



Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
Architecture of Information Systems Research Group

Adversarial Noise Benchmarking On Image Caption

Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

TODO Abstract

1 Introduction

The image caption generation task is at the cross-section between Computer Vision (CV) and Natural Language Processing (NLP). It requires the computer to understand a visual scene and describe it into a grammatically correct natural sentence. Practical use cases vary from automated describing of images to visually impaired people (Mazzoni, 2019) to context based image retrieval.

Show Attend and Tell (S.A.T.) proposed by K. Xu et al. is an end-to-end deep learning approach that tries to solve the image caption generation problem. It combines an attention mechanism with LSTM to generate sentences that describe the given image. An example output from S.A.T can be seen in figure 1. S.A.T. achieves a BLEU(Papineni, Roukos, Ward & Zhu, 2001) score of 0.8 on Flickr8K, Flickr30K(Hodosh, Young & Hockenmaier, n.d.) and COCO(Lin et al., 2015) datasets. Although the scores are not state-of-the-art(Stefanini et al., 2021) anymore. This model is chosen because it is small and thus can be run locally, and has publicly available implementations (Sgrvinod, n.d.).



Figure 1: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a clean image.

Top left picture is the input image. The highlighted areas in white are the visualization of the attention per predicted word.

Machine learning models can be very susceptible to noise where small changes to the input can lead to radically different outcomes. As shown by Goodfellow, Shlens and Szegedy adding a specific (small) noise layer to an image can alter a correct prediction to a very confident wrong prediction. As can be seen in figure 2. When the generation of the adversarial examples is not that computational expansive, they can be generated and used during training making the model more robust. It is shown that these adversarial examples act as regularizers during training. Reducing

the change of overfitting. Kurakin, Goodfellow and Bengio expands on generating adversarial examples showing that one can also steer the model towards a specific classification, however this comes at an increased computational cost.




Figure 2: Adversarial noise example from (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Where $\epsilon = 0.07$.

Combining these previous findings, S.A.T. can be used to find adversarial examples for image captioning models. These adversarial images can then be used to either improve current datasets by providing hard samples, or in a more malicious way. The latter being especially true when one can specify the output sentence for which an adversarial sample should be created. Improving the robustness against adversarial samples makes the model less susceptible to small changes in the input. Another point that makes S.A.T. an interesting target, is that it uses explicit attention to generate captions. Although attention has been surpassed by the use of transformers, it is still interesting to see if it is a potential attack vector in an adversarial setting.

1.1 Motivation and Related Work

In the last few years research in the direction of generating adversarial samples for gradient based models has been published (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016a) as well as research showing the usefulness of such adversarial samples(Ilyas et al., 2019) to create more robust datasets. The latter stating: "Adversarial vulnerability is a direct result of our models' sensitivity to well-generalizing features in the data." However, these generalizing features are not robust, as models are optimized to do well in the average case. Inserting adversarial examples in training help regularize these non-robust features(Kurakin, Goodfellow & Bengio, 2016b). The Fast Gradient Sign Method was originally designed for classification task, however it (and variations) have been successfully adopted to other tasks such as object detection (Bose & Aarabi, 2018; Liu et al., 2020; Zhang & Wang, 2019), and most notably for this research on image captioning(Chen, Zhang, Chen, Yi & Hsieh, 2017). Chen et al.'s method Show-and-Fool successfully and consistently is able to attack Show-and-Tell(Vinyals, Toshev, Bengio & Erhan, 2014) (predecessor of Show Attend and Tell). Achieving a success rate of 95.8%, this does come at the cost of taking about 38 seconds to generate a single adversarial sample.

Adversarial Methods

Over the last few years variations of the Fast Gradient Sign Method by (Goodfellow et al., 2015) have been designed. The Iterative Fast Gradient Method by Kurakin et al. applies the Fast Gradient Sign Method multiple times. Which is further improved by using various optimization techniques such as momentum (J. Xu, 2020), and in the case of Show-and-Fool the well known Adam(Kingma & Ba, 2017) optimizer for 1000 steps. The method proposed by Carlini and Wagner also includes a distance metric in their adversarial optimization instead of explicitly clipping the values. Although very powerful techniques they are also computationally expensive and due to the

computational limitations of this bachelor project, not feasible to apply extensively. Moreover, in the case of purely deceiving S.A.T. it is shown that Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method already provides significant results.

