





AUPE:


Collaborative Byzantine fault-tolerant peer-sampling

NCA'24

Augusta Mukam, Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix, Laurent Réveillère


Large scale distributed systems

No central tracking for peer discovery



Large scale distributed systems


- No central tracking for peer discovery
- Gossip-based peer sampling
 - Aim: Maintain knowledge of active nodes
 - For selecting and providing random & uniform samples of identifiers (IDs)






Gossip-based peer sampling service

• Each node has a local **View**




Gossip-based peer sampling service

- Each node has a local **View**
- Periodically:
 - Exchange Push and Pull requests 0
 - