Permalink
Cannot retrieve contributors at this time
Philosophical Letters: OR, MODEST REFLECTIONS Upon some Opinions in NATVRAL | |
PHILOSOPHY, MAINTAINED By several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age, | |
Expressed by way of LETTERS: By the Thrice Noble, Illustrious, and Excellent | |
Princess, The Lady MARCHIONESS of NEWCASTLE. | |
LONDON, Printed in the Year, 1664. | |
TO HER EXCELLENCY The Lady MARCHIONESS OF NEW CASTLE, On her Book of | |
Philosophical Letters. | |
TIs Supernatural, nay 'tis Divine, | |
To write whole Volumes ere I can a line. | |
I'mplor'd the Lady Muses, those fine things, | |
But they have broken all their Fidle-strings | |
And cannot help me; Nay, then I did try | |
Their Helicon, but that is grown all dry: | |
Then on Parnassus I did make a sally, | |
But that's laid level, like a Bowling-alley; | |
Invoked my Muse, found it a Pond, a Dream, | |
To your eternal Spring, and running Stream; | |
So clear and fresh, with Wit and Fancy store, | |
As then despair did bid me write no more. | |
W. Newcastle. | |
TO HIS EXCELLENCY The LORD MARQUIS of NEW CASTLE. | |
My Noble Lord, | |
ALthough you have always encouraged me in my harmless pastime of Writing, yet | |
was I afraid that your Lordship would be angry with me for Writing and | |
Publishing this Book, by reason it is a Book of Controversies, of which I have | |
heard your Lordship say, That Controversies and Disputations make Enemies of | |
Friends, and that such Disputations and Controversies as these, are a | |
pedantical kind of quarrelling, not becoming Noble Persons. But your Lordship | |
will be pleased to consider in my behalf, that it is impossible for one Person | |
to be of every one's Opinion, if their opinions be different, and that my | |
Opinions in Philosophy, being new, and never thought of, at least not divulged | |
by any, but my self, are quite different from others: For the Ground of my | |
Opinions is, that there is not only a Sensitive, but also a Rational Life and | |
Knowledge, and so a double Perception in all Creatures: And thus my opinions | |
being new, are not so easily understood as those, that take up several pieces | |
of old opinions, of which they patch up a new Philosophy, (if new may be made | |
of old things,) like a Suit made up of old Stuff bought at the Brokers: | |
Wherefore to find out a Truth, at least a Probability in Natural Philosophy by | |
a new and different way from other Writers, and to make this way more known, | |
easy and intelligible, I was in a manner forced to write this Book; for I have | |
not contradicted those Authors in any thing, but what concerns and is opposite | |
to my opinions; neither do I any thing, but what they have done themselves, as | |
being common amongst them to contradict each other: which may as well be | |
allowable, as for Lawyers to plead at the Barr in opposite Causes. For as | |
Lawyers are not Enemies to each other, but great Friends, all agreeing from the | |
Barr, although not at the Barr: so it is with Philosophers, who make their | |
Opinions as their Clients, not for Wealth, but for Fame, and therefore have no | |
reason to become Enemies to each other, by being Industrious in their | |
Profession. All which considered, was the cause of Publishing this Book; | |
wherein although I dissent from their opinions, yet doth not this take off the | |
least of the respect and esteem I have of their Merits and Works. But if your | |
Lordship do but pardon me, I care not if I be condemned by others; for your | |
Favour is more then the World to me, for which all the actions of my Life shall | |
be devoted and ready to serve you, as becomes, | |
My LORD, Your Lordships honest Wife, and humble Servant, M. N. | |
TO THE MOST FAMOUS UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE. | |
Most Noble, Ingenious, Learned, and Industrious Students. | |
BE not offended, that I dedicate to you this weak and infirm work of mine; for | |
though it be not an offering worthy your acceptance, yet it is as much as I can | |
present for this time; and I wish from my Soul, I might be so happy as to have | |
some means or ways to express my Gratitude for your Magnificent favours to me, | |
having done me more honour then ever I could expect, or give sufficient thanks | |
for: But your Generosity is above all Gratitude, and your Favours above all | |
Merit, like as your Learning is above Contradiction: And I pray God your | |
University may flourish to the end of the World, for the Service of the Church, | |
the Truth of Religion, the Salvation of Souls, the Instruction of Youth, the | |
preservation of Health, and prolonging of Life, and for the increase of | |
profitable Arts and Sciences: so as your several studies may be, like several | |
Magistrates, united for the good and benefit of the whole Common-wealth, nay, | |
the whole World. May Heaven prosper you, the World magnify you, and Eternity | |
record your fame; Which are the hearty wishes and prayers of, | |
Your most obliged Servant M. NEWCASTLE. | |
A PREFACE TO THE READER. | |
Worthy Readers, | |
I Did not write this Book out of delight, love or humour to contradiction; for | |
I would rather praise, then contradict any Person or Persons that are | |
ingenious; but by reason Opinion is free, and may pass without a pass-port, I | |
took the liberty to declare my own opinions as other Philosophers do, and to | |
that purpose I have here set down several famous and learned Authors opinions, | |
and my answers to them in the form of Letters, which was the easiest way for me | |
to write; and by so doing, I have done that, which I would have bone unto me; | |
for I am as willing to have my opinions contradicted, as I do contradict | |
others: for I love Reason so well, that whosoever can bring most rational and | |
probable arguments, shall have my vote, although against my own opinion. But | |
you may say, If contradictions were frequent, there would be no agreement | |
amongst Mankind. I answer; It is very true: Wherefore Contradictions are better | |
in general Books, then in particular Families, and in Schools better then in | |
Public States, and better in Philosophy then in Divinity. All which | |
considered, I shun, as much as I can, not to discourse or write of either | |
Church or State. But I desire so much favour, or rather Justice of you, Worthy | |
Readers, as not to interpret my objections or answers any other ways then | |
against several opinions in Philosophy; for I am confident there is not any | |
body, that doth esteem, respect and honour learned and ingenious Persons more | |
then I do: Wherefore judge me neither to be of a contradicting humour, nor of a | |
vain-glorious mind for dissenting from other men's opinions, but rather that it | |
is done out of love to Truth, and to make my own opinions the more | |
intelligible, which cannot better be done then by arguing and comparing other | |
men's opinions with them. The Authors whose opinions I mention, I have read, as | |
I found them printed, in my native Language, except Des Cartes, who being in | |
Latin, I had some few places translated to me out of his works; and I must | |
confess, that since I have read the works of these learned men, I understand | |
the names and terms of Art a little better then I did before; but it is not so | |
much as to make me a Scholar, nor yet so little, but that, had I read more | |
before I did begin to write my other Book called Philosophical Opinions, they | |
would have been more intelligible; for my error was, I began to write so early, | |
that I had not lived so long as to be able to read many Authors; I cannot say, | |
I divulged my opinions as soon as I had conceived them, but yet I divulged them | |
too soon to have them artificial and methodical, But since what is past, cannot | |
be recalled, I must desire you to excuse those faults, which were committed for | |
want of experience and learning. As for School-learning, had I applied my self | |
to it, yet I am confident I should never have arrived to any; for I am so | |
incapable of Learning, that I could never attain to the knowledge of any other | |
Language but my native, especially by the Rules of Art: wherefore I do not | |
repent that I spent not my time in Learning, for I consider, it is better to | |
write wittily then learnedly; nevertheless, I love and esteem Learning, | |
although I am not capable of it. But you may say, I have expressed neither Wit | |
nor Learning in my Writings: Truly, if not, I am the more sorry for it; but | |
selfconceit, which is natural to mankind, especially to our Sex, did flatter | |
and secretly persuade me that my Writings had Sense and Reason, Wit and | |
Variety; but Judgment being not called to Counsel, I yielded to Selfconceits | |
flattery, and so put out my Writings to be Printed as fast as I could, without | |
being reviewed or corrected: Neither did I fear any censure, for Selfconceit | |
had persuaded me, I should be highly applauded; wherefore I made such haste, | |
that I had three or four Books printed presently after each other. | |
But to return to this present Work, I must desire you, worthy Readers, to read | |
first my Book called Philosophical and Physical Opinions, before you censure | |
this, for this Book is but an explanation of the former, wherein is contained | |
the Ground of my Opinions, and those that will judge well of a Building, must | |
first consider the Foundation; to which purpose I will repeat some few Heads | |
and Principles of my Opinions, which are these following: First, That Nature is | |
Infinite, and the Eternal Servant of God: Next, That she is Corporeal, and | |
partly self-moving, dividable and composable; that all and every particular | |
Creature, as also all perception and variety in Nature, is made by corporeal | |
self-motion, which I name sensitive and rational matter, which is life and | |
knowledge, sense and reason. Again, That these sensitive and rational parts of | |
matter are the purest and subtilest parts of Nature, as the active parts, the | |
knowing, understanding and prudent parts, the designing, architectonical and | |
working parts, nay, the Life and Soul of Nature, and that there is not any | |
Creature or part of nature without this Life and Soul; and that not only | |
Animals, but also Vegetables, Minerals and Elements, and what more is in | |
Nature, are endued with this Life and Soul, Sense and Reason: and because this | |
Life and Soul is a corporeal Substance, it is both dividable and composable; | |
for it divides and removes parts from parts, as also composes and joins parts | |
to parts, and works in a perpetual motion without rest; by which actions not | |
any Creature can challenge a particular Life and Soul to it self, but every | |
Creature may have by the dividing and composing nature of this self-moving | |
matter more or fewer natural souls and lives. | |
These and the like actions of corporeal Nature or natural Matter you may find | |
more at large described in my aforementioned Book of Philosophical Opinions, | |
and more clearly repeated and explained in this present. Tis true, the way of | |
arguing I use, is common, but the Principles, Heads and Grounds of my Opinions | |
are my own, not borrowed or stolen in the least from any; and the first time I | |
divulged them, was in the year 1653. since which time I have reviewed, reformed | |
and reprinted them twice; for at first, as my Conceptions were new and my own, | |
so my Judgment was young, and my Experience little, so that I had not so much | |
knowledge as to declare them artificially and methodically; for as I mentioned | |
before, I was always unapt to learn by the Rules of Art. But although they may | |
be defective for want of Terms of Art, and artificial expressions, yet I am | |
sure they are not defective for want of Sense and Reason: And if any one can | |
bring more Sense and Reason to disprove these my opinions, I shall not repine | |
or grieve, but either acknowledge my error, if I find my self in any, or | |
defend them as rationally as I can, if it be but done justly and honestly, | |
without deceit, spite, or malice; for I connot choose but acquaint you, Noble | |
Readers, I have been informed, that if I should be answered in my Writings, it | |
would be done rather under the name and cover of a Woman, then of a Man, the | |
reason is, because no man dare or will set his name to the contradiction of a | |
Lady; and to confirm you the better herein, there has one Chapter of my Book | |
called The Worlds Olio, treating of a Monastical Life, been answered already in | |
a little Pamphlet, under the name of a woman, although she did little towards | |
it; wherefore it being a Hermaphroditical Book, I judged it not worthy taking | |
notice of. The like shall I do to any other that will answer this present work | |
of mine, or contradict my opinions indirectly with fraud and deceit. But I | |
cannot conceive why it should be a disgrace to any man to maintain his own or | |
others opinions against a woman, so it be done with respect and civility; but | |
to become a cheat by dissembling, and quit the Breeches for a Petticoat, merely | |
out of spite and malice, is base, and not fit for the honour of a man, or the | |
masculine sex. Besides, it will easily be known; for a Philosopher or | |
Philosopheress is not produced on a sudden. Wherefore, although I do not care, | |
nor fear contradiction, yet I desire it may be done without fraud or deceit, | |
spite and malice; and then I shall be ready to defend my opinions the best I | |
can, whilst I live, and after I am dead, I hope those that are just and | |
honourable will also defend me from all sophistry, malice, spite and envy, for | |
which Heaven will bless them. In the mean time, Worthy Readers, I should | |
rejoice to see that my Works are acceptable to you, for if you be not partial, | |
you will easily pardon those faults you find, when you do consider both my sex | |
and breeding; for which favour and justice, I shall always remain, | |
Your most obliged Servant, M. N. | |
Philosophical Letters. | |
SECT. 1. | |
1. | |
MADAM, | |
YOu have been pleased to send me the Works of four Famous and Learned Authors, | |
to wit, of two most Famous Philosophers of our Age, Des Gartes, and Hobbs, and | |
of that Learned Philosopher and Divine Dr. More, as also of that Famous | |
Physician and Chemist Van Helmont. Which Works you have sent me not only to | |
peruse, but also to give my judgment of them, and to send you word by the usual | |
way of our Correspondence, which is by Letters, how far, and wherein I do | |
dissent from these Famous Authors, their Opinions in Natural Philosophy. To | |
tell you truly, Madam, your Commands did at first much affright me, for it did | |
appear, as if you had commanded me to get upon a high Rock, and fling my self | |
into the Sea, where neither a Ship, nor a Plank, nor any kind of help was near | |
to rescue me, and save my life; but that I was forced to sink, by reason I | |
cannot swim: So I having no Learning nor Art to assist me in this dangerous | |
undertaking, thought, I must of necessity perish under the rough censures of my | |
Readers, and be not only accounted a fool for my labour, but a vain and | |
presumptuous person, to undertake things surpassing the ability of my | |
performance; but on the other side I considered first, that those Worthy | |
Authors, were they my censurers, would not deny me the same liberty they take | |
themselves; which is, that I may dissent from their Opinions, as well as they | |
dissent from others, and from amongst themselves: And if I should express more | |
Vanity then Wit, more Ignorance then Knowledge, more Folly then Discretion, it | |
being according to the Nature of our Sex, I hoped that my Masculine Readers | |
would civilly excuse me, and my Female Readers could not justly condemn me. | |
Next I considered with my self, that it would be a great advantage for my Book | |
called Philosophical Opinions, as to make it more perspicuous and intelligible | |
by the opposition of other Opinions, since two opposite things placed near each | |
other, are the better discerned; for I must confess, that when I did put forth | |
my Philosophical Work at first, I was not so well skilled in the Terms or | |
Expressions usual in Natural Philosophy; and therefore for want of their | |
knowledge, I could not declare my meaning so plainly and clearly as I ought to | |
have done, which may be a sufficient argument to my Readers, that I have not | |
read heretofore any Natural Philosophers, and taken some Light from them; but | |
that my Opinions did merely issue from the Fountain of my own Brain, without | |
any other help or assistance. Wherefore since for want of proper Expressions, | |
my named Book of Philosophy was accused of obscurity and intricacy, I thought | |
your Commands would be a means to explain and clear it the better, although not | |
by an Artificial way, as by Logical Arguments or Mathematical Demonstrations, | |
yet by expressing my Sense and Meaning more properly and clearly then I have | |
done heretofore: But the chief reason of all was, the Authority of your | |
Command, which did work so powerfully with me, that I could not resist, | |
although it were to the disgrace of my own judgment and wit; and therefore I am | |
fully resoved now to go on as far, and as well as the Natural strength of my | |
Reason will reach: but since neither the strength of my Body, nor of my | |
understanding, or wit, is able to mark every line, or every word of their | |
works, and to argue upon them, I shall only pick out the ground Opinions of | |
the aforementioned Authors, and those which do directly dissent from mine, upon | |
which I intend to make some few Reflections, according to the ability of my | |
Reason; and I shall merely go upon the bare Ground of Natural Philosophy, and | |
not mix Divinity with it, as many Philosophers use to do, except it be in those | |
places, where I am forced by the Authors Arguments to reflect upon it, which | |
yet shall be rather with an expression of my ignorance, then a positive | |
declaration of my opinion or judgment thereof; for I think it not only an | |
absurdity, but an injury to the holy Profession of Divinity to draw her to the | |
Proofs in Natural Philosophy; wherefore I shall strictly follow the Guidance of | |
Natural Reason, and keep to my own ground and Principles as much as I can; | |
which that I may perform the better, I humbly desire the help and assistance of | |
your Favour, that according to that real and entire Affection you bear to me, | |
you would be pleased to tell me unfeignedly, if I should chance to err or | |
contradict but the least probability of truth in any thing; for I honour Truth | |
so much, as I bow down to its shadow with the greatest respect and reverence; | |
and I esteem those persons most, that love and honour Truth with the same zeal | |
and fervor, whether they be Ancient or Modern Writers. | |
Thus, Madam, although I am destitute of the help of Arts, yet being supported | |
by your Favour and wise Directions, I shall not fear any smiles of scorn, or | |
words of reproach; for I am confident you will defend me against all the | |
mischievous and poisonous Teeth of malicious detractors. I shall besides, | |
implore the assistance of the Sacred Church, and the Learned Schools, to take | |
me into their Protection, and shelter my weak endeavours: For though I am but | |
an ignorant and simple Woman, yet I am their devoted and honest Servant, who | |
shall never quit the respect and honour due to them, but live and die theirs, as | |
also, | |
MADAM, Your Ladyships humble and faithful Servant. | |
II. | |
MADAM, | |
BEfore I begin my Reflections upon the Opinions of those Authors you sent me, | |
I will answer first your Objection concerning the Ground of my Philosophy, | |
which is Infinite Matter: For you were pleased to mention, That you could not | |
well apprehend, how it was possible, that many Infinites could be contained in | |
one Infinite, since one Infinite takes up all Place Imaginary, leaving no room | |
for any other; Also, if one Infinite should be contained in an other Infinite, | |
that which contains, must of necessity be bigger then that which is contained, | |
whereby the Nature of Infinite would be lost; as having no bigger nor less, but | |
being of an Infinite quantity. | |
First of all, Madam, there is no such thing as All in Infinite, nor any such | |
thing as All the Place, for Infinite is not circumscribed nor limited: Next, as | |
for that one Infinite cannot be in an other Infinite, I answer, as well as one | |
Finite can be in another Finite; for one Creature is not only composed of | |
Parts, but one Part lies within another, and one Figure within another, and one | |
Motion within another. As for example, Animal Kind, have they not Internal and | |
External Parts, and so Internal and External Motions? And are not Animals, | |
Vegetables and Minerals enclosed in the Elements? But as for Infinites, you | |
must know, Madam, that there are several kinds of Infinites. For there is | |
first Infinite in quantity or bulk, that is such a big and great Corporeal | |
substance, which exceeds all bounds and limits of measure, and may be called | |
Infinite in Magnitude. Next there is Infinite in Number, which exceeds all | |
numeration and account, and may be termed Infinite in Multitude; Again there is | |
Infinite in Quality; as for example, Infinite degrees of softness, hardness, | |
thickness, thinness, heat and cold, c. also Infinite degrees of Motion, and so | |
Infinite Creations, Infinite Compositions, Dissolutions, Contractions, | |
Dilations, Digestions, Expulsions; also Infinite degrees of Strength, Knowledge, | |
Power, c. Besides there is Infinite in Time, which is properly named Eternal. | |
Now, when I say, that there is but one Infinite, and that Infinite is the Only | |
Matter, I mean infinite in bulk and quantity. And this Only matter, because it | |
is Infinite in bulk, must of necessity be divisible into infinite Parts, that | |
is, infinite in number, not in bulk or quantity; for though Infinite Parts in | |
number make up one infinite in quantity, yet they considered in themselves, | |
cannot be said Infinite, because every Part is of a certain limited and | |
circumscribed Figure, Quantity and Proportion, whereas Infinite hath no limits | |
nor bounds: besides it is against the nature of a single Part to be Infinite, | |
or else there would be no difference between the Part and the whole, the nature | |
of a Part requiring that it must be less then its whole, but all what is less | |
hath a determined quantity, and so becomes finite. Therefore it is no absurdity | |
to say, that an Infinite may have both Finite and Infinite Parts, Finite in | |
Quantity, Infinite in Number. But those that say, if there were an Infinite | |
Body, that each of its Parts must of necessity be Infinite too, are much | |
mistaken; for it is a contradiction in the same Terms to say One Infinite Part, | |
for the very Name of a Part includes a Finiteness, but take all parts of an | |
Infinite Body together, then you may rightly say they are infinite. Nay Reason | |
will inform you plainly, for example: Imagine an Infinite number of grains of | |
Corn in one heap, surely if the number of Grains be Infinite, you must grant of | |
necessity the bulk or body, which contains this infinite number of grains, to | |
be Infinite too; to wit, Infinite in quantity, and yet you will find each Grain | |
in it self to be Finite. But you will say, an Infinite Body cannot have parts, | |
for if it be Infinite, it must be Infinite in Quantity, and therefore of one | |
bulk, and one continued quantity, but Infinite parts in number make a discrete | |
quantity. I answer it is all one; for a Body of a continued quantity may be | |
divided and severed into fo many Parts either actually, or mentally in our | |
Conceptions or thoughts; besides nature is one continued Body, for there is no | |
such Vacuum in Nature, as if her Parts did hang together like a linked Chain; | |
nor can any of her Parts subsist single and by it self, but all the Parts of | |
Infinite Nature, although they are in one continued Piece, yet are they several | |
and discerned from each other by their several Figures. And by this, I hope, | |
you will understand my meaning, when I say, that several Infinites may be | |
included or comprehended in one Infinite; for by the one Infinite, I understand | |
Infinite in Quantity, which includes Infinite in Number, that is Infinite | |
Parts; then Infinite in Quality, as Infinite degrees of Rarity, Density, | |
Swiftness, Slowness, Hardness, Softness, c. Infinite degrees of Motions, | |
Infinite Creations, Dissolutions, Contractions, Dilations, Alterations, c. | |
Infinite degres of Wisdom, Strength, Power, c. and lastly Infinite in Time or | |
Duration, which is Eternity, for Infinite and Eternal are inseparable; All | |
which Infinites are contained in the Only Matter as many Letters are contained | |
in one Word, many Words in one Line, many Lines in one Book. But you will say | |
perhaps, if I attribute an Infinite Wisdom, Strength, Power, Knowledge, c. to | |
Nature; then Nature is in all coequal with God, for God has the same | |
Attributes: I answer, Not at all; for I desire you to understand me rightly, | |
when I speak of Infinite Nature, and when I speak of the Infinite Deity, sor | |
there is great difference between them, for it is one thing a Deitical or | |
Divine Infinite, and another a Natural Infinite; You know, that God is a | |
Spirit, and not a bodily substance, again that Nature is a Body, and not a | |
Spirit, and therefore none of these Infinites can obstruct or hinder each | |
other, as being different in their kinds, for a Spirit being no Body, requires | |
no place, Place being an attribute which only belongs to a Body, and therefore | |
when I call Nature Infinite, I mean an Infinite extension of Body, containing | |
an Infinite number of Parts; but what doth an Infinite extension of Body hinder | |
the Infiniteness of God, as an Immaterial Spiritual being? Next, when I do | |
attribute an Infinite Power, Wisdom, Knowledge, c. to Nature, I do not | |
understand a Divine, but a Natural Infinite Wisdom and Power, that is, such as | |
properly belongs to Nature, and not a supernatural, as is in god; For Nature | |
having Infinite parts of Infinite degrees, must also have an Infinite natural | |
wisdom to order her natural Infinite parts and actions, and consequently an | |
Infinite natural power to put her wisdom into act; and so of the rest of her | |
attributes, which are all natural: But Gods Attributes being supernatural, | |
transcend much these natural infinite attributes; for God, being the God of | |
Nature, has not only Natures Infinite Wisdom and Power, but besides, a | |
Supernatural and Incomprehensible Infinite Wisdom and Power; which in no ways | |
do hinder each other, but may very well subsist together. Neither doth Gods | |
Infinite Justice and his Infinite Mercy hinder each other; for Gods Attributes, | |
though they be all several Infinites, yet they make but one Infinite. | |
But you will say, If Nature's Wisdom and Power extends no further then to | |
natural things, it is not Infinite, but limited and restrained. I answer, That | |
doth not take away the Infiniteness of Nature; for there may be several kinds | |
of Infinites, as I related before, and one may be as perfect an Infinite as the | |
other in its kind. For example: Suppose a Line to be extended infinitely in | |
length, you will call this Line Infinite, although it have not an Infinite | |
breadth: Also, if an infinite length and breadth join together, you will call | |
it, an Infinite Superficies, although it wants an infinite depth; and yet every | |
Infinite, in its kind, is a Perfect Infinite, if I may call it so: Why then | |
shall not Nature also be said to have an Infinite Natural Wisdom and Power, | |
although she has not a Divine Wisdom and Power? Can we say, Man hath not a free | |
Will, because he hath not an absolute free Will, as God hath? Wherefore, a | |
Natural Infinite, and the Infinite God, may well stand together, without any | |
opposition or hinderance, or without any detracting or derogating from the | |
Omnipotency and Glory of God; for God remains still the God of Nature, and is | |
an Infinite Immaterial Purity, when as Nature is an Infinite Corporeal | |
Substance; and Immaterial and Material cannot obstruct each other. And though | |
an Infinite Corporeal cannot make an Infinite Immaterial, yet an Infinite | |
Immaterial can make an Infinite Corporeal, by reason there is as much | |
difference in the Power as in the Purity: And the disparity between the Natural | |
and Divine Infinite is such, as they cannot join, mix, and work together, | |
unless you do believe that Divine Actions can have allay. | |
But you may say, Purity belongs only to natural things, and none but natural | |
bodies can be said purified, but God exceeds all Purity. 'Tis true: But if | |
there were infinite degrees of Purity in Matter, Matter might at last become | |
Immaterial, and so from an Infinite Material turn to an Infinite Immaterial, | |
and from Natrue to be God: A great, but an impossible Change. For I do verily | |
believe, that there can be but one Omnipotent God, and he cannot admit of | |
addition, or diminution; and that which is Material cannot be Immaterial, and | |
what is Immaterial cannot become Material, I mean, so, as to change their | |
natures; for Nature is what God was pleased she should be; and will be what she | |
was, until God be pleased to make her otherwise. Wherefore there can be no new | |
Creation of matter, motion, or figure; nor any annihilation of any matter, | |
motion, or figure in Nature, unless God do create a new Nature: For the | |
changing of Matter into several particular Figures, doth not prove an | |
annihilation of particular Figures; nor the cessation of particular Motions an | |
annihilation of them: Neither doth the variation of the Only Matter produce an | |
annihilation of any part of Matter, nor the variation of figures and motions of | |
Matter cause an alteration in the nature of Only Matter: Wherefore there | |
cannot be new Lives, Souls or Bodies in Nature; for, could there be any thing | |
new in Nature, or any thing annihilated, there would not be any stability in | |
Nature, as a continuance of every kind and sort of Creatures, but there would | |
be a confusion between the new and old matter, motions, and figures, as between | |
old and new Nature; In truth, it would be like new Wine in old Vessels, by | |
which all would break into disorder. Neither can supernatural and natural | |
effects be mixed together, no more then material and immaterial things or | |
beings: Therefore it is probable, God has ordained Nature to work in herself by | |
his Leave, Will, and Free Gift. But there have been, and are still strange and | |
erroneous Opinions, and great differences amongst Natural Philosophers, | |
concerning the Principles of Natural things; some will have them Atoms, others | |
will have the first Principles to be Salt, Sulphur and Mercury; some will have | |
them to be the four Elements, as Fire, Air, Water, and Earth; and others will | |
have but one of these Elements; also some will have Gas and Blas, Ferments, | |
Idea's, and the like; but what they believe to be Principles and Causes of | |
natural things, are only Effects; for in all Probability it appears to humane | |
sense and reason, that the cause of every particular material Creature is the | |
only and Infinite Matter, which has Motions and Figures inseparably united; | |
for Matter, Motion and Figure, are but one thing, individable in its Nature. | |
And as for Immaterial Spirits, there is surely no such thing in Infinite | |
Nature, to wit, so as to be Parts of Nature; for Nature is altogether Material, | |
but this opinion proceeds from the separation or abstraction of Motion form | |
Matter, viz. that man thinks matter and motion to be dividable from each other, | |
and believes motion to be a thing by its self, naming it an Imaterial thing, | |
which has a being, but not a bodily substance: But various and different | |
effects do not prove a different Matter or Cause, neither do they prove an | |
unsettled Cause, only the variety of Effects hath obscured the Cause from the | |
several parts, which makes Particular Creatures partly Ignorant, and partly | |
knowing. But in my opinion, Nature is material, and not any thing in Nature, | |
what belongs to her, is immaterial; but whatsoever is Immaterial, is | |
Supernatural, Therefore Motions, Forms, Thoughts, Ideas, Conceptions, | |
Sympathies, Antipathies, Accidents, Qualities, as also Natural Life, and Soul, | |
are all Material: And as for Colours, Scents, Light, Sound, Heat, Cold, and the | |
like, those that believe them not to be substances or material things, surely | |
their brain or heart (take what place you will for the forming of Conceptions) | |
moves very Irregularly, and they might as well say, Our sensitive Organs are | |
not material; for what Objects soever, that are subject to our senses, cannot | |
in sense be denied to be Corporeal, when as those things that are not subject | |
to our senses, can be conceived in reason to be Immaterial? But some | |
Philosophers striving to express their wit, obstruct reason; and drawing | |
Divinity to prove Sense and Reason, weaken Faith so, as their mixed Divine | |
Philosophy becomes mere Poetical Fictions, and Romancical expressions, making | |
material Bodies immaterial Spirits, and immaterial Spirits material Bodies; and | |
some have conceived some things neither to be Material nor Immaterial, but | |
between both. Truly, Madam, I wish their Wits had been less, and their | |
Judgments more, as not to jumble Natural and Supernatural things together, but | |
to distinguish either clearly, for such Mixtures are neither Natural nor | |
Divine; But as I said, the Confufion comes from their too nice abstractions, | |
and from the separation of Figure and Motion from Matter, as not conceiving | |
them individable; but if God, and his servant Nature were as Intricate and | |
Confuse in their Works, as Men in their Understandings and Words, the Universe | |
and Production of all Creatures would soon be without Order and Government, so | |
as there would be a horrid and Eternal War both in Heaven, and in the World, | |
and so pitying their troubled Brains, and wishing them the Light of Reason, | |
that they may clearly perceive the Truth, I rest | |
MADAM, Your real Friend and faithful Servant. | |
III. | |
MADAM, | |
IT seems you are offended at my Opinion, that Nature is Eternal without | |
beginning, which, you say, is to make her God, or at least coeqnal with God; | |
But, if you apprehend my meaning rightly, you will say, I do not: For first, | |
God is an Immaterial and Spiritual Infinite Being, which Propriety God cannot | |
give away to any Creature, nor make another God in Essence like to him, for | |
