Lecture 04: Randomized controlled trials II – Noncompliance

PPHA 34600

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From last time: randomization solves our selection issue

Recall that the ATE is just:

$$\tau^{ATE} = E[Y_i(1)] - E[Y_i(0)]$$

Since we have random assignment, we can estimate this as:

$$\hat{\tau}^{ATE} = \overline{Y(1)} - \overline{Y(0)}$$

Regression is a convenient way to do this:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \tau D_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Generalizing our approach to randomization

Define $R_i \in \{0,1\}$ as an indicator for being **selected for treatment**

- $R_i = 1$ is people assigned to treatment
- $R_i = 0$ is people assigned to control
- This is distinct from D_i , an indicator for **being treated**
- We can then write:

$$\tau^{\mathsf{experiment}} = E[Y_i | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i | R_i = 0]$$

$$\tau^{\text{experiment}} = E[Y_i | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i | R_i = 0]$$

$$au^{ ext{experiment}} = E[Y_i | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i | R_i = 0]$$

$$= \underbrace{E[Y_i(1) | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i(0) | R_i = 0]}_{ ext{requires perfect compliance}}$$

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Let's unpack the perfect compliance piece.

Why do we need perfect compliance?

$$au^{\text{experiment}} = E[Y_i | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i | R_i = 0]$$

= $E[Y_i(1) | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i(0) | R_i = 0]$

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= $E[Y_i(1) | R_i = 1] - E[Y_i(0) | R_i = 0]$

- Recall that we define $Y_i(D_i)$, **not** $Y_i(R_i)$!
- $E[Y_i|\mathbf{D_i}=1]$ and $E[Y_i(1)|\mathbf{D_i}=1]$ are equivalent

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- Recall that we define $Y_i(D_i)$, **not** $Y_i(R_i)$!
- $E[Y_i|\mathbf{D_i}=1]$ and $E[Y_i(1)|\mathbf{D_i}=1]$ are equivalent
- \rightarrow This is not automatic for R_i

To get $E[Y_i|R_i = 1] = E[Y_i(1)|R_i = 1]$, we need $D_i = R_i$ for all i... aka **perfect compliance**

What generates imperfect compliance?

Noncompliance has two sources:

- Treated units don't get treated
- Control units do get treated
 - This can come from inside or outside the experiment

What generates imperfect compliance?

Noncompliance has two sources:

- 1 Treated units don't get treated
- 2 Control units do get treated
 - This can come from inside or outside the experiment

Why might this happen?

- Treatment is costly (money, time, effort)
- Treatment is desirable
- Program implementers are imperfect

What's wrong with imperfect compliance?

The whole point of the RCT is that

$$E[Y_i(1)|D_i=1] = E[Y_i(1)|D_i=0] = E[Y_i(1)] \approx \overline{Y}(1)$$

and

$$E[Y_i(0)|D_i=0] = E[Y_i(0)|D_i=1] = E[Y_i(0)] \approx \overline{Y}(0)$$

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Non-compliance breaks this result

With non-compliance, our means don't estimate the ATE

With noncompliance:

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 1] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0]$$
 \neq
 $E[Y_i(1)|R_i = 1] - E[Y_i(0)|R_i = 0]$

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With noncompliance:

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 1] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0]$$
 \neq
 $E[Y_i(1)|R_i = 1] - E[Y_i(0)|R_i = 0]$

As a result, we can't just estimate

$$au^{ATE} = \overline{Y}(1) - \overline{Y}(0)$$

A simple example of non-compliance

The mean outcome for $R_i = 1$ is not equal to the mean for $D_i = 1$:

- Consider an intervention to get people into factories
- Without treatment, nobody works (hours = 0)
- Treatment causes a 10 hour increase in hours worked
- Of 100 treatment group units, only 50 are actually treated (comply)

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- Of 100 treatment group units, only 50 are actually treated (comply)

$$\bar{Y}(D_i = 1) = 10$$
, but $\bar{Y}(\mathbf{R_i} = 1) = 10 \times 0.5 + 0 \times 0.5 = 5$

We can tell the same story for control units

The mean outcome for $R_i = 0$ is not equal to the mean for $D_i = 0$:

