

Tempus: Probabilistic Network Latency Verifier

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ABSTRACT

To combat problems and bugs that a given network might have, network verifiers have emerged as one of the promising solutions. State-of-the-art network verifiers mainly focused on evaluating qualitative properties under various scenarios of network failures, such as reachability under k -link failure. However, as modern networks evolved and performance need becomes more stringent – often expressed in terms of Service Level Agreement (SLA) – there is a need to evolve network verifiers to also reason about quantitative performance properties. Works in quantitative network verifiers that has arose in recent years mainly focused on one side of the network performance metric: bandwidth and load violation properties. Questions about the other side of network performance metric, latency, were left unanswered.

In this work, we introduce a verifier framework, Tempus, that can answer the probability of a given temporal property being true given latency distributions of individual links and nodes in the network. Early evaluation shows that Tempus can verify bounded reachability property – the probability that the average delay of packets traversing from a source to destination node is below T time unit – by only adding a fraction of the state exploration overhead introduced by the qualitative verifier it’s built upon.

1 INTRODUCTION

Modern networks consisted of various distributed protocols such as OSPF and BGP that exchange routing information so that a packet can reach their intended destination efficiently, even in the event of a component failure. Due to their configuration intricacies however, these protocols are notoriously hard to get right. It is hard for a network engineer to reason about whether their configured network fulfilled some intended property in various possible states of the network. Thus, they are left between the choice of accepting the reality of Murphy’s Law or getting a tool to help them in this task, namely, network control plane verifier.

Popular control plane verifiers, like ARC [1], are formulated to answer questions about a given property deterministically. In other words, given a set of states of the network (e.g. k -link failures) the verifier are expected to give a yes or no answer about the property (e.g. two nodes are reachable). While useful to some extent, this kind of models are sometimes too restrictive since network operators are usually able to tolerate small fraction of failure. For example, a given network might have an availability SLA of 99.999%.

This kind of probabilistic properties have been the focus of a more recent works like NetDice [2].

The network property itself can also be divided into two kinds. Quantitative properties like reachability and loop existence, are the common properties that are studied by most of the existing verifiers. More recent work, like QARC [3], has also explored qualitative properties like link bandwidth violation for a given traffic.

In this work, we’re exploring the other side of the network performance metric: latency. Certain network deployment often necessitates some latency requirement such as an ISP that has latency SLA [4] or deployments of Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) [5]. We proposed a verification framework to probabilistically verify the latency property of packets traversing from a source to destination node under various failure scenarios, by using latency information of each components in the network.

2 OVERVIEW

To be written

3 ON LATENCY MODELING

3.1 Latency as Path Property

We began our study by first pondering about a basic construct: modeling the end-to-end latency of a single packet. In a packet-switched network, a packet is sent from one transmitting host to one receiving host through the many components of the network (e.g. links, routers, firewall) and each of those components might introduce some latency into the packet transmission process. Figuring out which of those components will actually introduce latency into the packet in question, and by how much, is the next logical step that we must figure out.

Obviously, a given packet doesn’t need to visit all network components to reach its destination host. A network engineer will configure the network in such a way that a packet will only need to be routed via a specific subset of its components. That specific subset is dictated by two things: how those components are connected together (i.e. topology) and how the control plane protocols are configured to route a packet (e.g. routing protocol, ACL). Based on a variety of these setups, nodes in the network will form a forwarding table to route a given packet appropriately.

The goal of a classical control plane verifier then, is to use this forwarding table in some form to verify certain properties. However, looking at the forwarding table alone will

not give us a conclusive result regarding which components are going to be visited by a given packet, making verification of latency properties less clear. For example, the network might be configured with a load-balancing protocol in which a packet departing from a source host might take multiple different *paths* (with certain probability weights) to arrive at the destination host, possibly resulting in a different end-to-end latency measurement.

Therefore, we argue that when it comes to analyzing end-to-end latency, a network path should be the primary unit of reasoning, rather than forwarding table. By being more specific about our unit of reasoning, we could answer verification questions more clearly, and we could design our verifier more efficiently since we could use it to represent multiple different forwarding tables that shares the same path.

3.2 Relation to Classical Verifier

Before we analyze the latency of a given packet that propagates through a certain network path however, we must make sure that said path exists in the first place. We note that latency is a property that only make sense after connectivity between two hosts has been established. In other words, if two nodes in a network aren't even functionally connected (e.g. physical link failure, ACL policy), then the latency between them will *always* be infinite, making the verification task trivial.

Fortunately, there are a rich body of work in the network verification literature regarding functional reachability under failure. We could then design our verifier on top of an existing classical control plane verifier. We use it to verify reachability property, and only if the reachability property is fulfilled, we would verify whether the latency between two hosts fulfilled some additional condition.

