

Oct 24:



The next lectures

Sep 12: Crypto part 2, Key establishment and Certificate management Operating systems, mail, browser and web-security, Sep 15: Introduction to risk assessments and risk management Security management and Disaster recovery Sep 19: Sep 22: Malicious software Sep 26: Software security Security architecture (perimeter, zero trust, OT), Sep 29: Hardware security Cloud-security, AI-security, IoT-security... Oct 3: Intrusion detection, Network attacks Oct 6: Forensics Oct 10: Oct 20: Privacy, Data protection

Privacy engineering, Privacy by design, PETS and GDPR

OS Security and **Access Control**


Identity and Access Management - ACL

An access control list (ACL) is a list of permissions attached to an object.

An ACL specifies which users or system processes are granted access to objects, as well as what operations are allowed on given objects

Alice: read, write; Bob: read

Subjects, Objects, and Access Rights




Access Control Policies

Discretionary access control (DAC)

- Controls access based on the identity of the requestor and on access rules (authorizations) stating what requestors are (or are not) allowed to do
- Mandatory access control (MAC)
 - Controls access based on comparing security labels with security clearances

UNIX – File Access Control

- Unique user identification nui (user ID)
- Member of a primary group identified by a group ID
- Belongs to a specific group
- 12 protection bits
 - Specify read, write, and execute permission for th owner of the file, member the group and all other us
- The owner ID, group ID, and protection bits are part of th file's inode





Traditional UNIX - File Access Control


- "Set user ID"(SetUID)
- "Set group ID"(SetGID)
 - System temporarily uses rights of the file owner/group in addition to the real user's rights when making access control decisions
 - Enables privileged programs to access files/resources not generally accessible
- Sticky bit
 - When applied to a directory it specifies that only the owner of any file in the directory can rename, move, or delete that file
- Superuser
 - Is exempt from usual access control restrictions
 - Has system-wide access

IAM

Role Based Access Control (RBAC)

Peter is a current employee, Peter is Administrator Mia is an employee, Mia has access to SAP Susan is no longer employee, Susan has Guestaccess

Jens has resigned, he was Administrator, does he still have access?



Access Control Policies

Role-based access control (RBAC)

 Controls access based on the roles that users have within the system and on rules stating what accesses are allowed to users in given roles

Attribute-based access control (ABAC)

 Controls access based on attributes of the user, the resource to be accessed, and current environmental conditions

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IAM – and PAM

An administrative process coupled with a technological solution which validates the identity of individuals and allows owners of data, applications, and systems to either maintain centrally or distribute responsibility for granting access to their respective resources to anyone participating within the IAM framework.

IAM refers to the processes, technologies and policies for managing digital identities and controlling how identities can be used to access resources

Limiting user access rights

- Daily use: only strictly necessary access rights (also applies to administrators)
- Privileged access must be controlled and limited
- Process for assigning administrative access rights (for time-limited periods?)
- Logging assigned (administrative) rights

IAM – Identity Life Cycle Management


Identity, Authentication and Authorization
Principle of Least Access
Groups and Roles
Administration
Auditing, Logging and Reporting
Segregation of Duties/Funktionsadskillelse

IAM


Identity: Who are you (person or a computer): UserIDs, certificates, cards...

Authentication: Prove your identity: challenge-response: Passwords, Private keys, PINs... Your possession of the secret proves you are who you claim to be

Authorization: the system controls which resources you're allowed to access. Typically through the use of a token or ticket mechanism. Allows you to access only that which the administrators have determined is necessary, thus enforcing the *principle of least privilege*



Identity, authentication, authorization – MitID?



Service Providers authorizes provides access to services based on their own risk assessment

Du arbejder på et internt projekt til udvikling af nyt økonomisystem til din virksomhed.

Projektlederne fortæller, at for at overholde tidsplanen skal der ikke bruges bruger-id'er. Systemet skal i stedet have et stærkt hardcodet password (17 tegn incl. specialtegn) Alle der skal have adgang til økonomisystemet vil få oplyst koden hvis de har brug for adgangen.

Hvad siger du til projektlederen?



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
Hvad siger du til projektlederen?