- Consider an intervention to get people into factories
- Without treatment, nobody works (hours = 0)
- Treatment causes a 10 hour increase in hours worked
- Of 100 control group units, 50 sneak into treatment

We can tell the same story for control units

The mean outcome for $R_i = 0$ is not equal to the mean for $D_i = 0$:

- Consider an intervention to get people into factories
- Without treatment, nobody works (hours = 0)
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- Of 100 control group units, 50 sneak into treatment

$$ar{Y}(D_i=0)=0$$
, but $ar{Y}(\mathbf{R_i}=0)=0 imes0.5+10 imes0.5=5$

We can tell the same story for control units

The mean outcome for $R_i = 0$ is not equal to the mean for $D_i = 0$:

- Consider an intervention to get people into factories
- Without treatment, nobody works (hours = 0)
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- Of 100 control group units, 50 sneak into treatment

$$\bar{Y}(D_i = 0) = 0$$
, but $\bar{Y}(\mathbf{R_i} = 0) = 0 \times 0.5 + 10 \times 0.5 = 5$

If these both happened in the same experiment, we'd estimate an "ATE" of 0!

What do we learn from the experimental estimate?

We're no longer measuring the ATE, but:

- This measure may still be meaningful (when?)
- We are now measuring the ATE of assigning treatment
- Another name for this: the **intent to treat (ITT)** estimate
- We can get an unbiased estimate of the ITT thanks to random assignment

An example: Electricity pricing in Sacramento

Policy issue:

- The cost of providing electricity is time-varying
- · Prices typically aren't
- This causes large welfare losses

Program:

- SMUD (randomly) implemented time-varying pricing
- Experimental run: 2011-2013
- Two flavors: "time-of-use" (TOU) and "critical peak pricing" (CPP)
- Both opt-in and opt-out versions

Randomized encouragement design: just an RCT w/ noncompliance!

Estimating the SMUD ITT

A very simple estimating equation:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_{ITT} Z_{it} + \gamma_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where:

 y_{it} is electricity use for unit i in time t

 Z_{it} is the assignment-to-treatment indicator (R_i in our world)

 γ_i and δ_t are "fixed effects" (more on these later)

 ε_{it} is an error term

The authors estimate this for each treatment (same control group)

Note that in our standard notation, the piece that matters is:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \tau^{ITT} R_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

What do we find?

Table 3: Intent to treat effects

	Critical event		Non-event peak	
	Opt-in	Opt-out	Opt-in	Opt-out
Encouragement (CPP)	-0.129***	-0.305***	-0.029***	-0.094***
	(0.010)	(0.037)	(0.006)	(0.020)
Mean usage (kW)	2.49	2.5	1.8	1.8
Customers	55,028	46,684	55,028	46,684
Customer-hours	4,832,874	4,104,263	31,198,201	26,495,612
Encouragement (TOU)	-0.091***	-0.130***	-0.054***	-0.100***
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.013)
Mean usage (kW)	2.49	2.5	1.8	1.8
Customers	55,028	46,684	55,028	46,684
Customer-hours	4,832,874	4,104,263	31,198,201	26,495,612

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Getting beyond the ITT requires extra assumptions

- Let's assume some treated units don't get treated...
- ... and no control units do
- Define D_i the usual way: 1 if treated, 0 if not treated
- Define D_i^* as a **latent (unseen) variable**:

$$D_i^* = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if control unit } i \text{ would've been treated} \\ 0 & \text{if control unit } i \text{ wouldn't have been treated} \end{cases}$$

How can we handle noncompliance?

Now we can look at people in both groups:

Treatment group $(R_i = 1)$:

- $E[Y_i|R_i=1,D_i=1]$: units who took up treatment
- $E[Y_i|R_i=1,D_i=0]$: units who **did not** take up treatment

Control group $(R_i = 0)$:

- $E[Y_i|R_i=0,D_i^*=1]$: units who would have taken up treatment
- $E[Y_i|R_i=0,D_i^*=0]$: units who **would not have** taken up treatment

How can we handle noncompliance?

