Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
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Adversarial Noise Benchmarking On Image Caption

Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

The task of generating image captions is at the intersection of Computer Vision and Natural Language Processing. It requires a visual scene to be understood by the computer and then described in text. To ensure they are reliable in real-world scenarios they should be robust against tampering. This research investigates the robustness of Show Attend and Tell (S.A.T.) (K. Xu et al., 2016), an end-to-end deep-learning approach using an attention mechanism(Bahdanau, Cho & Bengio, 2014) to generate a caption for the input image. The robustness is evaluated by generating adversarial disturbances on the input image using a variation of the Fast Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow, Shlens & Szegedy, 2015), which can find the input pixels to which the model is most sensitive in generating the output. Two different attacks will be tried, one directly on the output of the model and one targeting the attention to see if it can be distracted. It is shown that the model can be attacked by both methods. Attacking the attention layer can also be visualized and it is shown that the model only focuses on a single latent pixel.

1 Introduction

The image caption generation task is at the cross-section between Computer Vision (CV) and Natural Language Processing (NLP). It requires the computer to understand a visual scene and describe it in a grammatically correct natural sentence. It can also be seen as a translation task, translating an image into a natural sentence. Practical use cases vary from automated describing of images to visually impaired people (Mazzoni, 2019) to context-based image retrieval. For the model to be successful in these tasks it should be accurate and robust. Show-Attend-and-Tell (S.A.T.) (K. Xu et al., 2016) is an end-to-end deep-learning approach to solving the image captioning task. An example prediction can be seen in figure 1a

For these models to be useful in real-world scenarios they must be robust against tampering on the input image. However, the problem with machine learning is that models can be very susceptible to noise. As small changes to the input can lead to radically different outcomes. As shown by Goodfellow et al. adding a specific (small) noise layer to an image can alter a correct prediction to a very confident wrong prediction. When the generation of the adversarial examples is not that computationally expensive, they can be generated and used during training making the model more robust. It is shown that these adversarial examples then act as regularizers during training. Reducing the chance of overfitting. Kurakin, Goodfellow and Bengio expand on generating adversarial examples showing that one can also steer the model towards a specific classification however, this comes at an increased computational cost. An example of an adversarial sample on image captioning can be seen in figure 1b.

(a) A group of teddy bears sitting on top of a blanket.

(b) A close up of a person on a suitcase.

Figure 1: Example predictions by Show Attend and Tell on a clean image (left) and an adversarial image (right).

Attention mechanisms, such as those introduced by Bahdanau et al., have been shown to improve various machine learning tasks, one of which is image captioning. It allows the model to focus on different parts of the image at a time to ensure the whole scene is described. The aforementioned S.A.T. also uses this attention mechanism. Furthermore, it improves the explainability of the model, as for each word it can be shown which parts of the image the model "looked" at. However, if the attention is focused on the wrong parts of the image, the model is blind to possible important parts of the model. Hence, this attention mechanism can also be a possible new attack vector. This paper investigates the susceptibility of adversarial attacks specifically targeted at the attention layer, in an attempt to distract the network making it blind to parts of the image.

2 Motivation

When using machine learning models in real-world use cases, it is important to ensure those models are robust. If this is not the case they can be unreliable, wrong, or in the worst case attacked by adversaries. Finding and understanding the weaknesses, therefore, is important. Furthermore, understanding the weaknesses can also help us in finding better architectures that are less susceptible to these kinds of attacks.

Adversarial samples for machine learning models can be generated using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM)(Goodfellow et al., 2015). Originally proposed for image classification, it finds a small noise field that can be added to the image to generate an adversarial image. This adversarial image is then often incorrectly labeled with high confidence. An example of FSGM can be seen in figure 2. These adversarial samples prove to be useful during training, as they can act as regularizers, and improve the robustness of the model. Kurakin, Goodfellow and Bengio show that these adversarial samples are also transferable to different models, even if they are trained on other datasets or have different architectures. This might make it possible to generate adversarial samples once and add them to the dataset, to make the dataset itself more robust.



Figure 2: Adversarial noise example from (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Where $\epsilon = 0.07$.

