17.00 mm/s

Faculty of Science

IT-security: User Authentication

Access control

Identity and Access Management

Passwords Biometrics

Social engineering

Carsten Jørgensen Department of Computer Science



Lectures

OS, mail, browser og web-sikkerhed Sikkerhedsarkitektur (perimeter, zero trust, OT) Hardware-sikkerhed Sikkerhedsledelse, risikovurderinger Cloud-sikkerhed, AI-sikkerhed, IoT-Sikkerhed... Privacy og GDPR Privacy engineering



OS Security and Access Control



IAM - ACL

An access control list (ACL) is a list of permissions attached to an object.

An ACL specifies which users or system processes are granted access to objects, as well as what operations are allowed on given objects

Alice: read, write; Bob: read



Subjects, Objects, and Access Rights

Subject

An entity capable of accessing objects

Three classes

- Owner
- Group
- World

Object

A resource to which access is controlled

Entity used to contain and/or receive information

Access right

Describes the way in which a subject may access an object

Could include:

- Read
- •Write
- Execute
- Delete
- •Create
- Search



Access Control Policies

Discretionary access control (DAC)


 Controls access based on the identity of the requestor and on access rules (authorizations) stating what requestors are (or are not) allowed to do

Mandatory access control (MAC)

 Controls access based on comparing security labels with security clearances


UNIX - File Access Control

- Unique user identification number (user ID)
- Member of a primary group identified by a group ID
- Belongs to a specific group
- 12 protection bits
 - Specify read, write, and execute permission for the owner of the file, members of the group and all other users
- The owner ID, group ID, and protection bits are part of the file's inode



UNIX - File AC 🖭 ITS-2023-User-auth_IAM_biometrics_social-engineering Pro... ×

- Unique user ic number (user II
- Member of a r identified by a q
- Belongs to a s
- 12 protection
 - Specify re execute p the owner members and all ot
- The owner ID and protectio of the file's in



r--

Traditional UNIX - File Access Control

- "Set user ID"(SetUID)
- "Set group ID"(SetGID)
 - System temporarily uses rights of the file owner/group in addition to the real user's rights when making access control decisions
 - Enables privileged programs to access files/resources not generally accessible
- Sticky bit
 - When applied to a directory it specifies that only the owner of any file in the directory can rename, move, or delete that file
- Superuser
 - Is exempt from usual access control restrictions
 - Has system-wide access

Problemer med konceptet...




IAM

Role Based Access Control (RBAC)

Peter is a current employee, Peter is Administrator Mia is an employee, Mia has access to SAP Susan is no longer employee, Susan has Guestaccess

Jens has resigned, he was Administrator, does he still have access?





Access Control Policies

Role-based access control (RBAC)

 Controls access based on the roles that users have within the system and on rules stating what accesses are allowed to users in given roles

Attribute-based access control (ABAC)

 Controls access based on attributes of the user, the resource to be accessed, and current environmental conditions

Access Control Policies

Discretionary access control (DAC)

 Controls access based on the identity of the requestor and on access rules (authorizations) stating what requestors are (or are not) allowed to do

Mandatory access control (MAC)

 Controls access based on comparing security labels with security clearances

Role-based access control (RBAC)

 Controls access based on the roles that users have within the system and on rules stating what accesses are allowed to users in given roles

Attribute-based access control (ABAC)

 Controls access based on attributes of the user, the resource to be accessed, and current environmental conditions IAM - and PAM

An <u>administrative process</u> coupled with a <u>technological solution</u> which <u>validates</u> the identity of individuals and allows owners of data, applications, and systems to either maintain centrally or distribute responsibility for granting access to their respective resources to anyone participating within the IAM framework.

IAM refers to the processes, technologies and policies for managing digital identities and controlling how identities can be used to access resources



Limiting user access rights

Daily use: only strictly necessary access rights (also applies to administrators)

Privileged access must be controlled and limited

Process for assigning administrative access rights (for time-limited periods?)

