

On the use of trusted nodes for Byzantine fault tolerant peer sampling protocols





Augusta Mukam, Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix, Laurent Réveillère augusta.mukam@u-bordeaux.fr, joachim.bruneau-queyreix@u-bordeaux.fr, laurent.reveillere@u-bordeaux.fr



Univ. Bordeaux, CNRS, Bordeaux INP, LaBRI, UMR5800, F-33400 Talence, France

Introduction - Problem

- Most distributed systems use gossip peer sampling protocols for information dissemination in which nodes periodically build and refresh their local views of the evolving system which is a partial knowledge of the full membership.
- ▶ But an attacker controlling some nodes may aim at partitioning the network or being over-representated in the views of correct nodes to gain impact in the upper-layer protocols of the system.
- ► So, How to have Less biased views for correct nodes?

Known Byzantine Fault Tolerant Protocols in peer sampling

Let us consider a system of n active nodes with a fraction f < 1 of faulty nodes. We define some metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art protocols: Resilience, Time to discovery, Time to view stability.

▶ Brahms [1]

- ▶ It is one of the most Byzantine resilient protocol,
- 1. Contribution of push and pull and use of Limited pushes
- 2. Attack detection and blocking
- 3. History sampling




Figure 1:Brahms view update

 \triangleright Resilience of 81% when the system is composed of f=18% .

Now we add a proportion t>1 of trusted nodes (running using TEE devices) inside the system.

► Raptee [2]

- ▶ Raptee relies on different solutions on top of Brahms summarized in Fig2:
 - 1. Mutual authentication and Trusted communication
- 2. Byzantine eviction
- 3. When f=10%, we have resilience improvement of 17% and t=1% .




Figure 2:Overview of the RAPTEE protocol

► Knowledge Free One pass Strategy [3]

- 1. Sampling memory, Insertion and removal probabilities
- 2. Count Min Sketch: A memory constant data structure matrix built on the fly which provides an approximation of the number of times a node appeared in the stream




Figure 3:Sampling component of a node

Experimentation Work

- ► Implementation of Brahms, Raptee and Count Min Sketch
- ► Evalutation: Reproductibility of results




Figure 4: Resilience improvement of Raptee on Brahms

Ongoing work: Use of Count Min Sketch

- ► The purpose is to accelerate mutual decontamination of streams passing througth trusted nodes
- ► The idea is to merge the Count Min Sketch od trusted nodes during a trusted communication so that the will get more knowledge of the system



Figure 5:Use of Count Min sketch to unbias a stream



Figure 6: Merging Count Min Sketch

References

- [1] E. Bortnikov et al, "Brahms: Byzantine resilient random membership sampling," Computer Networks, 2009.
- [2] M. Pigaglio et al, "RAPTEE: Leveraging trusted execution environments for Byzantine-tolerant peer sampling services," IEEE 2022
- [3] Emmanuelle Anceaume et al, "Uniform Node Sampling Service Robust against Collusions of Malicious Nodes. 43rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks DSN 2013

Compas'23 System