



Department of Mathematics and Computer Science  
Architecture of Information Systems Research Group

# Adversarial Noise Benchmarking On Image Caption

*Bachelor Thesis*

H.J.M. van Genuchten

Supervisors:  
C. de Campos  
Z.M. van Cauter

Intermediate Draft

Eindhoven, April 2022

---

## Abstract

## 1 Introduction

The image caption generation task is at the cross-section between Computer Vision (CV) and Natural Language Processing (NLP). It requires the computer to understand a visual scene and describe it into a grammatically correct natural sentence. It can also be seen as a translation task, translating an image into natural language. Practical use cases vary from automated describing of images to visually impaired people (Mazzoni, 2019) to context based image retrieval. For the model to be successful in these tasks it should be accurate and robust. Show-Attend-and-Tell (S.A.T.) (K. Xu et al., 2016) is an end-to-end deep-learning approach to solve the image captioning task. An example prediction can be seen in figure 1a

For these models to be useful in real world examples they must be robust against small noise on the input image. However, the problem with machine learning is that models can be very susceptible to noise. As small changes to the input can lead to radically different outcomes. As shown by Goodfellow, Shlens and Szegedy adding a specific (small) noise layer to an image can alter a correct prediction to a very confident wrong prediction. When the generation of the adversarial examples is not that computational expensive, they can be generated and used during training making the model more robust. It is shown that these adversarial examples then act as regularizers during training. Reducing the chance of overfitting. Kurakin, Goodfellow and Bengio expands on generating adversarial examples showing that one can also steer the model towards a specific classification, however this comes at an increased computational cost. An example of an adversarial sample on image captioning can be seen in figure 1b.



Figure 1: Example predictions by Show Attend and Tell on a clean image (left) and an adversarial image (right).

Attention mechanisms, such as introduced by Bahdanau, Cho and Bengio, have been shown to improve various machine learning tasks, one of which is image captioning. It allows the model to focus on different parts of the image at a time to ensure the whole scene is described. The aforementioned S.A.T. also uses this attention mechanism. Furthermore, it improves the explainability of the model, as for each word it can be shown which parts of the image the model "looked" at. However, if the attention is focused on the wrong parts of the image, the model is blind to possible important parts of the model. Hence, this attention mechanism can also be a possible new attack vector. This paper investigates the susceptibility of adversarial attacks specifically targeted at the attention layer, in an attempt to distract the network making it blind to parts of the image.

## 2 Motivation

When using machine learning models in real world use cases, it is important to ensure those models are robust. As if that is not the case they can be unreliable, wrong or in the worst case attacked by adversaries. Finding and understanding the weaknesses therefore is important. Furthermore, understanding the weaknesses can also help us in finding better architectures that are less susceptible to these kinds of attacks.

Adversarial samples for machine learning models can be generated using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM)(Goodfellow et al., 2015). Originally proposed for image classification, it finds a small noise field that can be added to the image to generate an adversarial image. This adversarial image is than often incorrectly labeled with a high confidence. An example of FSGM can be seen in figure 2. These adversarial sample prove to be useful during training, as they can act as regularizers, and improve the robustness of the model. Kurakin, Goodfellow and Bengio show that these adversarial samples are also transferable to different models, even if they are trained on other datasets or have different architectures.




Figure 2: Adversarial noise example from (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Where  $\epsilon = 0.07$ .

There has already been some research in adversarial examples targeted at image captioning (Aafaq, Akhtar, Liu, Shah & Mian, 2021; Chen, Zhang, Chen, Yi & Hsieh, 2017). All of which attack the output of the model, often with the goal of generating a specific output sentence. Chen et al. shows that Show-and-Tell<sup>1</sup>(Vinyals, Toshev, Bengio & Erhan, 2014) is susceptible to adversarial samples. The question then arises if the attention added in S.A.T. makes it harder to generate adversarial samples, and if it opens up a new attack vector.

