



Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

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Protocol Audit Report

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Protocol Summary

Protocol does X, Y, Z

Disclaimer

The YOUR_NAME_HERE team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
1 7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413095feffd9924566
```

Scope

```
1 ./src/  
2 PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password. Outsides: No one else should be able to set or read the password.

Executive Summary

*Add some notes about how the audit

Issues found

Sevterity	Number of issues found
High	2
Meidum	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visable to anyone, and no longer private

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from blockchain.

Impact: Anyone can read the private password, severly breaking the functionlity of the protocol.

Proof of Concept: (Proof of Code)

The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
1 make anvil
```

- ## 2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
1 make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool We use 1 because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
1 cast storage <CONTRACT_ADDRESS> 1 --rpc-url http://localhost:8545
```

after this command, you can get this binary data 0x6d7950617373776f72644000000000000000000000000000000000

and then you can get the password by parsing the data

[illegible]

```
1 output: myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain.

[H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that this function allows only the owner to set a new password.

Description:

```
1 function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2     // @audit - There are no access controls
3     s_password = newPassword;
4     emit SetNetPassword();
5 }
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract

Proof of Concept: 1. Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol`

Code

```
1 function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public
2 {
3     vm.prank(randomAddress);
4     string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
5     passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);
6
7     vm.prank(owner);
8     string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
9 }
```

```
8         assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
9     }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
1     if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
2         revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
3     }
```

Informational

[I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword natspec indicates a paramter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec is incorrect

Description:

```
1     function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
2         if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
3             revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
4         }
5         return s_password;
6     }
```

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` while the natspec say it should be `getPassword(string)`.

Impact: The natspec is incorrect

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
1 -     * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```

Gas