1.2 Research Questions

This research investigates the susceptibility of S.A.T. against adversarial samples that are visually close but generate completely different descriptions as output. Chen et al. shows that Show-and-Tell is susceptible to adversarial samples, the question then arises if the attention added in S.A.T. makes it harder to generate adversarial samples. However, the attention mechanism might also be a new attack vector. If the attention is not focusing on the important parts of the image for generating the caption, the model is blind to those parts. It is therefore interesting to investigate if the attention can be used against S.A.T. Concretely this paper will try to answer the following questions:.

- Is S.A.T. susceptible to adversarial attacks using the Fast Gradient Sign Method?
- Can the attention of S.A.T. be abused by adversarial samples?

2 Methodology

2.1 Notation

- X , clean image in the range [0,1] retrieved from the dataset.
- X^{adv} , adversarial image generated from X by applying some perpetration to it. Clipped to be in the range [0,1].
- $Clip_{X,\epsilon}(A)$ is the element-wise clipping of A such that $X - \epsilon \leq A \leq X + \epsilon$ holds element-wise.

2.2 Dataset

As clean dataset the well known MSCOCO (Lin et al., 2015) dataset will be used. It contains 35 thousand images, of which 30 thousand are part of the train set, and 5 thousand of the testing set. Due to the computational limitations, only the test set is used.

2.3 Model

The model used, as already introduced in section 1, will be Show Attend and Tell. It is an interesting model as it uses attention, which can be visualized, to focus on most important places of the image.

2.4 Generating Adversarial Samples

Generating adversarial input images can be done by using the Fast Method (EQ. 1) proposed by Goodfellow et al..

$$X^{adv} = X + \epsilon * sign(\nabla_x J(X, y_{true})) \quad (1)$$

With X being the input image, ϵ a hyperparameter determining much the original image can be perpetrated and $J(X, y_{true})$ the loss function which to, in the adversarial case, maximize. Finally, the image is clipped ensuring the vector stays within the 0 to 1 input range of the model. As can be seen in Figure 3 (and bigger size in the appendix A), using this method images up to and including $\epsilon = 0.02$ are indistinguishable and up to and including $\epsilon = 0.16$ recognizable to humans. The sign in combination with the epsilon ensures $L_\infty(X - X^{adv}) \leq \epsilon$.

In practice applying this a single time is often not enough to successfully attack S.A.T. therefore the iterative method will be used as proposed by Kurakin et al.. Which repeatedly applies the Fast Gradient Sign Method for N iterations

$$X_0^{adv}, X_{n+1}^{adv} = Clip_{X,\epsilon}(X_n^{adv} + \alpha * sign(\nabla_x J(X_n^{adv}, y_{true}))) \quad (2)$$

In which, α is a hyperparameter which naively can be set to ϵ/N . Images generated using this method are usually less visually disturb for the same epsilons. Here an epsilon of 0.040 is nearly indistinguishable, as can be seen in figure 4

Distracting Adversarial Sample

Distraction is a powerful technique often used by adversaries in the real world. As S.A.T. employs attention to generate sentences, it is possible to try and distract it by creating an adversarial sample that makes the model hyperfocused on only part of the image. During training S.A.T. learns to divide the attention roughly equally over the whole image during the generation of a single caption. It does this by including the loss shown in equation 3.

$$L_{attention} = \sum_i^L (1 - \sum_t^C \alpha_{ti}^2) \quad (3)$$



Figure 3: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.020 and 0.160. Generated using equation 1. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix A.



Figure 4: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.020 and 0.160. Generated using equation 2. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix A.

With C equal to the amount of words generated by S.A.T., L equal to the amount of latent¹ pixels, and α_{ti} the attention given to latent pixel i for generating word t .

Using categorical cross-entropy we can craft an adversarial example which focuses the attention of S.A.T. to a single latent pixel.

$$L_{distraction} = \text{CrossEntropy}(d, \alpha) \quad (4)$$

With $d, \alpha \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times C}$ and d be constructed to focus attention on a specific latent pixel.