Logging assigned (administrative-) rights



IAM – Identity Life Cycle Management

Identity, Authentication and Authorization
Principle of Least Access
Groups and Roles
Administration
Auditing, Logging and Reporting
Segregation of Duties/Funktionsadskillelse



IAM


Identity: Who are you (person or a computer): UserIDs, certificates, cards...

Authentication: Prove your identity: challenge-response: Passwords, Private keys, PINs... Your possession of the secret proves you are who you claim to be

Authorization: the system controls which resources you're allowed to access. Typically through the use of a token or ticket mechanism.

Allows you to access only that which the administrators have determined is necessary, thus enforcing the *principle of least privilege*

Identity, authentication, authorization – MitID?



Service Providers provides access to services based on their own risk assessment



Du arbejder på et internt projekt til udvikling af nyt økonomisystem til din virksomhed.

Projektlederne fortæller, at for at overholde tidsplanen skal der ikke bruges bruger-id'er. Systemet skal i stedet have et stærkt hardcodet password (17 tegn incl. specialtegn) Alle der skal have adgang til økonomisystemet vil få oplyst koden hvis de har brug for adgangen.

Hvad siger du til projektlederen?



Du arbejder på et internt projekt til udvikling af nyt økonomisystem til din virksomhed.

Projektlederne fortæller, at for at overholde tidsplanen skal der ikke bruges bruger-id'er. Systemet skal i stedet have et stærkt hardcodet password (17 tegn incl. specialtegn) Alle der skal have adgang til økonomisystemet vil få oplyst koden hvis de har brug for adgangen.

Hvad siger du til projektlederen?




Identity, Authentication and Authorization
Principle of Least Access
Groups and Roles
Administration
Auditing, Logging and Reporting
Segregation of Duties/Funktionsadskillelse



Identity, Authentication and Authorization
Principle of Least Access
Groups and Roles
Administration
Auditing, Logging and Reporting
Segregation of Duties/Funktionsadskillelse




Identity and Access Management (IAM)



Three factors+ for authentication

Something you **know**, something you **have** and something you **are**

User authentication categories based on type of verification evidence



what time it is



Om brugen af kodeord

Kodeord har været anvendt i tusinder af år




Brugernes passwords er altid dårlige


Opfylder kun lige akkurat de tekniske krav der stilles


Dvs. password regler styrker passwords, men kun op til den tekniske grænse løsningen tvinger brugerne til

(a) What we want: randomly distributed passwords



(b) What we get: predictable clustering, highly skewed distribution







Med mindre vi bliver tvunget - eller undervist - i andet, så vælger vi alle password efter dette mønster:



1. Ingen koder

Hvis man giver en bruger frit valg vil alle brugere selvfølgelig, alt andet lige, vælge at ikke bruge passwords, fordi det er det mest brugervenlige (dvs. letteste)

2. Almindelige ord

Hvis systemet tvinger til at bruge et kodeord, er første problem hvordan man selv husker sin kode.

Så man vælger i første omgang sin kode ud fra, om man tror man kan huske den, ikke fordi man tænker på "sikkerhed"

- brugerens risikovurdering

Mental models – "noget man tit tænker på"

You Retweeted



Gene Spafford @TheRealSpaf · 22 Sep 2014

"@shariv67: Had I known I was going to need this many passwords, I would have had a lot more pets."











You Retweeted



George Takei @GeorgeTakei · 23 Jul 2014

Every time I change my password, I have to get a new pet.

1K









Systemer: problemet er, at vi bruger de same systemer:

- Hvis krav om bade STORE og små bogstaver bruger man kun ét stort bogstav – og det står altid først: Passwordet bliver "Password", ikke "pAssword"
- Hvis krav om numre står de altid til sidst: "Password12"
- Specialtegn er sidste del, og kun hvis de er krævet Så det "super-stærke" password er "Password12!"
- Vi laver mønstre: "1234", "1122", "1111" eller årstal/datoer, som "1945" (så en PIN bør være mindst 8 tegn)



To passwords

Password123dec

hY6%%#2873GH/GtAQ?08-dPe2>S


- Hvis man kender det første PW kan alle fremtidige PW gættes
- Brugeren kan huske de første PW nr.2 bliver skrevet ned, særligt når der er krav om PW-skift

- Hvilket password er bedst nu?
- Hvilket password er bedst næste måned?