### 2.1 Research Questions

This research investigates the susceptibility of S.A.T. against adversarial samples that are visually close but generate completely different descriptions as output. A special focus is placed on what the attention in S.A.T. does and if it is an attack vector. When the attention is not focusing on the important parts of the image for generating the caption, the model is blind to those parts therefore not being able to describe those parts. It is therefore interesting to investigate if the attention can be used against S.A.T. Concretely this paper will try to answer the following questions:

- Is S.A.T. susceptible to adversarial attacks using the Fast Gradient Sign Method?
- Can the attention of S.A.T. be abused by adversarial samples?

<sup>1</sup>Show-and-Tell is the predecessor of S.A.T. without attention mechanism

### 3 Related work

#### Image Captioning

Various techniques have been used to try and solve the image captioning task. Early methods mainly used hand-designed techniques based on template matching, which made them rigid in the sentences they could generate. One of the first end-to-end deep-learning approach was Show-and-Tell (Vinyals et al., 2014). It uses a CNN to extract most import features from an image, which then are decoded using an LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) to a sentence, which describes the image. Show Attend and Tell (S.A.T.) proposed by K. Xu et al. is an extension to Show-and-Tell, which adds an attention mechanism before the LSTM decoding. This attention allows the model to focus on specific parts of the image when generating a word. An added benefit is that this attention can be visualized, giving insight in what the model looks at to generate a specific word in the output sentence.

Evaluating image captioning tasks is often done using bilingual evaluation understudy (BLEU) (Papineni, Roukos, Ward & Zhu, 2001). The primary reason is that it is used is that it is currently the most reported metric in image captioning. It is a form of word n-gram precision between the predicted and human generated reference sentences. It correlates highly with human ratings of captions (Vinyals et al., 2014). An obvious drawback to this is that a synonym of a word can result in a lower score, even though the sentence still is closely related, or by inserting common words such as 'a', 'the', and 'person' the model can achieve a higher score.

S.A.T. achieves a BLEU score of 0.75<sup>1</sup> out of 1.0 on COCO(Lin et al., 2015) datasets, the human annotations reach a score of 0.66<sup>2</sup>. Although the score is not state-of-the-art(Stefanini et al., 2021) anymore. This model is chosen because it is small and thus can be run locally, and has publicly available implementations (Sgrvinod, n.d.).

#### Adversarial Methods

In the last few years research in the direction of generating adversarial samples for gradient based models has been published (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016a) as well as research showing the usefulness of such adversarial samples(Ilyas et al., 2019) to create more robust datasets. The latter stating: "Adversarial vulnerability is a direct result of our models' sensitivity to well-generalizing features in the data." However, these generalizing features are not robust, as models are optimized to do well in the average case. Inserting adversarial examples in training help regularize these non-robust features(Kurakin et al., 2016b).

One of the most influential methods in this field has been proposed by Goodfellow et al.. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM) (ab)uses the differentiability of machine leaning models to find an adversarial example. It is a single step gradient based approach to optimize the input image such that it maximizes a certain loss value. Various variations on FSGM have been proposed, such as the Iterative Fast Gradient Method (Kurakin et al., 2016a). Which applies multiple small steps of FSGM. It is further improved by adding various optimization techniques such as momentum (J. Xu, 2020).

Although FSGM was originally designed for classification task, it (and variations) have been successfully adopted to other tasks such as object detection (Bose & Aarabi, 2018; Liu et al., 2020; Zhang & Wang, 2019), and most notably for this research on image captioning(Chen et al., 2017). Chen et al.'s method Show-and-Fool successfully and consistently is able to attack Show-and-Tell(Vinyals et al., 2014). They do this by using Adam(Kingma & Ba, 2017) to optimize the input image for 1000 steps targeting specific keywords. In generating captions that contain those specific keywords they achieve a success rate of 95.8%, this does come at the cost of taking about 38 seconds to generate a single adversarial sample.

---

<sup>1</sup>Calculated using NLTK(Bird & Klein, 2009) bleu score implementation

<sup>2</sup>Calculated by comparing the captions with each other.

