



IT-Security (ITS) B1

DIKU, E2025



This is plain text

Computing in the presence of an adversary



This is not plain text

Cbzchgvat va gur cerfrapr bs na nqirefnel



This is not plain text


Q29tcHV0aW5nIGluIHRobzSBwcmVzZW5jZSBvZiBhbiBhZHZlcnNhcnkK



This is not plain text

689b ef01 affa eb02 5618 7770 1c66 58ed 139c 9020 8431 2ff0 e7af
0d41 b3d5 b4a6 f222 90b3 f51a afd9 00fe e01d c509 69f4

Cryptosystems





Security goals

Confidentiality

Integrity

Authenticity

Non-repudiation



Today's agenda

Part 1: Crypto building blocks

Part 2: More crypto building blocks

(Later: Real-world crypto protocols)



Today's agenda

Cryptography defined

Cryptography from a historic perspective

Tools: Encryption, decryption, cryptographic hash functions, digital signatures,

(Cryptography is key, but hard to get right and not a panacea)



Crypto defined



Today's agenda

Cryptology (from Ancient Greek: *kryptós* "hidden, secret"; and *graphein*, "to write"), is the practice and study of codes, both creating and breaking them


Cryptography is the art of creating codes

Cryptanalysis is the art of breaking codes



Crypto from a historic perspective

Cryptography influence world events



Cryptography influence world events

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

GERMAN LEGATION
MEXICO CITY

via Galveston JAN 8 9 1917

130 13042 13401 8501 115 3528 416 17214 6491 11310
18147 18222 21560 10247 11518 23677 13605 3494 14936
98092 5905 11311 10392 10371 0302 21290 5101 39095
23571 17504 11299 18276 18101 0317 0228 12694 4473
24284 22200 19452 21589 07893 5569 13918 8958 12137
1333 4725 4458 5905 17106 13851 4458 17149 14471 0700
13850 12224 0929 14991 7382 15857 07893 14218 36477
5870 17653 87903 5870 5454 16102 15217 22601 17138
21001 17398 7146 23638 18222 8719 14331 15021 23845
3156 23562 22096 21604 4797 9497 22461 20855 4377
23610 18140 22280 5905 13347 20420 39889 13732 50667
6929 5275 18507 52282 1340 22049 13339 11295 22295
10439 14814 4178 6992 8784 7632 7357 6926 52282 11207
21100 21272 9346 9559 22464 15874 18502 18500 15857
2188 5376 7381 98092 10127 13486 9350 9220 76036 14219
5144 2831 17920 11547 17142 11264 7687 7762 15099 9110
10482 97556 3509 3670

BEHNSTOFF.


Charge German Embassy.



Cryptography influence world events



Our goal: Secure online communication





Warm-up question



FileCrypt

“FileCrypt is a dynamic non-factor based quantum AI encryption hardware solution.

Developed by our cryptographic experts and hardwired into a tamper-resistant USB token.

Plug the token into your PC, start the program and encrypt the files you need to protect”

What problems do you see with this solution?



Multiple concerns

#1: “Developed by our cryptographic experts”

Should we trust proprietary crypto over public peer-reviewed time-tested crypto?

#2: “Dynamic non-factor based quantum AI”

What does that mean? Are there any academic papers that discuss this concept?

#3: “Plug the token into your PC”

Can anyone do this? What if token is lost? Violates **Kerckhoffs’ Principle**

Kerckhoffs' (2nd) Principle

The security of a cryptographic algorithm must rest solely in the secrecy of its **key**, not in the secrecy of the algorithm itself

Collaries:

- Assume attacker knows the algorithm
- Make it available for public analysis
- Protect the key!



Auguste Kerckhoffs
(1835 – 1903)



Symmetric cryptosystems



Symmetric cryptosystems

Stream ciphers

One time pad

If k random, $|k| \geq |p|$, never reused, and kept secret, then it is impossible to decrypt or break without knowing the key (Shannon, 1949)

Key	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Plaintext	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Ciphertext	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0


Towards modern stream ciphers

Problem

OTP key as long as plaintext

Solution

Generate pseudo random keystream





st 1 rule of stream ciphers

Never reuse key

$$C_1 \oplus P_1 = \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$C_2 \oplus P_2 = \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$C_1 = C_2 \quad \circ \quad P_1 = P_2$$

$$P_1 = P_2 \quad \circ \quad P_1, P_2$$



Solution: Initialisation Vector (IV)