Gods Attributes are not communicable to any Creature; Yet this doth not hinder, | |
that God should not make Infinite and Eternal Matter, for that is as easy to | |
him, as to make a Finite Creature, Infinite Matter being quite of another | |
Nature then God is, to wit, Corporeal, when God is Incorporeal, the difference | |
whereof I have declared in my former Letter. But as for Nature, that it cannot | |
be Eternal without beginning, because God is the Creator and Cause of it, and | |
that the Creator must be before the Creature, as the Cause before the Effect, | |
so, that it is impossible for Nature to be without a beginning; if you will | |
speak naturally, as human reason guides you, and bring an Argument concluding | |
from the Priority of the Cause before the Effect, give me leave to tell you, | |
that God is not tied to Natural Rules, but that he can do beyond our | |
Understanding, and therefore he is neither bound up to time, as to be before, | |
for if we will do this, we must not allow, that the Eternal Son of God is | |
Coeternal with the Father, because nature requires a Father to exist before the | |
Son, but in God is no time, but all Eternity; and if you allow, that God hath | |
made some Creatures, as Supernatural Spirits, to live Eternally, why should he | |
not as well have made a Creature from all Eternity? for Gods making is not our | |
making, he needs no Priority of Time. But you may say, the Comparison of the | |
Eternal Generation of the Son of God is Mystical and Divine, and not to be | |
applied to natural things: I answer, The action by which God created the World | |
or made Nature, was it natural of supernatural? surely you will say it was a | |
Supernatural and God-like action, why then will you apply Natural Rules to a | |
God-like and Supernatural Action? for what Man knows, how and when God created | |
Nature? You will say, the Scripture doth teach us that, for it is not Six | |
thousand years, when God created this World. I answer, the holy Scripture | |
informs us only of the Creation of this Visible World, but not of Nature and | |
natural Matter; for I firmly believe according to the Word of God, that this | |
World has been Created, as is described by Moses, but what is that to natural | |
Matter? There may have been worlds before, as many are of the opinion that | |
there have been men before Adam, and many amongst Divines do believe, that | |
after the destruction of this World God will Create a new World again, as a new | |
Heaven, and a new Earth; and if this be probable, or at least may be believed | |
without any prejudice to the holy Scripture, why may it not be probably | |
believed that there have been other worlds before this visible World? for | |
nothing is impossible with God; and all this doth derogate nothing from the | |
Honour and Glory of God, but rather increases his Divine Power. But as for the | |
Creation of this present World, it is related, that there was first a rude and | |
indigested Heap, or Chaos, without form, void and dark; and God said, Let it be | |
light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let the Waters | |
under the Heaven be gathered together, and let the dry Land appear; Let the | |
Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding | |
Fruit after its own kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament, the one to | |
rule the Day, and the other the Night; and let the Waters bring forth | |
abundantly the moving Creature that hath life; and let the Earth bring forth | |
living Creatures after its kind; and at last God said, Let us make Man, and | |
all what was made, God saw it was good. Thus all was made by Gods Command, and | |
who executed his Command but the Material servant of God, Nature? which ordered | |
her self-moving matter into such several Figures as God commanded, and God | |
approved of them. And thus, Madam, I verily believe the Creation of the World, | |
and that God is the Sole and omnipotent Creator of Heaven and Earth, and of all | |
Creatures therein; nay, although I believe Nature to have been from Eternity, | |
yet I believe also that God is the God and Author of Nature, and has made | |
Nature and natural Matter in a way and manner proper to his Omnipotency and | |
Incomprehensible by us: I will pass by natural Arguments and Proofs, as not | |
belonging to such an Omnipotent Action; as for example, how the nature of | |
relative terms requires, that they must both exist at one point of Time, viz. a | |
Master and his Servant, and a King and his Subjects; for one bearing relation | |
to the other, can in no ways be considered as different from one another in | |
formiliness or laterness of Time; but as I said, these being merely natural | |
things, I will nor cannot apply them to Supernatural and Divine Actions; But if | |
you ask me, how it is possible that Nature, the Effect and Creature of God, can | |
be Eternal without beginning? I will desire you to answer me first, how a | |
Creature can be Eternal without end, as, for example, Supernatural Spirits are, | |
and then I will answer you, how a Creature can be Eternal without beginning; | |
For Eternity consists herein, that it has neither beginning nor end; and if it | |
be easy for God to make a Being without end, it is not difficult for Him to | |
make a Being without beginning. One thing more I will add, which is, That if | |
Nature has not been made by God from all Eternity, then the Title of God, as | |
being a Creator, which is a Title and action, upon which our Faith is grounded, | |
(for it is the first Article in our Creed) has been accessory to God, as I | |
said, not full Six thousand years ago; but there is not anything accessory to | |
God, he being the Perfection himself. But, Madam, all what I speak, is under | |
the liberty of Natural Philosophy, and by the Light of Reason only, not of | |
Revelation; and my Reason being not infallible, I will not declare my Opinions | |
for an infallible Truth: Neither do I think, that they are offensive either to | |
Church or State, for I submit to the Laws of One, and believe the Doctrine of | |
the Other, so much, that if it were for the advantage of either, I should be | |
willing to sacrifice my Life, especially for the Church; yea, had I millions of | |
Lives, and every Life was either to suffer torment or to live in ease, I would | |
prefer torment for the benefit of the Church; and therefore, if I knew that my | |
Opinions should give any offence to the Church, I should be ready every minute | |
to alter them: And as much as I am bound in all duty to the obedience of the | |
Church, as much am I particularly bound to your Ladyship, for your entire love | |
and sincere affection towards me, for which I shall live and die, | |
MADAM, Your most faithful Friend, and humble Servant. | |
IV. | |
MADAM, | |
I Have chosen, in the first place, the Work of that famous Philosopher Hobbs, | |
called Leviathan, wherein I find he says, Part. 1. ch. 1. | |
That the cause of sense or sensitive perception is the external body or | |
Object, which presses the Organ proper to each Sense. To which I answer, | |
according to the ground of my own Philosophical Opinions, That all things, and | |
therefore outward objects as well as sensitive organs, have both Sense and | |
Reason, yet neither the objects nor the organs are the cause of them; for | |
Perception is but the effect of the Sensitive and rational Motions, and not the | |
Motions of the Perception; neither doth the pressure of parts upon parts make | |
Perception; for although Matter by the power of self-motion is as much | |
composeable as divideable, and parts do join to parts, yet that doth not make | |
perception; nay, the several parts, betwixt which the Perception is made, may | |
be at such a distance, as not capable to press: As for example, Two men may see | |
or hear each other at a distance, and yet there may be other bodies between | |
them, that do not move to those perceptions, so that no pressure can be made, | |
for all pressures are by some constraint and force; wherefore, according to my | |
Opinion, the Sensitive and Rational free Motions, do pattern out each others | |
object, as Figure and Voice in each others Eye and Ear; for Life and Knowledge, | |
which I name Rational and Sensitive Matter, are in every Creature, and in all | |
parts of every Creature, and make all perceptions in Nature, because they are | |
the self-moving parts of Nature, and according as those Corporeal, Rational, | |
and Sensitive Motions move, such or such perceptions are made: But these | |
self-moving parts being of different degrees (for the Rational matter is purer | |
then the Sensitive) it causes a double perception in all Creatures, whereof one | |
is made by the Rational corporeal motions, and the other by the Sensitive; and | |
though both perceptions are in all the body, and in every part of the body of a | |
Creature, yet the sensitive corporeal motions having their proper organs, as | |
Work-houses, in which they work some sorts of perceptions, those perceptions | |
are most commonly made in those organs, and are double again; for the sensitive | |
motions work either on the inside or on the outside of those organs, on the | |
inside in Dreams, on the out-side awake; and although both the Rational and the | |
Sensitive matter are inseparably joined and mixed together, yet do they not | |
always work together, for oftentimes the Rational works without any sensitive | |
paterns, and the sensitive again without any rational paterns. But mistake me | |
not, Madam, for I do not absolutely confine the sensitive perception to the | |
Organs, nor the rational to the Brain, but as they are both in the whole body, | |
so they may work in the whole body according to their own motions. Neither do I | |
say, that there is no other perception in the Eye but sight, in the Ear but | |
hearing, and so forth, but the sensitive organs have other perceptions besides | |
these; and if the sensitive and rational motions be irregular in those parts, | |
between which the perception is made, as for example, in the two fore-mentioned | |
men, that see and hear each other, then they both neither see nor hear each | |
other perfectly; and if one's motions be perfect, but the other's irregular and | |
erroneous, then one sees and hears better then the other; or if the Sensitive | |
and Rational motions move more regularly and make perfecter paterns in the Eye | |
then in the Ear, then they see better then they hear; and if more regularly and | |
perfectly in the Ear then in the Eye, they hear better then they see: And so it | |
may be said of each man singly, for one man may see the other better and more | |
perfectly, then the other may see him; and this man may hear the other better | |
and more perfectly, then the other may hear him; whereas, if perception were | |
made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes; besides the hard | |
pressure of objects, in my opinion, would rather annoy and obscure, then | |
inform. But as soon as the object is removed, the Perception of it, made by the | |
sensitive motions in the Organs, cease, by reason the sensitive Motions cease | |
from paterning, but yet the Rational Motions do not always cease so suddenly, | |
because the sensitive corporeal Motions work with the Inanimate Matter, and | |
therefore cannot retain particular figures long, whereas the Rational Matter | |
doth only move in its own substance and parts of matter, and upon none other, | |
as my Book of Philosophical Opinions will inform you better. And thus | |
Perception, in my opinion, is not made by Pressure, nor by Species, nor by | |
matter going either from the Organ to the Object, or from the Object into the | |
Organ. By this it is also manifest, that Understanding comes not from Exterior | |
Objects, or from the Exterior sensitive Organs; for as Exterior Objects do not | |
make Perception, so they do neither make Understanding, but it is the rational | |
matter that doth it, for Understanding may be without exterior objects and | |
sensitive organs; And this in short is the opinion of | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
V. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Authors opinion is, Leviathan, Part. 1. c. 2. | |
that when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still | |
for ever; but when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless | |
somewhat else stay it; the reason is, saith he, because nothing can change it | |
self; To tell you truly, Madam, I am not of his opinion, for if Matter moves | |
it self, as certainly it doth, then the least part of Matter, were it so small | |
as to seem Individable, will move it self; Tis true, it could not desist from | |
motion, as being its nature to move, and no thing can change its Nature; for | |
God himself, who hath more power then self-moving Matter, cannot change himself | |
from being God; but that Motion should proceed from another exterior Body, | |
joining with, or touching that body which it moves, is in my opinion not | |
probable; for though Nature is all Corporeal, and her actions are Corporeal | |
Motions, yet that doth not prove, that the Motion of particular Creatures or | |
Parts is caused by the joining, touching or pressing of parts upon parts; for | |
it is not the several parts that make motion, but motion makes them; and yet | |
Motion is not the cause of Matter, but Matter is the cause of Motion, for | |
Matter might subsist without Motion, but not Motion without Matter, only there | |
could be no perception without Motion, nor no Variety, if Matter were not | |
self-moving; but Matter, if it were all Inanimate and void of Motion, would lie | |
as a dull, dead and senseless heap; But that all Motion comes by joining or | |
pressing of other parts, I deny, for if sensitive and rational perceptions, | |
which are sensitive and rational motions, in the body, and in the mind, were | |
made by the pressure of outward objects, pressing the sensitive organs, and so | |
the brain or interior parts of the Body, they would cause such dents and holes | |
therein, as to make them sore and patched in a short time; Besides, what was | |
represented in this manner, would always remain, or at least not so soon be | |
dissolved, and then those pressures would make a strange and horrid confusion | |
of Figures, for not any figure would be distinct; Wherefore my opinion is, that | |
the sensitive and rational Matter doth make or pattern out the figures of | |
several Objects, and doth dissolve them in a moment of time; as for example, | |
when the eye sees the object first of a Man, then of a Horse, then of another | |
Creature, the sensitive motions in the eye move first into the figure of the | |
Man, then straight into the figure of the Horse, so that the Mans figure is | |
dissolved and altered into the figure of the Horse, and so forth; but if the | |
eye sees many figures at once, then so many several figures are made by the | |
sensitive Corporeal Motions, and as many by the Rational Motions, which are | |
Sight and Memory, at once: But in sleep both the sensitive and rational Motions | |
make the figures without patterns, that is, exterior objects, which is the | |
cause that they are often erroneous, whereas, if it were the former Impression | |
of the Objects, there could not possibly be imperfect Dreams or Remembrances, | |
for fading of Figures requires as much motion, as impression, and impression | |
and fading are very different and opposite motions; nay, if Perception was made | |
by Impression, there could not possibly be a fading or decay of the figures | |
printed either in the Mind or Body, whereas yet, as there is alteration of | |
Motions in self-moving Matter, so there is also an alteration of figures made | |
by these motions. But you will say, it doth not follow, if Perception be made | |
by Impression, that it must needs continue and not decay; for if you touch and | |
move a string, the motion doth not continue for ever, but cease by degrees; I | |
answer, There is great difference between Prime self-motion, and forced or | |
Artificial Motions; for Artificial Motions are only an Imitation of Natural | |
Motions, and not the same, but caused by Natural Motions; for although there is | |
no Art that is not made by Nature, yet Nature is not made by Art; Wherefore we | |
cannot rationally judge of Perception by comparing it to the motion of a string, | |
and its alteration to the ceasing of that motion, for Nature moves not by | |
force, but freely. 'Tis true, 'tis the freedom in Nature for one man to give | |
another a box on the Ear, or to trip up his heels, or for one or more men to | |
fight with each other; yet these actions are not like the actions of loving | |
Embraces and Kissing each other; neither are the actions one and the same, when | |
a man strikes himself, and when he strikes another; and so is likewise the | |
action of impression, and the action of self-figuring not one and the same, but | |
different; for the action of impression is forced, and the action of | |
self-figuring is free; Wherefore the comparison of the forced motions of a | |
string, rope, watch, or the like, can have no place here; for though the rope, | |
made of flax or hemp, may have the perception of a Vegetable, yet not of the | |
hand, or the like, that touched or struck it; and although the hand doth | |
occasion the rope to move in such a manner, yet it is not the motion of the | |
hand, by which it moves, and when it ceases, its natural and inherent power to | |
move is not lessened; like as a man, that hath left off carving or painting, | |
hath no less skill then he had before, neither is that skill lost when he plays | |
upon the Lute or Virginals, or plows, plants, and the like, but he hath only | |
altered his action, as from carving to painting, or from painting to playing, | |
and so to plowing and planting, which is not through disability but choice. But | |
you will say, it is nevertheless a cessation of such a motion. I grant it: but | |
the ceasing of such a motion is not the ceasing of self-moving matter from all | |
motions, neither is cessation as much as annihilation, for the motion lies in | |
the power of the matter to repeat it, as oft it will, if it be not overpowered, | |
for more parts, or more strength, or more motions may over-power the less; | |
Wherefore forced, or artificial and free Natural motions are different in their | |
effects, although they have but one Cause, which is the self-moving matter, and | |
though Matter is but active and passive, yet there is great Variety, and so | |
great difference in force and liberty, objects and perceptions, sense and | |
reason, and the like. But to conclude, perception is not made by the pressure | |
of objects, no more then hemp is made by the Rope-maker, or metal by the | |
Bell-founder or Ringer, and yet neither the rope nor the metal is without sense | |
and reason, but the natural motions of the metal, and the artificial motions of | |
the Ringer are different; wherefore a natural effect in truth cannot be | |
produced from an artificial cause, neither can the ceasing of particular forced | |
or artificial motions be a proof for the ceasing of general, natural, free | |
motions, as that matter it self should cease to move; for there is no such | |
thing as rest in Nature, but there is an alteration of motions and figures in | |
self-moving matter, which alteration causes variety as well in opinions, as in | |
every thing else; Wherefore in my opinion, though sense alters, yet it doth not | |
decay, for the rational and sensitive part of matter is as lasting as matter it | |
self, but that which is named decay of sense, is only the alteration of | |
motions, and not an obscurity of motions, like as the motions of memory and | |
forgetfulness, and the repetition of the same motions is called remembrance. | |
And thus much of this subject for the present, to which I add no more but rest | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
VI. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author discoursing of Imagination, saith, Leviathan, part. 1. c. 2. | |
That as soon as any object is removed from our Eyes, though the Impression | |
that is made in us, remain, yet other objects more present succeeding and | |
working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured and made weak. To which | |
I answer, first, that he conceives Sense and Imagination to be all one, for he | |
says, Imagination is nothing else, but a fading or decaying sense; whereas in | |
my opinion they are different, not only their matter, but their motions also | |
being distinct and different; for Imagination is a rational perception, and | |
sense a sensitive perception; wherefore as much as the rational matter differs | |
from the sensitive, as much doth Imagination differ from Sense. Next I say, | |
that Impressions do not remain in the body of sensitive matter, but it is in | |
its power to make or repeat the like figures; Neither is Imagination less, when | |
the object is absent, then when present, but the figure patterned out in the | |
sensitive organs, being altered, and remaining only in the Rational part of | |
matter, is not so perspicuous and clear, as when it was both in the Sense and | |
in the Mind: And to prove that Imagination of things past doth not grow weaker | |
by distance of time, as your Author says, many a man in his old age, will have | |
as perfect an Imagination of what is past in his younger years, as if he saw it | |
present. And as for your Authors opinion, that Imagination and Memory are one | |
and the same, I grant, that they are made of one kind of Matter; but although | |
the Matter is one and the same, yet several motions in the several parts make | |
Imagination and Memory several things: As for Example, a Man may Imagine that | |
which never came into his Senses, wherefore Imagination is not one and the same | |
thing with Memory. But your Author seems to make all Sense, as it were, one | |
Motion, but not all Motion Sense, whereas surely there is no Motion, but is | |
either Sensitive or Rational; for Reason is but a pure and refined Sense, and | |
Sense a grosser Reason. Yet all sensitive and rational Motions are not one and | |
the same; for forced or Artificial Motions, though they proceed from sensitive | |
matter, yet are they so different from the free and Prime Natural Motions, that | |
they seem, as it were, quite of another nature: And this distinction neglected | |
is the Cause, that many make Appetites and Passions, Perceptions and Objects, | |
and the like, as one, without any or but little difference. But having | |
discoursed of the difference of these Motions in my former Letter, I will not | |
be tedious to you, with repeating it again, but remain, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
VII. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Authors opinion, concerning Dreams Leviathan, Part. 1. c. 2. | |
, seems to me in some part very rational and probable, in some part not; For | |
when he says, that Dreams are only Imaginations of them that sleep, which | |
imaginations have been before either totally or by parcels in the Sense; and | |
that the organs of Sense, as the Brain and the Nerves, being benumbed in sleep, | |
as not easily to be moved by external objects, those Imaginations proceed only | |
from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body, which for the connexion | |
they have with the Brain, and other organs, when they be distempered, do keep | |
the same in motion, whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appear as if | |
a man were waking; This seems to my Reason not very probable: For, first, | |
Dreams are not absolutely Imaginations, except we do call all Motions and | |
Actions of the Sensitive and Rational Matter, Imaginations. Neither is it | |
necessary, that all Imaginations must have been before either totally or by | |
parcels in the Sense; neither is there any benumbing of the organs of Sense in | |
sleep. But Dreams, according to my opinion, are made by the Sensitive and | |
Rational Corporeal Motions, by figuring several objects, as awake; only the | |
difference is, that the Sensitive motions in Dreams work by rote and on the | |
inside of the Sensitive organs, when as awake they work according to the | |
patterns of outward objects, and exteriously or on the outside of the sensitive | |
Organs, so that sleep or dreams are nothing else but an alteration of motions, | |
from moving exteriously to move interiously, and from working after a Pattern | |
to work by rote: I do not say that the body is without all exterior motions, | |
when asleep, as breathing and beating of the Pulse (although these motions are | |
rather interior then exterior,) but that only the sensitive organs are | |
outwardly shut, so as not to receive the patterns of outward Objects, | |
nevertheless the sensitive Motions do not cease from moving inwardly, or on the | |
inside of the sensitive Organs; But the rational matter doth often, as awake, | |
so asleep or in dreams, make such figures, as the sensitive did never make | |
either from outward objects, or of its own accord; for the sensitive hath | |
sometimes liberty to work without Objects, but the Rational much more, which is | |
not bound either to the patterns of Exterior objects, or of the sensitive | |
voluntary Figures. Wherefore it is not divers distempers, as your Author | |
says, that cause different Dreams, or Cold, or Heat; neither are Dreams the | |
reverse of our waking Imaginations, nor all the Figures in Dreams are not made | |
with their heels up, and their heads downwards, though some are; but this error | |
or irregularity proceeds from want of exterior Objects or Patterns, and by | |
reason the sensitive Motions work by rote; neither are the Motions reverse, | |
because they work inwardly asleep, and outwardly awake, for Mad-men awake see | |
several Figures without Objects. In short, sleeping and waking is somewhat | |
after that manner, when men are called either out of their doors, or stay | |
within their houses; or like a Ship, where the Mariners work all under hatches, | |
whereof you will find more in my Philosophical Opinions; and so taking my | |
leave, I rest | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
VIII. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author going on in his discourse of Imagination, says, Leviathan, part. | |
1. c. 3. | |
That, as we have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in | |
whole or in parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to another, | |
whereof we never had the like before in our senses. To which my answer is in | |
short, that the Rational part of Matter in one composed figure, as in Man, or | |
the like Creature, may make such figures, as the senses did never make in that | |
composed Figure or Creature; And though your Author reproves those that say, | |
part. 1. c. 2. | |
Imaginations rise of themselves; yet, if the self-moving part of Matter, which | |
I call Rational, makes Imaginations, they must needs rise of themselves; for | |
the Rational part of matter being free and self-moving, depends upon nothing, | |
neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as not to be able to work without them. | |
Next, when your Author, defining Understanding, says that it is nothing else, | |
but Ibid. c. 3. | |
an Imagination raised by words or other voluntary signs, My Answer is, that | |
Understanding, and so Words and Signs are made by self-moving Matter, that is, | |
Sense and Reason, and not Sense and Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore | |
Thoughts are not like ibid. | |
Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and guided by the finger this or that | |
way, for every Part of self-moving matter is not always forced, persuaded or | |
directed, for if all the Parts of Sense and Reason were ruled by force or | |
persuasion, not any wounded Creature would fail to be healed, or any disease to | |
be cured by outward Applications, for outward Applications to Wounds and | |
Diseases might have more force, then any Object to the Eye: But though there is | |
great affinity and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference | |
and antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause that many objects cannot with | |
all their endeavours work such effects upon the Interior parts, although they | |
are closely pressed, for Impressions of objects do not always affect those | |
parts they press. Wherefore, I am not of your Author's opinion, that all Parts | |
of Matter press one another; It is true, Madam, there cannot be any part | |
single, but yet this doth not prove, that parts must needs press each other: | |
And as for his Train of Thoughts, I must confess, that Thoughts for the most | |
part are made orderly, but yet they do not follow each other like Geese, for | |
surely, man has sometimes very different thoughts; as for Example, a man | |
sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and thinks of his own death, | |
and immediately thinks of a wanton Mistress, which later thought, surely, the | |
thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore, though some thought may be the | |
Ring-leader of others, yet many are made without leaders. Again, your Author in | |
his description of the Mind says, that the discourse of the mind, when it it | |
is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a | |
hunting out of the Causes of some Effects, present or past; or of the Effects | |
of some present or past Cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he has lost, and from | |
that Place and Time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to | |
place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that is to say, to | |
find some certain and limited Time and Place, in which to begin a method of | |
Seeking. And from thence his thoughts run over the same places and times to | |
find what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call | |
Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, | |
within the compass whereof he is to seek, and then his thoughts run over all | |
the Parts thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a Jewel, | |
or as a Spaniel ranges the field till he find a sent; or as a Man should run | |
over the Alphabet to start a Rime. Thus far your Author: In which discourse I | |
do not perceive that he defines what the Mind is, but I say, that if, | |
according to his opinion, nothing moves it self, but one thing moves another, | |
then the Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward, nay, only | |
forward, and if all actions were thrusting or pressing of parts, it would be | |
like a crowd of People, and there would be but little or no motion, for the | |
crowd would make a stoppage, like water in a glass, the mouth of the Glass | |
being turned downwards, no water can pass out, by reason the numerous drops are | |
so closely pressed, as they cannot move exteriously. Next, I cannot conceive | |
how the Mind can run back either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind | |
is enclosed in the body, and the running about in the parts of the body or | |
brain will not inform it of an Exterior place or object; besides, objects being | |
the cause of the minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and so move until | |
it come to the object, that moved it first, so that the mind must run out of | |
the body to that object, which moved it to such a Thought, although that object | |
were removed out of the World (as the phrase is:) But for the mind to move | |
backward, to Time past, is more then it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, | |
Remembrance, or the like, is only a repetition of such Figures as were like to | |
the Objects; and for Thoughts in Particular, they are several figures, made by | |
the mind, which is the Rational Part of matter, in its own substance, either | |
voluntarily, or by imitation, whereof you may see more in my Book of | |
Philosophical Opinions. Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing else, but a | |
comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the several actions of those Figures, | |
as repeating former Figures, and comparing them to others of the like nature, | |
qualities, proprieties, as also chances, fortunes, c. Which figuring and | |
repeating is done actually, in and by the Rational Matter, so that all the | |
observation of the mind on outward Objects is only an actual repetition of the | |
mind, as moving in such or such figures and actions; and when the mind makes | |
voluntary Figures with those repeated Figures, and compares them together, this | |
comparing is Examination; and when several Figures agree and join, it is | |
Conclusion or Judgment: likewise doth Experience proceed from repeating and | |
comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and the more several Figures are | |
repeated and compared, the greater the experience is. One thing more there is | |
in the same Chapter, which I cannot let pass without examination; Your Author | |
says, That things Present only have a being in Nature, things Past only a | |
being in the Memory, but things to come have no being at all; Which how it | |
possibly can be, I am not able to conceive; for certainly, if nothing in nature | |
is lost or annihilated, what is past, and what is to come, hath as well a | |
being, as what is present; and, if that which is now, had its being before, why | |
may it not also have its being hereafter? It might as well be said, that what | |
is once forgot, cannot be remembered; for whatsoever is in Nature, has as much a | |
being as the Mind, and there is not any action, or motion, or figure, in | |
Nature, but may be repeated, that is, may return to its former Figure, when it | |
is altered and dissolved; But by reason Nature delights in variety, repetitions | |
are not so frequently made, especially of those things or creatures, which are | |
composed by the sensitive corporeal motions in the inanimate part of Matter, | |
because they are not so easily wrought, as the Rational matter can work upon | |
its own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the Inanimate matter is; And | |
this is the reason, that there are so many repetitions of one and the same | |
Figure in the Rational matter, which is the Mind, but seldom any in the Gross | |
and inanimate part of Matter, for Nature loves ease and freedom: But to | |
conclude, Madam, I perceive your Author confines Sense only to Animal-kind, | |
and Reason only to Man-kind: Truly, it is out of self-love, when one Creature | |
prefers his own Excellency before another, for nature being endued with | |
self-love, all Creatures have self-love too, because they are all Parts of | |
Nature; and when Parts agree or disagree, it is out of Interest and Self-love; | |
but Man herein exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul, whose | |