## 4 Methodology

### 4.1 Dataset

As clean dataset the well known MSCOCO (Lin et al., 2015) dataset will be used. It contains 35 thousand images, of which 30 thousand are part of the train set, and 5 thousand of the testing set. Due to the computational limitations, only the test set is used.

### 4.2 Model

The model used, as already introduced in section 3, will be Show Attend and Tell. It is an interesting model as it uses attention, which can be visualized, to focus on most important places of the image. It was trained on MSCOCO (Lin et al., 2015). S.A.T. uses a CNN as feature extractor to generate high dimensional latent pixels. These latent pixels are then fed to an attention layer, which in combination with an LSTM produces word tokens. It continues until a stop-token has been generated, or if it has generated 50 words, whichever comes first. In practice, it generally does not create sentences that are longer than 20 words. The attention that is used for each word can be visualized (Figure 3) by mapping the attention on the latent pixels back to the original location on the image. The implementation used, is a publicly available reproduction of S.A.T. in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2019) is used. (Sgrvinod, n.d.)




Figure 3: Visualization of attention. The highlighted parts show the attention that the model used to generate each specific word.

### 4.3 Generating Adversarial Samples

Generating adversarial input images can be done by using the Fast Method (EQ. 1) proposed by Goodfellow et al..

$$X^{adv} = X + \epsilon * sign(\nabla_x J(X, y_{true})) \quad (1)$$

$X^{adv}$  is the adversarial sample generated by taking the original image  $X$  and perpetrated it with the sign of the gradient of the loss function:  $J(X, y_{true})$ . Maximizes that loss function. The  $\epsilon$  is a hyperparameter which can be tuned to ensure that the adversarial image still is visually the same as the original image. Finally, the adversarial image is clipped to ensure it stays in the within the 0 to 1 input range of the model. As can be seen in Figure 4 (and more examples in the appendix A), using this method images up to and including  $\epsilon = 0.02$  are indistinguishable and up to and including  $\epsilon = 0.16$  recognizable to humans. The *sign* method in combination with the epsilon ensures  $L_\infty(X - X^{adv}) \leq \epsilon$ .



Figure 4: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.020 and 0.160. Generated using equation 1. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix A.

In practice applying this a single time is often not enough to successfully attack S.A.T. therefore the iterative method will be used as proposed by Kurakin et al.. Which repeatedly applies the Fast Gradient Sign Method for  $N$  iterations

$$X_0^{adv}, X_{n+1}^{adv} = Clip_{X,\epsilon}(X_n^{adv} + \alpha * sign(\nabla_x J(X_n^{adv}, y_{true}))) \quad (2)$$

In which,  $\alpha$  is a hyperparameter which naively can be set to  $\epsilon/N$ . Images generated using this method are usually less visually disturb for the same epsilons. Here an epsilon of 0.040 is nearly indistinguishable, as can be seen in figure 5



Figure 5: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.020 and 0.160. Generated using equation 2. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix A.

### Distracting Adversarial Sample

Distraction is a powerful technique often used by adversaries in the real world. As S.A.T. employs attention to generate sentences, it is possible to try and distract it by creating an adversarial sample that makes the model hyperfocused on only part of the image. During training S.A.T. learns to divide the attention roughly equally over the whole image during the generation of a single caption. It does this by including the loss shown in equation 3.

$$L_{attention} = \sum_i^L (1 - \sum_t^C \alpha_{ti}^2) \quad (3)$$

With  $C$  equal to the amount of words generated by S.A.T.,  $L$  equal to the amount of latent pixels, and  $\alpha_{ti}$  the attention given to latent pixel  $i$  for generating word  $t$ .