3.3 Path Latency Distribution

Up to this point, we have talked about measuring the latency of a single packet by figuring out its path; analyzing which exact components it has traversed through. However, when we try to generalize this framework and ask questions about the latency of multiple packets, it is apparent that the path alone is not a determinative information, as the latency of two packets propagating through the same path might be different due to a multitude of factors.

The natural extension to the framework then, is instead of representing latency of a path with a single number, we instead represent it with a continuous random variable that signifies the possible delay that a given packet traversing through that path might have. This random variable will have a distribution that marginalizes over all other factors other than the path.

We can then use this latency distribution to verify some temporal properties in a probabilistic manner. For example, we could verify the probability that a packet will be delivered in under a time unit by taking the CDF of the distribution.

3.4 Path Decomposition and Convolution

The final question that we had to decide on was how do we actually model path latency distribution based on real component measurements. Considering the complexity of factors that might determine the path latency distribution and the availability of measurement data, we settle on the assumption that the path latency distribution is composed of multiple independent distribution that corresponds to the latency each components in the path might introduce.

Since not all components in the path will introduce latency with a non-negligible value, we specifically choose to model two source of latency in the path's components which we deem significant: **link propagation latency** and **queuing latency**.

Propagation delay is the latency that is introduced by the links in the network, which is independent of the traffic load in the system. Queuing delay is the latency that the queuing process in the node introduced. Unlike propagation delay, queuing delay might be dependent on load in the system, since the more packets there are in the queue, the more delay the node will introduce to a subsequent packets.

For propagation delay, the semantic of this random variable is relatively straightforward: it is the distribution of latency that a given link will introduce. For queuing delay however, this random variable represents the delay that a given queuing process will introduce, marginalized over various traffic pattern that a given network state might have resulted.

In order to obtain the overall path latency distribution from these per-component latency distributions, we do a convolution operations over all the relevant component's latency distributions. Since not all distributions can be convolved in a closed-form fashion, we use a numerical convolution technique with a guaranteed error bound. We initially consider a Monte-Carlo simulation in order to approach numerical convolution, but the lack of a general technique to measure error made us opt for the formerly mentioned method.

4 ENCODING

We divide the problem of latency verification into two parts: verifying that two nodes are reachable (*functional* property) and only if the functional property is fulfilled, we would verify whether the latency between two nodes fulfilled some additional condition (*temporal* property).

4.1 Topology Graph

For functional property verification, NetDice [2] has laid the way for verifying reachability between two nodes under failure in a probabilistic and efficient manner. In this framework, the physical network is encoded in an edge-labeled directed graph $G_t = (V_t, E_t)$ where V_t represents the nodes in the network and E_t represents the functional connectivity between a source and a destination node. A physical link is then represented as a pair of symmetrical edges that shares the same source and destination node but with opposite direction (e.g. $v_1 \rightarrow v_2$ and $v_2 \rightarrow v_1$).

To represent the component's random failure, NetDice defined two failure rates. The first failure rate is the chance that a given physical link in the network will go down. The second failure rate is the chance that a given node in the network will go down. These rates are shared between all links / nodes in the network. Internally however, the node failure rate will be translated into the link failure rate with a Bayesian Network model, since a node failure can be modeled with the failure of each links connected to it.

We refine NetDice's model slightly by allowing each links to have different failure rate. We label each edge in E_t with a function $r : E_t \rightarrow \{x \in \mathbb{R} \mid 0 \leq x \leq 1\}$ that represents the failure rate of a given physical link. As a consequence, two symmetrical edges (i.e. two edges that shares the same node pairs but with opposite direction) will also share the same failure rate, and will be disabled in a coupled fashion.

4.2 Routing

On top of this topology, NetDice also defined additional informations that would be used by a routing protocol to determine the valid path(s) between two nodes $src, dst \in V_t$ given a particular link failure scenario. These routing informations would also be used by their optimization algorithms to reduce the amount of states that are going to be explored.

NetDice implemented iBGP and OSPF (with ECMP) routing protocols. They encode the relevant routing information by assigning some labels to the vertices or edges in the topology. In OSPF for example, we define a function $w_{ospf} : E_t \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as the edge-label that represents the positive weight of a link. They would later be used to compute the convergent paths of a given network state (5).

4.3 Latency Label

Similarly, we could also use this edge-labeling technique to represent latency. As mentioned in 3.4, our model will encode two kinds of latency: link propagation and queuing in the node. We will encode these latencies by equipping the model with two additional labels.