For each message

- Generate IV

- Mix k with IV

- Generate keystream $\text{PRG}(k + \text{IV})$ and encrypt

- Send c and IV (in plaintext)


Change k before IVs run out



Block ciphers



Block ciphers

One block at a time – as opposed to one bit at a time



One block at a time


Blocks, rounds function, key schedule, iterations




DES

DES

Key 64, block 64, rounds 16



(a) Encryption



(b) Decryption


AES

AES

Keys 128/192/256

Block 128


Rounds 10/12/14






Modes of operation

Electronic Codebook (ECB)



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

ECB decryption




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode decryption

If $p1 = p2$, then $c1 = c2$


An example plaintext



Encrypted with AES in ECB mode




Cipher Block Chaining



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

CBC decryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Better


An example plaintext



Encrypted with AES in CBC
mode



Output Feedback



Output Feedback (OFB) mode encryption



Security goals revisited

“Susceptibility to malicious insertions and modifications. Because each symbol is separately enciphered, an active interceptor who has broken the code can splice together pieces of previous messages and transmit a spurious new message that may look authentic.” - Phleeger & Phleeger in Security in Computing, Pearson, 2003

Is this a disadvantage of stream cipher? Why, why not?

Security goal of encryption: Confidentiality



Status

Confidentiality: Check!

Integrity: Missing



Message authentication code (MAC)



Message authentication code

Goal: Provide integrity

Process


Choose a cryptographic hash function $h : \{0,1\}^x \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$

Sender: Send $h(m), m$


Receiver: Calculate $h(m)$ and verify it matches $h(m)$

Examples MD5 ($n = 128$), SHA-256 ($n = 256$)


Cryptographic hash functions



Finding
Collision



Finding
Inversion



Finding
2nd Pre-image



Hash-based MAC (HMAC)


RFC2104: Hash-based MAC

$\text{HMAC}(h,k,m) =$

$$h((k \oplus \text{opad}) \parallel h((k \oplus \text{ipad}) \parallel m))$$

HMAC provides integrity and authenticity

CBC-MAC





Car keys

Your car key sends the code for "open the door", together with a MAC, to the car whenever you press the button.

What could go wrong?


Replay attack: attacker records message and replays it later

We need some freshness: a timestamp or nonce




Non-repudiation

Cryptosystems



Enter: Asymmetric encryption



Analogy: Combination locks

Bob sends out locks with combination he only knows

Alice picks one of Bob's locks, places her message in a box and locks it with Bob's lock

Bob is the only one who can open the box now





No pre-shared key!

Bob

Publish public key, protect private key

Alice

Encrypt message with Bob's public key

Bob

Decrypts with his private key



Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), 1978

First asymmetric cryptosystem



RSA encryption and decryption

Public key (N,e), private key (d)

$$C = M^e \pmod{N}$$

$$M = C^d \pmod{N}$$

Asymmetric encryption: Yes! But what about non-repudiation?



Reverse

Public key (N, e) , private key (d)

Signature $\text{sig}(M) = M^d \pmod{N}$

Verify $\text{ver}(M, \text{sig}(M)) = \text{true}$ iff $M = (M^d)^e \pmod{N}$



Wrap-up



Security goals achieved

Confidentiality

Integrity

Authenticity


Non-repudiation

CHECK!



But crypto can still fail

Small keys fail



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "Vulnerability Note VU#268267 - DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Verifiers may inappropriately convey message trust". The address bar shows the URL "www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/268267". The page header includes the CERT logo and the text "Software Engineering Institute | CarnegieMellon.". The main heading is "Vulnerability Notes Database" with the subtitle "Advisory and mitigation information about software vulnerabilities". Below this is a navigation bar with links: "DATABASE HOME", "SEARCH", "REPORT A VULNERABILITY", and "HELP". The main content area features the title "Vulnerability Note VU#268267" in red, followed by the subtitle "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Verifiers may inappropriately convey message trust". Below the subtitle, it states "Original Release date: 24 Oct 2012 | Last revised: 09 Nov 2012". There are social sharing buttons for "Print", "Tweet", "Send", and "Share". The "Overview" section begins with the text: "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Verifiers may inappropriately convey message trust when messages are signed using keys that are too weak (< 1024 bits) or that are marked as test keys."

Vulnerability Note VU#268267 - DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Verifiers may inappropriately convey message trust

CERT Vulnerability Note VU#268267...

www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/268267

us-cert warns dkim

CERT | Software Engineering Institute | CarnegieMellon.