Now we can look at people in both groups:


Treatment group $(R_i = 1)$:

- $E[Y_i|R_i=1,D_i=1]$: units who took up treatment
- $E[Y_i|R_i=1,D_i=0]$: units who **did not** take up treatment Control group $(R_i=0)$:
 - $E[Y_i|R_i=0,D_i^*=1]$: units who would have taken up treatment
 - $E[Y_i|R_i=0,D_i^*=0]$: units who **would not have** taken up treatment

Fundamental problem: we can see who is treated in the treatment group, but can't see who **would've been** treated in the control group!



A cute visual depiction



We can do better with an additional assumption

In order for us to get an unbiased estimate, we need:

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 1, D_i = 0] = E[Y_i|R_i = 0, D_i^* = 0]$$

We can do better with an additional assumption

In order for us to get an unbiased estimate, we need:

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 1, D_i = 0] = E[Y_i|R_i = 0, D_i^* = 0]$$

In words:

Units randomized into the treatment group who chose not to get treated have the same mean outcome as those in the control group who would have chosen not to be treated

In other words:

Assignment to treatment didn't affect the likelihood of non-compliance In other other words:

No selection into non-treatment

Suppose we **know** impacts on the treated (τ^T) and nontreated (τ^N) :

•
$$\tau^T = E[Y_i|R_i = 1, D_i = 1] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0, D_i^* = 1]$$

•
$$\tau^N = E[Y_i|R_i = 1, D_i = 0] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0, D_i^* = 0]$$

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We can weight to recover the experimental effect:

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We can weight to recover the experimental effect:

$$\tau^{\mathsf{Experiment}} = \underbrace{Pr(D_i = 1 | R_i = 1)}_{\text{\% of T group units treated}} \times \tau^T + \underbrace{(1 - Pr(D_i = 1 | R_i = 1))}_{\text{\% of T group units not}} \times \tau^N$$

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Then:

$$au^{\mathsf{Experiment}} = \mathit{Pr}(\mathit{D}_i = 1 | \mathit{R}_i = 1) imes au^{\mathsf{T}} + (1 - \mathit{Pr}(\mathit{D}_i = 1 | \mathit{R}_i = 1)) \underbrace{\hspace{0.1in} \underbrace{\hspace{0.1in} \hspace{0.1in} \hspace{0.1in} \hspace{0.1in} \hspace{0.1in} \hspace{0.1in} \hspace{0.1in} }_{\mathsf{assumption}}$$

Under this assumption we can get back to...something

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$$\tau^T = E[Y_i|R_i = 1, D_i = 1] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0, D_i^* = 1]$$

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Then:

$$au^{\mathsf{Experiment}} = extstyle{Pr(D_i = 1 | R_i = 1) imes au^T + (1 - extstyle{Pr(D_i = 1 | R_i = 1)})} \underbrace{ imes 0}_{\mathsf{assumption}}$$

$$\tau^{T} = \frac{\tau^{\mathsf{Experiment}}}{Pr(D_{i} = 1 | R_{i} = 1)}$$

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$$au^T = rac{ au^{\mathsf{Experiment}}}{\mathsf{Pr}(D_i = 1 | R_i = 1)}$$

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$$\hat{\tau}^{T} = \underbrace{\frac{\overline{Y}(R = 1) - \overline{Y}(R = 0)}{\Pr(R_{i} = 1)}}_{\mathsf{PR}_{i} = 1}$$

where $P_{R=1}^{D_i=1}$ is the fraction of treatment group units receiving treatment

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new definition

What is τ^T ?

If units who took up treatment are **not selected**:

$$\tau^T = \tau^{ATT} = \tau^{ATE}$$

- Non-selection is equivalent to treatment effect homogeneity
- → Why?

What is τ^T ?

If units who took up treatment are **not selected**:

$$\tau^T = \tau^{ATT} = \tau^{ATE}$$

- Non-selection is equivalent to treatment effect homogeneity
- → Why?

If units who took up treatment are selected:

$$\tau^T = \tau^{ATT} \neq \tau^{ATE}$$

- Selection is equivalent to treatment effect heterogeneity
- → Why?

What if control units can get treated?