Password reuse

Model2: samme password på mange sites Er det et problem?



Password reuse: https://haveibeenpwned.com



"The password must be impossible to remember and nowhere written down"

Peter Gutmann



Må man skrive sine passwords ned?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Srh_TV_J144



Hvor langt skal et password være? Hvad med special tegn?

http://howsecureismypassword.net



HOW PASSWORD LENGTH WINS THE INTERNET

Passwords 102



Password huskere/password managers

Overvej password managers, f.eks. 1password

Kan beskytte koderne og kan give adgang til de gemte koder med et "super-password"

Autogenere stærke koder: Undgår genbrug af passwords på forskellige sider Password længden kan øges



Password managers

Undgår password genbrug Stærke, lange passwords alle steder

Problemer?

"Password manager salt"



Sikkerhed er ikke sort-hvidt

they need no longer be remembered. In practice, master passwords may be weaker than hoped, and the individual site passwords managed remain not only static (thus replayable) but often remain user-chosen (thus guessable) for reasons explained below. Overall, password managers thus deliver fewer security advantages than expected, while introducing new risks (below); their main advantage is improved usability.

Computer Security and the Internet: Tools and Jewels from Malware to Bitcoin, Second Edition by Paul C. van Oorschot p.77

Forelæsning 20.sep: Risikovurderinger




Angreb imod brugerens passwords

- 1. Hvad er dit password? (spørge)
- 2. Gætte / default passwords
- 3. Dictionary Attack
- 4. Brute Force (f.eks. imod LanMan hash)
- 5. Rainbow Tables



Password cracking

Hashcat: https://hashcat.net



```
Hwmon.Dev.#2....: Temp: 55c Fan: 30% Core:1010Mhz Mem:1250Mhz Lanes:16
Hwmon.Dev.#3....: N/A
Started: Wed Nov 30 10:48:18 2016
Stopped: Wed Nov 30 10:48:43 2016
```

Algorithms

```
MD5
Half MD5 (left, mid, right)
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
SHA-3 (Keccak)
SipHash
RipeMD160
Whirlpool
DES (PT = $salt, key = $pass)
0 3DES (PT = $salt, key = $pass)
@ GOST R 34.11-94
@ GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) 256-bit
@ GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) 512-bit
Double MD5
Double SHA1
md5($pass.$salt)
md5($salt.$pass)
md5 (unicode ($pass) .$salt)
md5($salt.unicode($pass))
md5(sha1($pass))
md5($salt.md5($pass))
md5($salt.$pass.$salt)
md5(strtoupper(md5($pass)))
sha1($pass.$salt)
sha1($salt.$pass)
sha1(unicode($pass).$salt)
sha1($salt.unicode($pass))
sha1(md5($pass))
sha1($salt.$pass.$salt)
9 sha1(CX)
```



Default passwords

Eksempel på dårlige passwords: Amerikanske Dankort maskiner



ATM hacket, tror indeholder 5\$ sedler i stedet for \$20 => udbetaler 3x for meget

Pre Paid Card

9 dage før kunder rapporterede



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmW_4R81jVU


CNN Report: Robber Tricks ATM machine



CNN Report: Robber Tricks ATM machine














Knowledgebase:

"The ATM is programmed with the passwords that the distributor requests when the order is placed to program a new ATM. When special passwords are not requested they are left at the factory default (see your mini-bank operators manual) Every new ATM that is shipped from Tranax has a copy of the print setup included in the "open me first" box or envelope. The master password is hand written at the top of the print setup for the convenience of the installer."