Using categorical cross-entropy we can craft an adversarial example which focuses the attention of S.A.T. to a single latent pixel.

$$L_{distraction} = CrossEntropy(d, \alpha) \quad (4)$$

With  $d, \alpha \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times C}$  and  $d$  be constructed to focus attention on a specific latent pixel. Combining it with the Iterative Method 2, results in equation 5

$$X_0^{adv}, X_{n+1}^{adv} = Clip_{X,\epsilon}(X_n^{adv} + \alpha * sign(\nabla_x J(X_n^{adv}, \alpha))) \quad (5)$$

As can be seen in figure 6 the images are visually less perturbed even with a higher epsilon. With an image with a perturbation of  $\epsilon = 0.160$  almost indistinguishable from the clean image. Although  $\epsilon = 0.640$  is visually distorted it is still very recognizable and would still be described the same by a human.



Figure 6: Clean (left) and Adversarial images (right) for varying epsilon values of 0.160 and 0.640. Generated using equation 5. More values of epsilon can be found in appendix ??.

#### 4.4 Evaluation

The accuracy of Image Captioning models is often graded by using BLEU score (Papineni et al., 2001). It gives a score between 0 and 1 on how good a certain translation is, by comparing the candidate translation to multiple reference translations. The BLEU score is found to correlate

strongly with human judgement, however one weakness is that it cannot detect synonyms. To combat that the cosine similarity between the sentences is calculated. First the sentence is embedded by a Universal Sentence Encoder(Cer et al., 2018) model, this embedding is then used to calculate the cosine similarity.

To determine if the attention of the model is successfully attacked the average attention over all images will be plotted.

## 5 Results

### Adversarial Samples

Adversarial samples are generated using the iterative version of Fast Gradient Sign method as shown in equation 2. With  $N = 10$  satisfactory results can be achieved, however higher  $N$  results in even better results for the same  $\epsilon$ . Higher epsilons did not have an effect on BLEU score beyond 0.08 as can be seen in figure 7. This is in contrast to the cosine similarity as it does decrease further for the higher  $\epsilon$ .




Figure 7: Average BLEU score for adversarial samples.




Figure 8: Cosine similarity vs epsilon (Axis is not correct yet, is log scale on x.)

As can be seen in figure 9 the attention of S.A.T, even though not explicitly attacked, is not as focused as on the clean image. This is especially visible in images that are successfully attacked. Images for which the model still is able to generate decent captions, still have a good focus on the main subjects in the image (10).




Figure 9: Attention visualized for a clean (a) and an adversarial image (b) of a successful attack.




Figure 10: Attention visualized for a clean (a) and an adversarial image (b) of an unsuccessful attack.

## Distracting Samples

To distract the model, adversarial samples are created using the iterative method (EQ. 2) and the distraction adversarial loss (EQ. 4). The amount of iterations was experimentally found to be good enough in most cases at 100, in which more would result in better distraction at the cost of longer running times. The adversarial attention targets the left top pixel. On the given dataset the attention is nicely divided with all parts of the image getting close to 0.005 of the average attention per pixel. With an epsilon of 0.04 satisfactory results are achieved. The attention of the model clearly focused on the top left on average as can be seen in figure 11b. The top left pixels clearly get the most attention. With the perturbation at most 0.04 the image is visually identical to the human eye (figure 12).




Figure 11: Average attention visualized for clean (a) and adversarial images (b)

The attention and sentence generation for figure 12 are visualized in figure 13. The model is not completely distracted and still attends to other parts of the image, however they are not clearly a single object relating to the word that is generated. During the generations of the last few words the attention is focused almost solely on the top left part.



Figure 12: Clean Image (left), Adversarial Image  $\epsilon = 0.04, N = 100$  (right)

The BLEU score is less affected by the distracting samples, even though more iterations are used. The cosine similarity does go down further.



Figure 13: Attention on Clean Image (left) and Adversarial Image  $\epsilon = 0.04, N = 100$  (right)




Figure 14: BLEU score during distraction over epsilon

## 6 Discussion

S.A.T. clearly is susceptible to adversarial samples, and also the attention layer can be influenced. It however does require quite some iterations for it to become noticeable. Also it is not perfect and the model still gives some attention to the rest of the image.

