

The Security Council was established in 1946 with the objectives of keeping peace and preventing further war. It is important that we uncover the reasons for menace, for oppression, for peace. For the Security Council, the world exists only to be put in order. There are neither winners nor losers. In this committee, choose carefully what you want to communicate: to erase reality or recreate it.

# UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

**DiPSMUN 2018**

Chairperson: Sabeel Mehkri  
Vice Chairperson: Rohan Kanna  
Moderator: Razza Singh

**Page has been left blank**

## Foreword

Dear delegates,

It is our distinct pleasure to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council at DiPSMUN18 along with the Organizing Committee and the Secretariat. We dearly hope that this will be the best MUN conference you will ever attend.

“Waste not your time on broad sketches in color”

This quote is today reminiscent of the Durand Line which today embodies slavery for the Baloch and Pashtun nations. This dispute has been one of the principle and longest standing disputes plaguing the United Nations Security Council without sufficient discourse and action on the same. In light of repetitive failure of international arrangements to prevail over regional clamor, this session of the United Nations Security Council will meet at the onset of a failed international effort to mediate between Afghanistan, Pakistan and other state parties. This leaves multiple avenues for the parties to the dispute to bring about a conclusive and maybe historic end, to this dispute.

While creating the country matrix of this committee, we intended to create something unique, and potentially historic, hence the country matrix has a unique and decisive edge to it. A Security Council is often confused to be the most difficult committee at an MUN, however, this committee is the sole committee with power to execute actions and the committee vested with real authority.

This study guide will never be enough research; however it will give you enough insight into the agenda. Also, embedded in this study guide, are a series of hints, at which direction your research should be heading. The Executive Board encourages you to research further about the agenda, position of the member states and the intricate details of this geo-political conundrum.

We hope that every delegate has a great time during the 3 days of the MUN, inside and outside committee. An MUN is not only about battling out your foreign policy but also meeting new people, fostering friendships, learning new things and having a time to remember.

Feel free to drop your queries to the Executive Board. If this is your first MUN, it's highly encouraged that you should contact the Executive Board and come to pace with the intricacy of the committee, agenda and the procedure of an MUN conference. Feel free to contact us, no matter how trivial the doubts might be. Looking forward to see you in committee!

Sabeel Mehkri  
Chairperson, UNSC  
DiPSMUN– 2018

## Introduction

Since Independence Pakistan's largest province having geo-strategic importance and unlimited natural resources inducing a coastal line has remained plagued with unrest and disturbances. Decades of serious political and administrative neglect has aggravated the whole issue.

Pakistan's future and its leap forward towards prosperity is linked with Balochistan. For Pakistanis, Balochistan and its current situation and how it is handled is vital to understand. The FATA (Tribal areas in the map beside), are no exception to the neglect, and are under tremendous political pressure with little to no power. A fundamental

problem with the current administration is that FATA's residents are ruled by the prevailing political winds; not the law. **"A simplistic view of addressing the problem, which has too many dimensions and fault lines could be fatal"**. Only an in depth understanding of its past and present can give the contours of 'way forward'. A holistic approach encompassing Federal and Provincial governments can take the Balochistan out of current imbroglio.



## History and Background

### BALUCHISTAN

Balochistan has witnessed five successive insurgencies and unrests since 1947. Poor handling, coupled with non-institutionalized approach by successive governments is the main drivers of unrest. The current situation is far more complex, as the on-going unrest in the province is aided and abetted by the "international players", which should also be seen in the context of Afghanistan situation.

The insurgency in Balochistan is a guerrilla war waged by Baloch nationalists against the governments of Pakistan and Iran in the Balochistan region, which covers Balochistan Province in southwestern Pakistan, Sistan and Balochistan Province in south-eastern Iran, and the Balochistan region of southern Afghanistan.

The first insurgency played key in 1948, by Prince Karim, who defected to Afghanistan and conducted anti state activities to address the issue of State of Kalat as an independent state. This revolt may have lasted a few months, but it was the first of many insurgencies, and it was the cry or plea by the people. Late fifties

witnessed the eruption of second insurgency. The only outcome of this issue was the Balochi people's increased lack of trust in the Federation of Pakistan for the making promises they couldn't keep. The uneasy peace lasted for a brief period and the decade of sixties again found Balochistan gripped into the third insurgency. Its causes revolved around removal and arrest of many tribal chieftains (those of current known FATA regions) and uprisings surged in various districts and parts of the area, which soon led to the formation of the Baloch government in 1972, and another soon-to-be brief spell of peace. The state's inability to find lasting solution to the provincial problems, took Balochistan into its fourth insurgency in 1973 which lasted for four years.