Identity, Authentication and Authorization
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
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Identity and Access Management (IAM)



Three factors + for authentication

User authentication categories based on type of verification evidence



Something you **do**, **where** you are, what **time** it is

Om brugen af kodeord


Kodeord har været anvendt i tusinder af år, men...

Brugernes passwords er altid dårlige


Opfylder kun lige akkurat de tekniske krav der stilles

Dvs. password regler styrker passwords, men kun op til den tekniske grænse løsningen tvinger brugerne til


(a) What we want: randomly distributed passwords



(b) What we get: predictable clustering, highly skewed distribution







Med mindre vi bliver tvunget - eller undervist i andet, så vælger vi alle sammen password efter dette mønster:

1. Ingen koder

Hvis man giver en bruger frit valg vil alle brugere selvfølgelig, alt andet lige, vælge at ikke bruge passwords, fordi det er det mest brugervenlige (dvs. letteste)

2. Almindelige ord


Hvis systemet tvinger til at bruge et kodeord, er første problem hvordan man selv husker sin kode.

Så man vælger i første omgang sin kode ud fra, om man tror man kan huske den, ikke fordi man tænker på "sikkerhed"

brugerens risikovurdering

Mental models – "noget man tit tænker på"





Systemer: problemet er, at vi bruger alle sammen de same systemer:

- Hvis krav om både STORE og små bogstaver bruger man kun ét stort bogstav – og det står altid først: Passwordet bliver "<mark>P</mark>assword", ikke "p<mark>A</mark>ssword"
- Hvis krav om numre står de altid til sidst: "Password12"
- Specialtegn er sidste del, og kun hvis de er krævet Så det "super-stærke" password er "Password12!"
- Vi laver mønstre: "1234", "1122", "1111" eller årstal/datoer, som "1945" (så en PIN bør være mindst 8 tegn)

To Passwords

Password123oct


hY6%%#2873GH/GtAQ?08-dPe2>S

- Hvis man kender det første PW kan alle fremtidige PW gættes
- Brugeren kan huske de første PW nr.2 bliver skrevet ned, særligt når der er krav om skift af PW

- Hvilket password er bedst nu?
- Hvilket password er bedst næste måned?

Password reuse

Model 2: det samme password på mange sites Er det et problem?



Password reuse:

https://haveibeenpwned.com

"The password must be impossible to remember and nowhere written down"

Peter Gutmann

Må man skrive sine passwords ned?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Srh_TV_J144

Hvor langt skal et password være?

- Hvad med special tegn?

http://howsecureismypassword.net



```
HOW PASSWORD -
     LENGTH WINS
     THE INTERNET
Passwords 102
```

Password huskere/password managers

Overvej password managers, f.eks. 1password

Kan beskytte koderne og kan give adgang til de gemte koder med et "super-password"

Autogenere stærke koder: Undgår genbrug af passwords på forskellige sider Password længden kan øges

Password managers

Undgår password genbrug Stærke, lange passwords alle steder

Problemer?

"Password manager salt"

Sikkerhed er ikke sort-hvidt

they need no longer be remembered. In practice, master passwords may be weaker than hoped, and the individual site passwords managed remain not only static (thus replayable) but often remain user-chosen (thus guessable) for reasons explained below. Overall, password managers thus deliver fewer security advantages than expected, while introducing new risks (below); their main advantage is improved usability.

> Computer Security and the Internet: Tools and Jewels from Malware to Bitcoin, Second Edition by Paul C. van Oorschot p.77

Forelæsning 19.sep: Risikovurderinger

Angreb imod brugerens passwords

- 1. Hvad er dit password? (spørge)
- 2. Gætte / default passwords
- 3. Dictionary Attack
- 4. Brute Force (f.eks. imod LanMan hash)
- 5. Rainbow Tables

Password cracking

Hashcat: https://hashcat.net



```
HwMon.Dev.#2....: Temp: 55c Fan: 30% Core:1010Mhz Mem:1250Mhz Lanes:16
HwMon.Dev.#3....: N/A
Started: wed Nov 30 10:48:18 2016
Stopped: wed Nov 30 10:48:43 2016
```