- Suppose now control units can obtain treatment
- Just like before, $\overline{Y}(R_i = 1) \overline{Y}(R_i = 0) = \tau^{ITT}$
- And like before, getting from the ITT to something else requires assumptions

Let's think about four possible groups:

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• Never-takers: Never treated, regardless of treatment assignment

$$(D_i|R_i=1)=(D_i|R_i=0)=0$$

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• Compliers: Treated in treatment group, untreated in control group

$$(D_i|R_i=1)=1; (D_i|R_i=0)=0$$

Let's think about four possible groups:

Never-takers: Never treated, regardless of treatment assignment

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• Always-takers: Always treated, regardless of treatment assignment

$$(D_i|R_i=1)=(D_i|R_i=0)=1$$

Compliers: Treated in treatment group, untreated in control group

$$(D_i|R_i=1)=1; (D_i|R_i=0)=0$$

Defiers: Untreated in treatment group, treated in control group

$$(D_i|R_i=1)=0; (D_i|R_i=0)=1$$

→ We typically assume no defiers

Estimating treatment effects

We observe outcomes from $R_i = 0$ and $R_i = 1$ groups:

Define
$$\pi^{\it G}=rac{{
m total\ units\ of\ type\ G}}{{
m total\ units\ of\ all\ types}}$$

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 1] = \pi^{NT}E[Y_i(0)|NT] + \pi^C E[Y(1)|C] + \pi^{AT}E[Y_i(1)|AT]$$

and

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 0] = \pi^{NT}E[Y_i(0)|NT] + \pi^C E[Y(0)|C] + \pi^{AT}E[Y_i(1)|AT]$$

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$$E[Y_i|R_i = 0] = \pi^{NT}E[Y_i(0)|NT] + \pi^C E[Y(0)|C] + \pi^{AT}E[Y_i(1)|AT]$$

When we compare these groups, we get:

$$E[Y_i|R_i=1] - E[Y_i|R_i=0] = \pi^{C}(E[Y_i=1|C] - E[Y_i=0|C])$$

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Important assumption: No defiers

If we have defiers, we end up with:

$$\begin{split} E[Y_i|R_i &= 1] \\ &= \pi^{NT} E[Y_i(0)|NT] + \pi^C E[Y(1)|C] + \pi^{AT} E[Y_i(1)|AT] \\ &+ \pi^{DE} E[Y(0)|DE] \end{split}$$

and

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 0] = \pi^{NT} E[Y_i(0)|NT] + \pi^C E[Y(0)|C] + \pi^{AT} E[Y_i(1)|AT] + \pi^{DE} E[Y(1)|DE]$$

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and

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 0] = \pi^{NT} E[Y_i(0)|NT] + \pi^C E[Y(0)|C] + \pi^{AT} E[Y_i(1)|AT] + \pi^{DE} E[Y(1)|DE]$$

SO

$$E[Y_i|R_i = 1] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0] = \pi^C (E[Y(1)|C] - E[Y(0)|C]) + \pi^{DE} (E[Y(0)|DE] - E[Y(1)|DE])$$

We don't know how to interpret this gross thing

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$$E[Y_i|R_i=1] - E[Y_i|R_i=0] = \pi^{C}(E[Y_i=1|C] - E[Y_i=0|C])$$

$$E[Y_i|R_i=1] - E[Y_i|R_i=0] = \pi^{C}(E[Y_i=1|C] - E[Y_i=0|C])$$

$$\frac{E[Y_i|R_i = 1] - E[Y_i|R_i = 0]}{E[D_i|R_i = 1] - E[D_i|R_i = 0]} = \underbrace{\frac{\pi^C(E[Y_i = 1|C] - E[Y_i = 0|C])}{E[D_i|R_i = 1] - E[D_i|R_i = 0]}}_{\text{divide by effect of } R_i \text{ on } D_i}$$

$$E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 0] = \pi^{C}(E[Y_{i} = 1|C] - E[Y_{i} = 0|C])$$

$$\frac{E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 0]}{E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 0]} = \underbrace{\frac{\pi^{C}(E[Y_{i} = 1|C] - E[Y_{i} = 0|C])}{E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 0]}}_{\text{divide by effect of } R_{i} \text{ on } D_{i}}$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{\pi^{C}(E[Y_{i}(1)|C] - E[Y_{i}(0)|C])}{\pi^{C}}}_{\text{by def'n of } \pi^{C}}$$

$$\begin{split} E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 0] &= \pi^{C}(E[Y_{i} = 1|C] - E[Y_{i} = 0|C]) \\ \frac{E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 0]}{E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 0]} &= \underbrace{\frac{\pi^{C}(E[Y_{i} = 1|C] - E[Y_{i} = 0|C])}{E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 0]}}_{\text{divide by effect of } R_{i} \text{ on } D_{i}} \\ &= \underbrace{\frac{\pi^{C}(E[Y_{i}(1)|C] - E[Y_{i}(0)|C])}{\pi^{C}}}_{\text{by def'n of } \pi^{C}} \\ &= \underbrace{E[Y_{i}(1)|C] - E[Y_{i}(0)|C]}_{\text{thanks to division}} \end{split}$$