Tranax manual inurl:pdf



Thranax:

Master = 555555Service = 222222Operator = 111111

Triton:

12345


Lipman:


Merchant = 2222222 Technician = 1111111


GTI:

1234
















Faculty of Science

Pause



Password baggrund

Password hash, hash og salt, scrypt/bcrypt



Password baggrund

Password has hash og salt

Password Reminder

There was a recent password request from our webs

Here is your login information for your account.


Login Email: bigbob @mailinator.com

Login Password: 123456

Check the "manage account" page to change your page

login instantly

or click here to change your passwor



Password baggrund

Password hash, hash og salt,

Don't store the password, store a hash of the password

There was a recent password request from our website.

Here is your login information for your account.

Login Email. bigbob @mailinator.com

Login Password: 123456


Check the "manage account" page to change your password.

login instantly

or click here to change your password



Salt





Password hash?

Direkte off-line adgang til password hash eller
Online - forbinde til serveren hver gang?

- Begrænsninger på antallet af forsøg?
- Time-delay mellem sign-in attempts, brug penalty period (f.eks. 1 time) hvis forkert password er indtastet for mange gange
 - f.eks. 10 gange



Password hash?

The password "alpine fun" can be brute-forced in only 2 months if the server can be attacked 100 times per second. But, with a penalty period and 5 second delay, the same password can suddenly sustain an attack for 1,889 years.

No of attacks	Password	Time	Security level
100 times per sec	alpine fun	2 months	Low risk
1 time every 5 sec	alpine fun	63 years	Secure
1 time every 5 sec with a 1 hour penalty period after 10 attempts	alpine fun	1,889 years	Secure forever

Se f.eks. "The Usability of Passwords"

http://www.baekdal.com/tips/password-security-usability og

"The Usability of Passwords FAQ":

http://www.baekdal.com/tips/the-usability-of-passwords-faq



Apple

Apple default: 80ms per password attempt delay Enforced by tamper resistant hardware

Indbyggede lille forsinkelse per password-forsøg medfører eksponentiel vækst ift. at bryde passwordet:

# characters	[0-9]	[0-9a-z]	[0-9a-zA-Z]
1	0.8 seconds		5 seconds
2	8 seconds	1.7 minutes	5.1 minutes
3	1.3 minutes	1 hour	5.3 hours
4	13 minutes	1.6 days	2 weeks
5	2.2 hours	8 weeks	2.3 years
6	22 hours	5.5 years	140 years
7	1.3 weeks	200 years	9 thousand years
8	13 weeks	7 thousand years	550 thousand years
9	2.5 years	260 thousand years	34 million years
10	25 years	9 million years	2 billion years



Two Factor Authentication (2FA)











13.57 Google



Mon, 8 Feb, 12.00

G-743835 er din bekræftelseskode til Google.

Tue, 9 Feb, 08.47

G-493534 er din bekræftelseskode til Google.

Wed, 10 Feb, 08.22

G-840743 er din bekræftelseskode til Google.

Mon, 20 Jun, 12.15







Text Message Sat, 26 Nov, 07.36

Din personlige engangskode er: 1527

Bemærk! Engangskoden udløber om 12 timer.


Passwordless / FIDO2

Passwordless autentifikation er en form for multi-faktor autentifikation (MFA)

Erstatter passwords med to eller flere verifikations faktorer, sikret og krypteret på brugerens enhed, f.eks. fingeraftryk, ansigtsgenkendelse, device pin, eller en nøgle



Passwordless / FIDO2





Hvad er et godt password?

Hvor tit skal password skiftes?

Ikke kritisk (afhængig af hvor man har indtastet passwords)

Krav om skift f.eks. hver 90 dage kan være et problem fordi mennesker så typisk vælger svage passwords.

=> "Password06" eller "PasswordJuni"



Hvad er et godt password?