Due to the higher amount of iterations it is also not clear if these adversarial samples are still as transferable as is shown in the related research. However, as show-and-fool(Chen et al., 2017) iterates for 1000 steps, and show that those images are still highly transferable. It is likely it will have some degree of transferability. It does require proper research to determine it and see the effects on models that do not use explicit attention.

The aforementioned useability as regularizer also is less beneficial due to the required iterations. As it would hamper the training speed by a factor of 10-100x. However, it could be possible that the single step approaches are already effective enough. Another possible avenue is if the adversarial samples are transferable, they could be added to the training dataset itself.

The weakness of the BLEU score is clearly visible, as after an epsilon of 0.16 it is not affected a lot, while the cosine similarity still is clearly dropping. The model is able to achieve this due to the bias that is visible in the dataset. Some words such as a, the, and people are present in a lot of sentences. So if the decode is not sure what it sees, it falls back to this inherent bias. This is clearly visible in figure 13 where the focus is firmly placed on the left top corner. It predicts words like 'a', and 'people', which both occur very often in the dataset. Also the structure of the sentences is still good, although the words do not always make sense. They are mostly grammatically correct.

## 7 Conclusions

Although S.A.T. is clearly more difficult to attack in comparison to classification models, S.A.T. is not immune to adversarial examples. The results of successful attacks are often visible in the attention layer, showing that the model already is susceptible during the encoding and/or attention step. The attention layer can be distracted using the Iterative FSGM. When attacked to explicitly focus on a certain pixel it is clearly visible that the model is focusing more attention to the specified pixel. Also in the non-explicit case it is visible that the model is less focused on the correct parts of the image. S.A.T. is quite robust to adversarial examples as it requires either multiple iterations or, high epsilon values to skew the models output. To skew the attention into a certain direction takes more iterations than to get a wrong prediction. Interesting next steps would be investigating the effect of adding adversarial examples to the dataset, and researching the transferability of these examples, both on other models that employ attention as well as models that do not have an explicit attention mechanism.

## References

- Aafaq, N., Akhtar, N., Liu, W., Shah, M. & Mian, A. (2021). *Controlled caption generation for images through adversarial attacks*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.03050> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2107.03050 2
- Bahdanau, D., Cho, K. & Bengio, Y. (2014). *Neural machine translation by jointly learning to align and translate*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.0473> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.1409.0473 1
- Bird, E. L., Steven & Klein, E. (2009). *Natural language processing with python*. O Reilly Media Inc. Retrieved from [https://www.nltk.org/\\_modules/nltk/translate/bleu\\_score.html](https://www.nltk.org/_modules/nltk/translate/bleu_score.html) 3
- Bose, A. J. & Aarabi, P. (2018). *Adversarial attacks on face detectors using neural net based constrained optimization*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.12302> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.1805.12302 3
- Cer, D., Yang, Y., Kong, S., Hua, N., Limtiaco, N., John, R. S., ... Kurzweil, R. (2018). Universal sentence encoder. *CoRR, abs/1803.11175*. Retrieved from <http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.11175> 8
- Chen, H., Zhang, H., Chen, P., Yi, J. & Hsieh, C. (2017). Show-and-fool: Crafting adversarial examples for neural image captioning. *CoRR, abs/1712.02051*. Retrieved from <http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.02051> 2, 3, 13
- Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J. & Szegedy, C. (2015). *Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples*. 1, 2, 3, 5
- Hochreiter, S. & Schmidhuber, J. (1997, 12). Long short-term memory. *Neural computation*, 9, 1735-80. doi: 10.1162/neco.1997.9.8.1735 3
- Ilyas, A., Santurkar, S., Tsipras, D., Engstrom, L., Tran, B. & Madry, A. (2019). *Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.02175> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.1905.02175 3
- Kingma, D. P. & Ba, J. (2017). *Adam: A method for stochastic optimization*. 3
- Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. & Bengio, S. (2016a). *Adversarial examples in the physical world*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02533> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.1607.02533 1, 3, 6
- Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. & Bengio, S. (2016b). *Adversarial machine learning at scale*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.01236> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.1611.01236 2, 3
- Lin, T.-Y., Maire, M., Belongie, S., Bourdev, L., Girshick, R., Hays, J., ... Dollár, P. (2015). *Microsoft coco: Common objects in context*. 3, 4
- Liu, Z., Peng, W., Zhou, J., Wu, Z., Zhang, J. & Zhang, Y. (2020). Mi-fgsm on faster r-cnn object detector. In *2020 the 4th international conference on video and image processing* (p. 27–32). New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1145/3447450.3447455> doi: 10.1145/3447450.3447455 3
- Mazzoni, D. (2019, Oct). *Using ai to give people who are blind the "full picture"*. Google. Retrieved from <https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/accessibility/get-image-descriptions/> 1
- Papineni, K., Roukos, S., Ward, T. & Zhu, W.-J. (2001). Bleu. *Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics - ACL '02*. doi: 10.3115/1073083.1073135 3, 7
- Paszke, A., Gross, S., Massa, F., Lerer, A., Bradbury, J., Chanan, G., ... Chintala, S. (2019). Pytorch: An imperative style, high-performance deep learning library. In H. Wallach, H. Larochelle, A. Beygelzimer, F. d'Alché-Buc, E. Fox & R. Garnett (Eds.), *Advances in neural information processing systems 32* (pp. 8024–8035). Curran Associates, Inc. Retrieved from <http://papers.neurips.cc/paper/9015-pytorch-an-imperative-style-high-performance-deep-learning-library.pdf> 4
- Sgrvinod. (n.d.). *Sgrvinod/a-pytorch-tutorial-to-image-captioning: Show, attend, and tell: A pytorch tutorial to image captioning*. Retrieved from <https://github.com/sgrvinod/a>