actions also are supernatural, To which I leave him, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
IX. | |
MADAM, | |
WHen your Author discourses of the use of Speech or Words and Names, he is | |
pleased to say, Leviathan, part. 1. c. 4. | |
That their use is to serve for marks and notes of Remembrance; Whereof to give | |
you my opinion, I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of Man; and though | |
sometimes it serves for marks or notes of remembrance, yet it doth not always, | |
for all other Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and so have deaf | |
and dumb men, nay more then those that hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words | |
are useful to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be without them, | |
whereas Words cannot be without Memory; for take a Bird and teach him to speak, | |
if he had not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never learn them. You | |
will ask me, Madam, What then, is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life | |
and Knowledge, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and makes all sorts of | |
Creatures, so also amongst the rest it makes Words: And as I said before, that | |
Memory may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say also, that there is | |
a possibility of reckoning of numbers, as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of | |
force, and other things without words, although your Author denies it: But some | |
men are so much for Art, as they endeavour to make Art, which is only a | |
Drudgery-maid of Nature, the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which is | |
as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature before God, Discord | |
before Unity and Concord. | |
Again, your Author, in his Chapter of Reason Ch. 5. | |
, defines Reason to be nothing else but Reckoning: I answer, That in my opinion | |
Reckoning is not Reason it self, but only an effect or action of Reason; for | |
Reason, as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate matter, works | |
variously and in divers motions, by which it produces various and divers | |
effects, which are several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy, | |
Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment, Knowledge, and all the Passions, | |
with many more: Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part, nor bound | |
to one motion, for it is in every Creature more or less, and moves in its own | |
parts variously; and in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves | |
more variously then in others, which is the cause that some men are more dull | |
and stupid, then others; neither doth Reason always move in one Creature | |
regularly, which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish: And though all | |
men are made by the direction of Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first | |
time of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings, | |
Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, c. but some more, some less, and some | |
regular, some irregular, according to the motions of Reason or Rational part of | |
animate matter; and though some rational parts may make use of other rational | |
Parts, as one man of another mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot | |
associate together; as for example, all the Material parts of several objects, | |
no not their species, cannot enter or touch the eye without danger of hurting | |
or loosing it, nevertheless the eye makes use of the objects by patterning them | |
out, and so doth the rational matter; by taking patterns from the sensitive; | |
And thus knowledge or perception of objects, both sensitive and rational, is | |
taken without the pressure of any other parts; for though parts join to parts, | |
(for no part can be single) yet this joining doth not necessarily infer the | |
pressure of objects upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already | |
discoursed sufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you, and rest | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
X. | |
MADAM, | |
UNderstanding, says your Author, Leviathan, part. 1. c. 4. | |
is nothing else but Conception caused by speech, and therefore, if speech be | |
peculiar to man, (as, for ought I know, it is) then is understanding peculiar | |
to him also. Where he confineth Understanding only to speech and to Mankind; | |
But, by his leave, Madam, I surely believe, that there is more understanding in | |
Nature, then that, which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot | |
conceive, how all the exact forms in Generations could be produced, or how | |
there could be such distinct degrees of several sorts and kinds of Creatures, | |
or distinctions of times and seasons, and so many exact motions and figures in | |
Nature: Considering all this, my reason persuades me, that all Understanding, | |
which is a part of Knowledge, is not caused by speech, for all the motions of | |
the Celestial Orbs are not made by speech, neither is the knowledge or | |
understanding which a man hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick, | |
made by speech, nor by outward objects, especially in a disease he never heard, | |
nor saw, nor smelt, nor tasted, nor touched; Wherefore all Perception, | |
Sensation, Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding, and the like, are not | |
made nor caused by outward objects, nor by speech. And as for names of things, | |
they are but different postures of the figures in our mind or thoughts, made by | |
the Rational matter; But Reasoning is a comparing of the several figures with | |
their several postures and actions in the Mind, which joined with the several | |
words, made by the sensitive motions, inform another distinct and separate | |
part, as an other man, of their minds conceptions, understanding, opinions, and | |
the like. | |
Concerning Addition and Substraction, wherein your Author says Reasoning | |
consists, I grant, that it is an act of Reasoning, yet it doth not make Sense | |
or Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense and Reason which is | |
self-motion, makes addition and substraction of several Parts of matter; for | |
had matter not self-motion, it could not divide nor compose, nor make such | |
varieties, without great and lingering retardments, if not confusion. Wherefore | |
all, what is made in Nature, is made by self-moving matter, which self-moving | |
matter doth not at all times move regularly, but often irregularly, which | |
causes false Logic, false Arithmetic, and the like; and if there be not a | |
certainty in these self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in Art, which | |
is but a secondary action; and therefore, neither speech, words, nor exterior | |
objects cause Understanding or Reason. And although many parts of the Rational | |
and Sensitive Matter joined into one, may be stronger by their association, and | |
over-power other parts that are not so well knit and united, yet these are not | |
the less pure; only these Parts and Motions being not equal in several | |
Creatures, make their Knowledge and Reason more or less: For, when a man hath | |
more Rational Matter well regulated, and so more Wisdom then an other, that | |
same man may chance to over-power the other, whose Rational Matter is more | |
irreregular, but yet not so much by strength of the united Parts, as by their | |
subtilty; for the Rational Matter moving regularly, is more strong with | |
subtilty, then the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger then Life, | |
being more pure, and so more active; for in my opinion, there is a degree of | |
difference between Life and Knowledge, as my Book of Philosophical Opinions | |
will inform you. | |
Again, your Author says, That Man doth excel all other Animals in this | |
faculty, that when he conceives any thing whatsoever, he is apt to enquire the | |
Consequences of it, and what effects he can do with it: Besides this (says he) | |
Man hath an other degree of Excellence, that he can by Words reduce the | |
Consequences he finds to General Rules called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, | |
he can reason or reckon not only in Number, but in all other things, whereof | |
one may be added unto, or subtracted from an other. To which I answer, That | |
according to my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures may do as | |
much; but by reason they do it not after the same manner or way as Man, Man | |
denies, they can do it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows, whether | |
Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water, and ebbing and flowing, and the | |
saltness of the Sea? or whether Birds do not know more of the nature and | |
degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests? or whether Worms do not know more of | |
the nature of Earth, and how Plants are produced? or Bees of the several sorts | |
of juices of Flowers, then Men? And whether they do not make there Aphorisms | |
and Theoremes by their manner of Intelligence? For, though they have not the | |
speech of Man, yet thence doth not follow, that they have no Intelligence at | |
all. But the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause of | |
despising other Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in Nature, when | |
as Nature is not capable to make one God, much less so many as Mankind; and | |
were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would not be more Supreme, then | |
other Creatures in Nature, But (says your Author) this Privilege in Man is | |
allayed by another, which is, No living Creature is subject to absurdity, but | |
only Man. Certainly, Madam, I believe the contrary, to wit, that all other | |
Creatures do as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if it were | |
not to avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient proofs to you: Wherefore I | |
think, not only Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and subject | |
to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth, nor cannot truly know the | |
Faculties, and Abilities or Actions of all other Creatures, no not of his own | |
Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by himself he will be very much | |
mistaken, for what he conceives to be true or wise, an other may conceive to be | |
false and foolish. But Man may have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and | |
other Arts; and other Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or | |
way may be as Intelligible and Instructive to each other as Man's, I mean, in | |
those things which are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what your Author | |
says, That Children are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained | |
to the use of Speech; for Reason is in those Creatures which have not Speech, | |
witness Horses, especially those which are taught in the manage, and many other | |
Animals. And as for the weak understanding in Children, I have discoursed | |
thereof in my Book of Philosophy; The rest of this discourse, lest I tyre you | |
too much at once, I shall reserve for the next, resting in the mean time, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XI. | |
MADAM, | |
I sent you word in my last, that your Author's opinion is, That Children are | |
not endued with Reason at all, until they have attained to the use of Speech, | |
in the same Chapter Ch. 4. | |
he speaks to the same purpose thus: Reason is not as Sense and Memory born | |
with us, nor gotten by experience only, as Prudence is, but attained by | |
industry. To which I reply only this, That it might as well be said, a Child | |
when new born hath not flesh and blood, because by taking in nourishment or | |
food, the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or, that a Child is not | |
born with two legs, because he cannot go, or with two arms and hands, because | |
he cannot help himself; or that he is not born with a tongue, because he cannot | |
speak: For although Reason doth not move in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as | |
in Youth, in Youth as in Age, yet that doth not prove that Children are without | |
Reason, because they cannot run and prate: I grant, some other Creatures appear | |
to have more Knowledge when new born then others; as for example, a young Foal | |
has more knowledge than a young Child, because a Child cannot run and play; | |
besides a Foal knows his own Dam, and can tell where to take his food, as to | |
run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot do so, nor all beasts, though | |
most of them can, but yet this doth not prove, that a Child hath no reason at | |
all; Neither can I perceive that man is a Monopoler of all Reason, or Animals | |
of all Sense, but that Sense and Reason are in other Creatures as well as in | |
Man and Animals; for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals, although they | |
cannot slice, pound or infuse, as man can, yet they can work upon man more | |
subtly, wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting, spitting, or any | |
other way, as man by mincing, pounding and infusing them, and Vegetables will | |
as wisely nourish Men, as Men can nourish Vegetables; Also some Vegetables are | |
as malicious and mischievous to Man, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock, | |
Nightshade, and many more; and a little Poppy will as soon, nay sooner cause a | |
Man to sleep, though silently, then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; | |
But because they do not act in such manner or way as Man, Man judges them to | |
be without sense and reason; and because they do not prate and talk as Man, Man | |
believes they have not so much wit as he hath; and because they cannot run and | |
go, Man thinks they are not industrious; the like for Infants concerning | |
Reason. But certainly, it is not local motion or speech that makes sense and | |
reason, but sense and reason makes them; neither is sense and reason bound | |
only to the actions of Man, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and | |
proprieties of all Creatures; for if none but Man had reason, and none but | |
Animals sense, the World could not be so exact, and so well in order as it is: | |
but Nature is wiser then Man with all his Arts, for these are only produced | |
through the variety of Natures actions, and disputes through the superfluous | |
varieties of Mans follies or ignorances, not knowing Natures powerful life and | |
knowledge: But I wonder, Madam, your Author says in this place, That Reason is | |
not born with Man, when as in another place, In his Elements of Philosophy, | |
part. 1. c. 1. art. 1. | |
he says, That every man brought Philosophy, that is Natural reason with him | |
into the World; Which how it agree, I will leave to others to judge, and to him | |
to reconcile it, remaining in the mean time, | |
MADAM, Your Constant Friend and Faithful Servant. | |
XII. | |
MADAM, | |
TWo sorts of motions, I find your Author Leviathan, part. 1. c. 6. | |
doth attribute to Animals, viz. Vital and Animal, the Vital motions, says he, | |
are begun in Generation, and continued without Interruption through their whole | |
life, and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the Breathing, | |
Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, c. to which motions there needs no help of | |
Imaginations; But the animal Motions, otherwise called voluntary Motions, are | |
to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied | |
in our minds: And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, | |
depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it is | |
evident, that the Imagination is the first Internal beginning of all voluntary | |
Motion. Thus far your Author. Whereof in short I give you my opinion, first | |
concerning Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if not impossible to me, | |
that Generation should be the cause and beginning of Life, because Life must of | |
necessity be the cause of Generation, life being the Generator of all things, | |
for without life motion could not be, and without motion not any thing could be | |
begun, increased, perfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination is not | |
necessary to Vital Motions, it is probable it may not, but yet there is | |
required Knowledge, which I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledge in all | |
Generations or Productions, there could not any distinct Creature be made or | |
produced, for then all Generations would be confusedly mixed, neither would | |
there be any distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor no different Faculties, | |
Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerning Animal Motions, which your | |
Author names Voluntary Motions, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, | |
in such manner as is first fancied in our minds, and that they depend upon a | |
precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, and that Imagination is the | |
first Internal beginning of them; I think, by your Authors leave, it doth imply | |
a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions, and yet to say they are caused | |
and depend upon our Imagination; for if the Imagination draws them this way, or | |
that way, how can they be voluntary motions, being in a manner forced and | |
necessitated to move according to Fancy or Imagination? But when he goes on in | |
the same place and treats of Endeavour, Appetite, Desire, Hunger, Thirst, | |
Aversion, Love, Hate, and the like, he derives one from the other, and treats | |
well as a Moral Philosopher; but whether it be according to the truth or | |
probability of Natural Philosophy, I will leave to others to judge, for in my | |
opinion Passions and Appetites are very different, Appetites being made by the | |
motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination, Memory, c. by | |
the motions of the rational Life, which is the cause that Appetites belong more | |
to the actions of the Body then the Mind: Tis true, the Sensitive and Rational | |
self-moving matter doth so much resemble each other in their actions, as it is | |
difficult to distinguish them. But having treated hereof at large in my other | |
Philosophical Work, to cut off repetitions, I will refer you to that, and | |
desire you to compare our opinions together: But certainly there is so much | |
variety in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites, as it cannot | |
be easily expressed. To conclude, I do not perceive that your Author tells or | |
expresses what the cause is of such or such actions, only he mentions their | |
dependence, which is, as if a man should converse with a Nobleman's Friend or | |
Servant, and not know the Lord himself. But leaving him for this time, it is | |
sufficient to me, that I know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship knows me, that I | |
am, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant. | |
XIII. | |
MADAM, | |
HAving obeyed your Commands in giving you my opinion of the First Part of the | |
Book of that famous and learned Author you sent me, I would go on; but seeing | |
he treats in his following Parts of the Politics, I was forced to stay my Pen, | |
because of these following Reasons. First, That a Woman is not employed in | |
State Affairs, unless an absolute Queen. Next, That to study the Politics, is | |
but loss of Time, unless a man were sure to be a Favourite to an absolute | |
Prince. Thirdly, That it is but a deceiving Profession, and requires more Craft | |
then Wisdom. All which considered, I did not read that part of your Author: But | |
as for his Natural Philosophy, I will send you my opinion so far as I | |
understand it: For what belongs to Art, as to Geometry, being no Scholar, I | |
shall not trouble my self withal. And so I'll take my leave of you, when I have | |
in two or three words answered the Question you sent me last, which was, | |
Whether Nature be the Art of God, Man the Art of Nature, and a Politic | |
Government the Art of Man? To which I answer, Tis probable it may be so; only | |
I add this, That Nature doth not rule God, nor Man Nature, nor Politic | |
Government Man; for the Effect cannot rule the Cause, but the Cause doth rule | |
the Effect: Wherefore if men do not naturally agree, Art cannot make unity | |
amongst them, or associate them into one Politic Body and so rule them; But | |
man thinks he governs, when as it is Nature that doth it, for as nature doth | |
unite or divide parts regularly or irregularly, and moves the several minds of | |
men and the several parts of men's bodies, so war is made or peace kept: Thus it | |
is not the artificial form that governs men in a Politic Government, but a | |
natural power, for though natural motion can make artificial things, yet | |
artificial things cannot make natural power; and we might as well say, nature | |
is governed by the art of nature, as to say man is ruled by the art and | |
invention of men. The truth is, Man rules an artificial Government, and not the | |
Government Man, just like as a Watch-maker rules his Watch, and not the Watch | |
the Watch-maker. And thus I conclude and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XIV. | |
MADAM, | |
COncerning the other Book of that learned Author Hobbs you sent me, called | |
Elements of Philosophy, I shall likewise according to your desire, give you my | |
judgment and opinion of it as I have done of the former, not that I intend to | |
prejudice him any ways thereby, but only to mark those places wherein I seem | |
to dissent from his opinions, which liberty, I hope, he will not deny me; And | |
in order to this, I have read over the first Chapter of the mentioned Book, | |
treating of Philosophy in General, wherein amongst the rest, discoursing of the | |
Utility of Natural Philosophy, and relating the commodities and benefits which | |
proceed from so many arts and sciences, he is pleased to say, Art. 7. | |
that they are enjoyed almost by all people of Europe, Asia, and some of | |
Africa, only the Americans, and those that live near the Poles do want them: | |
But why, says he, have they sharper wits then these? Have not all men one kind | |
of soul, and the same faculties of mind? To which, give me leave, Madam, to | |
add, That my opinion is, that there is a difference between the Divine and the | |
Natural soul of man, and though the natural mind or soul is of one kind, yet | |
being made of rational matter, it is divideable and composeable, by which | |
division and composition, men may have more or less wit, or quicker and slower | |
wit; the like for Judgments, Imaginations, Fancies, Opinions, c. For were the | |
natural rational mind individeable, all men would have the like degree of wit | |
or understanding, all men would be Philosophers or fools, which by reason they | |
are not, it proves the natural rational mind is divideable and composeable, | |
making variations of its own several parts by self-motion; for it is not the | |
several outward objects, or foreign instructions, that make the variety of the | |
mind; neither is wit or ingenuity alike in all men; for some are natural Poets, | |
Philosophers, and the like, without learning, and some are far more ingenious | |
then others, although their breeding is obscure and mean, Neither will learning | |
make all men Scholars, for some will continue Dunces all their life time; | |
Neither doth much experience make all men wise, for some are not any ways | |
advanced in their wisdom by much and long experiences; And as for Poetry, it is | |
according to the common Proverb, a Poet is born, not made; Indeed learning doth | |
rather hurt Fancy, for great Scholars are not always good Poets, nor all | |
States-men Natural Philosophers, nor all Experienced Men Wise Men, nor all | |
Judges Just, nor all Divines Pious, nor all Pleaders or Preachers Eloquent, nor | |
all Moral Philosophers Virtuous; But all this is occasioned by the various | |
Motions of the rational selfmoving matter, which is the Natural Mind. And thus | |
much for the present of the difference of wits and faculties of the mind; I add | |
no more, but rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XV. | |
MADAM, | |
MY Discourse for the present shall be of Infinite, and the question shall be | |
first Whether several Finite parts, how many soever there be, can make an | |
Infinite. Your Author says, Elem. of Philos. c. 7. a. 12. | |
that several Finite parts when they are all put together make a whole Finite; | |
which, if his meaning be of a certain determinate number, how big soever, of | |
finite parts, I do willingly grant, for all what is determinate and limited, is | |
not Infinite but Finite; neither is there any such thing, as Whole or All in | |
Infinite; but if his meaning be, that no Infinite can be made of finite parts, | |
though infinite in number, I deny it; Next he says there can be no such thing | |
as One in Infinite, because No thing can be said One, except there be another | |
to compare it withal; which in my opinion doth not follow, for there is but One | |
God, who is Infinite, and hath none other to be compared withal, and so there | |
may be but one Only Infinite in Nature, which is Matter. But when he says, | |
there cannot be an Infinite and Eternal Division, is very true, viz, in this | |
sense, that one single part cannot be actually infinitely divided, for the | |
Compositions hinder the Divisions in Nature, and the Divisions the | |
Compositions, so that Nature, being Matter, cannot be composed so, as not to | |
have parts, nor divided so, as that her parts should not be composed, but there | |
are nevertheless infinite divided parts in Nature, and in this sense there may | |
also be infinite divisions, as I have declared in my Book of Philosophy. P. 1. | |
c. 8. | |
And thus there are Infinite divisions of Infinite parts in Nature, but not | |
Infinite actual divisions of one single part; But though Infinite is without | |
end, yet my discourse of it shall be but short and end here, though not my | |
affection, which shall last and continue with the life of | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Humble Servant. | |
XVI. | |
MADAM, | |
AN Accident, says your Author, Elem. of Philos c. 8. ^rt. 2. | |
is nothing else, but the manner of our Conception of body, or that Faculty of | |
any body, by which it works in us a Conception of it self; To which I willingly | |
consent; but yet I say, that these qualities cannot be separated from the body, | |
for as impossible it is that the essence of Nature should be separable from | |
Nature, as impossible is it that the various modes or alterations, either of | |
Figures or Motions, should be separable from matter or body; Wherefore when he | |
goes on, and says, An accident is not a body, but in a body, yet not so, as if | |
any thing were Art. 3. | |
contained therein, as it for example, redness were in blood in the same manner | |
as blood is in a bloody cloth; but as magnitude is in that which is great, rest | |
in that which rests, motion in that which is moved; I answer, that in my | |
opinion, not any thing in Nature can be without a body, and that redness is as | |
well in blood, as blood is in a bloody cloth, or any other colour in any thing | |
else; for there is no colour without a body, but every colour hath as well a | |
body as any thing else, and if Colour be a separable accident, I would faih | |
know, how it can be separated from a subject, being bodiless, for that which is | |
no body is nothing, and nothing cannot be taken away from any thing; Wherefore | |
as for natural Colour it cannot be taken away from any creature, without the | |
parts of its substance or body; and as for artificial Colours, when they are | |
taken away, it is a separation of two bodies, which joined together; and if | |
Colour, or Hardness, or Softness do change, it is nothing else but an | |
alteration of motions and not an annihilation, for all changes and alterations | |
remain in the power of Corporeal motions, as I have said in other places; for | |
we might as well say, life doth not remain in nature, when a body turns from an | |
animal to some other figure, as believe that those, they name accidents, do not | |
remain in Corporeal Motions; Wherefore I am not of your Authors mind, when he | |
says, Art. 20. | |
that when a White thing is made black, the whiteness perishes; for it cannot | |
perish, although it is altered from white to black, being in the power of the | |
same matter, to turn it again from black to white, so as it may make infinite | |
Repetitions of the same thing; but by reason nature takes delight in variety, | |
she seldom uses such repetitions; nevertheless that doth not take away the | |
Power of self-moving matter, for it doth not; and it cannot, are two several | |
things, and the latter doth not necessarily follow upon the former; Wherefore | |
not any, the least thing, can perish in Nature, for if this were possible, the | |
whole body of nature might perish also, for if so many. Fugures and Creatures | |
should be annihilated and perish without any supply or new Creation, Nature | |
would grow less, and at last become nothing; besides it is as difficult for | |
Nature to turn something into nothing, as to Create something out of nothing; | |
Wherefore as there is no annihilation or perishing in Nature, so there is | |
neither any new Creation in Nature. But your Author makes a difference between | |
bodies and accidents, saying, that bodies are things and not Generated, but | |
accidents are Generated and not things, Truly, Madam, these accidents seem to | |
me to be like Van Helmont's Lights, Gases, Blazes and Ideas; and Dr More's | |
Immaterial Substances or Daemons, only in this Dr More hath the better, that | |
his Immaterial Substances, are beings, which subsist of themselves, whereas | |
accidents do not, but their existence is in other bodies; But what they call | |
Accidents, are in my opinion nothing else but Corporeal Motions, and if these | |
accidents be generated, they must needs be bodies, for how nothing can be | |
Generated in nature, is not conceivable, and yet your Author denies, Art. 2. | |
that Accidents are something, namely some part of a natural thing; But as for | |
Generations, they are only various actions of self-moving matter, or a variety | |
of Corporeal Motions, and so are all Accidents whatsoever, so that there is not | |
any thing in nature, that can be made new, or destroyed, for whatsoever was and | |
shall be, is in nature, though not always in act, yet in power, as in the | |
nature and power of Corporeal motions, which is selfmoving matter, And as there | |
is no new Generation of Accidents, so there is neither a new Generation of | |
Motions; wherefore when your Author says, Art. 21. | |
That, when the hand, being moved, moves the pen, the motion doth not go out | |
of the hand into the pen, for so the writing might be continued, though the | |
hand stood still, but a new motion is generated in the pen, and is the pens | |
motion: I am of his opinion, that the motion doth not go out of the hand into | |
the pen, and that the motion of the pen, is the pens own motion; but I deny, | |
that after holding the hand a little while still, and beginning to write again, | |
a new motion of the pen is generated; for it is only a repetition, and not a | |
new generation, for the Hand, Pen and Ink, repeat but the same motion or action | |
of writing: Besides, Generation is made by Connexion or Conjunction of parts, | |
moving by consent to such or such Figures, but the motion of the Hand or the | |
Pen is always one and the same; wherefore it is but the variation and | |
repetition in and of the same motion of the Hand, or Pen, which may be | |
continued in that manner infinitely, just as the same Corporeal Motions can | |
make infinite variations and repetitions of one and the same Figure, repeating | |
it as oft as they please, as also making Copy of Copy; And although I do not | |
deny, but there are Generations in Nature, yet not annihilations or perishings, | |
for if any one motion or figure should perish, the matter must perish also; and | |
if any one part of matter can perish, all the matter in nature may perish also; | |
and if there can any new thing be made or created in nature, which hath not | |
been before, there may also be a new Nature, and so by perishings and new | |
Creations, this World would not have continued an age; But surely whatsoever is | |
in Nature, hath been existent always. Wherefore to conclude, it is not the | |
generation and perishing of an Accident that makes its subject to be changed, | |
but the production and alteration of the Form, makes it said to be generated or | |
destroyed, for matter will change its motions and figures without perishing or | |
annihilating; and whether there were words or not, there would be such causes | |
and effects; But having not the art of Logic to dispute with artificial words, | |
nor the art of Geometry to demonstrate my opinions by Mathematical Figures, I | |
fear they will not be so well received by the Learned; However, I leave them to | |
any mans unprejudiced Reason and Judgment, and devote my self to your service, | |
as becomes, | |
MADAM, Your Ladyships humble and faithful Servant. | |
XVII. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author concerning Place and Magnitude says, that Place is nothing out of | |
the mind, nor Part. 2. c. 8. a. 5. | |
Magnitude any thing within it; for Place is a mere Phantasm of a body of such | |
quantity and figure, and Magnitude a peculiar accident of the body; But this | |
doth not well agree with my reason, for I believe that Place, Magnitude and | |
Body are but one thing, and that Place is as true an extension as Magnitude, | |
and not a feigned one; Neither am I of his opinion, that Place is Immovable, | |
but that place moves, according as the body moves, for not any body wants | |
place, because place and body is but one thing, and wheresoever is body, there | |
is also place, and wheresoever is place, there is body, as being one and the | |
same; Wherefore Motion cannot be a relinquishing of one place and acquiring | |
another, Art. 10. | |
for there is no such thing as place different from body, but what is called | |
change of place, is nothing but change of corporeal motions; for, say an house | |
stands in such a place, if the house be gone, the place is gone also, as being | |
impossible that the place of the house should remain, when the house is taken | |
away; like as a man when he is gone out of his chamber, his place is gone too; | |
Tis true, if the ground or foundation do yet remain, one may say, there stood | |
such an house heretofore, but yet the place of the house is not there really at | |
that present, unless the same house be built up again as it was before, and | |
then it hath its place as before; Nevertheless the house being not there, it | |