Overvej det hvis det er muligt at bruge 2-faktor autentifikation på en site

Næsten altid en forbedring af sikkerheden

Support er dyrt

Pas på "secret questions" Backup systemet for glemte passwords må ikke være svagere end dit password.



Meget lavere sikkerhed

Pick a secure password:

"0k5ijU)=2w8VAiqxozKyB&3d"

Now, in case you forget it, what's your favorite color? "Blue"



Kort sagt

2FA er næsten altid bedst (brug det hvis i overhovedet kan)

Brug en password manager

Lange passwords er bedre end komplekse passwords (passphrases over 14 tegn)

Brug forskellige passwords på forskellige sites (password manager)

Back dine passwords op

Lange passwords er bedre end hyppige skift - med mindre der har været risiko for aflytning



Biometrics



Biometri

Noget man ved Noget man har **Noget man er** Hvor man er

Biometri bør altid kombineres med BrugerID/password

Biometri samles typisk i en hash



Hvad er et godt password?

Biometri?





Biometri

Er biometri identity eller authentication?

Public or private?

Man efterlader biometri-data overalt

AI/Deep-fakes (stemme, ansigt osv)

Biometri som autentifikation – uden andre faktorer – er potentielt et problem (risiko vurdering!)



Biometri

To biometriske målinger er aldrig helt ens, derfor er der altid element af usikkerhed:

False Acceptance Rate:

Rate at which someone other than the actual person is falsely recognized.

False Rejection Rate:

Rate at which the actual person is not recognized accurately.



Biometri

Modality	Type	Notes
fingerprints	P	common on laptops and smartphones
facial recognition	P	used by some smartphones
iris recognition	P	the part of the eye that a contact lens covers
hand geometry	P	hand length and size, also shape of fingers and palm
retinal scan	P	based on patterns of retinal blood vessels
voice authentication	M	physical-behavioral mix
gait	В	characteristics related to walking
typing rhythm	В	keystroke patterns and timing
mouse patterns	В	also scrolling, swipe patterns on touchscreen devices

Table 3.2: Biometric modalities: examples. P (physical), B (behavioral), M (mixed). Fingerprint (four digits) and iris biometrics are used at U.S.-Canadian airport borders.



Biometri

TABLE 37.1 Overv	Uniqueness	Universality	Permanence	Measurability	Acceptabilit
DNA	High	High	High	Low	Low
Face geometry	Low	High	Medium	High	High
Fingerprint	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium
Hand geometry	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
Iris	High	High	High	Medium	Low
Retina	High	High	Medium	Low	Low
Signature dynamics	Low	Medium	Low	High	High
/oice	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	High


Hvor let er det at stjæle credentials? Hvad skal løsningen beskytte?



Biometri

Biometri er let at bruge, let tilgængelig - men har lavere sikkerhed alene








Basic syste

Placering af "request to exit" knapper er vigtig, kan de aktiveres ude fra?











Anti-Passback system








- 1. Angreb imod data og kommunikation
- 2. Angreb imod templates
- 3. Angreb imod software
- 4. Angreb med sensoren



Anti-Passback system

Biometri




Der findes også default access nøgler til smart cards.

F.eks. - kan en MD5 hash af UID og master nøglen give adgang til smartcardet/administrator kortet



Credential revocation



Fingeraftryk / hånd revokering



Beskyttelse af biometri-data





"Cheating": Social engineering



Security is difficult (but fun)

Intelligent adversaries





Kompromittering via Social Engineering

- At narre mennesker til at gøre ting de ellers ikke ville gøre eller udlevere fortrolige oplysninger.
- Kan fører til hacking og identitetstyveri.
- F.eks. ved at optræde som insider med afsæt i viden om virksomheden.

Hvordan kan en angriber få viden om en virksomhed?



Fremgangsmåden

Informationsindsamling
Opbygning af tillid
Scenariet
Pres for en løsning - "hvad kan vi gøre?"



