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Personal

Born on August 31, 1992.

French Citizen, temporary resident of Canada.

Education

Ph.D. Economics (in progress), Concordia University, Canada, and Université Paris Dauphine, France.

Field: Applied microeconomic theory - contract theory and network formation games.
Expected completion date: June 2020.

M.A. Public Policies and Development Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, 2014.

B.S. Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, 2012.

References

Professor Francis Bloch
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Employment

Teaching

Université Paris Dauphine 2018–2020.

Lecturer, Microeconomics - 2d year Bachelor.

Concordia University 2014–2017.

TA, Microeconomics - 1st year Bachelor.

TA, Microeconomics and Game Theory - M.A.

TA, Mathematics for Economists - M.A.

Toulouse School of Economics, 2014.

TA, Macroeconomics - 3d year Bachelor.

Research Assistant

Prof. Ming Li, Concordia University 2016 - 2017.

CIRANO research internship, Montreal, Canada: supervisor Prof. Claude Montmarquette, 2014.

Research

Ph.D. papers

Collective action on an endogenous network (Job market paper)

Abstract: I present a model of network formation in an environment where agents balance the personal costs of forming links against their social benefits. The social benefit from a link is assumed alternatively to depend on (i) the total number of agents the link allows to connect; or (ii) how close the link brings agents to each others. An agent's payoff is equal to a reward which is the same for everyone and whose value depends on (i) the reach or (ii) the closeness of all agents, minus what he pays for the links he initiates. This allows me to formulate the game as a non-cooperative game and a potential game. In the version of the model where the reward depends on the reach of the players, I am able to characterize the set of strict Nash networks: these networks are the wheel network, a disconnected variant of it and the empty network. In the version of the model where the reward depends on the closeness of the agents, I use the maximum of the potential function as equilibrium concept. I am able to characterize partially a superset of the set of equilibrium networks: the networks in this superset have all the architecture of a flower network or that of a disconnected variant of a flower network.

KEYWORDS: NETWORK, PUBLIC GOOD, POTENTIAL GAME.

A theory on the carrot and the stick: how contracting for the rights over an offense performs as a marginal deterrent

Abstract: If your neighbor intends to cause you harm, how could you dissuade him? You would first threaten him to take the case to court, which makes him run the risk to be fined. If he is deterred, this is what scholars refer to as the marginal deterrence of the sanction. What if he is still not deterred? You two could simply negotiate the right over the harmful action. I show that, during the contract making stage, the threat of sanction helps in shifting part of the negotiating power away from the beneficiary of the harmful action to the victim. And that the possibility of contracting over the ownership of an act punished by law increases the scope of deterrence.

KEYWORDS: TORT LAW, CONTRACTS, NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY, MARGINAL DETERRENCE.

Secret Rebates and List Prices in Negotiations between Countries and Pharmaceutical Firms *(co-written with Sidartha Gordon)*

Abstract: This paper clarifies the reasons for and function of secret rebates in the negotiation over drug prices between suppliers and institutional payers (countries). For a pharmaceutical monopoly producer, hiding the net price charged to a payer, by only making the list price observable, has a simple motivation: if negotiations are carried out sequentially, secrecy on the net price charged to a payer prevents subsequent ones from claiming

for no less advantageous deals. For the country, rebates lead to a less effective access to the drug than the analogous list price reduction. We provide a model of this interaction and characterize the set of Pareto-efficient and individually rational trades between a country and the firm. We also provide conditions under which such trades involve secret rebates.

KEYWORDS: DRUG PRICE NEGOTIATION, SECRET REBATE, LIST PRICE, REFERENCE PRICING.

Asymmetric Information in Markets for Pharmaceutical Drugs : International Price Referencing and Secret Rebates *(co-written with Sidartha Gordon)*

Abstract: We build a model where two countries negotiate sequentially with a firm. The firm holds private information on the date at which the drug will become obsolete because of the entry of a superior substitute, which affects its willingness to accept a lower price in exchange for an earlier deal. The information contained in the list price agreed with the first country enables the second country to extract a greater surplus from the firm. As a result, if it is farsighted, the firm is then more reluctant to accept a low offer from the first country which reduces its surplus, making a high list price coupled with a secret rebate an attractive option for the first country and for the firm.

KEYWORDS: NEGOTIATION GAME, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, REFERENCE PRICING.

Work in Progress

Innovation networks and royalty stacking *(co-written with Diomides Mavroyiannis)*

KEYWORDS: patents, technology infringement, network.

Grants and Awards

Grants

Fonds de Recherche du Québec en Société et Culture, 2018–2019, $28,000.

Social Justice Center Fellowship, 2019–2020, $5,000.

Awards

Concordia Merit Award, 2014–2016, $20,000.

CIREQ research award, 2015, $1,500.

Balvir and Ranjna Singh Scholarship, 2015, $1,500.

Conferences and Seminars

Invited Seminar

Decisions and Market Interactions, Université Paris Dauphine, 2019.

University of Cyprus, 2019.

Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire, 2018.

Conferences

Bigsem 14th Workshop, 2019.

1st Ph.D. Students Workshop in Microeconomics (Concordia), CIRANO, 2019.

Coalition Theory LAGV, 2019.

Public Economic Theory PET Strasbourg, 2019.

Workshop CIGNE, 2017.

Canadian Economic Association, 2016.

CIREQ Ph.D. conference, 2015.