cannot be said that either place or house are annihilated, viz, when the | |
materials are dissolved, no not when transformed into millions of several other | |
figures, for the house remains still in the power of all those several parts of | |
matter; and as for space, it is only a distance betwixt some parts or bodies; | |
But an Empty place signifies to my opinion Nothing, for if place and body are | |
one and the same, and empty is as much as nothing, then certainly these two | |
words cannot consist together, but are destructive to one another. Concerning, | |
that your Author says; Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, nor | |
Art. 8. | |
one body in two places at the same time, is very true, for there are no more | |
places then bodies, nor more bodies then places, and this is to be understood | |
as well of the grosser, as the purest parts of nature, of the mind as well as | |
of the body, of the rational and sensitive animate matter as well as of the | |
inanimate, for there is no matter, how pure and subtle soever, but is imbodied, | |
and all that hath body hath place. Likewise I am of his opinion, That one body | |
hath always one and the same Art. 5. | |
magnitude; for, in my opinion, magnitude, place and body do not differ, and as | |
place, so magnitude can never be separated from body. But when he speaks of | |
Rest, I cannot believe there is any such thing truly in Nature, for it is | |
impossible to prove, that any thing is without Motion, either consistent, or | |
composing, or dissolving, or transforming motions, or the like, although not | |
altogether perceptible by our senses, for all the Matter is either moving or | |
moved, and although the moved parts are not capable to receive the nature of | |
self-motion from the self-moving parts, yet these self-moving parts, being | |
joined and mixed with all other parts of the moved matter, do always move the | |
same; for the Moved or Inanimate part of Matter, although it is a Part of it | |
self, yet it is so intermixed with the self-moving Animate Matter, as they make | |
but one Body; and though some parts of the Inanimate may be as pure as the | |
Sensitive Animate Matter, yet they are never so subtle as to be self-moving; | |
Wherefore the Sensitive moves in the Inanimate, and the Rational in the | |
Sensitive, but often the Rational moves in it self. And, although there is no | |
rest in nature, nevertheless Matter could have been without Motion, when as it | |
is impossible that Matter could be without place or magnitude, no more then | |
Variety can be without motion; And thus much at this present: I conclude, and | |
rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XVIII. | |
MADAM, | |
PAssing by those Chapters of your Authors, that treat of Power and Act, Identy | |
and Difference, Analogisme, Angle and Figure, Figures deficient, dimension of | |
Circles, and several others, most of which belong to art, as to Geometry, and | |
the like; I am come to that wherein he discourses of Sense and Animal Motion, | |
saying, That some Natural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all | |
things, and others of none C. 25. a. 1. | |
at all; Whereof my opinion is, that the sensitive and rational parts of Matter | |
are the living and knowing parts of Nature, and no part of nature can challenge | |
them only to it self, nor no creature can be sure, that sense is only in | |
Animal-kind, and reason in Man-kind; for can any one think or believe that | |
Nature is ignorant and dead in all her other parts besides Animals? Truly this | |
is a very unreasonable opinion; for no man, as wise as he thinks himself, nay | |
were all Man-kind joined into one body, yet they are not able to know it, | |
unless there were no variety of parts in nature, but only one whole and | |
individeable body, for other Creatures may know and perceive as much as | |
Animals, although they have not the same Sensitive Organs, nor the same manner | |
or way of Perception. Next your Author says, The cause of Sense or Perception | |
consists herein, that the first organ of sense is touched and pressed; For when | |
the Art. 2. | |
uttermost part of the organ is pressed, it no sooner yields, but the part next | |
within it is pressed also, and in this manner the pressure or motion is | |
propagated through all the parts of the organ to the innermost. And thus also | |
the pressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of some more | |
remote body, and so continually, till we come to that, from which, as from its | |
fountain, we derive the Phantasm or Idea, that is made in us by our sense: And | |
this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call the object; Sense therefore is | |
some Internal motion in the Sentient, Generated by some Internal motion of the | |
Parts of the object, and propagated through all the media to the innermost part | |
of the organ. Moreover there being a resistance or reaction in the organ, by | |
reason of its internal motion against the motion propagated from the object, | |
there is also an endeavour in the organ opposite to the endeavour proceeding | |
from the object, and when that endeavour inwards is the last action in the act | |
of sense, then from the reaction a Phantasm or Idea has its being. This is | |
your Authors opinion, which if it were so, perception could not be effected so | |
suddenly, nay I think the sentient by so many pressures in so many perceptions, | |
would at last be pressed to death, besides the organs would take a great deal | |
of hurt, nay totally be removed out of their places, so as the eye would in | |
time be pressed into the centre of the brain; And if there were any Resistance, | |
Reaction or Endeavour in the organ, opposite to the Endeavour of the object, | |
there would, in my opinion, be always a war between the animal senses and the | |
objects, the endeavour of the objects pressing one way, and the senses pressing | |
the other way, and if equal in their strengths, they would make a stop, and the | |
sensitive organs would be very much pained; Truly, Madam, in my opinion, it | |
would be like that Custom which formerly hath been used at Newcastle, when a | |
man was married, the guests divided themselves, behind and before the | |
Bridegroom; the one party driving him back, the other forwards, so that one | |
time a Bridegroom was killed in this fashion; But certainly Nature hath a more | |
quick and easy way of giving intelligence and knowledge to her Creatures, and | |
doth not use such constraint and force in her actions; Neither is sense or | |
sensitive perception a mere Phantasm or Idea, but a Corporeal action of the | |
sensitive and rational matter, and according to the variation of the objects or | |
patterns, and the sensitive and rational motions, the perception also is | |
various, produced not by external pressure, but by internal self-motion, as I | |
have declared heretofore; and to prove, that the sensitive and rational | |
corporeal motions are the only cause of perception; I say, if those motions in | |
an animal move in another way, and not to such perceptions, then that animal | |
can neither hear, see, taste, smell, nor touch, although all his sensitive | |
organs be perfect, as is evident in a man falling into a swoon, where all the | |
time he is in a swoon, the pressure of the objects is made without any effect; | |
Wherefore, as the sensitive and rational corporeal motions make all that is in | |
nature, so likewise they make perception, as being perception it self, for all | |
self-motion is perception, but all perception is not animal perception, or | |
after an animal way; and therefore sense cannot decay nor die; but what is | |
called a decay or death, is nothing else but a change or alteration of those | |
Motions: But you will say, Madam, it may be, that one body, as an object, | |
leaves the print of its figure, in the next adjoining body, until it comes to | |
the organ of sense, I answer that then sustained bodies only must be pressed, and | |
the object must be so hard as to make a print, and as for rare parts of matter, | |
they are not able to retain a print without self-motion; Wherefore it is not | |
probable that the parts of air should receive a print, and print the same again | |
upon the adjoining part, until the last part of the air print it upon the eye; | |
and that the exterior parts of the organ should print upon the interior, till | |
it come to the centre of the Brain, without self-motion. Wherefore in my | |
opinion, Perception is not caused either by the printing of objects, nor by | |
pressures, for pressures would make a general stop of all natural motions, | |
especially if there were any reaction or resistance of sense; but according to | |
my reason, the sensitive and rational corporeal motions in one body, pattern | |
out the Figure of another body, as of an exterior object, which may be done | |
easily without any pressure or reaction; I will not say, that there is no | |
pressure or reaction in Nature, but pressure and reaction doth not make | |
perception, for the sensitive and rational parts of matter make all perception | |
and variety of motion, being the most subtle parts of Nature, as self-moving, | |
as also divideable, and composeable, and alterable in their figurative motions, | |
for this Perceptive matter can change its substance into any figure whatsoever | |
in nature, as being not bound to one constant figure. But having treated hereof | |
before, and being to say more of it hereaster, this shall suffice for the | |
present, remaining always, | |
MADAM, Your constant Friend, and faithful Servant. | |
XIX. | |
MADAM, | |
TO discourse of the World and Stars, is more then I am able to do, wanting the | |
art of Astronomy and Geometry; wherefore passing by that Chapter of your | |
Author, I am come to that Ch. 27. | |
wherein he treats of Light, Heat and Colours; and to give you my opinion of | |
Light, I say, it is not the light of the Sun, that makes an Animal see, for we | |
can see inwardly in Dreams without the Suns light, but it is the sensitive and | |
rational Motions in the Eye and Brain that make such a figure as Light; For if | |
Light did press upon the Eye, according to your Authors opinion, it might put | |
the Eye into as much pain as Fire doth, when it sticks its points into our skin | |
or flesh. The same may be said of Colours, for the sensitive motions make such | |
a figure, which is such a Colour, and such a Figure, which is such a Colour; | |
Wherefore Light, Heat and Colour, are not bare and bodiless qualities; but such | |
figures made by corporeal self-motions, and are as well real and corporeal | |
objects as other figures are; and when these figures change or alter, it is | |
only that their motions alter, which may alter and change heat into cold, and | |
light into darkness, and black colour into white. But by reason the motions of | |
the Sun are so constant, as the motions of any other kind of Creatures, it is | |
no more subject to be altered then all the World, unless Nature did it by the | |
command of God; for though the Parts of self-moving Matter be alterable, yet | |
all are not altered; and this is the reason, that the figure of Light in our | |
eye and brain is altered, as well as it is alterable, but not the real figure | |
of the Sun, neither doth the Sun enter our eyes; and as the Light of the Sun is | |
made or patterned in the eye, so is the light of Glow-worms-tails, and | |
Cats-eyes, that shine in the dark, made not by the Sun's, but their own motions | |
in their own parts; The like when we dream of Light, the sensitive corporeal | |
motions working inwardly, make the figure of light on the inside of the eye, as | |
they did pattern out the figure of light on the out side of the eye when awake, | |
and the objects before them; for the sensitive motions of the eye pattern out | |
the figure of the object in the eye, and the rational motions make the same | |
figure in their own substance. But there is some difference between those | |
figures that perceive light, and those that are light themselves; for when we | |
sleep, there is made the figure of light, but not from a copy; but when the eye | |
sees light, that figure is made from a copy of the real figure of the Sun; but | |
those lights which are inherent, as in Glow-worms-tails, are original lights, | |
in which is as much difference as between a Man and his Picture; and as for the | |
swiftness of the Motions of light, and the violence of the Motions of fire, it | |
is very probable they are so, but they are a certain particular kind or sort of | |
swift and violent motions; neither will all sorts of swift and violent motions | |
make fire or light, as for example the swift and violent Circular motion of a | |
Whirlwind neither makes light nor fire; Neither is all fire light, nor all | |
light fire, for there is a sort of dead fire, as in Spices, Spirits, Oils, and | |
the like; and several sorts of lights, which are not hot, as the light which is | |
made in Dreams, as also the inherent lights in Glow-worms, Cats-eyes, | |
Fish-bones, and the like; all which several fires and lights are made by the | |
self-moving matter and motions distinguishable by their figures, for those | |
Motions make such a figure for the Suns light, such a figure for Glow-worms | |
light, such a figure for Cats-eyes light, and so some alteration in every sort | |
of light; The same for Fire, only Fire-light is a mixed figure, as partly of | |
the figure of Fire, and partly of the figure of Light: Also Colours are made | |
after the like manner, viz. so many several Colours, so many several Figures; | |
and as these Figures are less or more different, so are the Colours. | |
Thus, Madam, whosoever will study Nature, must consider the Figures of every | |
Creature, as well as their Motions, and must not make abstractions of Motion | |
and Figure from Matter, nor of Matter from Motion and Figure, for they are | |
inseparable, as being but one thing, viz. Corporeal Figurative Motions; and | |
whosoever conceives any of them as abstract, will, in my opinion, very much | |
err; but men are apt to make more difficulties and enforcements in nature then | |
nature ever knew. But to return to Light: There is no better argument to prove | |
that all objects of sight are figured in the Eye, by the sensitive, voluntary | |
or self-motions, without the pressure of objects, but that not only the | |
pressure of light would hurt the tender Eye, but that the eye doth not see all | |
objects according to their Magnitude, but sometimes bigger, sometimes less: as | |
for example, when the eye looks through a small passage, as a | |
Prospective-glass, by reason of the difficulty of seeing a body through a small | |
hole, and the double figure of the glass being convex and concave, the | |
corporeal motions use more force, by which the object is enlarged, like as a | |
spark of fire by force is dilated into a great fire, and a drop of water by | |
blowing into a bubble; so the corporeal motions do double and treble their | |
strength, making the Image of the object exceeding large in the eye; for though | |
the eye be contracted, yet the Image in the eye is enlarged to a great | |
extension; for the sensitive and rational matter is extremely subtle, by reason | |
it is extremely pure, by which it hath more means and ways of magnifying then | |
the Perspective-glass. But I intend to write more of this subject in my next, | |
and so I break off here, resting, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XX. | |
MADAM, | |
SOme perhaps will question the truth or probability of my saying, that Light | |
is a Body, objecting that if light were a body, when the Sun is absent or | |
retires under our Horizon, its light would leave an empty place, or if there | |
were no empty place but all full, the light of the Sun at its return would not | |
have room to display it self, especially in so great a compass as it doth, for | |
two bodies cannot be in one place at one time. I answer, all bodies carry their | |
places along with them, for body and place go together and are inseparable, and | |
when the light of the Sun is gone, darkness succeeds, and when darkness is | |
gone, light succeeds, so that it is with light and darkness as with all | |
Creatures else; For you cannot believe, that if the whole World were removed, | |
there would be a place of the world left, for there cannot be an empty nothing, | |
no more then there can be an empty something; but if the world were | |
annihilated, the place would be annihilated too, place and body being one and | |
the same thing; and therefore in my opinion, there be no more places then there | |
are bodies, nor no more bodies then there are places. | |
Secondly, They will think it absurd that I say, the eye can see without light; | |
but in my opinion it seems not absurd, but very rational, for we may see in | |
dreams, and some do see in the dark, not in their fancy or imagination, but | |
really; and as for dreams, the sensitive corporeal motions make a light on the | |
inside of the organ of sight really, as I have declared in my former Letter. | |
But that we do not see ordinarily without exterior Light, the reason is, that | |
the sensitive Motions cannot find the outward objects to pattern out without | |
exterior light, but all perception doth not proceed from light, for all other | |
perception besides animal sight requires not light. Neither in my opinion, doth | |
the Perception of sight in all Creatures but Animals, but yet Animals do often | |
see in the dark, and in sleep: I will not say but that the animate matter which | |
by self-motion doth make the Perception of light with other perceptive Figures, | |
and so animal perceptive light may be the presenter or ground perceptive figure | |
of sight; yet the sensitive corporeal motions can make other figures without | |
the help of light, and such as light did never present: But when the eye | |
patterns out an exterior object presented by light, it patterns also out the | |
object of light; for the sensitive motions can make many figures by one act, | |
not only in several organs, but in one organ; as for example, there is | |
presented to sight a piece of Imbroydery, wherein is silk, silver and gold upon | |
Satin in several forms or figures, as several flowers, the sensitive motions | |
straight by one and the same act, pattern out all those several figures of | |
flowers, as also the figures of Silk, Silver, Gold and Satin, without any | |
pressure of these objects, or motions in the medium, for if they all should | |
press, the eye would no more see the exterior objects, then the nose, being | |
stopped, could smell a presented perfume; | |
Thirdly, They may ask me, if sight be made in the eye, and proceeds not from | |
the outward object, what is the reason that we do not see inwardly, but | |
outwardly as from us? I answer, when we see objects outwardly, as from us, then | |
the sensitive motions work on the outside of the organ, which organ being | |
outwardly convex, causes us to see outwardly, as from us, but in dreams we see | |
inwardly; also the sensitive motions do pattern out the distance together with | |
the object: But you will say, the body of the distance, as the air, cannot be | |
perceived, and yet we can perceive the distance; I answer, you could not | |
perceive the distance, but by such or such an object as is subject to your | |
sight; for you do not see the distance more then the air, or the like rare | |
body, that is between grosser objects; for if there were no stars, nor planets, | |
nor clouds, nor earth, nor water, but only air, you would not see any space or | |
distance; but light being a more visible body then air, you might figure the | |
body of air by light, but so, as in an extensive or dilating way; for when the | |
mind or the rational matter conceives any thing that hath not such an exact | |
figure, or is not so perceptible by our senses; then the mind uses art, and | |
makes such figures, which stand like to that; as for example, to express | |
infinite to it self, it dilates it parts without alteration, and without | |
limitation or circumference; Likewise, when it will conceive a constant | |
succession of Time, it draws out its parts into the figure of a line; and if | |
eternity, it figures a line without beginning and end: But as for Immaterial, | |
no mind can conceive that, for it cannot put it self into nothing, although it | |
can dilate and rarify it self to an higher degree, but must stay within the | |
circle of natural bodies, as I within the circle of your Commands, to express | |
my self, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and obedient Servant. | |
XXI. | |
MADAM, | |
HEat and Cold, according to your Authors opinion, are made by Dilation and | |
Contraction: for says he, When the Motion of the ambient ethereal C. 28. ^. 1. | |
substance makes the spirits and fluid parts of our bodies tend outwards, we | |
acknowledge heat, but by the endeavour inwards of the same spirits and humours we | |
feel cold: so that to cool is to make the exterior parts of the body endeavour | |
inwards, by a motion contrary to that of calefaction, by which the internal | |
parts are called outwards. He therefore that would know the cause of Cold, must | |
find by what motion the exterior parts of any body endeavour to retire inwards. | |
But I desire you to consider, Madam, that there be moist Colds, and dry Heats, | |
as well as dry Colds, and moist Heats; wherefore all sorts of Cold are not made | |
by the retiring of parts inwards, which is contraction or attraction; neither | |
are all sorts of Heat made by parts tending outwards, which is dilation or | |
rarefaction; for a moist cold is made by dilation, and a dry heat by | |
contraction, as well as a moist heat is made by dilation, and a dry cold by | |
contraction: But your Author makes not this difference, but only a difference | |
between a dilated heat, and a contracted cold; but because a cold wind is made | |
by breath blown thorough pinched or contracted lips, and an hot wind by breath | |
through opened and extended lips, should we judge that all heat and cold must be | |
made after one manner or way? The contracted mouth makes Wind as well as the | |
dilated, but yet Wind is not made that way, as heat and cold; for it may be, | |
that only the air pressed together makes wind, or it may be that the corporeal | |
motions in the air may change air into wind, as they change water into vapour, | |
and vapour into air; or it may be something else that is invisible and rare, as | |
air; and there may be several sorts of wind, air, heat, cold, as of all other | |
Creatures, more then man is capable to know. As for your Authors opinion | |
concerning the congealing of Water, and how Ice is made, I will not contradict | |
it, only I think nature hath an easier way to effect it, then he describes; | |
Wherefore my opinion is, that it is done by altering motions; as for example, | |
the corporeal motions making the figure of water by dilation in a Circle | |
figure, only alter from such a dilating circular figure into a contracted | |
square, which is Ice, or into such a contracted triangle, as is snow: And thus | |
water and vapour may be changed with ease, without any forcing, pressing, | |
raking, or the like. The same may be said of hard and bent bodies; and of | |
restitution, as also of air, thunder and lightning, which are all done by an | |
easy change of motion, and changing into such or such a figure is not the | |
motion of Generation, which is to build a new house with old materials, but | |
only a Transformation; I say a new house with old materials; not that I mean | |
there is any new Creation in nature, of any thing that was not before in | |
nature; for nature is not God, to make new beings out of nothing, but any thing | |
may be called new, when it is altered from one figure into another. I add no | |
more at this time, but rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXII. | |
MADAM, | |
THe Generation of sound, according to your worthy Authors opinion, is as | |
follows: As Vision, Ch. 29. a. 1. | |
says he, so hearing is Generated by the medium, but but not in the same | |
manner; for sight is from pressure, that is, from an endeavour, in which there | |
is no perceptible progression of any of the parts of the medium, but one part | |
urging or thrusting on another, propagates that action successively to any | |
distance whatsoever; where as the motion of the medium, by which sound is made, | |
is a stroke; for when we hear, the drum of the Ear, which is the first organ of | |
hearing, is stricken, and the drum being stricken, the Pia Matter is also | |
shaken, and with it the arteries inserted into it, by which the action | |
propagated to the heart it self, by the reaction of the heart a Phantasm is | |
made which we call Sound. Thus far your Author: To which give me leave to | |
reply, that I fear, if the Ear was bound to hear any loud Music, or another | |
sound a good while, it would soundly be beaten, and grow sore and bruised with | |
so many strokes; but since a pleasant sound would be rendered very unpleasant in | |
this manner, my opinion is, that like as in the Eye, so in the Ear the | |
corporeal sensitive motions do pattern out as many several figures, as sounds | |
are presented to them; but if these motions be irregular, then the figure of | |
the sound in the ear is not perfect according to the original; for if it be, | |
that the motions are tyred with figuring, or the object of sound be too far | |
distant from the sensitive organ, then they move slowly and weakly, not that | |
they are tyred or weak in strength, but with working and repeating one and the | |
same object, and so through love to variety, change from working regularly to | |
move irregularly, so as not to pattern outward objects as they ought, and then | |
there are no such patterns made at all, which we call to be deaf; and sometimes | |
the sensitive motions do not so readily perceive a soft sound near, as a | |
stronger farther off. But to prove it is not the outward object of sound with | |
its striking or pressing motion, nor the medium, that causes this perception of | |
sense, if there be a great solid body, as a wall, or any other partition | |
betwixt two rooms, parting the object and the sensitive organ, so, as the sound | |
is not able to press it, nevertheless the perception will be made; And as for | |
pipes to convey sounds, the perception is more fixed and perfecter in united | |
then in dilated or extended bodies, and then the sensitive motions can make | |
perfecter patterns; for the stronger the objects are, the more perfect are the | |
figures and patterns of the objects, and the more perfect is the perception. | |
But when the sound is quite out of the ear, then the sensitive motions have | |
altered the patterning of such figures to some other action; and when the sound | |
fades by degrees, then the figure or pattern alters by degrees; but for the | |
most part the sensitive corporeal motions alter according as the objects are | |
presented, or the perception patterns out. Neither do they usually make figures | |
of outward objects, if not perceived by the senses, unless through | |
Irregularities as in Mad men, which see such and such things, when as these | |
things are not near, and then the sensitive motions work by rote, or after | |
their own voluntary invention. As for Reflection, it is a double perception, and | |
so a double figure of one object; like as many pictures of one man, where some | |
are more perfect then others, for a copy of a copy is not so perfect as a copy | |
of an original. But the recoiling of sound is, that the sensitive motions in | |
the ear begin a new pattern, before they dissolved the former, so as there is | |
no perfect alteration or change, from making to dissolving, but pattern is made | |
upon pattern, which causes a confusion of figures, the one being neither | |
perfectly finished, nor the other perfectly made. But it is to be observed, | |
that not always the sensitive motions in the organs take their pattern from the | |
original, but from copies; as for example, the sensitive motions in the eye, | |
pattern out the figure of an eye in a glass, and so do not take a pattern from | |
the original it self, but by an other pattern, representing the figure of the | |
eye in a Looking-glass; The same doth the Ear, by patterning out Echoes, which | |
is but a pattern of a pattern; But when as a man hears himself speak or make a | |
sound, then the corporeal sensitive motions in the Ear, pattern out the object | |
or figure made by the motions of the tongue and the throat, which is voice; By | |
which we may observe, that there may be many figures made by several motions | |
from one original; as for example, the figure of a word is made in a mans | |
mouth, then the copy of that figure is made in the ear, then in the brain, and | |
then in the memory, and all this in one Man: Also a word being made in a mans | |
mouth, the air takes a copy or many copies thereof; but the Ear patterns them | |
both out, first the original coming from the mouth, and then the copy made in | |
the air, which is called an Echo, and yet not any strikes or touches each | |
others parts, only perceives and patterns out each others figure. Neither are | |
their substances the same, although the figures be alike; for the figure of a | |
man may be carved in wood, then cut in brass, then in stone, and so forth, | |
where the figure may be always the same, although the substances which do | |
pattern out the figure are several, viz. Wood, Brass, Stone, c. and so likewise | |
may the figure of a stone be figured in the fleshy substance of the Eye, or the | |
figure of light or colour, and yet the substance of the Eye remains still the | |
same; neither doth the substantial figure of a stone, or tree, patterned out by | |
the sensitive corporeal motions, in the flesh of an animal eye, change from | |
being a vegetable or mineral, to an animal, and if this cannot be done by | |
nature, much less by art; for if the figure of an animal be carved in wood or | |
stone, it doth not give the wood or stone any animal knowledge, nor an animal | |
substance, as flesh, bones, blood, c. no more doth the patterning or figuring | |
of a Tree give a vegetable knowledge, or the substance of wood to the eye, for | |
the figure of an outward object doth not alter the substance that patterns it | |
out or figures it, but the patterning substance doth pattern out the figure, in | |
it self, or in its own substance, so as the figure which is patterned, hath the | |
same life and knowledge with the substance by and in which it is figured or | |
patterned, and the inherent motions of the same substance; and according as the | |
sensitive and rational self-moving matter moves, so figures are made; and thus | |
we see, that lives, knowledges, motions and figures are all material, and all | |
Creatures are endued with life, knowledge, motion and figure, but not all alike | |
or after the same manner. But to conclude this discourse of perception of | |
Sound, the Ear may take the object of sound afar off, as well as at a near | |
distance; not only if many figures of the same sound be made from that great | |
distance, but if the interposing parts be not so thick, close, or many as to | |
hinder or obscure the object from the animal Perception in the sensitive organ; | |
for if a man lays his Ear near to the Ground, the Ear may hear at a far | |
distance, as well as the Eye can see, for it may hear the noise of a troop afar | |
off, perception being very subtle and active; Also there may several Copies be | |
made from the Original, and from the last Copy nearest to the Ear, the Ear may | |
take a pattern, and so pattern out the noise in the organ, without any strokes | |
to the Ear, for the subtle matter in all Creatures doth inform and perceive. | |
But this is well to be observed, that the figures of objects are as soon made, | |
as perceived by the sensitive motions in their work of patterning. And this is | |
my Opinion concerning the Perception of Sound, which together with the rest I | |
leave to your Ladyships and others wiser Judgment, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXIII. | |
MADAM, | |
I Perceive by your last, that you cannot well apprehend my meaning, when I say | |
that the print or figure of a Body Printed or Carved, is not made by the | |
motions of the body Printing or Carving it, but by the motions of the body or | |
substance Printed or Carved; for say you, Doth a piece of Wood carve it self, | |
or a black Patch of a Lady cut its own figure by its own motions? Before I | |
answer you, Madam, give me leave to ask you this question, whether it be the | |
motion of the hand, or the Instrument, or both, that print or carve such or | |
such a body? Perchance you will say, that the motion of the hand moves the | |
Instrument, and the Instrument moves the Wood which is to be carved: Then I | |
ask, whether the motion that moves the Instrument, be the Instruments, or the | |
Hands? Perchance you will say the Hands; but I answer, how can it be the Hands | |
motion, if it be in the Instrument? You will say, perhaps, the motion of the | |
hand is tranferred out of the hand into the instrument, and so from the | |
instrument into the carved figure; but give me leave to ask you, was this | |
motion of the hand, that was transferred, Corporeal or Incorporeal? If you say, | |
Corporeal, then the hand must become less and weak, but if Incorporeal, I ask | |
you, how a bodiless motion can have force and strength to carve and cut? But | |
put an Impossible proposition, as that there is an Immaterial motion, and that | |
this Incorporeal motion could be transferred out of one body into another; then | |
I ask you, when the hand and instrument cease to move, what is become of the | |
motion? Perhaps you will say, the motion perishes or is annihilated, and when | |
the hand and the instrument do move again, to the carving or cutting of the | |
figure, then a new Incorporeal Motion is created; Truly then there will be a | |
perpetual creation and annihilation of Incorporeal motions, that is, of that | |
which naturally is nothing; for an Incorporeal being is as much as a natural | |
No-thing, for Natural reason cannot know nor have naturally any perception or | |
Idea of an Incorporeal being: besides, if the motion be Incorporeal, then it | |
must needs be a supernatural Spirit, for there is not any thing else Immaterial | |
but they, and then it will be either an Angel or a Devil, or the Immortal Soul | |
of man; but if you say it is the supernatural Soul, truly I cannot be persuaded | |
that the supernatural Soul should not have any other employment then to carve | |
or cut prints, or figures, or move in the hands, or heels, or legs, or arms of | |
a Man; for other animals have the same kind of Motions, and then they might | |
have a Supernatural Soul as well as Man, which moves in them. But if you say, | |