There has already been some research on adversarial examples targeted at image captioning (Aafaq, Akhtar, Liu, Shah & Mian, 2021; Chen, Zhang, Chen, Yi & Hsieh, 2017). All of which attack the output of the model, often intendig to generate a specific output sentence. Chen et al. show that Show-and-Tell[1](Vinyals, Toshev, Bengio & Erhan, 2014) is susceptible to adversarial samples. The question then arises if the attention added in S.A.T. makes it harder to generate adversarial samples or if it opens up a new attack vector.

2.1 Research Questions

This research investigates the susceptibility of S.A.T. against adversarial samples that are visually close but generate completely different descriptions as output. A special focus is placed on what the attention in S.A.T. does and if it is an attack vector. When the attention is not focused on the important parts of the image for generating the caption, the model is blind to those parts therefore not being able to describe those parts. It is therefore interesting to investigate if the attention can be used against S.A.T. Concretely this paper will try to answer the following questions:

- Is S.A.T. susceptible to adversarial attacks using the Fast Gradient Sign Method?
- Can the attention of S.A.T. be abused by adversarial samples?

[1]Show-and-Tell is the predecessor of S.A.T. without attention mechanism

3 Related work

Image Captioning

Various techniques have been used to try and solve the image captioning task. Early methods mainly used hand-designed techniques based on template matching, which made them rigid in the sentences they could generate. One of the first end-to-end deep-learning approaches was Show-and-Tell (Vinyals et al., 2014). It uses a CNN to extract most import features from an image, which then are decoded using an LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) to a sentence, which describes the image. Show Attend and Tell (S.A.T.) proposed by K. Xu et al. is an extension to Show-and-Tell, which adds an attention mechanism before the LSTM decoding. This attention allows the model to focus on specific parts of the image when generating a word. An added benefit is that this attention can be visualized, giving insight into what the model looks at to generate a specific word in the output sentence.

Evaluating image captioning tasks is often done using bilingual evaluation understudy (BLEU) (Papineni, Roukos, Ward & Zhu, 2001). The primary reason that it is used is that it is currently the most reported metric in image captioning. It is a form of word n-gram precision between the predicted and human-generated reference sentences. It correlates highly with human ratings of captions (Vinyals et al., 2014). An obvious drawback to this is that a synonym of a word can result in a lower score, even though the sentence still is closely related, or by inserting common words such as 'a', 'the', and 'person' the model can achieve a higher score.

S.A.T. achieves a BLEU score of 0.75[1] out of 1.0 on COCO(Lin et al., 2015) datasets, the human annotations reach a score of 0.66[2]. Although the score is not state-of-the-art(Stefanini et al., 2021) anymore. This model is chosen because it is small and thus can be run locally, and has publicly available implementations (Sgrvinod, n.d.).

Adversarial Methods

In the last few years research in the direction of generating adversarial samples for gradient-based models has been published (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016a) as well as research showing the usefulness of such adversarial samples(Ilyas et al., 2019) to create more robust datasets. The latter stating: "Adversarial vulnerability is a direct result of our models' sensitivity to well-generalizing features in the data." However, these generalizing features are not robust, as models are optimized to do well in the average case. Inserting adversarial examples in training help regularize these non-robust features(Kurakin et al., 2016b).

One of the most influential methods in this field has been proposed by Goodfellow et al.. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM) (ab)uses the differentiability of machine learning models to find an adversarial example. It is a single-step gradient-based approach to optimize the input image such that it maximizes a certain loss value. Various variations on FSGM have been proposed, such as the Iterative Fast Gradient Method (Kurakin et al., 2016a). Which applies multiple small steps of FSGM. It is further improved by adding various optimization techniques such as momentum (J. Xu, 2020).

Although FSGM was originally designed for classification tasks, it (and variations) have been successfully adapted to other tasks such as object detection (Bose & Aarabi, 2018; Liu et al., 2020; Zhang & Wang, 2019), and most notably for this research on image captioning(Chen et al., 2017). Chen et al.'s method Show-and-Fool successfully and consistently can attack Show-and-Tell(Vinyals et al., 2014). They do this by using Adam(Kingma & Ba, 2017) to optimize the input image for 1000 steps targeting specific keywords. In generating captions that contain those specific keywords they achieve a success rate of 95.8%, this does come at the cost of taking about 38 seconds to generate a single adversarial sample.

[1] Calculated using NLTK(Bird & Klein, 2009) bleu score implementation
[2] Calculated by comparing the captions with each other.