Encoding link propagation latency is fairly straightforward. We define a function $l_p : E_t \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$ where \mathcal{D} is a set

of continuous univariate distribution that has a minimum value of 0. This distribution signifies the time it would take for the respective physical link to transmit a packet from one end to another. Because of this, just like r , two symmetrical edges will share the same distribution.

To encode node queuing latency, we first note that the queuing mechanism in modern switches usually resides on the output port. Since a port in a switch is only connected to one other port, we could effectively assign the latency to the connectivity between switches. To do this, we define a function $l_q : E_t \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$ where \mathcal{D} . Unlike l_p however, two symmetrical edges will have different distribution since they represent two different output queues.

5 VERIFICATION

From a labeled graph that encodes a given network, we will then do functional verification and temporal verification in the following way:

5.1 Functional Verification

For functional verification, we will essentially do the exploration technique employed by NetDice. However, we made some modifications to the algorithm in order for it to remember and pass necessary informations to the next stage, which is the temporal verification. We will describe the high-level description of NetDice's algorithm in light of our modification as follows:

5.1.1 Network State. Let a network state s_i be defined as a 2-tuple (U, D) where U is a set of links that are alive / up and D is a set of links that are dead / down. We then define a set S that represents all possible network states in a given topology. Our goal is to identify a subset of S where each element is a network state that can connect the source and destination node given a convergent behavior of a routing protocol.

This framework fits nicely with the framework of probability theory, where S represents the sample space and the power set of S represents the possible events, one of which is the one we care about: the event that a packet from a source node can reach a destination node. The way we assign probability to events is to simply do a summation over the product of all the failure and success rate of each links in the network state.

The straightforward and naive way to compute the probability of this event is to iterate over all the network state. We then determine whether that network state can fulfill said property and which path it will take. If yes, then we would compute the probability from the product of the link's failure and success rate, and add it to the running sum. If no, then we could skip the computation altogether.

While natural, this brute-force algorithm obviously doesn't scale since it will take $2^{|E_i|}$ iterations.

5.1.2 Super-state. NetDice [2] solves this issue by noticing that we could prune over some states that are guaranteed not to change the convergent paths of the current network state, by marginalizing over *cold edges*. Said another way, we could merge multiple network states into a single super-state that shares the same convergent paths.

In NetDice, we start from a perfect network state (i.e. $s_i = (U, D)$ where $D = \emptyset$). We then determine whether that network state can fulfill said property and which path it will take, similar to the brute-force method. If no, then it is safe to say that the source node can never reach the destination node in all network state. If yes, then we could use the logic of the routing protocol to determine the set of cold edges, (i.e. edges whose failure won't change the convergent paths). Edges that are not part of this set is called *hot edges* $h_i = (U, D)$. Instead of using s_i to compute the probability of the current state, NetDice only use the set of hot edges to compute the probability of them being alive ($h_i = (U, D)$ where $D = \emptyset$). This in effect computes the probability of multiple network state at once.

Next, instead of examining other network state at random, we instead iterate over the links in h_i . By definition, if we fail a link that belongs to h_i , then the convergent paths will change. To cover all of those possibilities efficiently, NetDice iterate over all the links in h_i , disabled them, re-enabled them, and move to the next edge to do the same. If $h_i = ((e_1, e_2, \dots, e_j), \emptyset)$, then we would enqueue $(\emptyset, (e_1))$, $((e_1), (e_2))$, $((e_1, e_2), (e_3))$, ..., $((e_1, e_2, \dots, e_{j-1}), (e_j))$. Thus, instead of exploring 2^j events, we will enqueue j events instead.

NetDice's exploration will effectively form a tree, where each level of the tree represents how many links we will explicitly put down. The root is the event where we have empty hot edges, and the leaves are where the hot edges are full.

5.1.3 Convergent Paths. Remember instead of discarded

5.1.4 State and Functional Path Probability. State

5.2 Temporal Verification

Since we assign each links and output queue in the network with a certain latency distribution, computing the probability of the temporal property involves convolving the the paths we got from functional verification and measuring the statistical property of the resulting distribution. However, while NetDice has shrunk the exploration space compared to brute-force iteration, for the purpose of temporal verification, further optimization can be done.

5.2.1 Mega-state. The first is what we call **hot-edges union**. The idea is, while each hot-edges events has the same convergent paths, it is not guaranteed to be unique. Two or more of these events can have the same convergent paths. Therefore, we could merge these two events and compute the convolution for a given path once.

5.2.2 Path Memoization.

6 EVALUATION

6.1 Scalability




Figure 1: States explored for temporal verification and functional verification

6.1.1 States Explored.




Figure 2: Time took for temporal verification

6.1.2 Wall-clock Time.

6.2 Optimization Effectiveness

7 RELATED WORKS

8 FUTURE WORKS

9 CONCLUSION

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