



# **IT-Security (ITS) B1**

**DIKU, E2023**



# Today's agenda

1: Forensics



# Forensics defined

**Digital forensics** is a branch of forensic science encompassing the recovery and investigation of material found on digital devices

Applied in a **corporate**, **civil**, or **criminal** setting (originated in law enforcement)

Applied to a **security** investigation or **personnel** investigation

In security investigations, forensics either means a **root cause or impact analysis** of a cyber-attack, often post-mortem, **or simply techniques** used in the process of uncovering, understanding, and responding to a security incident

In security, **DFIRMA** = digital forensics + incident response + malware analysis



# DFIRMA in practice

while true:

    intrusion analysis

    if intrusion suspected:

        preliminary analysis

        if intrusion verified:

            repeat until incident fully contained:


                forensic analysis

                malware analysis

                incident response

    update plans

## Recap: Intrusion detection





# Many forms of forensics

Digital forensics =

Computer forensics

Memory forensics

Network forensics

Mobile forensics

Etc. forensics



# Memory forensics



# Memory forensics

From Wikipedia:

“Memory forensics is forensic analysis of a computer's **memory dump**.

Its primary application is investigation of advanced computer attacks which are stealthy enough to avoid leaving data on the computer's hard drive.”





# First, get a copy

Live acquisition

Different techniques

Live analysis

Direct analysis of the running kernel

Dead acquisition

Hibernation files, page files

Virtualization - thank you



# What to find in memory?

Running processes

Listening sockets

Open connections

Encryption keys

Credentials

Memory only malware

Closed connections

Terminated processes

Open file handles

Deobfuscated code




# Memory forensic analysis process

- 1: Find rogue processes
- 2: Analyse DLLs
- 3: Review network artefacts
- 4: Look for evidence of code injections
- 5: Dump suspicious processes → further analysis


# How to find processes (on Windows)

EPROCESS objects in memory:




# How to find processes (on Windows)

Scan for EPROCESS objects:



# Process enumeration (on Windows)





# Key concept in memory forensics:

**Walking a list, or scanning for objects**



# Step 1 revisited: Find rogue processes

Those that:

- Hide

- Have odd parents

- Do network comm but shouldn't


- Have unusually many handles open

- Contain maliciously injected code

- ...



# Direct kernel objection manipulation (DKOM)





# Example:

Stuxnet

# Stuxnet



# Stuxnet




Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran

# Volatility and Stuxnet

```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[zeus stux]$ python volatility/vol.py -f stux.mem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
Offset(V) Name PID PPID Thds Hnds Sess Wow64 Start Exit
-----
0x823c8030 System 4 0 59 403 ----- 0
0x820df020 smss.exe 376 4 3 19 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:53 UTC+0000
0x821a2da0 csrss.exe 600 376 11 395 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x81da5650 winlogon.exe 624 376 19 570 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x82073020 services.exe 668 624 21 431 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x81e70020 lsass.exe 680 624 19 342 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x823315d8 vmacthlp.exe 844 668 1 25 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81db8da0 svchost.exe 856 668 17 193 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81e61da0 svchost.exe 940 668 13 312 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x822843e8 svchost.exe 1032 668 61 1169 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81e19b20 svchost.exe 1080 668 5 80 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81ff7020 svchost.exe 1200 668 14 107 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81fee8b0 spoolsv.exe 1412 668 10 118 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:56 UTC+0000
0x81e0eda0 jqs.exe 1580 668 5 148 0 0 2010-10-29 17:09:05 UTC+0000
0x81fe52d0 vmtoolsd.exe 1664 668 5 284 0 0 2010-10-29 17:09:05 UTC+0000
0x821a0568 VMUpgradeHelper 1816 668 3 96 0 0 2010-10-29 17:09:08 UTC+0000
0x8205ada0 alg.exe 188 668 6 107 0 0 2010-10-29 17:09:09 UTC+0000
0x820ec7e8 explorer.exe 1196 1728 16 582 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
0x820ecc10 wscntfy.exe 2040 1032 1 28 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
0x81e86978 TSVNCache.exe 324 1196 7 54 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
0x81fc5da0 VMwareTray.exe 1912 1196 1 50 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
0x81e0b660 VMwareUser.exe 1356 1196 9 251 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
0x8210d478 jusched.exe 1712 1196 1 26 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
0x82279998 imapi.exe 756 668 4 116 0 0 2010-10-29 17:11:54 UTC+0000
0x822b9a10 wuauclt.exe 976 1032 3 133 0 0 2010-10-29 17:12:03 UTC+0000
0x81c543a0 Procmon.exe 660 1196 13 189 0 0 2011-06-03 04:25:56 UTC+0000
0x81fa5390 wmiprvse.exe 1872 856 5 134 0 0 2011-06-03 04:25:58 UTC+0000
0x81c498c8 lsass.exe 868 668 2 23 0 0 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
0x81c47c00 lsass.exe 1928 668 4 65 0 0 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
0x81c0cda0 cmd.exe 968 1664 0 ----- 0 2011-06-03 04:31:35 UTC+0000
0x81f14938 ipconfig.exe 304 968 0 ----- 0 2011-06-03 04:31:35 UTC+0000
[zeus stux]$ python volatility/vol.py -f stux.mem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 pslist | grep lsass
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
0x81e70020 lsass.exe 680 624 19 342 0 0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x81c498c8 lsass.exe 868 668 2 23 0 0 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
0x81c47c00 lsass.exe 1928 668 4 65 0 0 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
[zeus stux]$
```

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## Further reading





# **Disk (or, file system) forensics**






"Vi fik ham.  
Bombeplanen  
lå på hans  
bærbar."