Algorithms

```
    MD4

    MD5

• Half MD5 (left, mid, right)
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
SHA-3 (Keccak)
SipHash
RipeMD160
Whirlpool
DES (PT = $salt, key = $pass)
9 3DES (PT = $salt, key = $pass)
@ GOST R 34.11-94
@ GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) 256-bit
@ GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) 512-bit
Double MD5
Double SHA1
md5($pass.$salt)
md5($salt.$pass)
md5 (unicode ($pass).$salt)
md5($salt.unicode($pass))
md5(sha1($pass))
md5($salt.md5($pass))
md5($salt.$pass.$salt)
md5(strtoupper(md5($pass)))
sha1($pass.$salt)
sha1($salt.$pass)
sha1(unicode($pass).$salt)
sha1($salt.unicode($pass))
sha1 (md5 ($pass))
sha1($salt.$pass.$salt)
sha1(CX)
```

Default passwords

Eksempel på dårlige passwords: Amerikanske Dankort maskiner

Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password

ATM hacket, tror indeholder 5\$ sedler i stedet for \$20 => udbetaler 3x for meget

Pre Paid Card

9 dage før kunder rapporterede

Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmW_4R81jVU


CNN Report: Robber Tricks ATM machine



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Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password



Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default

password




Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password

Knowledgebase:

"The ATM is programmed with the passwords that the distributor requests when the order is placed to program a new ATM. When special passwords are not requested they are left at the factory default (see your mini-bank operators manual) Every new ATM that is shipped from Tranax has a copy of the print setup included in the "open me first" box or envelope. The master password is hand written at the top of the print setup for the convenience of the installer."

Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password



Tranax manual inurl:pdf

Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password

Thranax:

Master = 555555

Service = 222222

Operator = 111111

Triton:

12345

Lipman:

Merchant = 2222222


Technician = 11111111

GTI:

1234


Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default

password




Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default

password




Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default password



Amerikanske ATM/Dankortmaskiner hacket med default

password





Pause




Password baggrund

Password hash, hash og salt, scrypt/bcrypt

Password baggrund

Password hash, hash og salt,


Password Reminder There was a recent password request from our webs Here is your login information for your account. ogin Email: bigbob @mailinator.com Login Password: 123456 Check the "manage account" page to change your page login instantly or click here to change your passwor



Password baggrund


Don't store the password, store a hash of the password

Password hash, hash og salt,



56

Salt



Password hash?

Direkte off-line adgang til password hash eller Online - forbinde til serveren hver gang?

- Begrænsninger på antallet af forsøg?
- Time-delay mellem sign-in attempts, brug penalty period (f.eks. 1 time) hvis forkert password er indtastet for mange gange
 - f.eks. 10 gange

Password hash?

The password "alpine fun" can be brute-forced in only 2 months if the server can be attacked 100 times per second. But, with a penalty period and 5 second delay, the same password can suddenly sustain an attack for 1,889 years.

| No of attacks | Password | Time | Security level |
|---|------------|-------------|----------------|
| 100 times per sec | alpine fun | 2 months | Low risk |
| 1 time every 5 sec | alpine fun | 63 years | Secure |
| 1 time every 5 sec with a 1 hour penalty period after 10 attempts | alpine fun | 1,889 years | Secure forever |

Se f.eks. "The Usability of Passwords"

http://www.baekdal.com/tips/password-security-usability og

"The Usability of Passwords FAQ":

http://www.baekdal.com/tips/the-usability-of-passwords-faq

Apple

Apple default: 80ms per password attempt delay Enforced by tamper resistant hardware

Indbyggede lille forsinkelse per password-forsøg medfører eksponentiel vækst ift. at bryde passwordet:

```
# characters [0-9]
                [0-9a-z]
                                       [0-9a-zA-Z]
           0.8 seconds 2.9 seconds
                                       5 seconds
                      1.7 minutes
                                       5.1 minutes
              seconds
                      1 hour
           1.3 minutes
                                       5.3 hours
                                       2 weeks
           13 minutes 1.6 days
           2.2 hours 8
                         weeks 2.3 years
           22 hours 5.5 years 140 years
           1.3 weeks
                      200 years
                                          thousand years
           13 weeks 7
                          thousand years 550 thousand years
           2.5 years
                      260 thousand years 34 million years
10
           25 years
                          million years
                                       2 billion years
```

Two Factor Authentication (2FA)













udløber om 12 timer.