- PyTorch-Tutorial-to-Image-Captioning 3, 4
- Stefanini, M., Cornia, M., Baraldi, L., Cascianelli, S., Fiameni, G. & Cucchiara, R. (2021). From show to tell: A survey on image captioning. *CoRR, abs/2107.06912*. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.06912> 3
- Vinyals, O., Toshev, A., Bengio, S. & Erhan, D. (2014). *Show and tell: A neural image caption generator*. arXiv. Retrieved from <https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.4555> doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.1411.4555 2, 3
- Xu, J. (2020). Generate adversarial examples by nesterov-momentum iterative fast gradient sign method. In *2020 ieee 11th international conference on software engineering and service science (icsess)* (p. 244-249). doi: 10.1109/ICSESS49938.2020.9237700 3
- Xu, K., Ba, J., Kiros, R., Cho, K., Courville, A., Salakhutdinov, R., ... Bengio, Y. (2016). *Show, attend and tell: Neural image caption generation with visual attention*. 1, 3
- Zhang, H. & Wang, J. (2019). Towards adversarially robust object detection. *CoRR, abs/1907.10310*. Retrieved from <http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10310> 3

## A Bigger adversarial images



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.005$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people sitting in a room with a bunch of different colored vases.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.010$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of vases sitting on top of a table.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.020$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of vases sitting on top of a table.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.040$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A large glass vase with a bunch of flowers on it.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.080$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A bathroom with a toilet and a sink.



Clean image

Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.160$

Prediction by S.A.T.: A red wall with a red and white design.



Clean image  
Prediction by S.A.T.: A group of people standing around a tennis court.



Adversarial Image with  $\epsilon = 0.320$   
Prediction by S.A.T.: A large red object with a red and white background.

## B More Adversarial Samples




Figure 15: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 16: Prediction on an adversarial image with  $\epsilon = 0.2$  (roughly 5% of original range)




Figure 17: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 18: Prediction on an adversarial image with  $\epsilon = 0.2$  (roughly 5% of original range)




Figure 19: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 20: Prediction on an adversarial image with  $\epsilon = 0.2$  (roughly 5% of original range)




Figure 21: Prediction by Show Attend and Tell on a normal image




Figure 22: Prediction on an adversarial image with  $\epsilon = 0.2$  (roughly 5% of original range)