Copy

Og beregn hashværdi










0	\$MFT
1	\$MFTMirr
2	\$LogFile
3	\$Volume
4	\$Attr Def
5	.
6	\$Bitmap
7	\$Boot
8	\$BadClus
9	\$Secure
10	\$UpCase
11	\$Extend
12-23	Reserved
24	\$Extend\$Quota
25	\$Extend\$ObjId
26	\$Extend\$Reparse
27-	Beginning of regular file entries.





```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[forensics]$ dd if=copy.dd | xxd | less
[forensics]$ dd if=copy.dd | xxd | head -20
00000000: eb52 904e 5446 5320 2020 2000 0208 0000 .R.NTFS .....
00000010: 0000 0000 00f8 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000020: 0000 0000 8000 8000 ff4f 0000 0000 0000 .....0.....
00000030: 0400 0000 0000 0000 ff04 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000040: f600 0000 0100 0000 89ba bd7f 2335 1b74 .....#5.t
00000050: 0000 0000 0e1f be71 7cac 22c0 740b 56b4 .....q|."t.V.
00000060: 0ebb 0700 cd10 5eeb f032 e4cd 16cd 19eb .....^..2.....
00000070: fe54 6869 7320 6973 206e 6f74 2061 2062 .This is not a b
00000080: 6f6f 7461 626c 6520 6469 736b 2e20 506c ootable disk. Pl
00000090: 6561 7365 2069 6e73 6572 7420 6120 626f ease insert a bo
000000a0: 6f74 6162 6c65 2066 6c6f 7070 7920 616e otable floppy an
000000b0: 640d 0a70 7265 7373 2061 6e79 206b 6579 d..press any key
000000c0: 2074 6f20 7472 7920 6167 6169 6e20 2e2e to try again ..
000000d0: 2e20 0d0a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 . .....
000000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
000000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000120: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000130: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
[forensics]$
```



```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[forensics]$ dd if=copy.dd bs=512 skip=32 count=1 | xxd | head -18
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
512 bytes copied, 3.3372e-05 s, 15.3 MB/s
00000000: 4649 4c45 3000 0300 0000 0000 0000 0000  FILE0.....
00000010: 0100 0100 3800 0100 9801 0000 0004 0000  ....8.....
00000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0400 0000 0000 0000  .....
00000030: 0300 0000 0000 0000 1000 0000 6000 0000  .....
00000040: 0000 1800 0000 0000 4800 0000 1800 0000  .....H.....
00000050: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  .....
00000060: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  .....
00000070: 0600 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  .....
00000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  .....
00000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 3000 0000 6800 0000  .....0...h...
000000a0: 0000 1800 0000 0200 4a00 0000 1800 0100  .....J.....
000000b0: 0500 0000 0000 0500 00ac 4b06 5fd6 d901  .....K._...
000000c0: 00ac 4b06 5fd6 d901 00ac 4b06 5fd6 d901  ..K._...K._...
000000d0: 00ac 4b06 5fd6 d901 0070 0000 0000 0000  ..K._...p.....
000000e0: 006c 0000 0000 0000 0600 0000 0000 0000  .l.....
000000f0: 0403 2400 4d00 4600 5400 0000 0000 0000  ..$.M.F.T.....
00000100: 8000 0000 4800 0000 0100 4000 0000 0100  ....H.....@....
00000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 1200 0000 0000 0000  .....
[forensics]$
```



```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

[forensics]$ fls -rF -f ntfs copy.dd
r/r 4-128-1: $AttrDef
r/r 8-128-2: $BadClus
r/r 8-128-1: $BadClus:$Bad
r/r 6-128-1: $Bitmap
r/r 7-128-1: $Boot
r/r 25-144-2: $Extend/$ObjId:$0
r/r 24-144-3: $Extend/$Quota:$0
r/r 24-144-2: $Extend/$Quota:$Q
r/r 26-144-2: $Extend/$Reparse:$R
r/r 2-128-1: $LogFile
r/r 0-128-1: $MFT
r/r 1-128-1: $MFTMirr
r/r 9-128-2: $Secure:$SDS
r/r 9-144-3: $Secure:$SDH
r/r 9-144-4: $Secure:$SII
r/r 10-128-1: $UpCase
r/r 10-128-2: $UpCase:$Info
r/r 3-128-3: $Volume
r/r 64-128-2: bomba.jpeg
-/r * 16: $OrphanFiles/OrphanFile-16
-/r * 17: $OrphanFiles/OrphanFile-17
-/r * 18: $OrphanFiles/OrphanFile-18
-/r * 19: $OrphanFiles/OrphanFile-19
```





```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[forensics]$ icat copy.dd 64-128-2 > bomba_copy.jpeg
```




Terminal

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

```
[forensics]$ display bomba_copy.jpeg
```

ImageMagick: bomba\_...



Frank Barnaby



# Deleted != destroyed

When a file is deleted, **data still exists** on disk until overwritten

If overwritten, **remnants may still exist** in

- extra copies of the file

- page/swap/hibernation file, or

- elsewhere on the disk due to (de)fragmentation

**However, if disk wiped**, only just once, recovery infeasible

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# Think libraries




# Format is not wiping

Formats create and replace file system structures



Files are not overwritten

Regular formats take longer as the disk is scanned for bad sectors


Use wiping software for wiping



# Slack space




# Timeline (Modified, Accessed, Changed)



# Searching for file types



Slack.txt



Slack.exe



Slack.pdf



Slack.zip



Slack.dat



Slack.mp3




Slack.dll



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# Further reading





# Wrap-up