4 Methodology

4.1 Dataset

The well-known MSCOCO (Lin et al., 2015) dataset will be used as clean dataset. It contains 35 thousand images, of which 30 thousand are part of the train set and 5 thousand of the testing set.

4.2 Model

The model used, as already introduced in section 3, will be Show Attend and Tell. It is an interesting model as it uses attention, which can be visualized, to focus on the most important places of the image. It was trained on MSCOCO (Lin et al., 2015). S.A.T. uses a CNN as a feature extractor to generate high-dimensional latent pixels. These latent pixels are then fed to an attention layer, which in combination with an LSTM produces word tokens. It continues until a stop-token has been generated, or if it has generated 50 words, whichever comes first. In practice, it generally does not create sentences that are longer than 20 words. The attention that is used for each word can be visualized (Figure 3) by mapping the attention on the latent pixels back to the original location on the image. The attention allows the model to focus on different parts during the generation of the sentence, while reusing the same decoder weights. In essenence it allows the model to divide the image in smaller pieces that it thinks are acceptable. The implementation used, is a publicly available reproduction of S.A.T. in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2019) is used. (Sgrvinod, n.d.)



Figure 3: Visualization of attention. The highlighted parts show the attention that the model used to generate each specific word.

4.3 Generating Adversarial Samples

Generating adversarial input images can be done by using the Fast Method (EQ. 1) proposed by Goodfellow et al..

$$X^{adv} = X + \epsilon * sign(\nabla_x J(X, y_{true})) \tag{1}$$

X^{adv} is the adversarial sample generated by taking the original image X and perpetrating it with the sign of the gradient of the loss function: $J(X, y_{true})$, maximizing that loss function. The ϵ is a hyperparameter that controls the amount of perpetration. It can be tuned to ensure that the adversarial image still is visually the same as the original image. Finally, the adversarial image is clipped to ensure it stays within the 0 to 1 input range of the model. As can be seen in Figure 4 (and more examples in the appendix A), using this method images up to and including $\epsilon = 0.02$ are indistinguishable and up to and including $\epsilon = 0.16$ recognizable to humans. The *sign* method in combination with the epsilon ensures $L_\infty(X - X^{adv}) \le \epsilon$.

(a) ϵ=0.000 (b) ϵ=0.020

(c) ϵ=0.000 (d) ϵ=0.160

Figure 4: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.020 and 0.160. Generated using equation 1. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix A.

In practice applying this a single time is often not enough to successfully attack S.A.T. therefore the Iterative FSGM (I-FSGM) will be used as proposed by Kurakin et al.. Which repeatedly applies the Fast Gradient Sign Method for N iterations

$$X_0^{adv}, X_{n+1}^{adv} = Clip_{X,\epsilon}(X_n^{adv} + \alpha * sign(\nabla_x J(X_n^{adv}, y_{true}))) \tag{2}$$

In which, α is a hyperparameter that naively can be set to ϵ/N. Images generated using this method are usually less visually disturbed for the same epsilons. Here an epsilon of 0.040 is nearly indistinguishable, as can be seen in figure 5.

(a) $\epsilon = 0.000, N = 10$ (Clean image)

(b) $\epsilon = 0.020, N = 10$

(c) $\epsilon = 0.160, N = 10$

(d) $\epsilon = 0.160, N = 100$

Figure 5: Clean (a) and Adversarial images (b,c,d) for varying epsilon values and iterations. Generated using equation 2. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix A.

Distracting Adversarial Sample

Distraction is a powerful technique often used by real-world adversaries[1] against humans. As S.A.T. employs attention to generate sentences, it is possible to try and distract it by creating an adversarial sample that makes the model hyperfocused on only part of the image. During training S.A.T. learns to divide the attention roughly equally over the whole image during the generation of a single caption. It does this by including the loss shown in equation 3.

$$L_{attention} = \sum_{i}^{L}(1 - \sum_{t}^{C} \alpha_{ti}^2) \tag{3}$$

With C equal to the number of words generated by S.A.T., L equal to the number of latent pixels, and α_{ti} the attention given to each latent pixel i for generating word t.