Currently the Major players include separatist groups such the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) and the Baloch Liberation Front. These groups receive the unofficial and alleged backing of India, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The question of the **Right to Self-Determination** of peoples plays an extremely important role in dealing with these insurgent groups.

The spatial dimensions of current disturbances now cover vast spaces of Baloch and Brahvi areas with distinct shade of mental subversion of masses having roots in lower and middle class with educated youth joining hands. So far, a coherent policy and requisite political initiatives at different tiers to address the issue through a wholesome approach have not emerged on the national scene.

Economic inequality, and Balochistan's status as a "neglected province where a majority of population lacks amenities" is a dimension in the conflict.



After independence, the Government could not comprehend the complex dynamics of Balochistan and tried to resolve the issues through reactive measures which lacked a long-term vision. Resultantly, the disturbances grew in quantum and space, engulfing entire Baloch/Brahvi dominated areas. The neglect of over last sixty years is now emerging in the form of deepening fault-lines with significantly fractured society. Destroyed societal fabric will poses serious challenges for a way forward without a wholesome response.

## DURAND LINE

In 1893, England created the Durand Line — an arbitrary 1,500-mile border separating 'British' India and Afghanistan. The agreement was signed between Sir Mortimer Durand, the Indian Foreign Secretary of the time and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in Kabul. This new border divided the Pashtun tribal lands —also called Pashthunistan — into two, one half of it remaining with Afghanistan and the other half residing with the British India (present Pakistan). The line ensured that a thin strip of Afghanistan stretched to the Chinese border, to separate Russian empire from the British empire. “This line became the principle issue in the foreign policy of Afghanistan and now is the contingent issue in the Afghan–Pak relationship.”

The original treaty was over a page long and was written in English. Bowing under the might of the British empire, the Afghanistan reaffirmed the border line by additional treaties and agreements in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930.

At the advent of the 20th century, the Durand line remained a long-running dispute between the government of Afghanistan and Great Britain and this prompted the third Anglo–Afghan war in 1919. Afghanistan had trouble accepting the division of states especially since the separation of Balochistan robbed the country of its direct passage to the sea.

However, in 1905, Amir Habibullah Khan — the successor of Abdur Rahman Khan — had signed a new agreement to confirm the legality of Durand Line. This legality was reaffirmed by the Anglo–Afghan treaty of 1919 (also known as the Rawalpindi agreement) based on which Afghanistan reclaimed its independence. The Kabul agreement of 1921 surpassed even the Rawalpindi agreement and stated that the Durand line will be recognised as an international border. Despite the annulment of the treaty (in three years) according to a clause of the Kabul Agreement, the border was reinforced by the king in 1921.

Afghanistan has time and again repudiated the legality of the Durand Line. The Afghan government have several claims for a re-demarcation of the Durand Line with both a legal and moral basis.

While Customary International Law and international support favour Pakistan, deeper introspection opens up opportunities for debate with regard to the legality of the line. Delegates do note here that there is a fundamental difference between a line demarcating two spheres of political influence and a line demarcating the boundaries of two sovereigns.

The Durand Line has also been affected off late by several other issues. Cross Border fire, illicit smuggling of arms, narcotics (emphasis on Opium) and poor security are some of the problems that need to be urgently addressed. The border crossing at Torkham and Chaman are sensitive and vulnerable and need reinforcement of stringent security measures.

## FATA

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas was granted a Semi-Autonomous status and is an economically backward region. Recently on the 24<sup>th</sup> of May 2018, a merger with Khyber Pakhtunwa was initiated and approved. The reintegration process is expected to take place over two years. There have been mixed reactions towards this move. While Article II (7) of the Charter of the United Nations charter prevents direct interference by the world community within Pakistani administration, this move could have extraterritorial effects and might cause social disruption among certain tribes. Investment with reference to Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ) seem like potential solutions for the economic upliftment of the people living in the area.

## Human Right Violations in Balochistan

Human rights violations in the Balochistan province of Pakistan have drawn concern and criticism in the international community, being described by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as having reached epidemic proportions.

Alleged killings, reports of torture and missing persons have run into tens of thousands at present. Baloch insurgent movements have also been accused of human rights abuses in Balochistan, including targeted killings of ethnic non-Baloch civilians. This has caused an economic brain drain in the province.

Journalists, teachers, students, and human rights defenders have been targeted in Balochistan according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal. The U.S. Department of State estimates that in 2012 at least 690 civilians were victims of violence in Balochistan. A report from the Interior Ministry in 2012 stated that Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Baloch Musalla Difa Tanzeem, and the Baloch Liberation Army were involved in violent disturbances. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimates that these groups and others killed 2,050 innocent persons and injured another 3,822 in 2012.