that these tranferrable motions are material, then every action whereby the | |
hand moves to the making or moving of some other body, would lessen the number | |
of the motions in the hand, and weaken it, so that in the writing of one | |
letter, the hand would not be able to write a second letter, at least not a | |
third. But I pray, Madam, consider rationally, that though the Artificer or | |
Workman be the occasion of the motions of the carved body, yet the motions of | |
the body that is carved, are they which put themselves into such or such a | |
figure, or give themselves such or such a print as the Artificer intended; for | |
a Watch, although the Artist or Watch-maker be the occasional cause that the | |
Watch moves in such or such an artificial figure, as the figure of a Watch, yet | |
it is the Watches own motion by which it moves; for when you carry the Watch | |
about you, certainly the Watch-makers hand is not then with it as to move it; | |
or if the motion of the Watch-makers hand be transferred into the Watch, then | |
certainly the Watch-maker cannot make another Watch, unless there be a new | |
creation of new motions made in his hands; so that God and Nature would be as | |
much troubled and concerned in the making of Watches, as in the making of a new | |
World; for God created this World in six days, and rested the seventh day, but | |
this would be a perpetual Creation; Wherefore I say that some things may be | |
Occasional causes of other things, but not the Prime or Principal causes; and | |
this distinction is very well to be considered, for there are no frequenter | |
mistakes then to confound these two different causes, which make so many | |
confusions in natural Philosophy; and this is the Opinion of, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXIV. | |
MADAM, | |
IN answer to your question, What makes Echo, I say, it is that which makes | |
all the effects of Nature, viz. self-moving matter; I know, the common opinion | |
is, that Echo is made like as the figure of a Face, or the like, in a | |
Looking-glass, and that the Reverberation of sound is like the Reflection of | |
sight in a Looking-glass; But I am not of that opinion, for both Echo, and | |
that which is called the Reflection in a Looking-glass, are made by the | |
self-moving matter, by way of patterning and copying out. But then you will ask | |
me, whether the glass takes the copy of the face, or the face prints its copy | |
on the glass, or whether it be the medium of light and air that makes it? I | |
answer, although many Learned men say, that as all perception, so also the | |
seeing of ones face in a Looking-glass, and Echo, are made by impression and | |
reaction; yet I cannot in my simplicity conceive it, how bodies that come not | |
near, or touch each other, can make a figure by impression and reaction: They | |
say it proceeds from the motions of the Medium of light, or air, or both, viz. | |
that the Medium is like a long stick with two ends, whereof one touches the | |
object, the other the organ of sense, and that one end of it moving, the other | |
moves also at the same point of Time, by which motions it may make many several | |
figures; But I cannot conceive, how this motion of pressing forward and | |
backward should make so many figures, wherein there is so much variety and | |
curiosity. But, say light and air are as one figure, and like as a seal do | |
print another body; I answer, if any thing could print, yet it is not probable, | |
that so soft and rare bodies as light and air, could print such solid bodies as | |
glass, nor could air by reverberation make such a sound as Echo. But mistake | |
me not, for, I do not say, that the Corporeal motions of light or air, cannot, | |
or do not pencil, copy, or pattern out any figure, for both light and air are | |
very active in such sorts of Motions, but I say, they cannot do it on any other | |
bodies but their own. But to cut off tedious and unnecessary disputes, I return | |
to the expressing of my own opinion, and believe, that the glass in its own | |
substance doth figure out the copy of the face, or the like, and from that copy | |
the sensitive motions in the eyes take another copy, and so the rational from | |
the sensitive; and in this manner is made both rational and sensitive | |
perception, sight and knowledge. The same with Echoes; for the air patterns out | |
the copy of the sound, and then the sensitive corporeal motions in the ear | |
pattern again this copy from the air, and so do make the perception and sense | |
of hearing. You may ask me, Madam, if it be so, that the glass and the air copy | |
out the figure of the face and of sound, whether the Glass may be said to see | |
and the Air to speak? I answer, I cannot tell that; for though I say, that the | |
air repeats the words, and the glass represents the face, yet I cannot guess | |
what their perceptions are, only this I may say, that the air hath an | |
elemental, and the glass a mineral, but not an animal perception. But if these | |
figures were made by the pressures of several objects or parts, and by | |
reaction, there could not be such variety as there is, for they could but act | |
by one sort of motion: Likewise is it improbable, that sounds, words or voices, | |
should like a company of Wild-Geese fly in the air, and so enter into the ears | |
of the hearers, as they into their nests: Neither can I conceive, how in this | |
manner a word can enter so many ears, that is, be divided into every ear, and | |
yet strike every ear with an undivided vocal sound; You will say, as a small | |
fire doth heat and warm all those that stand by; for the heat issues from the | |
fire, as the light from the Sun. I answer, all what issues and hath motion, | |
hath a Body, and yet most learned men deny that sound, light and heat have | |
bodies: But if they grand of light that it has a body, they say it moves and | |
presses the air, and the air the eye, and so of heat; which if so, then the air | |
must not move to any other motion but light, and only to one sort of light, as | |
the Suns light; for if it did move in any other motion, it would disturb the | |
light; for if a Bird did but fly in the air, it would give all the region of | |
air another motion, and so put out, or alter the light, or at least disturb it; | |
and wind would make a great disturbance in it. Besides, if one body did give | |
another body motion, it must needs give it also substance, for motion is either | |
something or nothing, body or no body, substance or no substance; if nothing, | |
it cannot enter into another body; if something, it must lessen the bulk of the | |
body it quits, and increase the bulk of the body it enters, and so the Sun and | |
Fire with giving light and heat, would become less, for they cannot both give | |
and keep at once, for this is as impossible, as for a man to give to another | |
creature his human Nature, and yet to keep it still. Wherefore my opinion is | |
for heat, that when many men stand round about a fire, and are heated and | |
warmed by it, the fire doth not give them any thing, nor do they receive | |
something from the fire, but the sensitive motions in their bodies pattern out | |
the object of the fires heat, and so they become more or less hot according as | |
their patterns are numerous or perfect; And as for air, it patterns out the | |
light of the Sun, and the sensitive motions in the eyes of animals pattern out | |
the light in the air. The like for Echoes, or any other sound, and for the | |
figures which are presented in a Looking-glass. And thus millions of parts or | |
creatures may make patterns of one or more objects, and the objects neither | |
give nor loose any thing. And this I repeat here, that my meaning of Perception | |
may be the better understood, which is the desire of, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XXV. | |
MADAM, | |
I Perceive you are not fully satisfied with my former Letter concerning Echo, | |
and a figure presented in a Looking-glass; for you say, how is it possible, if | |
Echo consists in the ears patterning out of a voice or sound, but that it will | |
make a confusion in all the parts of the air? My answer is, that I do not say | |
that Echo is only made by the patterning out of the voice or sound, but by | |
repeating the same voice or sound, which repetition is named an Echo, for | |
millions of ears in animals may pattern out a voice or words, and yet never | |
repeat them, and so may millions of parts of the air; wherefore Echo doth not | |
consist in the bare patterning out, but in the repetition of the same sound or | |
words, which are patterned out; and so some parts of the air may at one and the | |
same time pattern out a sound and not repeat it, and some may both pattern out, | |
and repeat it, but some may neither pattern out, nor repeat it, and therefore | |
the Repetition, not the bare Patterning out is called Echo: Just as when two | |
or more men do answer or mock each other, and repeat each others words, it is | |
not necessary, if there were a thousand standers by, that they should all do | |
the same. And as for the figure presented in a Looking-glass, I cannot conceive | |
it to be made by pressure and reaction; for although there is both pressure and | |
reaction in nature, and those very frequent amongst natures Parts, yet they do | |
neither make perception nor production. although both pressure and reaction are | |
made by corporeal self-motions; Wherefore the figure presented in a | |
Looking-glass, or any other smooth glassy body, is, in my opinion, only made | |
by the motions of the Looking-glass, which do both pattern out; and present the | |
figure of an external object in the Glass: But you will say, why do not the | |
motions of other bodies pattern out, and present the figures of external | |
objects, as well as smooth glassy bodies do? I answer, they may pattern out | |
external objects, for any thing I know; but the reason that their figures are | |
not presented to our eyes, lies partly in the presenting subject it self, | |
partly in our sight; for it is observed, that two things are chiefly required | |
in a subject that will present the figure of an external object; first it must | |
be smooth, even and glassy, next it must not be transparent: the first is | |
manifest by experience; for the subject being rough and uneven, will never be | |
able to present such a figure; as for example, A piece of steel rough and | |
unpolished, although it may perhaps pattern out the figure of an external | |
object, yet it will never present its figure, but as soon as it is polished, | |
and made smooth and glassy, the figure is presently perceived. But this is to | |
be observed, that smooth and glassy bodies do not always pattern out exterior | |
objects exactly, but some better, some worse; like as Painters have not all the | |
same ingenuity; neither do all eyes pattern out all objects exactly; which | |
proves that the perception of sight is not made by pressure and reaction, o: | |
herwise there would be no difference, but all eyes would see alike, Next I say, | |
it is observed, that the subject which will present the figure of an external | |
object, must not be transparent; the reason is, that the figure of Light being | |
a substance of a piercing and penetrating quality, hath more force on | |
transparent, then on other solid dark bodies, and so disturbs the figure of an | |
external object patterned out in a transparent body, and quite over-masters it. | |
But you will say, you have found by experience, that if you hold a burning | |
Candle before a Transparentglass, although it be in an open Sun-light, yet the | |
figure of light and flame of the Candle will clearly be seen in the Glass. I | |
answer, that it is an other thing with the figure of Candle-light, then of a | |
duskish or dark body; for a Candle-light, though it is not of the same sort as | |
the Suns light, yet it is of the same nature and quality, and therefore the | |
Candle-light doth resist and oppose the light of the Sun, so that it cannot | |
have so much power over it, as over the figures of other bodies patterned out | |
and presented in Transparent-glass. Lastly, I say, that the fault often-times | |
lies in the perceptive motions of our sight, which is evident by a plain and | |
Concave-glass; for in a plain Looking-glass, the further you go from it, the | |
more your figure presented in the glass seems to draw backward; and in a | |
Concave-glass, the nearer you go to it, the more seems your figure to come | |
forth: which effects are like as an house or tree appears to a Traveller; for, | |
as the man moves from the house or tree, so the house or tree seems to move | |
from the man; or like one that sails upon a Ship, who imagines that the Ship | |
stands still, and the Land moves; when as yet it is the Man and the Ship that | |
moves, and not the House, or Tree, or the Land: so when a Man turns round in a | |
quick motion, or when his head is dizzy, he imagines the room or place, where | |
he is, turns round. Wherefore it is the Inherent Perceptive motions in the Eye, | |
and not the motions in the Looking-glass, which cause these effects. And as for | |
several figures that are presented in one glass, it is absurd to imagine that | |
so many several figures made by so many several motions should touch the eye; | |
certainly this would make such a disturbance, if all figures were to enter or | |
but to touch the eye, as the eye would not perceive any of them, at least not | |
distinctly; Wherefore it is most probable that the glass patterns out those | |
figures, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the eye take again a pattern | |
from those figures patterned out by the glass, and so make copies of copies; | |
but the reason why several figures are presented in one glass in several | |
places, is, that two perfect figures cannot be in one point, nor made by one | |
motion, but by several corporeal motions. Concerning a Looking-glass, made in | |
the form or shape of a Cylinder, why it represents the figure of an external | |
object in an other shape and posture then the object is, the cause is the shape | |
and form of the Glass, and not the patterning motions in the Glass. But this | |
discourse belongs properly to the Optics, wherefore I will leave it to those | |
that are versed in that Art, to enquire and search more after the rational | |
truth thereof. In the mean time, my opinion is, that though the object is the | |
occasion of the figure presented in a Looking-glass, yet the figure is made by | |
the motions of the glass or body that presents it, and that the figure of the | |
glass perhaps may be patterned out as much by the motions of the object in its | |
own substance, as the figure of the object is patterned out and presented by | |
the motions of the glass in its own body or substance. And thus I conclude and | |
rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXVI. | |
MADAM, | |
SInce I mentioned in my last that Light did disturb the figures of External | |
objects presented in Transparent bodies; you were pleased to ask, Whether light | |
doth penetrate transparent bodies? I answer, for any thing I know, it may; for | |
when I consider the subtle, piercing and penetrating nature of light, I believe | |
it doth; but again, when I consider that light is presented to our sight by | |
transparent bodies only, and not by duskish and dark bodies, and yet that | |
those duskish bodies are more porous then the transparent bodies, so that the | |
light hath more passage to pass through them, then through transparent bodies; | |
but that on the contrary, those dark bodies, as Wood, and the like, do quite | |
obscure the light, when as transparent bodies, as Glass, c. transmit it, I am | |
half persuaded that the transparent bodies, as Glass, rather present the Light | |
by patterning it out, then by giving it passage: Also I am of a mind, that the | |
air in a room may pattern out the Light from the Glass, for the Light in a room | |
doth not appear so clear as in the Glass; also if the Glass be any way | |
defective, it doth not present the Light so perfectly, whereas, if it were the | |
penetration of light through the glass, the light would pass through all sorts | |
of glass alike, which it doth not, but is more clearly seen through some, and | |
more obscurely through others, according to the goodness or purity of the | |
glass. But you may say, that the light divulges the imperfection or goodness of | |
the glass; I answer, so it doth of any other objects perceived by our sight; | |
for light is the presenter of objects to the sense and perception of sight, and | |
for any thing I know, the corporeal optic motions make the figure of light, | |
the ground figure of all other figures patterned out by the corporeal optic | |
motions, as in dreams, or when as some do see in the dark, that is, without the | |
help of exterior light. But you may say, That if the glass and the air in a | |
room did pattern out the figure of light, those patterns of light would remain | |
when light is absent: I answer, That is not usual in nature; for when the | |
object removes, the Pattern alters; I will not say but that the corporeal | |
optic motions may work by rote without objects, but that is irregular, as in | |
some distempers. And thus, Madam, I have given you my opinion also to this your | |
question; if you have any more scruples, I pray let me know of them, and assure | |
your self that I shall be ready upon all occasions to express my self, | |
MADAM, Your humble and faithful Servant. | |
XXVII. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur desire is to know, why sound is louder in a Vault, and in a large Room | |
then in a less? I answer, A Vault or arched Figure is the freest from | |
obstruction, as being without corners and points, so as the sensitive and | |
rational corporeal motions of the Ear can have a better perception; like as the | |
Eye can see farthest from a hill then being upon a level ground, because the | |
prospect is freer from the hill, as without obstruction, unless it be so cloudy | |
that the clouds do hinder the perception; And as the eye can have a better | |
prospect upon a hill, so the ear a stronger perception in a Vault; And as for | |
sound, that it is better perceived in a large, then in a little close room or | |
place, it is somewhat like the perception of sent, for the more the odorous | |
parts are bruised, the stronger is that perception of sent, as being repeated | |
double or treble, which makes the perception stronger, like as a thick body is | |
stronger then a thin one; So likewise the perception of sound in the air; for | |
though not all the parts of the air make repetitions, yet some or many make | |
patterns of the sound; the truth is, Air is as industrious to divulge or | |
present a found, by patterns to the Ear, as light doth objects to the Eye. But | |
then you may ask me, Why a long hollow pipe doth convey a voice to the ear more | |
readily, then any large and open place? My answer is, That the Parts of the air | |
in a long pipe are more Composed and not at liberty to wander, so that upon | |
necessity they must move only to the patterning out of the sound, having no | |
choice, which makes the sound much stronger, and the perception of the Ear | |
perfecter; But as for Pipes, Vaults, Prospects, as also figures presented in a | |
room through a little hole, inverted, and many the like, belongs more to | |
Artists then to my study, for though Natural Philosophy gives or points out the | |
Ground, and shows the reason, yet it is the Artist that Works; Besides it is | |
more proper for Mathematicians to discourse of, which study I am not versed in; | |
and so leaving it to them, I rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXVIII. | |
MADAM, | |
FRom Sound I am come to Sent, in the discourse whereof, your Author Ch. 29. | |
art. 12. | |
is pleased to set down these following propositions: 1. That smelling is | |
hindered by cold and helped by heat: 2. That when the Wind blows from the | |
object, the smell is the stronger, and when it blows from the sentient towards | |
the object, the weaker, which by experience is found in dogs, that follow | |
thetrack of beasts by the Sent: 3. That such bodies as are last pervious to the | |
fluid medium, yield less smell then such as are more pervious: 4. That such | |
bodies as are of their own nature odorous, become yet more odorous, when they | |
are bruised: 5. That when the breath is stopped (at least in man) nothing can | |
be smelt: 6. That the Sense of smelling is also taken away by the stopping of | |
the Nostrils, though the mouth be left open. To begin from the last, I say, | |
that the nose is like the other sensitive organs, which if they be stopped, the | |
corporeal sensitive motions cannot take copies of the exterior objects, and | |
therefore must alter their action of patterning to some other, for when the eye | |
is shut and cannot perceive outward objects then it works to the Sense of | |
Touch, or on the inside of the organ to some phantasmes; and so do the rest of | |
the Senses. As for the stopping of breath, why it hinders the Sent, the cause | |
is, that the nostrils and the mouth are the chief organs, to receive air and to | |
let out breath: but though they be common passages for air and breath, yet | |
taste is only made in the mouth and tongue, and sent in the nose; not by the | |
pressure of meat, and the odoriferous object, but by patterning out the several | |
figures or objects of sent and taste, for the nose and the mouth will smell and | |
taste one, nay several things at the same time, like as the eye will see light, | |
colour, and other objects at once, which I think can hardly be done by | |
pressures; and the reason is, that the sensitive motions in the sensitive | |
organs make patterns of several objects at one time, which is the cause, that | |
when flowers, and such like odoriferous bodies are bruised, there are as many | |
figures made as there are parts bruised or divided, and by reason of so many | |
figures the sensitive knowledge is stronger; but that stones, minerals, and the | |
like, seem not so strong to our smell, the reason is, that their parts being | |
close and united, the sensitive motions in the organ cannot so readily perceive | |
and pattern them out, as those bodies which are more porous and divided. But as | |
for the wind blowing the sent either to or from the sentient, it is like a | |
window or door that by the motion of opening and shutting, hinders or | |
disturbs the sight; for bodies coming between the object and the organ, make | |
a stop of that perception. And as for the Dogs smelling out the track of | |
Beasts, the cause is, that the earth or ground hath taken a copy of that sent, | |
which copy the sensitive motions in the nose of the Dog do pattern out, and so | |
long as that figure or copy lasts, the Dog perceives the sent, but if he doth | |
not follow or hunt readily, then there is either no perfect copy made by the | |
ground, or otherwise he cannot find it, which causes him to seek and smell | |
about until he hath it; and thus smell is not made by the motion of the air, | |
but by the figuring motions in the nose: Where it is also to be observed, that | |
not only the motions in one, but in millions of noses, may pattern out one | |
little object at one time, and therefore it is not, that the object of sent | |
fills a room by sending out the sent from its substance, but that so many | |
figures are made of that object of sent by so many several sensitive motions, | |
which pattern the same out; and so the air, or ground, or any other creature, | |
whose sensitive motions pattern out the object of sent, may perceive the same, | |
although their sensitive organs are not like to those of animal creatures; for | |
if there be but such sensitive motions and perceptions, it is no matter for | |
such organs. Lastly, it is to be observed, That all Creatures have not the same | |
strength of smelling, but some smell stronger, some weaker, according to the | |
disposition of their sensitive motions: Also there be other parts in the body, | |
which pattern out the object of sent, besides the nose, but those are interior | |
parts, and take their patterns from the nose as the organ properly designed for | |
it; neither is their resentment the same, because their motions are not alike, | |
for the stomach may perceive and pattern out a sent with aversion, when the | |
nose may pattern it out with pleasure. And thus much also of Sent; I conclude | |
and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XXIX. | |
MADAM, | |
COncerning your Learned Authors discourse of Density and Rality, he defines C. | |
30. a. 1. | |
Thick to be that, which takes up more parts of a space given; and thin, which | |
contains fewer parts of the same magnitude: not that there is more matter in | |
one place then in an other equal place, but a greater quantity of some named | |
body; wherefore the multitude and paucity of the parts contained within the | |
same space do constitute density and rarity. Where of my opinion is, That there | |
is no more nor less space or place then body according to its dilation or | |
contraction, and that space and place are dilated and contracted with the body, | |
according to the magnitude of the body, for body, place and magnitude are the | |
same thing, only place is in regard of the several parts of the body, and there | |
is as well space betwixt things distant a hairs breadth from one another, as | |
betwixt things distant a million of miles, but yet this space is nothing from | |
the body; but it makes, that that body has not the same place with this body, | |
that is, that this body is not that body, and that this bodies place is not | |
that bodies place. Next your Author says, Art. 2. | |
He hath already clearly enough demonstrated, that there can be no beginning of | |
motion, but from an external and moved body, and that heavy bodies being once | |
cast upwards cannot be cast down again, but by external motion. Truly, Madam, I | |
will not speak of your Authors demonstrations, for it is done most by art, | |
which I have no knowledge in, but I think I have probably declared, that all the | |
actions of nature are not forced by one part, driving, pressing, or shoving | |
another, as a man doth a wheel-barrow, or a whip a horse; nor by reactions, as | |
if men were at foot-ball or cuffs, or as men with carts meeting each other in a | |
narrow lane. But to prove there is no self-motion in nature, he goes on and | |
says; To attribute to created bodies the power to move themselves, what is it | |
else, then to say that there be creatures which have no dependence upon the | |
Creator? To which I answer, That if man. (who is but a single part of nature) | |
hath given him by God the power and a free will of moving himself, why should | |
not God give it to Nature? Neither can I see, how it can take off the | |
dependence upon God, more then Eternity; for if there be an Eternal Creator, | |
there is also an Eternal Creature, and if an Eternal Master, an Eternal | |
Servant, which is Nature; and yet Nature is subject to Gods Command, and | |
depends upon him; and if all Gods Attributes be Infinite, then his Bounty is | |
Infinite also, which cannot be exercised but by an Infinite Gift, but a Gift | |
doth not cause a less dependence. I do not say, That man hath an absolute | |
Free-will, or power to move, according to his desire; for it is not conceived, | |
that a part can have an absolute power: nevertheless his motion both of body | |
and mind is a free and self-motion, and such a self-motion hath every thing in | |
Nature according to its figure or shape; for motion and figure, being inherent | |
in matter, matter moves figuratively. Yet do I not say, That there is no | |
hindrance, obstruction and opposition in nature; but as there is no particular | |
Creature, that hath an absolute power of self-moving; so that Creature which | |
hath the advantage of strength, subtilty, or policy, shape, or figure, and the | |
like, may oppose and over-power another which is inferior to it, in all this; | |
yet this hinderance and opposition doth not take away self-motion. But I | |
perceive your Author is much for necessitation, and against free-will, which I | |
leave to Moral Philosophers and Divines. And as for the ascending of light, and | |
descending of heavy bodies, there may be many causes, but these four are | |
perceiveable by our senses, as bulk, or quantity of body, grossness of | |
substance, density, and shape or figure, which make heavy bodies descend: But | |
little quantity, purity of substance, rarity, and figure or shape make light | |
bodies ascend. Wherefore I cannot believe, that there are certain little bodies | |
as atoms, and by reason of their smallness, invisible, differing Art. 3. | |
from one another in consistence, figure, motion and magnitude, intermingled | |
with the air, which should be the cause of the descending of heavy bodies. And | |
concerning air, whether it be subject to our senses or not, I say, that if air | |
be neither hot, nor cold, it is not subject; but Art. 14. | |
if it be, the sensitive motions will soon pattern it out, and declare it. I'll | |
conclude with your Authors question, What Art. 6. | |
the cause is, that a man doth not feel the weight of Water in Water? and | |
answer, it is the dilating nature of Water. But of this question and of Water I | |
shall treat more fully hereafter, and so I rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXX. | |
MADAM, | |
I Am reading now the works of that Famous and most Renowned Author, Des | |
Cartes, out of which I intend to pick out only those discourses which I like | |
best, and not to examine his opinions, as they go along from the beginning to | |
the end of his books; And in order to this, I have chosen in the first place, | |
his discourse of motion, and do not assent to his opinion, Philos. p. 2. | |
when he defines Motion to be only a Mode of a thing, and not the thing or | |
body it self; for, in my opinion, Art. 2^ | |
there can be no abstraction made of motion from body, neither really, nor in | |
the manner of our conception, for how can I conceive that which is not, nor | |
cannot be in nature, that is, to conceive motion without body? Wherefore Motion | |
is but one thing with body, without any separation or abstraction soever. | |
Neither doth it agree with my reason, that one body can give or transferr Art. | |
40. | |
motion into another body; and as much motion it gives or transferrs into that | |
body, as much loses it: As for example, in two hard bodies thrown against one | |
another, where one, that is thrown with greater force, takes the other along | |
with it, and loses as much motion as it gives it. For how can motion, being no | |
substance, but only a mode, quit one body, and pass into another? One body may | |
either occasion, or imitate another motion, but it can neither give nor take | |
away what belongs to its own or another bodies substance, no more then matter | |
can quit its nature from being matter; and therefore my opinion is, that if | |
motion doth go out of one body into another, then substance goes too; for | |
motion, and substance or body, as aforementioned, are all one thing, and then | |
all bodies that receive motion from other bodies, must needs increase in their | |
substance and quantity, and those bodies which impart or transferr motion, must | |
decrease as much as they increase: Truly, Madam, that neither Motion nor Figure | |
should subsist by themselves, and yet be transferrable into other bodies, is | |
very strange, and as much as to prove them to be nothing, and yet to say they | |
are something. The like may be said of all others, which they call accidents, | |
as skill, learning, knowledge, c. saying, they are no bodies, because they have | |
no extension, but inherent in bodies or substances as in their subjects; for | |
although the body may subsist without them, yet they being always with the | |
body, body and they are all one thing: And so is power and body, for body | |
cannot quit power, nor power the body, being all one thing. But to return to | |
Motion, my opinion is, That all matter is partly animate, and partly inanimate, | |
and all matter is moving and moved, and that there is no part of Nature that | |
hath not life and knowledge, for there is no Part that has not a comixture of | |
animate and inanimate matter; and though the inanimate matter has no motion, | |
nor life and knowledge of it self, as the animate has, nevertheless being both | |
so closely joined and commixed as in one body, the inanimate moves as well as | |
the animate, although not in the same manner; for the animate moves of it self, | |
and the inanimate moves by the help of the animate, and thus the animate is | |
moving and the inanimate moved; not that the animate matter transfers, infuses, | |
or communicates its own motion to the inanimate; for this is impossible, by | |
reason it cannot part with its own nature, nor alter the nature of inanimate | |
matter, but each retains its own nature; for the inanimate matter remains | |
inanimate, that is, without self-motion, and the animate loses nothing of its | |
self-motion, which otherwise it would, if it should impart or transferr its | |
motion into the inanimate matter; but only as I said heretofore, the inanimate | |
works or moves with the animate, because of their close union and commixture; | |
for the animate forces or causes the inanimate matter to work with her; and | |
thus one is moving, the other moved, and consequently there is life and | |
knowledge in all parts of nature, by reason in all parts of nature there is a | |
commixture of animate and inanimate matter: and this Life and Knowledge is sense | |
and reason, or sensitive and rational corporeal motions, which are all one | |
thing with animate matter without any distinction or abstraction, and can no | |
more quit matter, then matter can quit motion. Wherefore every creature being | |
composed of this commixture of animate and inanimate matter, has also | |
selfe-motion, that is life and knowledge, sense and reason, so that no part hath | |
need to give or receive motion to or from another part; although it may be an | |
occasion of such a manner of motion to another part, and cause it to move thus | |
or thus: as for example, A Watch-maker doth not give the watch its motion, but | |
he is only the occasion, that the watch moves after that manner, for the | |
motion of the watch is the watches own motion, inherent in those parts ever | |
since that matter was, and if the watch ceases to move after such a manner or | |
way, that manner or way of motion is never the less in those parts of matter, | |
the watch is made of, and if several other figures should be made of that | |
matter, the power of moving in the said manner or mode, would yet still remain | |