Without defiers, we can get to something interesting:

$$E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 0] = \pi^{C}(E[Y_{i} = 1|C] - E[Y_{i} = 0|C])$$

$$\frac{E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[Y_{i}|R_{i} = 0]}{E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 0]} = \underbrace{\frac{\pi^{C}(E[Y_{i} = 1|C] - E[Y_{i} = 0|C])}{E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 1] - E[D_{i}|R_{i} = 0]}}_{\text{divide by effect of } R_{i} \text{ on } D_{i}}$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{\pi^{C}(E[Y_{i}(1)|C] - E[Y_{i}(0)|C])}{\pi^{C}}}_{\text{by def'n of } \pi^{C}}$$

$$= \underbrace{E[Y_{i}(1)|C] - E[Y_{i}(0)|C]}_{\text{thanks to division}}$$

$$= \tau^{LATE}$$

The LATE is the effect of treatment for the compliers

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From τ^T to τ^{LATE}

To bring us full circle, notice that:

$$\tau^T = \underbrace{\frac{\bar{Y}(R=1) - \bar{Y}(R=0)}{P_{R_i=1}^{D_i=1} - P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1}}}_{P_{R_i=1}^{D_i=1} - P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1} = \pi^C \text{ when both groups non-comply}}$$

From τ^T to τ^{LATE}

To bring us full circle, notice that:

$$\tau^T = \underbrace{\frac{\bar{Y}(R=1) - \bar{Y}(R=0)}{P_{R_i=1}^{D_i=1} - P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1}}}_{P_{R_i=1}^{D_i=1} - P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1} = \pi^C \text{ when both groups non-comply}}$$

In other words:

$$\tau^T = \tau^{LATE}$$

From τ^T to τ^{LATE}

To bring us full circle, notice that:

$$\tau^T = \underbrace{\frac{\bar{Y}(R=1) - \bar{Y}(R=0)}{P_{R_i=1}^{D_i=1} - P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1}}}_{P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1} - P_{R_i=0}^{D_i=1} = \pi^C \text{ when both groups non-comply}}$$

In other words:

$$\tau^T = \tau^{LATE}$$

To estimate the LATE:

- **1** Regress Y_i on R_i to recover $\hat{\tau}^{ITT}$
- **2** Regress D_i on R_i to recover $\hat{\pi}^C$
- $\hat{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}^{LATE} = \frac{\hat{\tau}^{ITT}}{\hat{\pi}^C}$

Back to treatment parameters

What can we estimate with non-compliance?

• ITT:
$$\bar{Y}(R_i = 1) - \bar{Y}(R_i = 0)$$

Back to treatment parameters

What can we estimate with non-compliance?

- ITT: $\bar{Y}(R_i = 1) \bar{Y}(R_i = 0)$
- LATE: $\frac{\bar{Y}(R_i=1) \bar{Y}(R_i=0)}{T^C}$
 - Under constant treatment effects: equal to ATE, ATT
 - With heterogeneous treatment effects: equal to ATT
 - With defiers: equal to <u>§</u>




Estimating the SMUD τ^T

All they need to do is estimate:


$$\hat{\tau}^{T} = \frac{\overline{Y}(R_{i} = 1) - \overline{Y}(R_{i} = 0)}{\hat{\pi}^{C}}$$
$$= \hat{\tau}_{ITT}/\hat{\pi}^{C}$$

They do this with an "instrumental variable" (more on this in a few weeks)

What do they find?




What do they find?



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What do they find?



Recap

TL;DR:

- 1 RCTs are (still) great!
- Non-compliance makes things more complicated
- 3 We can still make progress on (some) treatment parameters

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