



IT-Security (ITS) B1

DIKU, E2021



Today's agenda

- 1: Forensics
- 2: (Defensive) Cyber security in practice (guest)
- 3: Exam Q/A



Forensics defined

Digital forensics is a branch of forensic science encompassing the recovery and investigation of material found on digital devices


Applied in a **corporate**, **civil**, or **criminal** setting (originated in law enforcement)

Applied to a **security** investigation or **personnel** investigation

In security investigations, forensics either means a **root cause or impact analysis** of a cyber-attack, often post-mortem, **or simply techniques** used in the process of uncovering, understanding, and responding to a security incident

In security, **DFIRMA** = digital forensics + incident response + malware analysis

Recap: Intrusion detection





DFIRMA in practice

while true:

- intrusion analysis

- if intrusion suspected:

 - preliminary analysis

 - if intrusion verified:

 - repeat until incident fully grasped:

 - incident analysis

 - forensic analysis

 - malware analysis

 - incident response

- update plans



Sidebar: Many forms of forensics

Digital forensics =

Computer forensics

Memory forensics

Network forensics

Mobile forensics

Etc. forensics



Memory forensics



Situation: Evil code is running

Out job: Find it in memory



Memory forensics

From Wikipedia:

“Memory forensics is forensic analysis of a computer's **memory dump**.

Its primary application is investigation of advanced computer attacks which are stealthy enough to avoid leaving data on the computer's hard drive.”



First, get a copy

- Live acquisition

 - Different techniques

- Live analysis

 - Direct analysis of the running kernel

- Dead acquisition

 - Hibernation files, page files

- Virtualization - thank you



What to find in memory?

Running processes

Listening sockets

Open connections

Encryption keys

Credentials

Memory only malware

Closed connections

Terminated processes

Open file handles

Deobfuscated code




Memory forensic analysis process

- 1: Find rogue processes
- 2: Analyse DLLs
- 3: Review network artefacts
- 4: Look for evidence of code injections
- 5: Dump suspicious processes → further analysis


How to find processes (on Windows)

EPROCESS objects in memory:




How to find processes (on Windows)

Scan for EPROCESS objects:



Process enumeration (on Windows)





Key concept in memory forensics:

Walking a list, or scanning for objects



Step 1 revisited: Find rogue processes

Those that:

- Hide

- Have odd parents


- Do network comm but shouldn't

- Have unusually many handles open

- Contain maliciously injected code

- ...

Direct kernel objection manipulation (DKOM)





Another example:

Zeus

Zeus

**WANTED
BY THE FBI**

**EVGENIY MIKHAILOVICH
BOGACHEV**

Conspiracy to Participate in Racketeering Activity; Bank Fraud; Conspiracy to Violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; Conspiracy to Violate the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act; Aggravated Identity Theft; Conspiracy; Computer Fraud; Wire Fraud; Money Laundering; Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud



DESCRIPTION

Aliases: "Evgeniy Bogachev, Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, "lucky12345", "slavik", "Pollingsoon"
Date(s) of Birth Used: October 28, 1983
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown (usually shaves his head)
Height: Approximately 5'9"
Weight: Approximately 180 pounds
Sex: Male
Race: White
Occupation: Bogachev works in the Information Technology field.
NCIC: W890989955

REWARD

The United States Department of State's Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program is offering a reward of up to \$3 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev.

Visgean/Zeus: NOT MY CODE! Zeus trojan horse - leaked in 2011, I am not the author. This repository is for study purposes ...