in all those parts of matter as long as they are body, and have motion in them. | |
Wherefore one body may occasion another body to move so or so, but not give it | |
any motion, but everybody (though occasioned by another, to move in such a way) | |
moves by its own natural motion; for self-motion is the very nature of animate | |
matter, and is as much in hard, as in fluid bodies, although your Author denies | |
it, saying, The nature of fluid bodies consists in the motion of those little | |
insensible parts into which Philos. part. 2. a. 54. | |
they are divided, and the nature of bard bodies, when those little particles | |
joined closely together, do rest; for there is no rest in nature; wherefore if | |
there were a World of Gold, and a World of Air, I do verily believe, that the | |
World of Gold would be as much interiously active, as the World of Air | |
exteriously; for Natures motions are not all external or perceptible by our | |
senses, neither are they all circular, or only of one sort, but there is an | |
infinite change and variety of motions; for though I say in my Philosophical | |
opinions, Part. 1. c. 5. | |
As there is but one only Matter, so there is but one only Motion; yet I do | |
not mean, there is but one particular sort of motions, as either circular, or | |
straight, or the like, but that the nature of motion is one and the same, | |
simple and entire in it self, that is, it is mere motion, or nothing else but | |
corporeal motion; and that as there are infinite divisions or parts of matter, | |
so there are infinite changes and varieties of motions, which is the reason | |
that I call motion as well infinite as matter; first that matter and motion are | |
but one thing, and if matter be infinite, motion must be so too; and secondly, | |
that motion is infinite in its changes and variations, as matter is in its | |
parts. And thus much of motion for this time; I add no more, but rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XXXI. | |
MADAM, | |
I Observe your Author in his discourse of Place makes a difference betwixt an | |
Interior and Exterior Philos. p. 2. a. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. | |
place, and that according to this distinction, one body may be said to change, | |
and not to change its place at the same time, and that one body may succeed | |
into another place. But I am not of this opinion, for I believe not that there | |
is any more place then body; as for example, Water being mixed with Earth, the | |
water doth not take the Earths place, but as their parts intermix, so do their | |
places, and as their parts change, so do their places, so that there is no more | |
place, then there is water and earth; the same may be said of Air and Water, or | |
Air and Earth, or did they all mix together; for as their bodies join, so do | |
their places, and as they are separated from each other, so are their places. | |
Say a man travels a hundred miles, and so a hundred thousand paces; but yet | |
this man has not been in a hundred thousand places, for he never had any other | |
place but his own, he hath joined and separated himself from a hundred | |
thousand, nay millions of parts, but he has left no places behind him. You will | |
say, if he travel the same way back again, then he is said to travel thorough the | |
same places. I answer, It may be the vulgar way of expression, or the common | |
phrase; but to speak properly, after a Philosophical way, and according to the | |
truth in nature, he cannot be said to go back again thorough the same places he | |
went, because he left none behind him, or else all his way would be nothing but | |
place after place, all the hundred miles along; besides if place should be | |
taken so, as to express the joining to the nearest bodies which compass him | |
about, certainly he would never find his places again; for the air being fluid, | |
changes or moves continually, and perchance the same parts of the air, which | |
compassed him once, will never come near him again. But you may say, If a man | |
be hurt, or hath some mischance in his body, so as to have a piece of flesh cut | |
out, and new flesh growing there; then we say, because the adjoining parts do | |
not change, that a new piece of flesh is grown in the same place where the | |
former flesh was, and that the place of the former flesh cut or fallen out, is | |
the same of this new grown flesh. I answer, In my opinion, it is not, for the | |
parts being not the same, the places are not, but every one hath its own place. | |
But if the wound be not filled or closed up with other new flesh, you will say, | |
that according to my opinion there is no place then at all. I say, Yes, for the | |
air or any thing else may be there, as new parts joining to the other parts; | |
nevertheless, the air, or that same body which is there, hath not taken the | |
fleshes place, which was there before, but hath its own; but, by reason the | |
adjoining parts remain, man thinks the place remains there also which is no | |
consequence. 'Tis true, a man may return to the same adjoining bodies, where he | |
was before, but then he brings his place with him again, and as his body, so | |
his place returns also, and if a mans arm be cut off, you may say, there was | |
an arm heretofore, but you cannot say properly, this is the place where the arm | |
was. But to return to my first example of the mixture of Water, and Earth or | |
Air; Suppose water is not porous, but only dividable, and hath no other place | |
but what is its own bodies', and that other parts of water intermix with it by | |
dividing and composing; I say, there is no more place required, then what | |
belongs to their own parts, for if some contract, others dilate, some divide, | |
others join, the places are the same according to the magnitude of each part or | |
body. The same may be said of all kinds or sorts of mixtures, for one body hath | |
but one place; and so if many parts of the same nature join into one body and | |
increase the bulk of the body, the place of that same body is accordingly; and | |
if they be bodies of different natures which intermix and join, each several | |
keeps its place; And so each body and each particular part of a body hath its | |
place, for you cannot name body or part of a body, but you must also understand | |
place to be with them, and if a point should dilate to a world, or a world | |
contract to a point, the place would always be the same with the body. And thus | |
I have declared my opinion of this subject, which I submit to the correction of | |
your better judgment, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your Ladyships faithful Friend and humble Servant. | |
XXXII. | |
MADAM, | |
IN my last, I hope, I have sufficiently declared my opinion, That to one body | |
belongs but one place, and that no body can leave a place behind it, but | |
wheresoever is body, there is place also. Now give me leave to examine this | |
question: when a bodies figure is printed on snow, or any other fluid or soft | |
matter, as air, water, and the like; whether it be the body, that prints its | |
own figure upon the snow, or whether it be the snow, that patterns the figure | |
of the body? My answer is, That it is not the body, which prints its figure | |
upon the snow, but the snow that patterns out the figure of the body; for if a | |
seal be printed upon wax, 'tis true, it is the figure of the seal, which is | |
printed on the wax, but yet the seal doth not give the wax the print of its own | |
figure, but it is the wax that takes the print or pattern from the seal, and | |
patterns or copies it out in its own substance, just as the sensitive motions | |
in the eye do pattern out the figure of an object, as I have declared | |
heretofore. But you will say, perhaps, A body being printed upon snow, as it | |
leaves its print, so it leaves also its place with the print in the snow. I | |
answer, That doth not follow; For the place remains still the bodies place, and | |
when the body removes out of the snow, it takes its place along with it: Just | |
like a man, whose picture is drawn by a Painter, when he goes away, he leaves | |
not his place with his picture, but his place goes with his body; and as the | |
place of the picture is the place of the colour or paint, and the place of the | |
copy of an exterior object patterned out by the sensitive corporeal motions is | |
the place of the sensitive organ, so the place of the print in snow, is the | |
snows place; or else, if the print were the bodies place that is printed, and | |
not the snow's, it might as well be said, that the motion and shape of a watch | |
were not the motion and shape of the watch, but of the hand of him that made | |
it. And as it is with snow, so it is with air, for a mans figure is patterned | |
out by the parts and motions of the air, wheresoever he moves; the difference | |
is only, that air being a fluid body doth not retain the print so long, as | |
snow or a harder body doth, but when the body removes, the print is presently | |
dissolved. But I wonder much, your Author denies, that there can be two bodies | |
in one place, and yet makes two places for one body, when all is but the | |
motions of one body: Wherefore a man sailing in a Ship, cannot be said to keep | |
place, and to change his place; for it is not place he changes, but only the | |
adjoining parts, as leaving some, and joining to others; and it is very | |
improper, to attribute that to place which belongs to parts, and to make a | |
change of place out of change of parts. I conclude, repeating once again, that | |
figure and place are still remaining the same with body; For example; let a | |
stone be beat to dust, and this dust be severally dispersed, nay, changed into | |
numerous figures; I say, as long as the substance of the stone remains in the | |
power of those dispersed and changed parts, and their corporeal motions, the | |
place of it continues also; and as the corporeal motions change and vary, so | |
doth place, magnitude and figure, together with their parts or bodies, for they | |
are but one thing. And so I conclude, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXXIII. | |
MADAM, | |
I Am absolutely of your Authors opinion, when he says, That all bodies of | |
this Universe are of one and Philos. part. 3. a. 46. | |
the same matter, really divided into many parts, and that these parts are | |
diversely moved: But that these motions should be circular more then of any | |
other sort, I cannot believe, although he thinks that this is the most probable | |
way, to find out the causes of natural effects: for nature is not bound to one | |
sort of motions more then to another, and it is but in vain to endeavour to | |
know how, and by what motions God did make the World, since Creation is an | |
action of God, and Gods actions are incomprehensible; Wherefore his ethereal | |
Whirlpooles, and little particles of matter, which he reduces to three sorts | |
and calls them the three elements of the Universe, their circular motions, | |
several figures, shavings, and many the like, which you may better read, then I | |
rehearse to you, are to my thinking, rather Fancies, then rational or probable | |
conceptions: for how can we imagine that the Universe was set a moving as a Top | |
by a Whip, or a Wheel by the hand of a Spinster, and that the vacuities were | |
filled up with shavings? for these violent motions would rather have disturbed | |
and disordered Nature; and though Nature uses variety in her motions or | |
actions, yet these are not extravagant, nor by force or violence, but orderly, | |
temperate, free, and easy, which causes me to believe, the Earth turns about | |
rather then the Sun; and though corporeal motions for variety make Whirl-winds, | |
yet Whirl-winds are not constant, Neither can I believe that the swiftness of | |
motion could make the matter more subtle and pure then it was by nature, for it | |
is the purity and subtilty of the matter, that causes motion, and makes it | |
swifter or slower, and not motion the subtilty and purity of matter; motion | |
being only the action of matter; and the self-moving part of matter is the | |
working part of nature, which is wise, and knows how to move and form every | |
creature without instruction; and this self-motion is as much her own as the | |
other parts of her body, matter and figure, and is one and the same with her | |
self, as a corporeal, living, knowing, and inseparable being, and a part of her | |
self. As for the several parts of matter, I do believe, that they are not all | |
of one and the same bigness, nor of one and the same figure, neither do I hold | |
their figures to be unalterable; for if all parts in nature be corporeal, they | |
are dividable, composable, and intermixable, and then they cannot be always of | |
one and the same sort of figure; besides nature would not have so much work if | |
there were no change of figures: and since her only action is change of | |
motion, change of motion must needs make change of figures: and thus natural | |
parts of matter may change from lines to points, and from points to lines, from | |
squares to circles, and so forth, infinite ways, according to the change of | |
motions; but though they change their figures, yet they cannot change their | |
matter; for matter as it has been, so it remains constantly in each degree, as | |
the Rational, Sensitive and Inanimate, none becomes purer, none grosser then | |
ever it was, notwithstanding the infinite changes of motions, which their | |
figures undergo; for Motion changes only the figure, not the matter it self, | |
which continues still the same in its nature, and cannot be altered without a | |
confusion or destruction of Nature. And this is the constant opinion of, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and humble Servant. | |
XXXIV. | |
MADAM, | |
THat Rarefaction is only a change of figure, according to your Authors | |
opinion, is in my reason Philos. part. 2. a. 6, 7. | |
very probable; but when he says, that in rarefied bodies are little intervals | |
or pores filled up with some other subtle matter, if he means that all rarefied | |
bodies are porous, I dissent from him; for it is not necessary that all | |
rarefied bodies should be porous, and all hard bodies without pores: but if | |
there were a probability of pores, I am of opinion, it would be more in dense | |
and hard, than in rare and soft bodies; as for example, rarefying and dilating | |
motions are plaining, smoothing, spreading and making all parts even, which | |
could not well be, if there were holes or pores; Earth is dense and hard, and | |
yet is porous, and flame is rare and dilating, and yet is not porous; and | |
certainly Water is not so porous as Earth. Wherefore pores, in my opinion, are | |
according to the nature or form of the figure, and not according to the rarity | |
or thinness, and density or thickness of the substance. As for his thin and | |
subtle matter filling up the pores of porous bodies, I assent to your Author so | |
far, that I mean, thin and thick, or rare and dense substances are joined and | |
mixed together. As for plaining, smoothing and spreading, I do not mean so much | |
artificial plaining and spreading; as for example, when a piece of gold is | |
beaten into a thin plate, and a board is made plain and smooth by a Joiners | |
tool, or a napkin folded up is spread plain and even, although, when you | |
observe these arts, you may judge somewhat of the nature of natural dilations; | |
for a folded cloth is fuller of creases then when plain, and the beating of a | |
thin plate is like to the motion of dilation, which is to spread out, and the | |
form of rarefying is thinning and extending. I add only this, that I am not | |
of your Authors opinion, that Rest is the Cause or Glue which keeps the parts | |
of dense or hard bodies together, but it is retentive motions. And so I | |
conclude, resting, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXXV. | |
MADAM, | |
THat the Mind, according to your Authors opinion, is a substance really | |
distinct from the body, and may be actually separated from it and subsist | |
without it: If he mean the natural mind and soul of Man, not the supernatural | |
or divine, I am far from his opinion; for though the mind moves only in its | |
own parts, and not upon, or with the parts of inanimate matter, yet it cannot | |
be separated from these parts of matter, and subsist by its self, as being a | |
part of one and the same matter the inanimate is of, (for there is but one | |
only matter, and one kind of matter, although of several degrees,) only it is | |
the self-moving part; but yet this cannot empower it, to quit the same natural | |
body, whose part it is. Neither can I apprehend, that the Mind's or Soul's seat | |
should be in the Glandula or kernel of the Brain, and there sit like a Spider | |
in a Cobweb, to whom the least motion of the Cobweb gives intelligence of a | |
Fly, which he is ready to assault, and that the Brain should get intelligence | |
by the animal spirits as his servants, which run to and fro like Ants to inform | |
it; or that the Mind should, according to others opinions, be a light, and | |
embroidered all with Ideas, like a Heralds Coat; and that the sensitive organs | |
should have no knowledge in themselves, but serve only like peepingholes for | |
the mind, or barn-dores to receive bundles of pressures, like sheaves of Corn; | |
For there being a thorough mixture of animate, rational and sensitive, and | |
inanimate matter, we cannot assign a certain seat or place to the rational, | |
another to the sensitive, and another to the inanimate, but they are diffused | |
and intermixed throughout all the body; And this is the reason, that sense and | |
knowledge cannot be bound only to the head or brain: But although they are mixed | |
together, nevertheless they do not lose their interior natures by this mixture, | |
nor their purity and subtilty, nor their proper motions or actions, but each | |
moves according to its nature and substance, without confusion; The actions of | |
the rational part in Man, which is the Mind or Soul, are called Thoughts, or | |
thoughtful perceptions, which are numerous, and so are the sensitive | |
perceptions; for though Man, or any other animal hath but five exterior | |
sensitive organs, yet there be numerous perceptions made in these sensitive | |
organs, and in all the body; nay, every several Pore of the flesh is a | |
sensitive organ, as well as the Eye, or the Ear. But both sorts, as well the | |
rational as the sensitive, are different from each other, although both do | |
resemble another, as being both parts of animate matter, as I have mentioned | |
before: Wherefore I'll add no more, only let you know, that I constantly | |
remain, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XXXVI. | |
MADAM, | |
THat all other animals, besides man, want reason, your Author endeavours to | |
prove in his discourse of method, where his chief argument is, That other | |
animals cannot express their mind, thoughts or conceptions, either by speech or | |
any other signs, as man can do: For, says he, it is not for want of the organs | |
belonging to the framing of words, as we may observe in Parrots and Pies, which | |
are apt enough to express words they are taught, but understand nothing of | |
them. My answer is, That one man expressing his mind by speech or words to an | |
other, doth not declare by it his excellency and supremacy above all other | |
Creatures, but for the most part more folly, for a talking man is not so wise | |
as a contemplating man. But by reason other Creatures cannot speak or discourse | |
with each other as men, or make certain signs, whereby to express themselves as | |
dumb and deaf men do, should we conclude, they have neither knowledge, sense, | |
reason, or intelligence? Certainly, this is a very weak argument; for one part | |
of a mans body, as one hand, is not less sensible then the other, nor the heel | |
less sensible then the heart, nor the leg less sensible then the head, but | |
each part hath its sense and reason, and so consequently its sensitive and | |
rational knowledge; and although they cannot talk or give intelligence to each | |
other by speech, nevertheless each hath its own peculiar and particular | |
knowledge, just as each particular man has his own particular knowledge, for | |
one man's knowledge is not another man's knowledge; and if there be such a | |
peculiar and particular knowledge in every several part of one animal creature, | |
as man, well may there be such in Creatures of different kinds and sorts: But | |
this particular knowledge belonging to each creature, doth not prove that there | |
is no intelligence at all betwixt them, no more then the want of humane | |
Knowledge doth prove the want of Reason; for reason is the rational part of | |
matter, and makes perception, observation, and intelligence different in every | |
creature, and every sort of creatures, according to their proper natures, but | |
perception, observation and intelligence do not make reason, Reason being the | |
cause, and they the effects. Wherefore though other Creatures have not the | |
speech, nor Mathematical rules and demonstrations, with other Arts and | |
Sciences, as Men; yet may their perceptions and observations be as wise as | |
Men's, and they may have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, | |
after their own manner and way, as men have after theirs: To which I leave | |
them, and Man to his conceited prerogative and excellence, resting, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XXXVII. | |
MADAM, | |
COncerning Sense and Perception, your Authors opinion is, That it is made by a | |
motion or impression from the object upon the sensitive organ, Philos. part. 4. | |
a. 189. | |
which impression, by means of the nerves, is brought to the brain, and so to | |
the mind or soul, which only perceives in the brain; Explaining it by the | |
example of a Man being blind, or walking in dark, who by the help Diopt. c. 1. | |
a. 2, 3. c. 4. a. 1. | |
of his stick can perceive when he touches a Stone, a Tree, Water, Sand, and | |
the like; which example he brings to make a comparison with the perception of | |
Light; For, says he, Light in a shining body, is nothing else but a quick and | |
lively motion or action, which through the air and other transparent bodies | |
tends towards the eye, in the same manner as the motion or resistance of the | |
bodies, the blind man meets withal, tends thorough the stick towards the hand; | |
wherefore it is no wonder that the Sun can display its rays so far in an | |
instant, seeing that the same action, whereby one end of the stick is moved, | |
goes instantly also to the other end, and would do the same if the stick were | |
as long as Heaven is distant from Earth. To which I answer first, That it is | |
not only the Mind that perceives in the kernel of the Brain, but that there is | |
a double perception, rational and sensitive, and that the mind perceives by the | |
rational, but the body and the sensitive organs by the sensitive perception; | |
and as there is a double perception, so there is also a double knowledge, | |
rational tional and sensitive, one belonging to the mind, the other to the | |
body; for I believe that the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and all the Body, have | |
knowledge as well as the Mind, only the rational matter, being subtle and pure, | |
is not encumbered with the grosser part of matter, to work upon, or with it, but | |
leaves that to the sensitive, and works or moves only in its own substance, | |
which makes a difference between thoughts, and exterior senses. Next I say, | |
That it is not the Motion or Reaction of the bodies, the blind man meets | |
withal, which makes the sensitive perception of these objects, but the | |
sensitive corporeal motions in the hand do pattern out the figure of the Stick, | |
Stone, Tree, Sand, and the like. And as for comparing the perception of the | |
hand, when by the help of the stick it perceives the objects, with the | |
perception of light, I confess that the sensitive perceptions do all resemble | |
each other, because all sensitive parts of matter are of one degree, as being | |
sensible parts, only there is a difference according to the figures of the | |
objects presented to the senses; and there is no better proof for perception | |
being made by the sensitive motions in the body, or sensitive organs, but that | |
all these sensitive perceptions are alike; and resemble one another; for if | |
they were not made in the body of the sentient, but by the impression of | |
exterior objects, there would be so much difference betwixt them, by reason of | |
the diversity of objects, as they would have no resemblance at all. But for a | |
further proof of my own opinion, did the perception proceed merely from the | |
motion, impression and resistance of the objects, the hand could not perceive | |
those objects, unless they touched the hand it self, as the stick doth; for it | |
is not probable, that the motions of the stone, water, sand; c. should leave | |
their bodies and enter into the stick, and so into the hand; for motion must be | |
either something or nothing; if something, the stick and the hand would grow | |
bigger, and the objects touched less, or else the touching and the touched must | |
exchange their motions, which cannot be done so suddenly, especially between | |
solid bodies; But if motion has no body, it is nothing, and how nothing can | |
pass or enter or move some body, I cannot conceive. Tis true there is no part | |
that can subsist singly by it self, without dependence upon each other, and so | |
parts do always join and touch each other, which I am not against; but only I | |
say perception is not made by the exterior motions of exterior parts of | |
objects, but by the interior motions of the parts of the body sentient. But I | |
have discoursed hereof before, and so I take my leave, resting, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXXVIII. | |
MADAM, | |
ICannot conceive why your Author is so much for little and insensible parts, | |
out of which the Elements and all other bodies are made; for though Nature is | |
divideable, yet she is also composeable; and I think there is no need to | |
dissect every creature into such little parts, to know their nature, but we can | |
do it by another way as well; for we may dissect or divide them into never so | |
little parts, and yet gain never the more knowledge by it. But according to | |
these principles he describing amongst the rest the nature of Water, says, That | |
those little Of Meteor. 1. a. 3. | |
parts, out of which Water consists, are in figure somewhat long, light and | |
slippery like little Eels, which are never so closely joined and entangled, | |
but may easily be separated. To which I answer, That I observe the nature and | |
figure of water to be flowing, dilating, divideable and circular; for we may | |
see, in Tides, overflowings, and breaking into parts, as in rain, it will | |
always move in a round and circular figure; And I think, if its parts were long | |
and entangled like a knot of Eels, it could never be so easily contracted and | |
denced into snow or ice. Neither do I think, That Salt-water hath a mixture of | |
somewhat grosser parts, not so apt to bend; for to C. 3. a. 1. | |
my observation and reason, the nature of salt-water consists herein, that its | |
circle-lines are pointed, which sharp and pointed figure makes it so | |
penetrating; yet may those points be separated from the circle lines of water, | |
as it is seen in the making of Salt. But I am not of your Authors opinion, That | |
those little points do stick so fast in flesh, as little nails, to keep it from | |
putrefaction; for points do not always fasten; or else fire, which certainly is | |
composed of sharp-pointed parts, would harden, and keep other bodies from | |
dissolving, whereas on the contrary, it separates and divides them, although | |
after several manners. But Putrefaction is only a dissolving and separating of | |
parts, after the manner of dilation; and the motion of salt is contracting as | |
well as penetrating, for we may observe, what flesh soever is dry-salted, doth | |
shrink and contract close together; I will not say, but the pointed parts of | |
salt may fasten like nails in some sorts of bodies, but not in all they work | |
on. And this is the reason also, that Sea-water is of more weight then | |
fresh-water, for being composed of points, those points stick within each | |
other, and so become more strong; But yet do they not hinder the circular | |
dilating motion of water, for the circle-lines are within, and the points | |
without, but only they make it more strong from being divided by other | |
exterior bodies that swim upon it. And this is the cause that Salt-water is not | |
so easily forced or turned to vapour, as Fresh, for the points piercing into | |
each other, hold it more strongly together; but this is to be considered, that | |
the points of salt are on the outside of the watery Circle, not on the inside, | |
which causes it to be divideable from the watery Circles. I will conclude, when | |
I have given the reason why water is so soon sucked up by sand, lime, and the | |
like bodies, and say that it is the nature of all spongy, dry and porous | |
bodies, meeting with liquid and pliable bodies as water, do draw and suck them | |
up, like as animal Creatures being thirsty, do drink: And so I take my leave, | |
and rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XXXIX. | |
MADAM, | |
COncerning Vapour, Clouds, Wind and Rain, I am of your Authors opinion, That | |
Water is changed into Vapour, and Vapour into Air, and that dilated Vapours | |
make Wind, and condensed Vapours, Clouds Of Meteor. c. 2, 4, 5, 6. | |
and Mists; But I am not for his little particles, whereof, he says, Vapours | |
are made, by the motion of a rare and subtle matter in the pores of terrestrial | |
bodies; which certainly I should conceive to be loose atoms, did he not make | |
them of several figures and magnitude: for, in my opinion, there are no such | |
things in nature, which like little Flies or Bees do fly up into the air; and | |
although I grant, that in Nature are several parts, whereof some are more rare, | |
others more dense, according to the several degrees of matter, yet they are not | |
single, but all mixed together in one body, and the change of motions in those | |
joined parts, is the cause of all changes of figures whatever, without the | |
assistance of any foreign parts: And thus Water of it self is changed to Snow, | |
Ice, or Hail, by its inherent figurative Motions; that is, the circular | |
dilation of Water by contraction, changes into the figure of Snow, Ice, or | |
Hail; or by rarefying motions it turns into the figure of Vapour, and this | |
Vapour again by contracting motions into the figure of hoar-frost; and when all | |
these motions change again into the former, then the figure of Ice, Snow, Hail, | |
Vapour and Frost, turns again into the figure of Water: And this in all sense | |
and reason is the most facil and probable way of making Ice, Snow, Hail, c. As | |
for rarefaction and condensation, I will not say that they may be forced by | |
foreign parts, but yet they are made by change and alteration of the inherent | |
motions of their own parts, for though the motions of foreign parts, may be | |
the occasion of them, yet they are not the immediate cause or actors thereof. | |
And as for Thunder, that clouds of Ice and Snow, the uppermost being condensed | |
by heat, and so made heavy, should fall upon another and produce the noise of | |
thunder, is very improbable; for the breaking of a little small string, will | |
make a greater noise then a huge shower of snow with falling, and as for Ice | |
being hard, it may make a great noise, one part falling upon another, but then | |
their weight would be as much as their noise, so that the clouds or roves of | |
Ice would be as soon upon our heads, if not sooner, as the noise in our Ears; | |
like as a bullet shot out of a Canon, we may feel the bullet as soon as we hear | |
the noise. But to conclude, all densations are not made by heat, nor all noises | |
by pressures, for sound is oftener made by division then pressure, and | |
densation by cold then by heat: And this is all for the present, from, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XL. | |
MADAM, | |
I Cannot perceive the Rational Truth of your Authors opinion, concerning | |
Colours, made by the agitation of little spherical bodies of an Ethereal | |
matter, transmitting the action of Light; for if colours were made after this | |
manner, there would, in my opinion, not be any fixed or lasting colour, but one | |
colour would be so various, and change faster then every minute; the truth is, | |
there would be no certain or perfect colour at all: wherefore it seems | |
altogether improbable, that such liquid, rare and disunited bodies should | |
either keep or make inherent and fixed colours; for liquid and rare bodies, | |
whose several parts are united into one considerable bulk of body, their | |
colours are more apt to change then the colours of those bodies that are dry, | |
solid and dense; the reason is, that rare and liquid bodies are more loose, | |
slack, and agil, then solid and dry bodies, in so much, as in every alteration | |
of motion their colours are apt to change: And if united rare and liquid bodies | |
be so apt to alter and change, how is it probable, that those bodies, which are | |
small and not united, should either keep or make inherent fixed colours? I will | |
not say, but that such little bodies may range into such lines and figures, as | |
make colours, but then they cannot last, being not united into a lasting body, | |
that is, into a solid, substantial body, proper to make such figures as | |
colours. But I desire you not to mistake me, Madam, for I do not mean, that the | |
substance of colours is a gross thick substance, for the substance may be as | |
thin and rare as flame or light, or in the next degree to it; for certainly the | |
substance of light, and the substance of colours come in their degrees very | |
near each other; But according to the contraction of the figures, colours are | |
paler or deeper, or more or less lasting. And as for the reason, why colours | |
will change and rechange, it is according as the figures alter or recover their | |
forms; for colours will be as animal Creatures, which sometimes are faint, | |
pale, and sick, and yet recover; but when as a particular colour is, as I may | |
say, quite dead, then there is no recovering of it. But colours may seem | |
altered sometimes in our eyes, and yet not be altered in themselves; for our | |
eyes, if perfect, see things as they are presented; and for proof, if any | |
animal should be presented in an unusual posture or shape, we could not judge of | |
