

A brief view at auction Theory, Week 8

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Agenda

- 1 Big picture
- 2 Four classic kinds of actions
- 3 A basic model private value model

Auction theory plan

- ▶ Plan: Discussion of Auction theory
- ▶ The idea, people can decide how much to give you
- ▶ Useful for thinking about information

Some context

- ▶ Hayek, 'The use of knowledge in society'
- ▶ The central planner does not have all the information
- ▶ People will only give you what they want to give you(birth of incentive compatibility)



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Four classic kinds of actions

- ▶ English: Public increasing bids(1)
- ▶ Dutch: Descending Price auction (2)
- ▶ First price sealed bid: Self explanatory (2)
- ▶ Second price sealed bid: Self explanatory(1)

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Private value auction

$$E(S_i) = (v_i - B(w_i))F^{n-1}(w_i) + (0)(1 - F^{n-1}(w_i)) \quad (1)$$

$$\rightarrow B'(v_i) = (n-1)(v_i - B(v_i)) \frac{f(v_i)}{F(v_i)} \quad (2)$$

$$B(v_i) = v_i - \frac{\int_{\underline{v}}^{\bar{v}} F^{n-1}(t) dt}{F^{n-1}(v_i)} \quad (3)$$

$$(4)$$

If uniform

$$B(v_i) = \frac{n-1}{n} v_i \quad (5)$$

Revenue equivalence

- ▶ All direct mechanisms have the same expected revenue
- ▶ Limitation 1: Risk averse agents shade less in Dutch and first price
- ▶ Limitation 2: Asymmetric distributions, it may result in inefficiency
- ▶ Limitation 3: Similar to two part tariff, reserve price helps

Common value versus private value

- ▶ Common value: There is an objective value to the good
- ▶ Private value: Value is subjective
- ▶ Common value: Winner's curse
- ▶ Common value also led to the no trade theorem
- ▶ Example: Imagine bidding for a wallet

Linkage principle

- ▶ The auction designer has an incentive to maximize information of participants
- ▶ Reason: If bidders asymmetrically informed, more opportunities for surplus
- ▶ If bidders have to look for information themselves, they lower their bids

Contests

- ▶ What if everyone pays?
- ▶ Marginally willing to bid more than your valuation?
- ▶ $v_i F^{N-1}(b^{-1}(b_i)) - b_i$
- ▶ Result: People bid less

Conclusions

- ▶ A mix of probability theory, microeconomics, industrial organization, differential equations, etc
- ▶ Very powerful in the real world, growing in importance
- ▶ Narrow but precise