## International Opinions

### The United States

The United States of America have adopted a cautious approach towards the Baloch Insurgency but have strongly condemned the Afghan stance over the legality of the Durand Line. The United States today engages in extensive economic, social, and scientific assistance as well as vital military relations with Pakistan, while Pakistan continues to occupy a strategic position in the United States' interests in Central and South Asia. The United States is the second-largest supplier of military equipment to Pakistan after China, and is one of Pakistan's largest donors of foreign assistance. However the Trump administration has been extremely

unpredictable in its foreign policy and opinions and decision are subject to change especially with regard to the Pakistani war on “terror”.

### **The People’s Republic of China**

PRC are an integral part of Pakistan’s efforts to suppress the Baloch Insurgency. China was involved into the crisis when the Gwadar port was attacked by separatists. Chinese cooperation with Pakistan has reached economic high points, with substantial Chinese investment in Pakistani infrastructural expansion including the Pakistani deep-water port at Gwadar. Both countries have an on-going free trade agreement. China and Pakistan are economically, politically and militarily close and the Chinese influence has boosted Pakistan’s position in the international strata.

### **Islamic Republic of Pakistan**

Pakistan’s view, if not obvious yet, strongly opposes Afghan claims and justifies their actions (Humanitarian or Economical) over Balochistan and the tribes that live in and around the region. It’s stance over the Durand line is firm, and abides by the treaty with no regard to the Afghan pleas. Pakistan claims to abide by the law and silences those who speak of a second war.

### **Republic of India**

Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of supporting Baloch rebels, starting with an attack in Gwadar in 2004 where three Chinese engineers were killed. On 29 March 2016, Pakistan claimed that it had apprehended a serving Indian naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav who was tasked by Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to carry out terrorism in Balochistan, and bomb Chinese nationals in a hotel in Gwadar who were there to work on a deep sea port construction project. India has categorically denied the allegations, pointing to Pakistan’s failure to provide evidence. In 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi criticized Pakistan and alleged human rights issues in Balochistan during an Independence Day speech. Pakistan condemned Modi’s remarks, calling it an attempted diversion from violence in Kashmir and a reiteration of Pakistani allegations vis-a-vis Indian involvement in Balochistan. Modi’s comments were welcomed by exiled Baloch separatist leaders, but sparked anti-India protests by political organisations and locals in Balochistan. India has been an important ally of Afghanistan and would look to counter the political influence of the Chinese.

### **Afghanistan**

Afghanistan has made it clear multiple times that it shall not accept the Durand Line as an international border. The Afghan government lacks a strong basis for its arguments and hence is not able to garner international support. Afghanistan will be looking to apply diplomatic pressure on Pakistan while providing humanitarian aid to the Baloch people and the indigenous tribes.



## Conclusion

Western Pakistan has always been a subject that hasn't been given its due importance at an international level. This region has been a hotspot for social and political instability. Culturally, the region's primary ethnicity has been Pashtun with a mixture of several tribes and local inhabitants. The local people have been denied several basic human rights. Despite the region being economically rich in natural resources such as copper, gold and oil, the lack of investment has rendered it as one of the poorest regions in the world. In the midst of this situation, the legality of the Durand Line is another issue affecting this region. Afghanistan cry foul over the treaties and agreements that have been ratified in the past and claim that the Pashtun inhabited regions extending to Peshawar rightfully belong to Afghanistan. Pakistan have strong political backing in the form of China and the attack on the Gwadar port has only strengthened China's stance on the issue. Recently on 24th May 2018, a bill was passed to integrate the backward Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunwa. Separatism has been rampant and weak security along the Durand Line has allowed drug smuggling, trafficking and other forms of Organized crime to take place across an international border.

Delegates of the most powerful committee of the UN, the onus is on you to secure the maintenance of International peace and security.

## Points to Consider in the resolution

- 1) How must the international community respond the Baloch insurgency without breaching the sovereignty of any state involved in the issue while defending the right to self-determination of the local people?
- 2) Can the legality of the Durand Line be questioned? Should the UNSC call for the International Court of Justice to provide legal dialogue with reference to this matter?
- 3) How the UNSC help demilitarize the area and ensure that international peace and security is maintained?
- 4) How can the UNSC help facilitate cooperation and collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to strengthen border security and prevent cross border hostilities?
- 5) Can the United Nations facilitate dialogue between the tribal people of the FATA region and the Pakistani government in order to ensure certain special rights and privileges to the inhabitants?
- 6) What other bodies of the UN should the Security Council call upon to aid the situation, such as the UNODC and the ECOSOC to help with prevention of trafficking and help with economic reconstruction respectively?