it; also if a Picture, which must be viewed side-wards, should be looked upon | |
forwards, we could not know what to make of it; so the figures of colours, if | |
they be not placed rightly to the sight, but turned topsie-turvie as the Phrase | |
is, or upside-down, or be moved too quick, and this quick motion do make a | |
confusion with the lines of Light, we cannot possibly see the colour perfectly. | |
Also several lights or shades may make colours appear otherwise then in | |
themselves they are, for some sorts of lights and shades may fall upon the | |
substantial figures of colours in solid bodies, in such lines and figures, as | |
they may over-power the natural or artificial inherent colours in solid bodies, | |
and for a time make other colours, and many times the lines of light or of | |
shadows will meet and sympathize so with inherent colours, and place their | |
lines so exactly, as they will make those inherent colours more splendorous | |
then in their own nature they are, so that light and shadows will add or | |
diminish or alter colours very much. Likewise some sorts of colours will be | |
altered to our sight, not by all, but only by some sorts of light, as for | |
example, blew will seem green, and green blew by candle light, when as other | |
colours will never appear changed, but show constantly as they are; the reason | |
is, because the lines of candle light fall in such figures upon the inherent | |
colours, and so make them appear according to their own figures; Wherefore it | |
is only the alteration of the exterior figures of light and shadows, that make | |
colours appear otherwise, and not a change of their own natures; And hence we | |
may rationally conclude, that several lights and shadows by their spreading and | |
dilating lines may alter the face or out-side of colours, but not suddenly | |
change them, unless the power of heat, and continuance of time, or any other | |
cause, do help and assist them in that work of metamorphosing or transforming | |
of colours; but if the lines of light be only, as the phrase is, Skin-deep; | |
that is, but lightly spreading and not deeply penetrating, they may soon wear | |
out or be rubbed of; for though they hurt, yet they do not kill the natural | |
colour, but the colour may recover and reassume its former vigour and lustre: | |
but time and other accidental causes will not only alter, but destroy | |
particular colours as well as other creatures, although not all after the same | |
manner, for some will last longer then others. And thus, Madam, there are three | |
sorts of Colours, Natural, Artificial, and Accidental; but I have discoursed of | |
this subject more at large in my Philosophical Opinions, to which I refer you, | |
and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XLI. | |
MADAM, | |
MY answer to your Authors question, Why flame ascends in a pointed figure? is, | |
That the figure P. 4. art. 97. | |
of fire consists in points, and being dilated into a flame, it ascends in | |
lines of points slope-wayes from the fired fuel; like as if you should make two | |
or more sticks stand upright and put the upper ends close together, but let the | |
lower ends be asunder, in which posture they will support each other, which, if | |
both their ends were close together, they could not do. The second question is, | |
Why fire doth not always flame? Art. 107. | |
I answer, Because all fuel is not flameable, some being so moist, as it doth | |
oppose the fires dryness, and some so hard and retentive, as fire cannot so | |
soon dissolve it; and in this contest, where one dissipares, and the other | |
retains, a third figure is produced, viz. smoke, between the heat of one, and | |
the moisture of the other; and this smoke is forced by the fire out of the | |
fuel, and is nothing else but certain parts of fuel, raised to such a degree of | |
rarefaction; and if fire come near, it forces the smoke into flame, the smoke | |
changing it self by its figurative motions into flame; but when smoke is above | |
the flame, the flame cannot force the smoke to fire or enkindle it self, for | |
the flame cannot so well encounter it; which shows, as if smoke had a swifter | |
motion then flame, although flame is more rarefied then smoke; and if moisture | |
predominate, there is only smoke, if fire, then there is flame: But there are | |
many figures, that do not flame, until they are quite dissolved, as Leather, | |
and many other things. Neither can fire work upon all bodies alike, but | |
according to their several natures, like as men cannot encounter several sorts | |
of creatures after one and the same manner; for not any part in nature hath an | |
absolute power, although it hath self-motion; and this is the reason, that wax | |
by fire is melted, and clay hardened. The third question is, Why some few drops | |
of water sprinkled upon fire, do increase its flame? I answer, by reason of | |
their little quantity, which being overpowered by the greater quantity and | |
force of fire, is by its self-motions converted into fire; for water being of a | |
rare nature, and fire, for the most part, of a rarefying quality, it cannot | |
suddenly convert it self into a more solid body then its nature is, but | |
following its nature by force it turns into flame. The fourth question is, Why | |
the flame of spirit of Wine doth consume the Wine, and yet cannot burn or hurt | |
a linen cloth? I answer, The Wine is the fuel that feeds the flame, and upon | |
what it feeds, it devoureth, and with the food, and feeder; but by reason Wine | |
is a rarer body then Oil, or Wood, or any other fuel, its flame is also | |
weaker. And thus much of these questions, I rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XLII. | |
MADAM, | |
TO conclude my discourse upon the Opinions of these two famous and learned | |
Authors, which I have hitherto sent you in several Letters, I could not choose | |
but repeat the ground of my own opinions in this present; which I desire you to | |
observe well, left you mistake any thing, whereof I have formerly discoursed. | |
First I am for self-moving matter, which I call the sensitive and rational | |
matter, and the perceptive and architectonical part of nature, which is the | |
life and knowledge of nature. Next I am of an opinion, That all Perception is | |
made by corporeal, figuring self-motions, and that the perception of foreign | |
objects is made by patterning them out: as for example, The sensitive | |
perception of foreign objects is by making or taking copies from these | |
objects, so as the sensitive corporeal motions in the eyes copy out the objects | |
of sight, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the ears copy out the objects | |
of sound; the sensitive corporeal motions in the nostrils; copy out the objects | |
of sent; the sensitive corporeal motions in the tongue and mouth, copy out the | |
objects of taste, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the flesh and skin of | |
the body copy out the foreign objects of touch; for when you stand by the | |
fire, it is not that the fire, or the heat of the fire enters your flesh, but | |
that the sensitive motions copy out the objects of fire and heat. As for my | |
Book of Philosophy, I must tell you, that it treats more of the production and | |
architecture of Creatures then of their perceptions, and more of the causes | |
then the effects, more in a general then peculiar way, which I thought | |
necessary to inform you of, and so I remain, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XLIII. | |
MADAM, | |
I Received your questions in your last: the first was, Whether there be more | |
body compact together in a heavy then in a light thing? I answer, That purity, | |
rarity, little quantity, exterior shape, as also motion cause lightness; and | |
grossness of bulk, density, much quantity, exterior figure and motion cause | |
heaviness, as it may be confirmed by many examples: but lightness and heaviness | |
are only conceptions of man, as also ascent and descent; and it may be | |
questioned, whether there be such things really in nature; for change of | |
motions of one and the same body will make lightness, and heaviness, as also | |
rarity and density: besides, the several figures and compositions of bodies | |
will cause them to ascend or descend, for Snow is a light body and yet descends | |
fron the clouds, and Water is a heavy body, and yet ascends in springs out of | |
the Earth; Dust is a dense body and yet is apt to ascend, Rain or Dew is a rare | |
body and yet is apt to descend; Also a Bird ascends by his shape, and a small | |
worm although of less body and lighter will fall down; and there can be no | |
other prof of light and heavy bodies but by their ascent and descent; But as | |
really there is no such thing as heavy or light in nature more then words, and | |
comparisons of different corporeal motions, so there is no such thing, as high | |
or low, place or time, but only words to make comparisons and to distinguish | |
different corporeal motions. The second question was, When a Basin with water | |
is wasted into smoke, which fills up a whole Room, Whether the air in the room | |
doth, as the sensitive motions of the eye, pattern out the figure of the smoke; | |
or whether all the room is really filled with the vapour or smoke? I answer, If | |
it be only the pattern or figure of smoke or vapour, the extension and | |
dilation is not so much as man imagines; but why may not the air, which in my | |
opinion hath self-motion, pattern out the figure of smoke as well as the eye? | |
for that the eye surely doth it, may be proved; because smoke, if it enter the | |
eye, makes it not only smart and water much, but blinds it quite for the | |
present; wherefore smoke doth not enter the eye, when the eye sees it, but the | |
eye patterns out the figure of smoke, and this is perception; In the same | |
manner may the air pattern out the figure of smoke. The third question was; | |
Whether all that they name qualities of bodies, as thickness, thinness, | |
hardness, softness, gravity, levity, transparentness and the like, be | |
substances? I answer, That all those, they call qualities, are nothing else but | |
change of motion and figure of the same body, and several changes of motions | |
are not several bodies, but several actions of one body; for change of motion | |
doth not create new matter or multiply its quantity: for though corporeal | |
motions may divide and compose, contract and dilate, yet they cannot create new | |
matter, or make matter any otherwise then it is by nature, neither can they add | |
or substract any thing from its nature. And therefore my opinion is, not that | |
they are things subsisting by themselves without matter, but that there can no | |
abstraction be made of motion and figure from matter, and that matter and | |
motion being but one thing and inseparable, make but one substance. Wherefore | |
density and rarity, gravity and levity, c. being nothing else but change of | |
motions, cannot be without matter, but a dense or rare, heavy or light matter | |
is but one substance or body; And thus having obeyed your commands, I rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XLIV. | |
MADAM, | |
Jam very ready to give you my opinion of those two questions you sent me, | |
whereof the first was, Whether that, which is rare and subtle, be not withal | |
pure? To which I answer, That all rare bodies are not subtle, nor pure, and | |
that all which is dense is not gross and dull: As for example, Puddle-water, or | |
also clear water, is rarer then Quicksilver, and yet not so subtle and pure as | |
Quicksilver; the like of Gold; for Quicksilver and Gold may be rarefied to a | |
transparentness, and yet be so dense, as not to be easily dissolved; and | |
Quicksilver is very subtle and searching, so as to be able to force other | |
bodies to divide as well as it can divide and compose its own parts. Wherefore | |
my opinion is, that the purest and subtilest degree of matter in nature, is | |
that degree of matter which can dilate and contract, compose and divide into | |
any figure by corporeal self-motion. Your second question was, Why a man's hand | |
cannot break a little hard body, as a little nail, whereas yet it is bigger | |
then the nail? I answer, It is not because the hand is softer then the nail, | |
for one hard body will not break suddenly another hard body, and a man may | |
easily break an iron nail with his hand, as I have bin informed; but it is some | |
kind of motion which can easier do it, then another: for I have seen a strong | |
cord wound about both a man's hands, who pulled his hands as hard and strongly | |
asunder as he could, and yet was not able to break it; when as a Youth taking | |
the same cord, and winding it about his hands as the former did, immediately | |
broke it; the cause was, that he did it with another kind of motion or pulling, | |
then the other did, which though he used as much force and strength, as he was | |
able, yet could not break it, when the boy did break it with the greatest ease, | |
and turning only his hands a little, which shows, that many things may be done | |
by a slight of motion, which otherwise a great strength and force cannot do. | |
This is my answer and opinion concerning your proposed questions; if you have | |
any more, I shall be ready to obey you, as, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and humble Servant. | |
XLV. | |
MADAM, | |
I understand by your last, that you are very desirous to know, Whether there | |
be not in nature such animal creatures both for purity and size, as we are not | |
capable to perceive by our sight. Truly, Madam, in my opinion it is very | |
probable there may be animal creatures of such rare bodies as are not subject | |
to our exterior senses, as well, as there are elements which are not subject to | |
all our exterior senses: as for example, fire is only subject to our sight and | |
feeling, and not to any other sense, water is subject to our sight, taste, | |
touch and hearing, but not to smelling; and earth is subject to our sight, | |
taste, touch and smelling, but not to our hearing; and vapour is only subject | |
to our sight, and wind only to our hearing; but pure air is not subject to any | |
of our senses, but only known by its effects: and so there may likewise be | |
animal creatures which are not subject to any of our senses both for their | |
purity and life; as for example, I have seen pumped out of a water pump small | |
worms which could hardly be discerned but by a bright Sun-light, for they were | |
smaller then the smallest hair, some of a pure scarlet colour and some white, | |
but though they were the smallest creatures that ever I did see, yet they were | |
more agil and fuller of life, then many a creature of a bigger size, and so | |
small they were, as I am confident, they were neither subject to taste, smell, | |
touch nor hearing, but only to sight, and that neither without dificulty, | |
requiring both a sharp sight and a clear light to perceive them; and I do | |
verily believe that these small animal creatures may be great in comparison to | |
others which may be in nature. But if it be probable that there may be such | |
small animal creatures in nature, as are not subject to our exterior senses, by | |
reason of their littleness; it is also probable, that there may be such great | |
and big animal creatures in nature as are beyond the reach and knowledge of our | |
exterior senses; for bigness and smallness are not to be judged by our exterior | |
senses, only; but as sense and reason inform us, that there are different | |
degrees in Purity and Rarity, so also in shapes, figures and sizes in all | |
natural creatures. Next you desired to know, Whether there can be an | |
artificial Life, or a Life made by Art? My answer is, Not; for although there | |
is Life in all natures parts, yet not all the parts are life, for there is one | |
part of natural matter which in its nature is inanimate or without life, and | |
though natural Life doth produce Art, yet Art cannot produce natural Life, for | |
though Art is the action of Life, yet it is not Life it self: not but that | |
there is Life in Art, but not art in life, for Life is natural, and not | |
artificial; and thus the several parts of a watch may have sense and reason | |
according to the nature of their natural figure, which is steel, but not as | |
they have an artificial shape, for Art cannot put Life into the watch, Life | |
being only natural, not artificial. Lastly your desire was to know, Whether a | |
part of matter may be so small, as it cannot be made less? I answer, there is | |
no such thing in nature as biggest or least, nature being Infinite as well in | |
her actions as in her substance; and I have mentioned in my book of Philosophy, | |
and in a letter, I sent you heretofore concerning Infinite, that there are | |
several forts of Infinites, as Infinite in quantity or bulk, Infinite in | |
number, Infinite in quality, as Infinite degrees of hardness, softness, | |
thickness, thinness, swiftness, slowness, c. as also Infinite compositions, | |
divisions, creations, dissolutions, c. in nature; and my meaning is, that all | |
these Infinite actions do belong to the Infinite body of nature, which being | |
infinite in substance must also of necessity be infinite in its actions; but | |
although these Infinite actions are inherent in the power of the Infinite | |
substance of nature, yet they are never put in act in her parts, by reason | |
there being contraries in nature, and every one of the aforementioned actions | |
having its opposite, they do hinder and obstruct each other so, that none can | |
actually run into infinite; for the Infinite degrees of compositions hinder the | |
infinite degrees of divisions; and the infinite degrees of rarity, softness, | |
swiftness, c. hinder the infinite degrees of density, hardness, slowness, c. | |
all which nature has ordered with great wisdom and Prudence to make an amiable | |
combination between her parts; for if but one of these actions should run into | |
infinite, it would cause a horrid confusion between natures parts, nay an utter | |
destruction of the whole body of nature, if I may call it whole: as for | |
example, if one part should have infinite compositions, without the hinderance | |
or obstruction of division, it would at last mount and become equal to the | |
Infinite body of nature, and so from a part change to a whole, from being | |
finite to infinite, which is impossible; Wherefore, though nature hath an | |
Infinite natural power, yet she doth not put this power in act in her | |
particulars; and although she has an infinite force or strength, yet she doth | |
not use this force or strength in her parts. Moreover when I speak of Infinite | |
divisions and compositions, creations and dissolutions, c. in nature, I do not | |
mean so much the infinite degrees of compositions and divisions, as the actions | |
themselves to be infinite in number; for there being infinite parts in nature, | |
and every one having its compositions and divisions, creations and | |
dissolutions, these actions must of necessity be infinite too, to wit, in | |
number, according to the Infinite number of parts, for as there is an Infinite | |
number of parts in nature, so there is also an infinite number and variety of | |
motions which are natural actions. However let there be also infinite degrees | |
of these natural actions, in the body or substance of infinite nature; yet, as | |
I said, they are never put in act, by reason every action hath its contrary or | |
opposite, which doth hinder and obstruct it from running actually into | |
infinite. And thus I hope, you conceive clearly now, what my opinion is, and | |
that I do not contradict my self in my works, as some have falsely accused me, | |
for they by misapprehending my meaning, judge not according to the truth of my | |
sense, but according to their own false interpretation, which shows not only a | |
weakness in their understandings and passions, but a great injustice and injury | |
to me, which I desire you to vindicate when ever you chance to hear such | |
accusations and blemishes laid upon my works, by which you will Infinitely | |
oblige, | |
MADAM, Your humble and faithful Servant. | |
SECT. II. | |
I. | |
MADAM, | |
BEing come now to the Perusal of the Works of that learned Author Dr. Moor, I | |
find that the only design of his Book called Antidote, is to prove the | |
Existence of a God, and to refute, or rather convert Atheists; which I wonder | |
very much at, considering, he says himself, Antidote, Book 1. c. 10. a. 5. | |
That there is no man under the cope of Heaven but believes a God; which if so, | |
what needs there to make so many arguments to no purpose? unless it be to show | |
Learning and wit; In my opinion, it were better to convert Pagans to be | |
Christians, or to reform irregular Christians to a more pious life, then to | |
prove that, which all men believe, which is the way to bring it into question. | |
For certainly, according to the natural Light of Reason, there is a God, and no | |
man, I believe, doth doubt it; for though there may be many vain words, yet I | |
think there is no such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not only | |
amongst men, but also, amongst all other creatures, for if nature believes a | |
God, all her parts, especially the sensitive and rational, which are the living | |
and knowing parts, and are in all natural creatures, do the like, and therefore | |
all parts and creatures in nature do adore and worship God, for any thing man | |
can know to the contrary; for no question, but natures soul adores and | |
worships God as well as man's soul; and why may not God be worshipped by all | |
sorts and kinds of creatures as well, as by one kind or sort? I will not say | |
the same way, but I believe there is a general worship and adoration of God; | |
for as God is an Infinite Deity, so certainly he has an Infinite Worship and | |
Adoration, and there is not any part of nature, but adores and worships the | |
only omnipotent God, to whom belongs Praise and Glory from and to all eternity: | |
For it is very improbable, that God should be worshipped only in part, and not | |
in whole, and that all creatures were made to obey man, and not to worship God, | |
only for man's sake, and not for God's worship, for man's use, and not God's | |
adoration, for mans spoil and not God's blessing. But this Presumption, Pride, | |
Vain-glory and Ambition of man, proceeds from the irregularity of nature, who | |
being a servant, is apt to commit errors; and cannot be so absolute and exact | |
in her devotion, adoration and worship, as she ought, nor so well observant of | |
God as God is observing her: Nevertheless, there is not any of her parts or | |
creatures, that God is not acknowledged by, though not so perfectly as he | |
ought, which is caused by the irregularities of nature, as I said before. And | |
so God of his mercy have mercy upon all Creatures; To whose protection I | |
commend your Ladyship, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
II. | |
MADAM, | |
SInce I spake in my last of the adoration and worship of God, you would fain | |
know, whether we can have an Idea of God? I answer, That naturally we may, and | |
really have a knowledge of the existence of God, as I proved in my former | |
letter, to wit, that there is a God, and that he is the Author of all things, | |
who rules and governs all things, and is also the God of Nature: but I dare not | |
think, that naturally we can have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know | |
what God is in his very nature and essence; for how can there be a finite Idea | |
of an Infinite God? You may say, As well as of Infinite space. I answer, Space | |
is relative, or has respect to body, but there is not any thing that can be | |
compared to God; for the Idea of Infinite nature is material, as being a | |
material creature of Infinite material Nature. You will say, How can a finite | |
part have an Idea of infinite nature? I answer, Very well, by reason the Idea | |
is part of Infinite Nature, and so of the same kind, as material; but God being | |
an Eternal, Infinite, Immaterial, Individable Being, no natural creature can | |
have an Idea of him. You will say, That the Idea of God in the mind is | |
immaterial; I answer, I cannot conceive, that there can be any immaterial Idea | |
in nature; but be it granted, yet that Immaterial is not a part of God, for God | |
is individable, and hath no parts; wherefore the Mind cannot have an Idea of | |
God, as it hath of Infinite nature, being a part of nature; for the Idea of God | |
cannot be of the essence of God, as the Idea of nature is a corporeal part of | |
nature: and though nature may be known in some parts, yet God being | |
Incomprehensible, his Essence can by no ways or means be naturally known; and | |
this is constantly believed, by | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
III. | |
MADAM, | |
ALthough I mentioned in my last, that it is impossible to have an Idea of God, | |
yet your Author is pleased to say, That he will not stick to affirm, that the | |
Idea or notion of God is as easy, as any notion else Of the Immortality of the | |
Soul, l. 1. a. 4. | |
whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the | |
world. To which I answer, That in my opinion, God is not so easily to be known | |
by any creature, as man may know himself; nor his attributes so well, as man | |
can know his own natural proprieties: for Gods Infinite attributes are not | |
conceivable, and cannot be comprehended by a finite knowledge and understanding, | |
as a finite part of nature; for though nature's parts may be Infinite in | |
number, and as they have a relation to the Infinite whole, if I may call it so, | |
which is Infinite nature, yet no part is infinite in it self, and therefore it | |
cannot know so much as whole nature: and God being an Infinite Deity, there is | |
required an Infinite capacity to conceive him; nay, Nature her self although | |
Infinite, yet cannot posibly have an exact notion of God, by reason of the | |
disparity between God and her self; and therefore it is not probable, if the | |
Infinite servant of God is not able to conceive him, that a finite part or | |
creature of nature, of what kind or sort soever, whether Spiritual, as your | |
Author is pleased to name it, or Corporeal, should comprehend God. Concerning | |
my belief of God, I submit wholly to the Church, and believe as I have bin | |
informed out of the Athanasian Creed, that the Father is Incomprehensible, the | |
Son Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible; and that there are | |
not three, but one Incomprehensible God; Wherefore if any man can prove (as I | |
do verily believe he cannot) that God is not Incomprehensible, he must of | |
necessity be more knowing then the whole Church, however he must needs dissent | |
from the Church. But perchance your Author may say, I raise new and prejudicial | |
opinions, in saying that matter is eternal. I answer, The Holy Writ doth not | |
mention Matter to be created, but only Particular Creatures, as this Visible | |
World, with all its Parts, as the history or description of the Creation of the | |
World in Genesis plainly shows; For God said, Let it it be Light, and there was | |
Light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let it divide | |
the Waters from the Waters; and Let the Waters under the Heaven be gathered | |
together unto one place, and let the dry Land appear; and let the Earth bring | |
forth Grass, the Herb yielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after | |
his kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the | |
Day from the Night, c. Which proves, that all creatures and figures were made | |
and produced out of that rude and desolate heap or chaos which the Scripture | |
mentions, which is nothing else but matter, by the powerful Word and Command of | |
God, executed by his Eternal Servant, Nature; as I have heretofore declared it | |
in a Letter I sent you in the beginning concerning Infinite Nature. But least I | |
seem to encroach too much upon Divinity, I submit this Interpretation to the | |
Church; However, I think it not against the ground of our Faith; for I am so | |
far from maintaining any thing either against Church or State, as I am | |
submitting to both in all duty, and shall do so as long as I live, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
IV. | |
MADAM, | |
SInce your Worthy and Learned Author is pleased to mention, That an ample | |
experience both of Men Antid. Book. 2. Ch. 2. a. 1. | |
and Things doth enlarge our Understanding, I have taken occasion hence to | |
enquire, how a mans Understanding may be increased or enlarged. The | |
Understanding must either be in Parts, or it must be Individable as one; if in | |
Parts, then there must be so many Understandings as there are things | |
understood; but if Individable, and but one Understanding, then it must dilate | |
it self upon so many several objects. I for my part, assent to the first, That | |
Understanding increases by Parts, and not by Dilation, which Dilation must | |
needs follow, if the Mind or Understanding of man be Indivisible and without | |
parts; but if the Mind or Soul be Individable, then I would fain know, how | |
Understanding, Imagination, Conception, Memory, Remembrance, and the like, can | |
be in the mind? You will say, perhaps, they are so many faculties or properties | |
of the Incorporeal Mind, but, I hope, you do not intend to make the Mind or | |
Soul a Deity, with so many attributes, Wherefore, in my opinion, it is safer to | |
say, That the Mind is composed of several active Parts: but of these Parts I | |
have treated in my Philosophy, where you will find, that all the several Parts | |
of Nature are Living and Knowing, and that there is no part that has not Life | |
and Knowledge, being all composed of rational and sensitive matter, which is the | |
life and soul of Nature; and that Nature being Material, is composable and | |
dividable, which is the cause of so many several Creatures, where every | |
Creature is a part of Nature, and these Infinite parts or creatures are Nature | |
her self; for though Nature is a self-moving substance, and by self-motion | |
divides and composes her self several manners or ways into several forms and | |
figures, yet being a knowing, as well as a living substance, she knows how to | |
order her parts and actions wisely; for as she hath an Infinite body or | |
substance, so she has an Infinite life and knowledge; and as she hath an | |
Infinite life and knowledge, so she hath an infinite wisdom: But mistake me not, | |
Madam; I do not mean an Infinite Divine Wisdom, but an Infinite Natural Wisdom, | |
given her by the Infinite bounty of the Omnipotent God; but yet this Infinite | |
Wisdom, Life and Knowledge in Nature make but one Infinite. And as Nature hath | |
degrees of matter, so she has also degrees and variety of corporeal motions; | |
for some parts of matter are self-moving, and some are moved by these | |
self-moving parts of matter; and all these parts, both the moving and moved, | |
are so intermixed, that none is without the other, no not in any the least | |
Creature or part of Nature we can conceive; for there is no Creature or part of | |
Nature, but has a comixture of those mentioned parts of animate and inanimate | |
matter, and all the motions are so ordered by Natures wisdom, as not any thing | |
in Nature can be otherwise, unless by a Supernatural Command and Power of God; | |
for no part of corporeal matter and motion can either perish, or but rest; one | |
part may cause another part to alter its motions, but not to quit motion, no | |
more then one part of matter can annihilate or destroy another; and therefore | |
matter is not merely Passive, but always Active, by reason of the thorough | |
mixture of animate and inanimate matter; for although the animate matter is | |
only active in its nature, and the inanimate passive, yet because they are so | |
closely united and mixed together that they make but one body, the parts of the | |
animate or self-moving matter do bear up and cause the inanimate parts to move | |
and work with them; and thus there is an activity in all parts of matter moving | |
and working as one body, without any fixation or rest, for all is moveable, | |
moving and moved. All which, Madam, if it were well observed, there would not | |
be so many strange opinions concerning nature and her actions, making the | |
purest and subtlest part of matter immaterial or incorporeal, which is as | |
much, as to extend her beyond nature, and to rack her quite to nothing. But I | |
fear the opinion of Immaterial substances in Nature will at last bring in again | |
the Heathen Religion, and make us believe a god Pan, Bacchus, Ceres, Venus, and | |
the like, so as we may become worshippers of Groves and shadows, Beans and | |
Onions, as our Forefathers. I say not this, as if I would ascribe any worship | |
to Nature, or make her a Deity, for she is only a servant to God, and so are | |
all her parts or creatures, which parts or creatures, although they are | |
transformed, yet cannot be annihilated, except Nature her self be annihilated, | |
which may be, whenever the Great God pleases; for her existence and | |
resolution, or total destruction, depends upon Gods Will and Decree, whom she | |
fears, adores, admires, praises and prays unto, as being her God and Master; | |
and as she adores God, so do all her parts and creatures, and amongst the rest | |
Man, so that there is no Atheist in Infinite Nature, at least not in the | |
opinion of, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
V. | |
MADAM, | |
I Cannot well conceive what your Author means by the Common Laws of Nature; | |
But if you desire Antid. Book. 2. c. 2. | |
my opinion how many Laws Nature hath, and what they are; I say Nature hath but | |
One Law, which is a wise Law, viz. to keep Infinite matter in order, and to | |
keep [so much Peace, as not to disturb the Foundation of her Government: for | |
though Natures actions are various, and so many times opposite, which would | |
seem to make wars between several Parts, yet those active Parts, being united | |
into one Infinite body, cannot break Natures general Peace; for that which Man | |
names War, Sickness, Sleep, Death, and the like, are but various particular | |
actions of the only matter; not, as your Author imagines, in a confusion, like | |
Bullets, or such like things juggled together in a mans Hat, but very orderly | |
and methodical: And the Playing motions of nature are the actions of Art, but | |
her serious actions are the actions of Production, Generation and | |
Transformation in several kinds, sorts and particulars of her Creatures, as | |
also the action of ruling and governing these her several active Parts. | |
Concerning the Preeminence and Prerogative of Man, whom your Author calls C. 3. | |
