# Network Security Assignment Report

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## **HMAC**

## **Problem Statement**

Implement HMAC and verify message integrity, confidentiality and non repudiation. (Recommended to use your own unique hashing algorithm)

## Solution

### Approach

We must verify Non Repudiation, Confidentiality and Message Integrity. **HMAC** can be used to verify the **Message Integrity**. We will have to use other things in order to get **Non Repudiation** and **Confidentiality**. We are using Public Key Cryptography(in order to get Non Repudiation) and Private Key Cryptography(in order to get Confidentiality). Namely we're using **RSA** and **AES**.

Steps we followed are as follow:

- 1. Let the message be MESSAGE.
- 2. Both the sender and receiver have private key and public key of their own. Let the public key PUB(sender) and private key be PRIV(sender). Similarly let the public key of receiver be PUB(receiver) and private key of receiver be PRIV(receiver).
- 3. Let AESKEY be key for AES. AESKEY is known only to the sender initially.
- 4. Sender encrypts the AESKEY with PUB(receiver). Let the result be enc1
- 5. Sender will then encrypt enc1 with PRIV(sender). Let the result be ENC AES KEY.

let priv\_key = rsa::encrypt\_private(&rsa::encrypt\_public(AES\_KEY));

- 6. Sender will now encrypt MESSAGE with AESKEY. Let the result be ENC\_MSG.
- 7. Sender will use hmac to generate the signature for ENC\_MSG.
- 8. In our case, we're using two hashing algorithm for hmac. We're using a well known and popular cryptographic hashing algorithm Blake3 and another one made by us which we're naming FibMulCombineHash.

### FibMulCombineHash description

• The code is available in hmac/src/hash.rs. There are some tests for it as well.

FibMulCombineHash is a cryptographic hashing algorithm which outputs 128 bit digest. The inspiration for this algorithm was taken from the book The Art of Computer Programming by Donald Knuth, Volume 3,Section 6.4, page 518. The algorithm is extremely fast, because it's just a multiplication followed by a shift, in order to bring the output to some [0, 2^k) domain. We

don't have the shift state as we want the domain to be full  $[0,2^{2}]$ . The hash function is known to produce a very uniform distribution of hash values, hence minimizing collisions.

We hash each input byte with this and combine all of them parallely, which makes a very good usage of CPU cores. In order to hash a 2 Mega Byte String, our CPU usage was well over 200% for this algorithm. The hash combining strategy is also just a bunch of shifts and additions which will be very fast. The hash function has Avalance Effect as well, which makes it a very hash function.

More than 200% CPU usage for 2MB string

Coc

#### Avalanche Effect

```
NetSecAssignment/hmac on hmain [?] is v0.1.0 via ν1.66.0-nightly

• λ cargo test --package hmac --lib -- 'hash::tests::avalanche_fib_mul_combine' --exact --nocapture
Finished test [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.02s
Running unittests src/lib.rs (target/debug/deps/hmac-651351ad97d3d67b)

running 1 test
Mismatches in hash: 29
Mismatches in keys: 1
test hash::tests::avalanche_fib_mul_combine ... ok

test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 5 filtered out; finished in 0.00s

NetSecAssignment/hmac on main [?] is v0.1.0 via v1.66.0-nightly

• λ
```

- 9. We will send **HMAC** value calculated using both of these hash functions to the receiver.
- 10. Sender will then generate a json file called sender.json which follows the following struct.

```
pub struct SenderStruct {
    // stores ENC_AES_KEY
    pub rsa_enc_aes_key: Vec<u8>,
    // stores ENC_MSG
    pub aes_encrypted_message: Vec<u8>,
```

```
//stores Hmac of ENC_MSG with Blake3
pub hmac_blake3: Vec<u8>,
   // Stores Hmac of ENC_MSG with FibMulCombineHash
pub hmac_custom_hash: Vec<u8>,
```

- 11. Receiver will read sender.json and get the fields from it.
- 12. Receiver will then verify the HMAC for both the hash functions. This proves Message Integrity.
- 13. Receiver will then go on and decrypt the ENC\_AES\_KEY using PRIV(receiver) and PUB(sender). It will be rust aes\_priv\_key = rsa::decrypt\_private(&rsa::decrypt\_public(&sender\_params.rsa\_enc\_aes\_key));
- 14. This RSA decryption proves Non Repudiation, since private key of the sender was involved in the AESKEY encryption.
- 15. Now the encrypted message ENC\_MSG can be decrypted using the AESKEY. This proves Confidentiality

## Output

#### Sender Output

```
NetSecAssignment/Meac on } main [?] is ● v0.1.0 via ≥ v1.66.0-nightly

A cargor run —bin sender NetSecAssignment

Finished dev (unoptimized a debuginfo] larget(s) in 0.02s

Running 'target/debug/sender NetSecAssignment

MissAnce: NetSecAssignment

10 Ne'll uncrypt the AES KET wing BSA(public key of receiver) and then encrypt(RSA again with private key of sender) to get non repudiation

2) Ne'll uncrypt the AES KET wing BSA(public key of receiver) and then encrypt(RSA again with private key of sender) to get non repudiation

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4) Net To the private wing AES (public key of receiver) and then encrypt the s
```

#### Sender Json

Receiver Output

```
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A cargo run --bin receiver
Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.05s
Running `target/debug/receiver`

1) Get AES Key by Rsa decryption

2) Verify AES encrypted message with hmac to check for integrity
--- Verified Successfully----

3) Get the original message by AES Decryption

MESSAGE: NetSecAssignment

NetSecAssignment/hmac on main [?] is v0.1.0 via v1.66.0-nightly

A
```

**Buffer Overflow** 

Illegal Packet

DOS

**Shrew Attack**