Passwordless / FIDO2

Passwordless autentifikation er en form for multi-faktor autentifikation (MFA)

Erstatter passwords med to eller flere verifikations faktorer, sikret og krypteret på brugerens enhed, f.eks. fingeraftryk, ansigtsgenkendelse, device pin, eller en nøgle



Passwordless / FIDO2



Hvad er et godt password?

Hvor tit skal password skiftes?

Ikke kritisk (afhængig af hvor man har indtastet passwords)

Krav om skift f.eks. hver 90 dage kan være et problem fordi mennesker så typisk vælger svage passwords.

=> "Password06" eller "PasswordJuni"

Hvad er et godt password?

Overvej det hvis det er muligt at bruge 2-faktor autentifikation på en site

Næsten altid en forbedring af sikkerheden

Support er dyrt

Pas på "secret questions" Backup systemet for glemte passwords må ikke være svagere end dit password.

Meget lavere sikkerhed

Pick a secure password:

"0k5ijU)=2w8VAiqxozKyB&3d"

Now, in case you forget it, what's your favorite color?

"Blue"

Kort sagt

2FA er næsten altid bedst (brug det hvis i overhovedet kan)

Brug en password manager

Lange passwords er bedre end komplekse passwords (passphrases over 14 tegn)


Brug forskellige passwords på forskellige sites (password manager)

Back dine passwords op

Lange passwords er bedre end hyppige skift - med mindre der har været risiko for aflytning

Hvad er et godt password?

Biometri



Noget man ved Noget man har **Noget man er** Hvor man er

Biometri bør altid kombineres med BrugerID+password

Biometri samles typisk i en hash

Er biometri identity eller authentication?

Public or private?

Man efterlader biometri-data overalt

AI/Deep-fakes (stemme, ansigt osv)

Biometri som autentifikation – uden andre faktorer – er potentielt et problem (risiko vurdering!)

To biometriske målinger er aldrig helt ens, derfor er der altid element af usikkerhed:

False Acceptance Rate:

Rate at which someone other than the actual person is falsely recognized.

False Rejection Rate:

Rate at which the actual person is not recognized accurately.

| Modality | Type | Notes |
|----------------------|------|---|
| fingerprints | P | common on laptops and smartphones |
| facial recognition | P | used by some smartphones |
| iris recognition | P | the part of the eye that a contact lens covers |
| hand geometry | P | hand length and size, also shape of fingers and palm |
| retinal scan | P | based on patterns of retinal blood vessels |
| voice authentication | M | physical-behavioral mix |
| gait | В | characteristics related to walking |
| typing rhythm | В | keystroke patterns and timing |
| mouse patterns | В | also scrolling, swipe patterns on touchscreen devices |

Table 3.2: Biometric modalities: examples. P (physical), B (behavioral), M (mixed). Fingerprint (four digits) and iris biometrics are used at U.S.-Canadian airport borders.


| TABLE 37.1 Overv | Uniqueness | Universality | Permanence | Measurability | Acceptabilit |
|--------------------|------------|--------------|------------|---------------|--------------|
| DNA | High | High | High | Low | Low |
| Face geometry | Low | High | Medium | High | High |
| Fingerprint | High | Medium | High | Medium | Medium |
| Hand geometry | Medium | Medium | Medium | High | Medium |
| Iris | High | High | High | Medium | Low |
| Retina | High | High | Medium | Low | Low |
| Signature dynamics | Low | Medium | Low | High | High |
| /oice | Low | Medium | Low | Medium | High |

Hvor let er det at stjæle credentials? Hvad skal løsningen beskytte?

Biometri


Biometri er let at bruge, er let tilgængelig - men har lavere sikkerhed alene






Basic system


Placering af "request to exit" knapper er vigtig, kan de aktiveres ude fra?





Anti-Passback system






- 1. Angreb imod data og kommunikation
- 2. Angreb imod templates
- 3. Angreb imod software
- 4. Angreb med sensoren

Biometri


- Der findes også default access nøgler til smart cards.
- F.eks. kan en MD5 hash af UID og master nøglen give adgang til smartcardet/administrator kortet

Anti-Passback system



Credential revocation

• Fingeraftryk / hånd revokering



Beskyttelse af biometri-data



"Cheating": Social engineering

Security is difficult (but fun)

Intelligent adversaries



Kompromittering via Social Engineering

- At narre mennesker til at gøre ting de ellers ikke ville gøre eller udlevere fortrolige oplysninger.
- · Kan fører til hacking og identitetstyveri.
- F.eks. ved at optræde som insider med afsæt i viden om virksomheden.