- 7) How can the human right violations be addressed? Should a tribunal be established? If so what kind of structure and framework will it have? What will its scope and mandate extend to?
- 8) How does the development of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar port affect the regional situation in terms of sociopolitical stability?

## Agenda II– Curbing socio–political instability in Mali whilst dealing with European Intervention

### Introduction

In 2012, struck with an ethnic insurgency, coup d'état, and an al–Qaida–linked land grab within months of one another, Mali descended into statelessness and lost control of two–thirds of its territory with dizzying speed. Just one year later, territorial integrity is almost completely recovered thanks to a French–led intervention that killed, detained, and dispersed the al–Qaida–linked radicals. Presidential elections are expected to restore legitimate state leadership as soon as July.

Before 2012, Mali proclaimed a successful spot in the “third” wave of democracy with its President, Amadou Toumani Touré. After leading a coup in 1991 and overseeing a democratic transition, Touré held power until 1992, and returned to politics to win the 2002 and the 2007 elections. With the upcoming elections in 2012, the Malian President prepared to receive the seat with open arms, and little did he know what was in store.

Months before the April 2012 elections, **Tuareg separatists** in north Mali under the **National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad** (MNLA, “Azawad” refers to the northern areas of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu), declared a rebellion against the central government. The regime's soldiers suffered defeats and seemed too ill–equipped to withstand rebel assaults. Soldiers' discontent with the regime, which they blamed for their losses, erupted into protests, mutiny, and ultimately a coup against Touré on 22 March 2012. The coup created a power vacuum that enabled Tuareg rebels in the north backed by Islamist forces to take control of nearly two thirds of the country. These disparate Islamist forces included **Ansar Dine** (“Defenders of the Faith”), Al–Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and **Jama'a al Tawhid wa al Jihad fi Gharb Afriqiya** (The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, MUJWA). Meanwhile, following the ousting of the weak Malian forces by the coalition, the MNLA in turn lost control to the armed Islamists.

The West African regional body, the **Economic Community of West African States** (ECOWAS), rejected both the military coup and the rebel occupation of north Mali. As part of its overarching strategy for restoring civilian rule in Mali, ECOWAS imposed targeted sanctions on the junta and initiated dialogue with Tuareg rebels and

Islamist forces, a dialogue that later faltered. The breakdown of dialogue between the government and the rebel groups, and the advance of rebel forces into Konna (which lies only 600 kilometres to the northeast of Bamako) prompted France to intervene militarily on 11 January 2013. Against this backdrop, observers have wondered how Mali's apparent successes turned so quickly into failures, and what security implications the resort to military intervention holds. This piece engages with these emerging concerns.

## The road to Military intervention


Engulfed in the rise of an Islamist threat, the interim government of Mali in September 2012 requested the assistance of ECOWAS to suppress the rebellion. ECOWAS, however, adopted a two-pronged approach to the crisis.

- President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was given the task of negotiating with Ansar Dine representatives, hoping to get Ansar Dine to cut ties with AQIM and broker a peace deal. After a peace talks in mid-November 2012, with President Compaoré, Ansar Dine promised to reject extremism and terrorism, fight trans-border organised crime and engage in dialogue with all parties in the Mali crisis.
- Second, ECOWAS sustained its diplomatic pressure for military intervention should negotiation fail. As such, it forwarded the interim Malian government's request for assistance in suppressing the rebellion to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). On 12 October, the UNSC adopted Resolution No. 2071, authorising ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) to develop a plan for international military intervention in Mali and report back in 45 days. In response, military experts from Africa, the UN and Europe held a week-long meeting in Bamako, where they drew up a preliminary blueprint for the deployment of about 3,000–4,000 troops to recapture north Mali from al Qaeda-linked rebel groups.

## Resolutions to Consider

After a meeting on 11 November 2012, ECOWAS unanimously agreed on an intervention force of 3,300 to retake north Mali from Islamist rebels.

The ECOWAS decision was forwarded to the AU, and the AU Peace and Security Council in turn endorsed the proposed ECOWAS military plan. The AU Peace and Security Council Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra stated at a press conference in Addis Ababa on 13



November 2012 that "it has been decided therefore today in light of all the relevant factors to endorse the harmonised concept of operations for the planned deployment of AFISMA, which is the African Union Led Mission in Support of Mali". The military plan was later presented to the UNSC as mandated by Resolution No. 2071.

