

CSCI 556: Introduction to Cryptography

Homework – 2

1.

$$\begin{aligned}c1 &= m1 \oplus k \\c2 &= m2 \oplus k \\c3 &= m3 \oplus k\end{aligned}$$

If $c1$, $c2$ and $c3$ is known then we can get little info about $m1$, $m2$ and $m3$

$$\begin{aligned}c1 \oplus c2 &= m1 \oplus k \oplus m2 \oplus k \\ \Rightarrow c1 \oplus c2 &= m1 \oplus m2 \quad (\text{because } k \oplus k = 1) \\ \Rightarrow c2 \oplus c3 &= m2 \oplus m3 \quad (\text{because } k \oplus k = 1) \\ \Rightarrow c1 \oplus c3 &= m1 \oplus m3 \quad (\text{because } k \oplus k = 1)\end{aligned}$$

But if Alice gets to know $m1$ then all the information is compromised now. She can easily decode everything with the use of $c1$, $c2$, $c3$ and $m1$. With $c1$ and $m1$, she can get to know about key k and once she knows k , she can easily get to know $m2$ and $m3$ as well.

$$\begin{aligned}c1 \oplus m1 &= m1 \oplus k \oplus m1 \quad (\text{Using } c1 \text{ and } m1) \\ \Rightarrow c1 \oplus m1 &= k \\ c2 \oplus k &= m2 \oplus k \oplus k \quad (\text{Using } c2 \text{ and } k \text{ calculated above}) \\ \Rightarrow c2 \oplus k &= m2 \\ c3 \oplus k &= m3 \oplus k \oplus k \quad (\text{Using } c3 \text{ and } k \text{ calculated above}) \\ \Rightarrow c3 \oplus k &= m3\end{aligned}$$

2. Last two digits of:

- i. $76^{\text{any natural number}}$ is always 76
- ii. 24^{odd} is always 24
- iii. 24^{even} is always 76

$$\begin{aligned}4^{100} &= (2^2)^{100} = 2^{200} \\ &= (2^{10})^{20} \\ &= (24)^{20} \quad (\text{because last two digits of } 2^{10} = 24) \\ &= 76. \quad (\text{according to above facts})\end{aligned}$$

Last two digits of $4^{100} = 76$

3

- i. $f: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$
- ii. $f(\langle a \rangle) = \langle a^2 \bmod N \rangle \parallel \langle a^3 \bmod N \rangle$

- I. Let's consider $\text{term1} = \langle a^2 \bmod N \rangle$ and $\text{term2} = \langle a^3 \bmod N \rangle$.
- II. $f(\langle a \rangle) = \text{term1} \parallel \text{term2}$.
- III. As we can see $f(\langle a \rangle)$ is not random.
- IV. That is, if we compute term1 then we can easily compute term2 by just raising it to $3/2$ or by multiplying it with $\langle a \rangle$ again. This is clearly not random since term2 depends on term1 .
- V. Because of the above reasons, I don't think $f(\langle a \rangle)$ is a pseudo-random generator.

4. $G(x, y) = (x^2 \bmod N, y, b)$ $b = \oplus$ of last bit of x and last bit of y

- I. We know $x^2 \bmod N \Rightarrow$ we know last bit of x
- II. We know last bit of x and we already know $y \Rightarrow$ we know b value
- III. So, b is indeed a hard code bit and it's not random
- IV. Because of above reasons $G(x, y)$ is not a pseudo-random generator

5.

Yes, matrix cipher is vulnerable to plain text attack. Let's say we have a plain-message vector $[x, y]$ and a 2×2 matrix cipher of unknowns along with an encrypted message vector $[p, q]$. The attacker already knows the plain-message vector $[x, y]$ and encrypted message vector $[p, q]$. He only has to decrypt the 2×2 matrix cipher.

$$\begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \\ q \end{bmatrix}$$

If we solve now, we get 2 equations:

$$ax + by = p$$

$$cx + dy = q$$

Attacker already knows x, y, p, q . Only a, b, c, d has to be deduced. Since now the equation has been reduced to linear time or specifically polynomial time, it can be solved by machines. Hence Matrix Cipher is vulnerable to plain-text attack.