The flower and chief of all the products of nature upon this Globe of the | |
earth; I answer, That Man cannot well be judged of himself, because he is a | |
Party, and so may be Partial; But if we observe well, we shall find that the | |
Elemental Creatures are as excellent as Man, and as able to be a friend or foe | |
to Man, as Man to them, and so the rest of all Creatures; so that I cannot | |
perceive more abilities in Man then in the rest of natural Creatures; for | |
though he can build a stately House, yet he cannot make a Honey-comb; and | |
though he can plant a Slip, yet he cannot make a Tree; though he can make a | |
Sword, or Knife, yet he cannot make the Mettle. And as Man makes use of other | |
Creatures, so other Creatures make use of Man, as far as he is good for any | |
thing: But Man is not so useful to his neighbour or fellow-creatures, as his | |
neighbour or fellow-creatures to him, being not so profitable for use, as apt | |
to make spoil. And so leaving him, I rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
VI. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author demands, Whether there was ever any man, that was not mortal, and | |
whether there be any mortal that had not a beginning? Truly, if nature Antid. | |
1. 3. c. 15. a. 3. | |
be eternal, all the material figures which ever were, are, and can be, must be | |
also eternal in nature; for the figures cannot be annihilated, unless nature be | |
destroyed; and although a Creature is dissolved and transformed into numerous | |
different figures, yet all these several figures remain still in those parts of | |
matter, whereof that creature was made, for matter never changes, but is always | |
one and the same, and figure is nothing else but matter transposed or | |
transformed by motion several modes or ways. But if you conceive Matter to be | |
one thing, Figure another, and Motion a third, several, distinct and dividable | |
from each other, it will produce gross errors, for, matter, motion, and figure, | |
are but one thing. And as for that common question, whether the Egg was before | |
the Chick, or the Chick before the Egg, it is but a thred-bare argument, which | |
proves nothing, for there is no such thing as First in Eternity, neither doth | |
Time make productions or generations, but Matter; and whatsoever matter can | |
produce or generate, was in matter before it was produced; wherefore the | |
question is, whether Matter, which is Nature, had a beginning, or not? I say | |
not: for put the case, the figures of Earth, Air, Water, and Fire, Light and | |
Colours, Heat and Cold, Animals, Vegetables and Minerals, c. were not produced | |
from all Eternity, yet those figures have nevertheless been in Matter, which is | |
Nature, from all eternity, for these mentioned Creatures are only made by the | |
corporeal motions of Matter, transforming Matter into such several figures; | |
Neither can there be any perishing or dying in Nature, for that which Man calls | |
so, is only an alteration of Figure. And as all other productions are but a | |
change of Matters sensitive motions, so all irregular and extravagant opinions | |
are nothing but a change of Matters rational motions; only productions by | |
rational motions are interior, and those by sensitive motions exterior. For the | |
Natural Mind is not less material then the body, only the Matter of the Mind | |
is much purer and subtler then the Matter of the Body. And thus there is | |
nothing in Nature but what is material; but he that thinks it absurd to say, | |
the World is composed of mere self-moving Matter, may consider, that it is more | |
absurd to believe Immaterial substances or spirits in Nature, as also a spirit | |
of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon Matter; For why should it | |
not be as probable, that God did give Matter a selfmoving power to her self, as | |
to have made another Creature to govern her? For Nature is not a Babe, or | |
Child, to need such a Spiritual Nurse, to teach her to go, or to move; neither | |
is she so young a Lady as to have need of a Governess, for surely she can | |
govern her self; she needs not a Guardian for fear she should run away with a | |
younger Brother, or one that cannot make her a Jointure. But leaving those | |
strange opinions to the fancies of their Authors, He add no more, but that I | |
am, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
VII. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author being very earnest in arguing against those that maintain the | |
opinion of Matter being self-moving, amongst the rest of his arguments brings | |
in this: Suppose, says he, Matter could Of the Immortality of the Soul, l. 1. | |
c. 12. | |
move it self, would mere Matter with self-motion amount to that admirable wise | |
contrivance of things which we see in the World? -- All the evasion I can | |
imagine, our adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of | |
sense, and the finest and most subtle of the most refined sense; and | |
consequently of Imagination too, yea happily of Reason and Understanding. I | |
answer, it is very probable, that not only all the Matter in the World or | |
Universe hath Sense, but also Reason; and that the sensitive part of matter is | |
the builder, and the rational the designer; whereof I have spoken of before, | |
and you may find more of it in my Book of Philosophy. But, says your Author, | |
Let us see, if all their heads laid together can contrive the anatomical | |
Fabric of any Creature that lives? I answer, all parts of Nature are not | |
bound to have heads or tails; but if they have, surely they are wiser then many | |
a man's. I demand, says he, Has every one of these Particles, that must have a | |
hand in the framing of the body of an animal, the whole design of the work by | |
the Impress of some Phantasm upon it? or as they have several offices, so have | |
they several parts of the design? I answer, All the actions of self-moving | |
Matter are not Impresses, nor is every part a handlabourer, but every part | |
unites by degrees into such or such a Figure. Again, says he, How is it | |
conceiveable that any one Particle of Matter, or many together, (there not | |
existing, yet in Nature an animal) can have the Idea Impressed of that Creature | |
they are to frame? I answer, all figures whatsoever have been, are, or can be | |
in Nature, are existent in nature. How, says he, can they in framing several | |
parts confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their | |
Counsels one to another? I answer, Knowledge doth not always require speech, for | |
speech is an effect and not a cause, but knowledge is a cause and not an effect; | |
and nature hath infinite more ways to express knowledge then man can imagine, | |
Wherefore, he concludes, that they should mutually serve one another in such a | |
design, is more impossible; then that so many men, blind and dumb from their | |
nativity, should join their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or | |
carve a statue of such a Creature, as none of them knew any more in several, | |
then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to | |
the whole. I answer, Nature is neither blind nor dumb, nor any ways defective, | |
but infinitely wife and knowing; for blindness and dumbness are but effects of | |
some of her particular actions, but there is no defect in self-moving matter, | |
nor in her actions in general; and it is absurd to conceive the Generality of | |
wisdom according to an Irregular effect or defect of a particular Creature; for | |
the General actions of Nature are both life and knowledge, which are the | |
architects of all Creatures, and know better how to frame all kinds and sorts | |
of Creatures then man can conceive; and the several parts of Matter have a more | |
easy way of communication, then Mans head hath with his hand, or his hand with | |
pen, ink, and paper, when he is going to write; which later example will make | |
you understand my opinion the better, if you do but compare the rational part | |
of Matter to the head, the sensitive to the hand, the inanimate to pen, ink and | |
paper, their action to writing, and their framed figures to those figures or | |
letters which are written; in all which is a mutual agreement without noise or | |
trouble. But give me leave, Madam, to tell you, That self-moving Matter may | |
sometimes err and move irregularly, and in some parts not move so strong, | |
curious, or subtle at sometimes, as in other parts, for Nature delights in | |
variety; Nevertheless she is more wise then any Particular Creature or part can | |
conceive, which is the cause that Man thinks Nature's wise, subtle and lively | |
actions, are as his own gross actions, conceiving them to be constrained and | |
turbulent, not free and easy, as well as wise and knowing; Whereas Nature's | |
Creating, Generating and Producing actions are by an easy connexion of parts | |
to parts, without Counterbuffs, Joggs and Jolts, producing a particular figure | |
by degrees, and in order and method, as humane sense and reason may well | |
perceive: And why may not the sensitive and rational part of Matter know better | |
how to make a Be, then a Be doth how to make Honey and Wax? or have a better | |
communication betwixt them, then Bees that fly several ways, meeting and | |
joining to make their Combs in their Hives? But pardon, Madam, for I think it | |
a Crime to compare the Creating, Generating and producing Coporeal Life and | |
Wisdom of Nature unto any particular Creature, although every particular | |
Creature hath their share, being a part of Nature. Wherefore those, in my | |
opinion, do grossly err, that bind up the sensitive matter only to taste, | |
touch, hearing, seeing, and smelling; as if the sensitive parts of Nature had | |
not more variety of actions, then to make five senses; for we may well observe, | |
in every Creature there is difference of sense and reason according to the | |
several modes of self-motion; For the Sun, Stars, Earth, Air, Fire, Water, | |
Plants, Animals, Minerals; although they have all sense and knowledge, yet they | |
have not all sense and knowledge alike, because sense and knowledge moves not | |
alike in every kind or sort of Creatures, nay many times very different in one | |
and the same Creature; but yet this doth not cause a general Ignorance, as to | |
be altogether Insensible or Irrational, neither do the erroneous and irregular | |
actions of sense and reason prove an annihilation of sense and reason; as for | |
example, a man may become Mad or a Fool through the irregular motions of sense | |
and reason, and yet have still the Perception of sense and reason, only the | |
alteration is caused through the alteration of the sensitive and rational | |
corporeal motions or actions, from regular to irregular; nevertheless he has | |
Perceptions, Thoughts, Ideas, Passions, and whatsoever is made by sensitive and | |
rational Matter, neither can Perception be divided from Motion, nor Motion from | |
Matter; for all sensation is Corporeal, and so is Perception. I can add no | |
more, but take my leave, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
VIII. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author is pleased to say, that Matter is a Principle purely passive, and | |
no otherwise moved or modified, Of the Immortality of the Soul, l. 2. c. 1. a. | |
3. | |
then as some other thing moves and modifies it, but cannot move it self at | |
all; which is most demonstrable to them that contend for sense and perception | |
in it: For if it had any such perception, it would, by virtue of its | |
self-motion withdraw its self from under the knocks of hammers, or fury of the | |
fire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it, | |
and pleasing, and that without the help of muscles, it being thus immediately | |
endowed with a self-moving power. By his leave, Madam, I must tell you, that I | |
see no consequence in this argument; Because some parts of matter cannot | |
withdraw themselves from the force and power of other parts, therefore they | |
have neither sense, reason, nor perception: For put the case, a man should be | |
overpowered by some other men, truly he would be forced to suffer, and no | |
Immaterial Spirits, I think, would assist him. The very same may be said of | |
other Creatures or parts of Nature; for some may over-power others, as the | |
fire, hammer and hand doth over-power a Horse-shooe, which cannot prevail over | |
so much odds of power and strength; And so likewise it is with sickness and | |
health, life and death; for example, some corporeal motions in the body turning | |
Rebels, by moving contrary to the health of an animal Creature, it must become | |
sick; for not every particular creature hath an absolute power, the power being | |
in the Infinite whole, and not in single divided parts: Indeed, to speak | |
properly, there is no such thing as an absolute power in Nature; for though | |
Nature hath power to move it self, yet not beyond it self. But mistake me not, | |
for I mean by an absolute Power; not a circumscribed and limited, but an | |
unlimited power, no ways bound or confined, but absolutely or every way | |
Infinite, and there is not any thing that has such an absolute power but God | |
alone: neither can Nature be undividable, being Corporeal or Material; nor rest | |
from motion being naturally self-moving, and in a perpetual motion. Wherefore | |
though Matter is self-moving, and very wise, (although your Author denies it, | |
calling those Fools that maintain this In the Append. to the Antid. c. 3. a. | |
10. | |
opinion) yet it cannot go beyond the rules of its Nature, no more then any Art | |
can go beyond its Rules and Principles: And as for what your Author says, That | |
every thing would approach to that, which is agreeable and pleasant; I think I | |
need no demonstration to prove it; sor we may plainly see it in all effects of | |
Nature, that there is Sympathy and Antipathy, and what is this else, but | |
approaching to things agreeable and pleasant, and withdrawing it self from | |
things disagreeable, and hurtful or offensive? But of this subject I shall | |
discourse more hereafter, wherefore I finish here, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
IX. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Authors opinion is, That Matter being once actually divided as far as | |
possibly it can, it is a perfect In the Preface before the Imm. of the Soul. | |
contradiction it should be divided any further. I answer, Though Nature is | |
Infinite, yet her actions are not all dilative nor separative, but some divide | |
and some compose, some dilate and some contract, which causes a mean betwixt | |
Natures actions or motions. Next your Author says, That as Infinite Greatness | |
has no Figure, so Infinite Littleness hath none also. I answer, Whatsoever hath | |
a body, has a figure; for it is impossible that substance, or body, and figure, | |
should be separated from each other, but wheresoever is body or substance, | |
there is also figure, and if there be an infinite substance, there must also be | |
an infinite figure, although not a certain determined or circumscribed figure, | |
for such a figure belongs only to finite particulars; and therefore I am of | |
your Authors mind, That it is a contradiction to say an Infinite Cube or | |
Triangle, for a Cube and a Triangle is a perfect circumscribed figure, having | |
its certain compass and circumference, be it never so great or little; | |
wherefore to say an Infinite Cube, would be as much as to say a Finite | |
Infinite. But as for your Authors example of Infinite matter, space or | |
duration, divided into three equal parts, all which he says must needs be | |
Infinite, or else the whole will not be so, and then the middle part of them | |
will seem both Finite and Infinite. I answer, That Matter is not dividable into | |
three equal parts, for three is a finite number and so are three equal parts; | |
but I say that Matter being an Infinite body, is dividable into Infinite parts, | |
and it doth not follow, as your Author says, That one of those infinite parts | |
must be infinite also, for else there would be no difference betwixt the whole | |
and its parts; I say whole for distinctions and better expressions sake, and do | |
not mean such a whole which hath a certain number of parts, and is of a certain | |
and limited figure, although never so great; but an Infinite whole, which | |
expression I must needs use, by reason I speak of Infinite parts; and that each | |
one of these Infinite parts in number may be finite in substance or figure, is | |
no contradiction, but very probable and rational; nay, I think it rather absurd | |
to say that each part is infinite; for then there would be no difference | |
betwixt parts and whole, as I said before. Only this is to be observed, that | |
the Infinite whole is Infinite in substance or bulk, but the parts are Infinite | |
in number, and not in bulk, for each part is circumscribed, and finite in its | |
exterior figure and substance. But mistake me not, when I speak of | |
circumscribed and finite single parts; for I do not mean, that each part doth | |
subsist single and by it self, there being no such thing as an absolute single | |
part in Nature, but Infinite Matter being by self-motion divided into an | |
infinite number of parts, all these parts have so near a relation to each | |
other, and to the infinite whole, that one cannot subsist without the other; | |
for the Infinite parts in number do make the Infinite whole, and the Infinite | |
whole consists in the Infinite number of parts; wherefore it is only their | |
figures which make a difference betwixt them; for each part having its proper | |
figure different from the other, which is circumscribed and limited, it is | |
called a finite single part; and such a part cannot be said Infinitely | |
dividable, for infinite composition and division belong only to the Infinite | |
body of Nature, which being infinite in substance may also be infinitely | |
divided, but not a finite and single part: Besides, Infinite composition doth | |
hinder the Infinite division, and Infinite division hinders the Infinite | |
composition; so that one part cannot be either infinitely composed, or | |
infinitely divided; and it is one thing to be dividable, and another to be | |
divided. And thus, when your Author Antid. Book. 2. c. 4. | |
mentions in another place, That if a body be divisible into Infinite Parts, it | |
hath an Infinite number of extended parts: If by extension he mean corporeal | |
dimension, I am of his opinion; for there is no part, be it never so little in | |
Nature, but is material; and if material, it has a body; and if a body, it must | |
needs have a bodily dimension; and so every part will be an extended part: but | |
since there is no part but is finite in its self, it cannot be divisible into | |
infinite parts; neither can any part be infinitely dilated or contracted; for | |
as composition and division do hinder and obstruct each other from running into | |
Infinite, so doth dilation hinder the Infinite contraction, and contraction the | |
Infinite dilation, which, as I said before, causes a mean betwixt Nature's | |
actions; nevertheless, there are Infinite dilations and contractions in Nature, | |
because there are Infinite contracted and dilated parts, and so are infinite | |
divisions because there are infinite divided parts; but contraction, dilation, | |
extension, composition, division, and the like, are only Nature's several | |
actions; and as there can be no single part in Nature that is Infinite, so | |
there can neither be any single Infinite action. But as for Matter, Motion and | |
Figure, those are Individable and Inseparable, and make but one body or | |
substance; for it is as impossible to divide them, as impossible it is to your | |
Author to separate the essential proprieties, which he gives, from an Immortal | |
Spirit; And as Matter, Motion and Figure are inseparable; so is likewise | |
Matter, Space, Place and Duration; For Parts, Motion, Figure, Place and | |
Duration, are but one Infinite body; only the Infinite parts are the Infinite | |
divisions of the Infinite body, and the Infinite body is a composition of the | |
Infinite parts; but figure, place and body are all one, and so is time, and | |
duration, except you will call time the division of duration, and duration the | |
composition of time; but infinite time, and infinite duration is all one in | |
Nature: and thus Nature's Principal motions and actions are dividing, | |
composing, and disposing or ordering, according to her Natural wisdom, by the | |
Omnipotent God's leave and permission. Concerning the Sun, which your Author | |
speaks of in the same place, and denies him to be a Spectator of our Particular | |
affairs upon Earth; saying, there is no such divine Principle in him, whereby | |
he can do it. I will speak nothing against, nor for it; but I may say, that the | |
Sun hath such a Principle as other Creatures have, which is, that he has | |
sensitive and rational corporeal motions, as well as animals or other | |
Creatures, although not in the same manner, nor the same organs; and if he have | |
sensitive and rational motions, he may also have sensitive and rational | |
knowledge or perception, as well as man, or other animals and parts of Nature | |
have, for ought any body knows; for it is plain to humane sense and reason, | |
that all Creatures must needs have rational and sensitive knowledge, because | |
they have all sensitive and rational matter and motions. But leaving the Sun | |
for Astronomers to contemplate upon, I take my leave, and rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
X. | |
MADAM, | |
YOur Author in his arguments against Motion, being a Principle of Nature, | |
endeavours to prove, Append. to the Antid. c. 11. | |
that Beauty, Colour, Symmetry, and the like, in Plants, as well as in other | |
Creatures, are no result from the mere motion of the matter; and forming this | |
objection, It may be said, says he, That the regular motion of the matter made | |
the first plant of every kind; but we demand, What regulated the motion of it, | |
so as to guide it, to form it self into such a state? I answer, The Wisdom of | |
Nature or infinite Matter did order its own actions so, as to form those her | |
Parts into such an exact and beautiful figure, as such a Tree, or such a | |
Flower, or such a Fruit, and the like; and some of her Parts are pleased and | |
delighted with other parts, but some of her parts are afraid or have an | |
aversion to other parts; and hence is like and dislike, or sympathy and | |
antipathy, hate and love, according as nature, which is infinite self-moving | |
matter, pleases to move; for though Natural Wisdom is dividable into parts, yet | |
these parts are united in one infinite Body, and make but one Being in it self, | |
like as the several parts of a man make up but one perfect man; for though a | |
man may be wise in several causes or actions, yet it is but one wisdom; and | |
though a Judge may show Justice in several causes, yet it is but one Justice; | |
for Wisdom and Justice, though they be practised in several causes, yet it is | |
but one Wisdom, and one Justice; and so, all the parts of a mans body, although | |
they move differently, yet are they but one man's bodily actions; Just as a | |
man, if he carve or cut out by art several statues, or draw several Pictures, | |
those statues or pictures are but that one man's work. The like may be said of | |
Natures Motions and Figures; all which are but one self-active or self-moving | |
Material Nature. But Wise Nature's Ground or Fundamental actions are very | |
Regular, as you may observe in the several and distinct kinds, sorts and | |
particulars of her Creatures, and in their distinct Proprieties, Qualities, and | |
Faculties, belonging not only to each kind and sort, but to each particular | |
Creature; and since man is not able to know perfectly all those proprieties | |
which belong to animals, much less will he be able to know and judge of those | |
that are in Vegetables, Minerals and Elements; and yet these Creatures, for any | |
thing Man knows, may be as knowing, understanding, and wise as he; and each as | |
knowing of its kind or sort, as man is of his; But the mixture of ignorance and | |
knowledge in all Creatures proceeds from thence, that they are but Parts; and | |
there is no better proof, that the mind of man is dividable, then that it is | |
not perfectly knowing; nor no better proof that it is composeable, then that it | |
knows so much: but all minds are not alike, but some are more composed then | |
others, which is the cause, some know more then others; for if the mind in all | |
men were alike, all men would have the same Imaginations, Fancies, Conceptions, | |
Memories, Remembrances, Passions, Affections, Understanding, and so forth: The | |
same may be said of their bodies; for if all men's sensitive parts were as one, | |
and not dividable and composeable, all their Faculties, Properties, | |
Constitutions, Complexions, Appetites, would be the same in every man without | |
any difference; but humane sense and reason doth well perceive, that neither | |
the mind, life nor body are as one piece, without division and composition. | |
Concerning the divine Soul, I do not treat of it; only this I may say, That | |
all are not devout alike, nor those which are, are not at all times alike | |
devout. But to conclude: some of our modern Philosophers think they do God good | |
service, when they endeavour to prove Nature, as Gods good Servant, to be | |
stupid, ignorant, foolish and mad, or any thing rather then wise, and yet they | |
believe themselves wise, as if they were no part of Nature; but I cannot | |
imagine any reason why they should rail on her, except Nature had not given | |
them as great a share or portion, as she hath given to others; for children in | |
this case do often rail at their Parents, for leaving their Brothers and | |
Sisters more then themselves. However, Nature can do more then any of her | |
Creatures: and if Man can Paint, Imbroider, Carve, Engrave curiously; why may | |
not Nature have more Ingenuity, Wit and Wisdom then any of her particular | |
Creatures? The same may be said of her Government. And so leaving Wise Nature, | |
I rest, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XI. | |
MADAM, | |
TO your Authors argument, That if Motion belong naturally to Matter, Matter | |
being Uniform, Antid. l. 2. c. 1. | |
it must be alike moved in every part of particle imaginable of it, by reason | |
this Motion being natural and essential to Matter, is alike every way. I | |
answer, That this is no more necessary, then that the several actions of one | |
body, or of one part of a body should be alike; for though Matter is one and | |
the same in its Nature, and never changes, yet the motions are various, which | |
motions are the several actions of one and the same Natural Matter; and this is | |
the cause of so many several Creatures; for self-moving matter by its | |
self-moving power can act several ways, modes or manners; and had not natural | |
matter a self-acting power, there could not be any variety in Nature; for | |
Nature knows of no rest, there being no such thing as rest in Nature; but she | |
is in a perpetual motion, I mean self-motion, given her from God: Neither do I | |
think it Atheistical (as your Author deems) to maintain this opinion of | |
selfmotion, as long as I do not deny the Omnipotency of God; but I should | |
rather think it Irreligious to make so many several Creatures as Immaterial | |
Spirits, like so many several Deities, to rule and govern Nature and all | |
material substances in Nature; for what Atheism doth there lie in saying, that | |
natural matter is naturally moving, and wise in her self? Doth this oppose the | |
omnipotency and Infinite wisdom of God? It rather proves and confirms it; for | |
all Natures free power of moving and wisdom is a gift of God, and proceeds from | |
him; but I must confess, it destroys the power of Immaterial substances, for | |
Nature will not be ruled nor governed by them, and to be against Natural | |
Immaterial substances, I think, is no Atheism, except we make them Deities; | |
neither is it Atheism to contradict the opinion of those, that believe such | |
natural incorporeal Spirits, unless man make himself a God. But although Nature | |
is wise, as I said before, and acts methodically, yet the variety of motions is | |
the cause of so many Irregularities in Nature, as also the cause of Irregular | |
opinions; for all opinions are made by self-moving matters motions, or (which | |
is all one) by corporeal self-motion, and some in their opinions do conceive | |
Nature according to the measure of themselves, as that Nature can, nor could | |
not do more, then they think, nay, some believe they can do as much as Nature | |
doth; which opinions, whether they be probable or regular, I'll let any man | |
judge; adding only this, that to humane sense and reason it appears plainly, | |
that as God has given Nature a power to act freely, so he doth approve of her | |
actions, being wise and methodical in all her several Productions, Generations, | |
Transformations and Designs: And so I conclude for the present, only subscribe | |
my self, as really I am, | |
MADAM, Your faithful Friend, and Servant. | |
XII. | |
MADAM, | |
I Am of your Authors opinion, concerning self-activity or self-motion, That | |
what is Active of it self, can Of the Immortality of the Soul, l. 1. c. 7. | |
no more cease to be active then to be: And I have been always of this opinion, | |
even from the first beginning of my conceptions in natural Philosophy, as you | |
may see in my first Treatise of Natural Philosophy, which I put forth eleven | |
years since; where I say, That self-moving Matter is in a Perpetual motion; But | |
your Author endeavours srom thence to conclude, That Matter is not self-active, | |
because it is reducible to rest. To which I answer, That there is no such thing | |
as Rest in Nature: Not do I say, that all sorts of motions are subject to our | |
senses, for those that are subject to our sensitive Perceptions, are but gross | |
Motions, in comparison to those that are not subject to our exterior senses: as | |
for example; We see some bodies dilate, others consume, others corrupt; yet we | |
do not see how they dilate, nor how they consume, nor how they corrupt: Also we | |
see some bodies contract, some attract, some condense, some consist, c. yet we | |
do not see their contracting, attracting, condensing, consisting or retenting | |
motions; and yet we cannot say, they are not corporeal motions, because not | |
subject to our exterior senses; for if there were not contracting, attracting, | |
retenting or consistent corporeal self-motions, it had been impossible that any | |
creature could have been composed into one united figure, much less stayed and | |
continued in the same figure without a general alteration. But your Author | |
says, If Matter, as Matter, had Motion, nothing would hold together, but | |
Flints, Adamants, Brass, Iron, yea, this whole Earth, would suddenly melt into | |
a thinner substance then the subtle Air, or rather it never had been | |
condensated together to this consistency we find it. But I would ask him, what | |
reason he can give, that corporeal self-motion should make all matter rare and | |
fluid, unless he believe there is but one kind of motion in Nature, but this, | |
human sense and reason will contradict; for we may observe there are Infinite | |
changes of Motion, and there is more variety and curiosity in corporeal | |
motions, then any one single Creature can imagine, much less know; but I | |
suppose he conceives all corporeal matter to be gross, and that not any | |
corporeal motion can be subtle, penetrating, contracting and dilating; and that | |
whatsoever is penetrating, contracting and dilating, is Individable: But by his | |
leave, Madam, this doth not follow; for though there be gross degrees of | |
Matter, and strong degrees of Corporeal Motions, yet there are also pure and | |
subtle degrees of Matter and Motions; to wit, that degree of Matter, which I | |
name sensitive and rational Matter, which is natural Life and Knowledge, as | |
sensitive Life and rational Knowledge. Again, your Author asks, What glue or | |
cement holds the parts of hard matter in Stones and Metals together? I answer, | |
Consistent or retentive corporeal motions, by an agreeable union and | |
conjunction in the several parts of Metal or Stone; and these retentive or | |
consistent motions, are as strong and active, if not more, then some dilative | |
or contractive motions; for I have mentioned heretofore, that, as sensitive and | |
rational corporeal motions are in all Creatures, so also in Stone, Metal, and | |
any other dense body whatsoever; so that not any one Creature or part of Matter | |
is without Motion, and therefore not any thing is at rest. But, Madam, I dare | |
say, I could bring more reason and sense to prove, that sensitive and rational | |
Matter is fuller of activity, and has more variety of motion, and can change | |
its own parts of self-moving Matter more suddenly, and into more exterior | |
figures, then Immaterial Spirits can do upon natural Matter. But your Author | |
says, That Immaterial Spirits are endued with Sense and Reason; I say, My | |
sensitive and rational corporeal Matter is Sense and Reason it self, and is the | |
Architect or Creator of all figures of Natural matter; for though all the parts | |
of Matter are not self-moving, yet there is not any part that is not moving or | |
moved, by and with the mover, which is animate matter. And thus I conclude, and | |
rest constantly, | |
MADAM, Your Faithful Friend and Servant. | |
XIII. | |
MADAM, | |
THat Matter is incapable of Sense, your Author proves by the example of dead | |
Carcasses; For, says he, Motion and Sense being really one and the Of the | |
Imwortality of the Soul. l. 2. c. 2. | |
same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is motion, there is also | |
sense and perception; but on the contrary, there is Reaction in dead Carcasses, | |
and yet no Sense. I answer shortly, That it is no consequence, because there is | |
no animal sense nor exterior perceptible local motion in a dead Carcass, | |
therefore there is no sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, | |
yet it may nevertheless have sense according to the nature of that figure, into | |
which it did change from being an animal. Also he says, If any Matter have | |
sense, it will follow, that upon reaction all shall have the like; and that a | |
Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every fack-in-a-box, | |
that School-boys play with, shall be living animals. I answer, It is true, if | |
reaction made sense; but reaction doth not make sense, but sense makes | |
reaction; and |