In Resolution No. 2085 (adopted on 20 December 2012), the UNSC authorised the deployment of AFISMA to Mali for an initial period of one year. The resolution also urged the transitional authorities of Mali to expeditiously put a credible framework in place for negotiations with all parties in north Mali who have cut off all ties to terrorist organisations. "Due to obvious challenges relating to funding, training, capacity and logistics, and so on, actual deployment was considered practicable as of September or October 2013".

## Countries involved, and regions affected

- Based on President Traoré's request and given the extant approval of UNSC Resolution 2085 for deployment of AFISMA, France deployed its forces in Operation Serval on 11 January 2013 to stop the advance of Islamists group who were intent on invading Bamako. French Mirage and Rafael fighter jets mounted air strikes across a wide belt of Islamist strongholds, from Gao and Kidal in the northeast, near the Algerian border, to the western town of Lere, close to Mauritania (Figure above). France's air and ground assaults on rebel strongholds and outposts have enabled French and Malian forces to retake Konna, Douentza, Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal with hopes of capturing more territories from the Islamists.
- French warplanes dispatched from France and Chad targeted areas within Mali, covering an operational distance of nearly 2,000 kilometres, from east to west. France plans to eventually increase the number of its ground troops to as many as 3700, as it confronts battle-hardened and well-armed Islamist fighters.
- France's speedy intervention was commended by Malians and regional West African leaders. The international community is also forthcoming with financial pledges to help Mali defeat the Islamist rebels. The AU agreed to contribute \$50 million; Japan pledged 120 million; Germany \$20 million; India and China \$1 million each; and the United States \$96 million.
- A West African force composed of troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, and Senegal, are trickling in to join French forces and roll back the Islamist advance and occupation of north Mali. With a dozen African nations (including forces from Chad, Tanzania, South Africa and Rwanda) promising to contribute forces, an estimated 8,000 African troops are expected to eventually take over the mission. The case of Nigeria's contributions (so far about \$34 million, 900 combat soldiers and 300 air force personnel) to resolving the crisis

## Legality of Military Intervention

Military Intervention in Mali has been deemed to be inevitable, but the extent to which it must be conducted is yet to be determined. Following requests from both the Mali government and ECOWAS for foreign military intervention, on 12 October 2012 the United Nations Security Council unanimously, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, passed a French resolution approving an African-led force to assist the army of Mali in combating the Islamist militants. The resolution gave 45 days for "detailed and actionable recommendations" for military intervention which would be drafted by ECOWAS and the African Union, with a figure of 3,000 proposed troops reported. A prior ECOWAS plan had been rejected by diplomats as lacking sufficient detail.

While authorising the planning of force, and dedicating UN resources to this planning, UN Security Council Resolution 2071 does not authorize the deployment of force. However, UN Security Council Resolution 2085, passed on 20 December 2012, "authorizes the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year.

The United Nations Security Council has the power to legally permit Military Intervention under Article 42 of the UN Charter. But Military intervention can also have an adverse effect by escalating the situation and can create a severe humanitarian crisis. It is of utmost importance for the UNSC to coordinate with regional bodies of the African Union such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and propose a detailed plan of action such that the threat of Non state actors are curbed whilst ensuring that fundamental human rights of civilians are not affected.

## QARMA (Questions a Resolution Must Answer)

- 1) Are the previous resolutions addressing the situation in Mali enough to maintain peace and security in the region or must the UN take new approach?
- 2) What approach must the UN take in order to tackle Islamist rebels coordinating with Non State Actors such as the Al Qaeda and the Boko Haram?
- 3) Should a regional body comprising the local states be established for the Sahel region in order to ensure that the provisions of previous resolutions are being implemented? If yes, how will this body function? What will be its structure? Who will it report to?
- 4) Should the UNSC authorize the use of force in Mali? How will it be carried out?
- 5) What steps should the UN take to ensure that Military Intervention does not violate the fundamental human rights of civilians?

6) What steps should the ECOWAS take to help in economic reconstruction of the Sahel region?



## Position Paper Requirements

A Position Paper is the basic stance of the country on an agenda. We expect the position paper to be to the point and accurate. As the EB, we look forward to seeing Position Papers which talk about what each country has to offer, or what their policies or views are. This would be a very crucial part to define your stance since, and hopefully it would add to something that would stand out. We also look favorably upon a few possible solutions to tackle the situation at hand. Keep the font size to 12 and the style should be Times New Roman.

Submit your position papers to [unsc.dipsmun2018@gmail.com](mailto:unsc.dipsmun2018@gmail.com) before 11:59pm on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July. **Delegates failing to submit a position paper will not be eligible for an award.** Requests for an extension should be sent to the members of the Executive Board.

All the best for the three days of conference Delegates. The fate of the international community lies in your hands.