Using categorical cross-entropy we can craft an adversarial example that focuses the attention of S.A.T. on a single latent pixel.

$$L_{distraction} = CrossEntropy(d, \alpha) \tag{4}$$

With d, $\alpha \in \mathrm{I\!R}^{\mathrm{LxC}}$ and d be constructed to focus attention on a specific latent pixel. Combining it with the Iterative Method 2, results in equation 5

$$X_0^{adv}, X_{n+1}^{adv} = Clip_{X,\epsilon}(X_n^{adv} + \alpha * sign(\nabla_x J(X_n^{adv}, \alpha))) \tag{5}$$

As can be seen in figure 6 the images are visually less perturbed even with a higher epsilon. An image with a perturbation of $\epsilon = 0.160$ is almost indistinguishable from the clean image. Although $\epsilon = 0.640$ is visually distorted it is still very recognizable and would still be described the same by a human.

4.4 Evaluation Metrics

The accuracy of Image Captioning models is often graded by using the BLEU score (Papineni et al., 2001). It gives a score between 0 and 1 on how good a certain translation is, by comparing the candidate translation to multiple reference translations. The BLEU score is found to correlate strongly with human judgment, however one weakness is that it cannot detect synonyms. To combat that the cosine similarity between the sentences is calculated. First, the sentence is embedded by a Universal Sentence Encoder(Cer et al., 2018) model, this embedding is then used to calculate the cosine similarity. To determine if the attention of the model is successfully attacked the average attention over all images will be plotted.

[1] Pickpocketers, street magicians, etc.

(a) $\epsilon = 0.000$

(b) $\epsilon = 0.160, N = 100$

(c) $\epsilon = 0.000$

(d) $\epsilon = 0.640, N = 100$

Figure 6: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.160 and 0.640. Generated using equation 5. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix D.

5 Results

Adversarial Samples

Adversarial samples are generated using the iterative version of the Fast Gradient Sign method as shown in equation 2. With $N = 10$ satisfactory results can be achieved, however higher N results in even better results for the same ϵ. Higher epsilons did not affect the BLEU score beyond 0.08 significantly as can be seen in figure 7a.



(a) Average BLEU score for adversarial samples.

(b) Cosine similarity vs epsilon

Figure 7: Scores over epsilon for adversarial samples. Note the log x-scale.

(a) ϵ=0.000

(b) $\epsilon = 0.020, N = 10$

Figure 8: Attention visualized for a clean (a) and an adversarial image (b) of a successful attack.

As can be seen in figure 8 the attention of S.A.T, even though not explicitly attacked, is not as focused as on the clean image. This is especially visible in images that are successfully attacked. Images for which the model still is able to generate decent captions, still have a good focus on the main subjects in the image (9).



(a) ϵ=0.000

(b) $\epsilon = 0.020, N = 100$

Figure 9: Attention visualized for a clean (a) and an adversarial image (b) of an unsuccessful attack.

Distracting Samples

To distract the model, adversarial samples are created using the iterative method (EQ. 2) and the distraction adversarial loss (EQ. 4). The number of iterations was experimentally found to be good enough in most cases at 100, in which more would result in better distraction at the cost of longer running times. The adversarial attention targets the left top pixel. On the given dataset the attention is nicely divided with all parts of the image getting close to 0.005[1] of the average attention per pixel. With an epsilon of 0.04 satisfactory results are achieved. The attention of the model is focused on the top-left on average as can be seen in figure 10b. It gets attented to about 4x as much as before. With the perturbation at most 0.04 the image is visually identical to the human eye (figure 11a).



(a) Average attention on clean images

(b) Average attention on adversarial images with ϵ=0.04 at 100 iterations

Figure 10: Average attention visualized for clean (a) and adversarial images (b)

The attention and sentence generation for figure 11a are visualized in figure 11. The attention

[1] $attention/number\_of\_latent\_pixels = 1/196 = 0.005$

is focused on the correct parts of the image. The model is completely distracted and attends solely to the top-left part.

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image *epsilon* $= 0.040, N = 100$



(c) Clean Image with attention

(d) Adversarial Image *epsilon* $= 0.040, N = 100$

Figure 11: Successful distracting the model.

Both the BLEU score and cosine similarity go down with higher values of epsilon, however, there are diminishing returns. Furthermore, with the higher values of epsilon, the image will eventually be unrecognizable, and thus not reasonable to expect sensible output



(a) Average BLEU score



(b) Average cosine similarity

Figure 12: BLEU score and cosine similarity during distraction over epsilon

6 Discussion

S.A.T. is susceptible to adversarial samples, and also the attention layer can be influenced. It however does require quite some iterations for it to become noticeable. Also, it is not perfect and the model still gives some attention to the rest of the image.