2.5 Evaluation

To determine if the model is indeed susceptible to distraction the BLEU-4 score (Papineni et al., 2001) will be calculated, as it is a widely reported metric within the image captioning task. Because the BLEU score checks for direct word occurrences it does not give a complete view on the success of the adversarial attack, as the model can still give a correct description using synonyms. This would result in a low BLEU score, where in fact the model is still performing correctly. To combat this the cosine similarity of the original and adversarial output will be calculated using universal sentence embedding proposed by Cer et al.. It is a separately learned model that embeds an entire sentence. In the case of distraction, the average attention the model applies on the dataset is also analyzed.

¹S.A.T. uses a CNN architecture as feature extractor before the attention layer. The output of the CNN is described by the authors as the latent pixel space.

3 Results

Adversarial Samples

Adversarial samples are generated using the iterative version of Fast Gradient Sign method as shown in equation 2. With $N = 10$ satisfactory results can be achieved, however higher N results in even better results for the same ϵ . Higher epsilons did not have an effect on BLEU score beyond 0.08 as can be seen in figure 5. This is in contrast to the cosine similarity as it does decrease further for the higher ϵ .



Figure 5: Average BLEU score




Figure 6: Cosine similarity vs epsilon (Axis is not correct yet)





Figure 7: Clean Image (left), Adversarial Image $\epsilon = 0.02, N = 10$ (right)

As can be seen in figure 7 the attention of S.A.T, even though not explicitly attacked, is not as focused as on the clean image. This is especially visible in images that are successfully attacked. Images for which the model still is able to generate decent captions, still have a good focus on the main subjects in the image (8).





Figure 8: Clean Image (left), Adversarial Image $\epsilon = 0.02, N = 10$ (right)

Distracting Samples

To distract the model, adversarial samples are created using the iterative method (EQ. 2) and the distraction adversarial loss (EQ. 4). The amount of iterations was experimentally found to be good enough in most cases at 100, in which more would result in better distraction at the cost of longer running times. The top left pixel was chosen to focus the attention on as the model focus least on it (9) (albeit slightly) during the clean images. With an epsilon of 0.04 satisfactory results are achieved. The attention of the model clearly focused on the top left on average as can be seen in figure 10. With the perturbation at most 0.04 the image is visually almost identical to the human eye (figure 11).




Figure 9: Average attention on clean images




Figure 10: Average attention on adversarial images with $\epsilon=0.04$ at 100 iterations




Figure 11: Clean Image (left), Adversarial Image $\epsilon = 0.04$, $N = 100$ (right)

The attention and sentence generation for figure 11 are visualized in figure 12. The model is not completely distracted and still attends to other parts of the image, however they are not clearly a single object relating to the word that is generated. During the generations of the last few words the attention is focused almost solely on the top left part.




Figure 12: Attention on Clean Image (left) and Adversarial Image $\epsilon = 0.04, N = 100$ (right)




Figure 13: BLEU score during distraction over epsilon

4 Discussion

- Cosine similarity is based on a learned value, it is not a watertight value. (But neither is BLEU)
- How useful is the iterative method for training, as it takes a significant time to compute.
- Future work:

If the adversarial samples generated are included during training is the model more robust.

Are the adversarial samples transferable to other models, even ones not employing attention?

5 Conclusions

- S.A.T. is susceptible to adversarial samples, with the most important part in generating them is the amount of iterations. (This could use some more plots)
- Successful attacks are visible in the attention layer, even if not attack explicitly.
- The attention layer is susceptible to attacks.
- Attacking the attention is harder than attacking the sentence.
- Summarizing in attacking using the (iterative) fast gradient sign method, the most important part is iterations.

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A Bigger adversarial images



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.005$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people sitting in a room with a bunch of different colored vases.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.010$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of vases sitting on top of a table.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.020$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of vases sitting on top of a table.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.040$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A large glass vase with a bunch of flowers on it.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.080$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A bathroom with a toilet and a sink.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.160$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A red wall with a red and white design.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with $\epsilon = 0.320$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A large red object with a red and white background.

B More Adversarial Samples




Figure 14: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 15: Prediction on an adversarial image with $\epsilon = 0.2$ (roughly 5% of original range)




Figure 16: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 17: Prediction on an adversarial image with $\epsilon = 0.2$ (roughly 5% of original range)




Figure 18: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 19: Prediction on an adversarial image with $\epsilon = 0.2$ (roughly 5% of original range)




Figure 20: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 21: Prediction on an adversarial image with $\epsilon = 0.2$ (roughly 5% of original range)