Bagrundsviden



0. Indformations indsamling

Internet, sociale netværk, dumpster diving, besøg, opsøge medarbejdere, webmail, linkedin, jobannoncer osv, osv.



Hej, hvad er dit password?

1. Opbygning af tillid

Det er sjældent nok at sige "Hej, hvad er dit password?" eller "Hallo – det er din chef, giv mig Admin passwordet eller du er fyret"

En række venlige, trivielle spørgsmål først (opbygger tillid)



Hej, hvad er dit password?

2. Baggrundsscenariet (pretexting)

Ramme for angreb, kan være en hel identitet (baseret på indledende research)



Hej, hvad er dit password?

3. Pres

"Hvordan løser vi det her?"

Kropssprog, stemmeføring, høflig/vred/travl/autoritær osv



Han er "en af vores"

Samme sprog og jargon Det rigtige tøj

Overbevise folk om man "hører til"



Påklædning er vigtig

Dress as a DJ: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoIL2x6s IC8

Hvad ville have virket i bussen?



Man er usynlig i en neon-vest

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFur1-i6BpA



"Pre-loading"


Mange, mange teknikker

Påvirke inden faktiske møde/hændelse Verifikation af identitet



Det svageste led i sikkerhedskæden

Telefon, personlig fremmøde, USB, CD, websider, pdf-filer, hacke e-mail, vinde gaver, voice beskeder






Phishing


A phishing attack usually comes in the form of a message meant to convince you to:

- click on a link
- open a document
- install software on your device
- enter your username and password into a website that's made to look legitimate.



Don't click it





Billede 1: Den falske e-mail-login-side sidestillet med den legitime side. De to URL'er er fremhævet nedenunder.







Someone has your password

Hi William

Someone just used your password to try to sign in to your Google Account agmail.com.

Details:

Tuesday, 22 March, 14:9:25 UTC IP Address: 134.249.139.239


Location: Ukraine

Google stopped this sign-in attempt. You should change your password immediately.

CHANGE PASSWORD

Best, The Gmail Team





Be suspicious of all **links** that ask you to log in, regardless of the sender.

And be very careful of all **attached files** – regardless of the sender



By the way - do not "enable content" on documents with macros (.docm)



Don't click it - and don't pick it up either!

Ah – og hvis du finder en USB-nøgle på jorden: lad være med at teste den !





Hvad gør man imod Social Engineering?

Pain Center



Forstå truslerne

Jo højere sikkerhed, jo mere sandsynlig er social engineering

Træning og understøttende procedurer

- hvad er advarselssignalerne
- procedure gør det svært for angriber

Ikke kun telefonen - også mail, chat, hjemmesider og fysisk fremmøde m.m.

"Hvordan kan vi forbedre vores procedurer?"



Ikke det samme for alle

Rette niveau af paranoia!

Hvis man føler sig *usikker* – "der er et eller andet, der ikke føles rigtigt"



Forstå truslerne

O. Informations inds amling

Makuler dokumenter Forsigtig i offentlige rum Information over telefonen, mail o.lign., særligt ved uventede henvendelser

1. Opbygge tillid

Meget snakkende Hvorfor taler han om det? Spørg ind ved fejl, hvis fejl fortsætter -> afslut



Forstå truslerne

2. Scenariet

Hvis usikker: gencheck, gencheck, gencheck Tag dig tid og følg proceduren

3. Pres

Teknikker der benyttes (awareness)
Giv ikke efter
Henvis til politikker og procedurer
Tilkald en leder hvis usikker (overfør risiko),
tag ikke beslutningen selv



Mulige tiltag

- Awareness
- Opdateret software
- Brug 2FA (og/eller password manager)
- Bekræft med afsender (vha andre kanaler)
- Åben attachments på en sikker måde
- Backup

"A sense of urgency is always the first big clue"

Giver pretext'en egentlig mening – ville et firma virkelig ringe til dig, eller bede dig om at ringe til dem?

Ville dét firma virkelig bede om den information?



Spørgsmål