Hvordan kan en angriber opnå viden om en virksomhed?

Fremgangsmåden

Informationsindsamling Opbygning af tillid Scenariet Pres for en løsning - "hvad kan vi gøre?"

Bagrundsviden



0. Indformations indsamling

Internet, sociale netværk, dumpster diving, besøg, opsøge medarbejdere, webmail, linkedin, jobannoncer osv, osv.

Hej, hvad er dit password?

1. Opbygning af tillid

Det er sjældent nok at sige "Hej, hvad er dit password?" eller "Hallo – det er din chef, giv mig Admin passwordet eller du er fyret"

En række venlige, trivielle spørgsmål først (opbygger tillid)

Hej, hvad er dit password?

2. Baggrundsscenariet (pretexting)

Ramme for angreb, kan være en hel identitet (baseret på indledende research)

Hej, hvad er dit password?

3. Pres

"Hvordan løser vi det her?"

Kropssprog, stemmeføring, høflig/vred/travl/autoritær osv

Han er "en af vores"

Samme sprog og jargon Det rigtige tøj

Overbevise folk om man "hører til"

Påklædning er vigtig

Dress as a DJ:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoIL2x6slC8

Hvad ville have virket i bussen?

Man er usynlig i en neon-vest

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFur1-i6BpA



"Pre-loading"

Mange, mange teknikker

Påvirke inden faktiske møde/hændelse Verifikation af identitet

Det svageste led i sikkerhedskæden

Telefon, personlig fremmøde, USB, CD, websider, pdf-filer, hacke e-mail, vinde gaver, voice beskeder




Phishing

A phishing attack usually comes in the form of a message meant to convince you to:

- click on a link
- open a document
- install software on your device
- enter your username and password into a website that's made to look legitimate.





Billede 1: Den falske e-mail-login-side sidestillet med den legitime side. De to URL'er er fremhævet nedenunder.





Someone has your password

Hi William

Someone just used your password to try to sign in to your Google Account @gmail.com.

Details:

Tuesday, 22 March, 14:9:25 UTC IP Address: 134.249.139.239


Location: Ukraine

Google stopped this sign-in attempt. You should change your password immediately.

CHANGE PASSWORD

Best,

The Gmail Team



Be suspicious of all **links** that ask you to log in, regardless of the sender.


And be very careful of all **attached files** – regardless of the sender



Don't click it – and don't pick it up either!

Ah – og hvis du finder en USB-nøgle på jorden: lad være med at teste den !





Forstå truslerne

Jo højere sikkerhed, jo mere sandsynlig er social engineering

Træning og understøttende procedurer

- hvad er advarselssignalerne
- procedure gør det svært for angriber

Ikke kun telefonen - også mail, chat, hjemmesider og fysisk fremmøde m.m.

"Hvordan kan vi forbedre vores procedurer?"

Ikke det samme for alle

Rette niveau af paranoia!

Hvis man føler sig *usikker* – "der er et eller andet, der ikke føles rigtigt"

Forstå truslerne

O. Informations indsamling

Makuler dokumenter Forsigtig i offentlige rum Information over telefonen, mail o.lign., særligt ved uventede henvendelser

1. Opbygge tillid

Meget snakkende Hvorfor taler han om det? Spørg ind ved fejl, hvis fejl fortsætter -> afslut

Forstå truslerne

2. Scenariet

Hvis usikker: gencheck, gencheck, gencheck Tag dig tid og følg proceduren

3. Pres

Teknikker der benyttes (awareness)
Giv ikke efter
Henvis til politikker og procedurer
Tilkald en leder hvis usikker (overfør risiko), tag ikke beslutningen selv

Mulige tiltag

- Awareness
- Opdateret software
- Brug 2FA (og/eller password manager)
- Bekræft med afsender (vha andre kanaler)
- Åben attachments på en sikker måde
- Backup

"A sense of urgency is always the first big clue"

Giver pretext'en egentlig mening – ville et firma virkelig ringe til dig, eller bede dig om at ringe til dem? Ville dét firma virkelig bede om den information?

Spørgsmål