Visgean/Zeus: NOT MY CODE! X +

https://github.com/Visgean/Zeus

Search or jump to... Pulls Issues Marketplace Explore

Visgean / Zeus Watch 132 Star 1k Fork 651

<> Code Pull requests Actions Security Insights

translation Go to file Add file Code About

Visgean copied content of readme.txt on Feb 23, 2014 14

bin	Sources uploaded.	10 years ago
configs	Sources uploaded.	10 years ago
geobase	Revert "encoding experiments"	7 years ago
include	Sources uploaded.	10 years ago
lib	Sources uploaded.	10 years ago
make	Revert "encoding experiments"	7 years ago
output	Added exe fro real...	7 years ago
source	Revert "encoding experiments"	7 years ago
temp	Revert "encoding experiments"	7 years ago
README	copied content of readme.txt	7 years ago

NOT MY CODE! Zeus trojan horse - leaked in 2011, I am not the author. This repository is for study purposes only, do not message me about your lame hacking attempts.

[en.wikipedia.org/wiki/zeu...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeus_trojan_horse)


[c](#) [c-plus-plus](#) [malware](#) [russian](#) [virus](#) [leaks](#)

Readme

Releases


No releases published

Zeus infection



Volatility

Volatility is an open source memory analysis framework writtin in Python





Example memory analyses


Volatility and Zeus

```
Terminal
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[zeus_stux]$ python volatility/vol.py -f zeus.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connections
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
Offset(V) Local Address Remote Address Pid
-----
[zeus_stux]$ python volatility/vol.py -f zeus.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
Offset(P) Local Address Remote Address Pid
-----
0x02214988 172.16.176.143:1054 193.104.41.75:80 856
0x06015ab0 0.0.0.0:1056 193.104.41.75:80 856
[zeus_stux]$ python volatility/vol.py -f zeus.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist | grep 856
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
0x80ff88d8 svchost.exe 856 676 29 336 0 0 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
[zeus_stux]$
```

Don't pull the plug



Further reading





Disk (or, file system) forensics




Situation: Evil file has reached disk

Out job: Find the malware

Typical disk forensic approach

Forensic workstation

Write blocker




Seized harddrive




Forensics in a nutshell

Understanding the low-level details



- File names, directories
- Structure information about files/directories
- Partition information
- Sectors, blocks, clusters
- The drive itself, and partitions

Disk forensic example: DOS partitions



MBR/EBR same layout

Bytes	Content
0-445	Upstart code, disk signature
446-461	Partition entry 1
462-477	Partition entry 2
478-493	Partition entry 3
494-509	Partition entry 4
510-511	MBR/EBR signature (0xAA55)



Bytes	Content
0	0x00 not boot, 0x80 boot
1-3	Cylinder-head-sector (CHS) of start sector
4	Partition type
5-7	Cylinder-head-sector (CHS) of end sector
8-11	Logical block addressing (LBA) of start sector
12-15	Number of sectors in partition



Type	FAT12	FAT16	FAT32	Linux native	Linux swap	Extended	NTFS
Hex value	0x01	0x0E	0x0C	0x83	0x82	0x05	0x07



File system example: NTFS

NTFS boot sector	Master File Table	File storage area	Master File Table Copy
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Master File Table (MFT)

An entry in the MFT describes a file

Filename and metadata like permissions, timestamps

Entries are 1024 bytes

For larger files (non-resident files), the MFT entry contains links to areas of the disk where the file data resides




File system example: NTFS






File system example: NTFS



File system example: NTFS





Data / File storage area

Clusters (Windows) or **blocks** (Unix) = 1 or more 512-byte **sectors**

Clusters/blocks either **allocated**

Actively being used by a file

Or **unallocated**

Not being used by a file

May contain deleted or unused data



Deleted != destroyed

When a file is deleted, **data still exists** on disk until overwritten

If overwritten, **remnants may still exist** in

- extra copies of the file

- page/swap/hibernation file, or

- elsewhere on the disk due to (de)fragmentation

However, if disk wiped, only just once, recovery infeasible

Think libraries




Format is not wiping

Formats create and replace file system structures



Files are not overwritten

Regular formats take longer as the disk is scanned for bad sectors


Use wiping software for wiping



Slack space




Timeline (Modified, Accessed, Changed)



Searching for file types



Slack.txt



Slack.exe



Slack.pdf



Slack.zip



Slack.dat




Slack.mp3



Slack.dll

Further reading





Wrap-up