Due to the higher amount of iterations, it is also not clear if these adversarial samples are still as transferable as is shown in the related research. However, as show-and-fool(Chen et al., 2017) iterates for 1000 steps, and show that those images are still highly transferable. It is likely it will have some degree of transferability. It does require proper research to determine it and see the effects on models that do not use explicit attention.

The aforementioned usability as a regularizer also is less beneficial due to the required iterations. As it would hamper the training speed by a factor of 10-100x. However, a possible avenue is if the adversarial samples are transferable, they could be added to the training dataset itself. This way they only need to be generated once.

The weakness of the BLEU score is visible, as after an epsilon of 0.16 it is not affected as much. The model likely does this due to the bias that is visible in the dataset. Some words such as 'a', 'the', 'man', 'woman', and 'people' are present in a lot of sentences. So if the decoder is not sure what it sees, it falls back to this inherent bias. This is visible in figure 11d where the focus is firmly placed on the left top corner. It predicts words like 'a', and 'woman', which both occur very often in the dataset. Also, the structure of the sentences is still good, although the words do not always make sense. They are mostly grammatically correct.

7 Conclusions

Although S.A.T. is more difficult to attack in comparison to classification models, S.A.T. is not immune to adversarial examples. Successful attacks are often visible in the attention layer, showing that the model already is susceptible during the encoding and/or attention step. The most important hyperparameter is the number of iterations of applying I-FSGM. Both attacks are visible in the attention layer, where the attack on the output makes the model focus more blurry. The explicit attack on the attention works as well, making the attention purely focused on the top-left corner.

Attacking the attention is a harder task, as it requires more iterations to achieve a similar result. It is also not certain that these adversarial samples are transferable, especially those that do not employ attention at all. As it could improve our understanding of the attention mechanism.

Finally, it is not known if the model can be made more robust against the adversaries samples by including adversarial samples in the training set. Either by generating them once and adding them or by generating adversarial samples on the fly during training.

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A FSGM samples

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.005$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people sitting in a room with a bunch of different colored vases.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.010$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of vases sitting on top of a table.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.020$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of vases sitting on top of a table.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.040$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A large glass vase with a bunch of flowers on it.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.080$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A bathroom with a toilet and a sink.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.160$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A red wall with a red and white design.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.320$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A large red object with a red and white background.

B Adversarial samples with various epsilon

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.005, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.010, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a large window

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.020, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a large window.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.040, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a fireplace.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.080, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A man is sitting in a living room with a lot of chairs.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.160, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A man is standing next to a fence with a shopping cart.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.320, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A bunch of different colored bottles of wine.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a fireplace and a television

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.320, N = 10$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A bunch of toothbrushes sitting on a table.

C Adversarial samples with attention

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.040, N = 10$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.040, N = 10$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image *epsilon* $= 0.040, N = 10$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image *epsilon* $= 0.040, N = 10$

(a) Clean Image



(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.160, N = 10$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.160, N = 10$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.005, N = 10$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.005, N = 10$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.005, N = 10$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.005, N = 10$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.020, N = 100$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.005, N = 100$

D Distracting samples with various epsilon

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.005, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.010, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a with a fireplace and a clock on the wall.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.020, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A train with a train on the side.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.040, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A large metal train with a clock on it.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.080, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A large train with a clock on it.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.160, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A large clock on a wall with a picture of a woman.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.320, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A close up of a metal clock on a table.

Clean image
Prediction by S.A.T.: A living room with a television and a couch

Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.320, N = 100$
Prediction by S.A.T.: A clock with a pitcher of a beer and a glass of orange juice.

E Distraction samples with attention



(a) Clean Image



(b) Adversarial Image *epsilon* $= 0.010, N = 100$

(c) Clean Image with attention

(d) Adversarial Image *epsilon* $= 0.010, N = 100$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.160, N = 100$



(c) Clean Image with attention



(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.160, N = 100$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.040, N = 100$



(c) Clean Image with attention

(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.040, N = 100$

(a) Clean Image

(b) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.040, N = 100$



(c) Clean Image with attention

(d) Adversarial Image $epsilon = 0.040, N = 100$