest  $i, j$ , and  $t, t'$ ,

$$\text{LOG}_i^t < \text{LOG}_j^{t'} \quad \text{or} \quad \text{LOG}_j^{t'} < \text{LOG}_i^t$$

Holds for 1-negl probability over the choice of execution

# Blockchain

Every round  $t$ , node  $i$  outputs *longest final* log denoted  $\text{LOG}_i^t$

► **Consistency:** for any honest  $i, j$ , and  $t, t'$ ,

$$\text{LOG}_i^t < \text{LOG}_j^{t'} \quad \text{or} \quad \text{LOG}_j^{t'} < \text{LOG}_i^t$$

► **Liveness:** if an honest node receives input  $\text{tx}$  in round  $t$ ,  
then in round  $t + T(\lambda, n, \Delta)$ , any honest node has  $\text{tx}$  in its  
 $\text{LOG}$

Holds for 1-negl probability over the choice of execution

# Blockchain

Single-shot consensus

In PKI setting, equivalent to BA from a feasibility perspective

# Blockchain

In PKI setting, equivalent to BA from a feasibility perspective



Is blockchain a meaningful abstraction?

# Blockchain: 2 approaches

PODC, CRYPTO community

Sequential composition of BA

SOSP, NDSI, real-world community

Direct blockchain construction  
(e.g., pbft, paxos)

# Blockchain: 2 approaches

PODC, CRYPTO community

Sequential composition of BA

SOSP, NDSI, real-world community

Direct blockchain construction  
(e.g., pbft, paxos)



# Roadmap




Classical approaches  
(e.g., pbft, paxos)




Streamlet: a streamlined  
blockchain

# Block Format






# 1 Proposer proposes block




# 2 Vote




3


Confirm  upon  $\frac{2}{3} n$  votes




# $\frac{2}{3} n$ votes: notarization



# Honest nodes vote **uniquely** each height




# Must intersect at an honest node



Assume:  $< \frac{1}{3} n$  corrupt

# Must intersect at an honest node



Thus =


$\frac{2}{3}$  honest

honest



Consistency

Liveness




$\frac{2}{3}$  honest


Consistency

Liveness

# How do we achieve liveness?



# Anatomy of classical consensus



Simple normal  
path

Complicated  
recovery path



Can we achieve **full** consensus  
(almost) **as easily** as the normal path?



# Roadmap




Classical approaches  
(e.g., pbft, paxos)



Streamlined blockchains  
(Casper, Dfinity, Hotstuff, Pili, Pala, Streamlet)

# Assume: epoch = 1 sec $\geq$ 1 roundtrip



# Proposer rotation

**Node  $H(i) \bmod n$  is the proposer in epoch  $i$**

Easy to support any other proposer-rotation policy

# If everyone were honest

1

2

3

4


5




# Real world

1


can skip epochs



# Real world



# Height = “position in chain”



## ► **Propose**

- extend longest notarized chain

## ► **Vote**

- no double-vote each epoch
- verify parent block notarized
- no conflicting notr at the height

}

**Every epoch**



**Finalization:** height **h** final if heights **h-1, h, h+1** have consecutive epochs & are notarized

Height **h**





This talk


1


## Consistency Proof

2

## Liveness Proof

- Finalization: height  $h$  final if heights  $h-1, h, h+1$  have consecutive epochs & are notarized








Case 1

**Lemma:** every epoch  
has at most 1  
notarized block.

Case 2








“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

**Proof:**


many voted for 8 in epoch 8



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

### Proof:


many voted for 8 in epoch 8  
--> many saw 7 notarized in epoch 8



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

### Proof:


- many voted for 8 in epoch 8
- > many saw 7 notarized in epoch 8
- > they will not vote for 9 in epoch 9



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

### Proof:

- many voted for 8 in epoch 8
- > many saw 7 notarized in epoch 8
- > they will not vote for 9 in epoch 9
- > 9 cannot gain notarization



Case 1


Case 2



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

**Proof:**


many voted for  in epoch 5



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

## Proof:


many voted for  $\bullet 5$  in epoch 5  
--> many saw  $\bullet 3$  notarized in epoch 5



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

## Proof:


- many voted for  in epoch 5
- > many saw  notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for  in epoch 6



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

## Proof:


- many voted for  $\bullet 5$  in epoch 5
- > many saw  $\bullet 3$  notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for  $\bullet 6$  in epoch 6
- >  $\bullet 6$  cannot gain notarization



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

## Proof:

- many voted for  $\bullet 5$  in epoch 5
- > many saw  $\bullet 3$  notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for  $\bullet 6$  in epoch 6
- >  $\bullet 6$  cannot gain notarization



“many” = at least  $n/3$  honest

## Proof:

- many voted for  $\textcolor{red}{\bullet 5}$  in epoch 5
- > many saw  $\textcolor{teal}{\bullet 3}$  notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for  $\textcolor{blue}{\bullet 6}$  in epoch 6
- >  $\textcolor{blue}{\bullet 6}$  cannot gain notarization



Consistency does not depend on sync. assumptions!



# Liveness Theorem

During a **period of synchrony**, honest nodes' finalized chains grow whenever **5 consecutive epochs have honest proposers.**

(and moreover the finalized chains grow by **honest blocks**)

# Partial Synchrony

[DLS]

- ▶ Protocol knows a delay estimate  $\Delta$
- ▶ Consistency is guaranteed even if actual delay arbitrarily long
- ▶ Liveness only during periods of synchrony

# Partial Synchrony

[DLS]

Theorem:

Cannot tolerate  $\frac{1}{3}$  or more corruptions

# Summary: streamlined blockchains

- Every epoch allows proposer-switch.
- View change embedded in a unified “propose-vote” paradigm.



# Roadmap

**$\frac{1}{2}$  synchronous**



**$\frac{1}{3}$  partially synchronous**

## Every epoch:

- Proposer proposes a block extending longest notarized chain
- Vote on the first proposal if parent notarized and no other notarized block at same height
- A block with **majority** votes is **notarized**

## Finalization:

- **6 consecutive** at the end, **no conflicting notarization**, chop off **5**



Optimistic  
Responsiveness

Best-possible  
partition  
tolerance

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/981>

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/980>

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/179>



# Thank You!

[elaine@cs.cornell.edu](mailto:elaine@cs.cornell.edu)