Vulnerability Notes Database

Advisory and mitigation information about software vulnerabilities

DATABASE HOME SEARCH REPORT A VULNERABILITY HELP

Vulnerability Note VU#268267

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Verifiers may inappropriately convey message trust

Original Release date: 24 Oct 2012 | Last revised: 09 Nov 2012

Print Tweet Send Share

Overview

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Verifiers may inappropriately convey message trust when messages are signed using keys that are too weak (< 1024 bits) or that are marked as test keys.

Collision fail



The image is a screenshot of the top portion of the Ars Technica website. At the top left is the Ars Technica logo, consisting of an orange circle with the word 'ars' in white lowercase letters, followed by the word 'technica' in a white sans-serif font. To the right of the logo is a large orange rectangular banner with the text 'See what Accuweather built for Windows' in white. Below the banner is a dark grey navigation bar containing a home icon, the text 'MAIN MENU' with a dropdown arrow, 'MY STORIES: 25' with a dropdown arrow, 'FORUMS', 'SUBSCRIBE' in orange, and 'VIDEO'. Below the navigation bar is a large grey horizontal bar with the text 'RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM' in a bold, dark grey sans-serif font. Below this bar is the article title 'Crypto breakthrough shows Flame was designed by world-class scientists' in a large, bold, dark grey sans-serif font. Under the title is a subtitle in a smaller, grey sans-serif font: 'The spy malware achieved an attack unlike any cryptographers have seen before.' At the bottom left of the article section is the byline 'by Dan Goodin - June 7 2012, 8:20pm -200'. At the bottom right are three tags: 'BLACK HAT' in orange, 'NATIONAL SECURITY' in orange, and '161' in white inside a grey box.

ars technica

See what Accuweather built for Windows

HOME MAIN MENU MY STORIES: 25 FORUMS SUBSCRIBE VIDEO

RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

Crypto breakthrough shows Flame was designed by world-class scientists

The spy malware achieved an attack unlike any cryptographers have seen before.

by Dan Goodin - June 7 2012, 8:20pm -200

BLACK HAT NATIONAL SECURITY 161

Impressive fail

New attack steals e-mail decryption keys by capturing computer sounds


Scientists use smartphone to extract secret key of nearby PC running PGP app.

by Dan Goodin - Dec 18, 2013 11:25 pm UTC

Share

Tweet

108





Bad choice fail

IRS Encourages Poor Cryptography

Buried in one of the [documents](#) are the [rules for encryption](#):

While performing AES encryption, there are several settings and options depending on the tool used to perform encryption. IRS recommended settings should be used to maintain compatibility:

- Cipher Mode: ECB (Electronic Code Book).
- Salt: No salt value
- Initialization Vector: No Initialization Vector (IV). If an IV is present, set to all zeros to avoid affecting the encryption.
- Key Size: 256 bits / 32 bytes Key size should be verified and moving the key across operating systems can affect the key size.
- Encoding: There can be no special encoding. The file will contain only the raw encrypted bytes.
- Padding: PKCS#7 or PKCS#5.

ECB? Are they [serious](#)?

DIY fail



Smart grid security WORSE than we thought

OSGP's DIY MAC is a JOKE



Backdoor fail

Topic: *Security*

Follow via:  

NIST finally dumps NSA-tainted random number algorithm

Summary: *Many years since a backdoor was discovered, probably planted by the NSA, public pressure finally forces NIST to formally remove Dual_EC_DRBG from their recommendations.*



By [Larry Seltzer](#) for [Zero Day](#) | April 23, 2014 -- 14:04 GMT (07:04 PDT)

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Supply chain fail

Schneier on Security

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Crypto AG Was Owned by the CIA

The Swiss cryptography firm Crypto AG sold equipment to governments and militaries around the world for decades after World War II. They were owned by the CIA:

But what none of its customers ever knew was that Crypto AG was secretly owned by the CIA in a highly classified partnership with West German intelligence. These spy agencies rigged the company's devices so they could easily break the codes that countries used to send encrypted messages.

This isn't really news. We have [long known](#) that Crypto AG was backdooring crypto equipment for the Americans. What is new is the formerly classified documents describing the details:

The decades-long arrangement, among the most closely guarded secrets of the Cold War, is laid bare in a classified, comprehensive CIA history of the operation obtained by The Washington Post and ZDF, a German public broadcaster, in a joint reporting project.

The account identifies the CIA officers who ran the program and the

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
About Bruce Schneier



Malware fail



Real-world fail



Suggested reading

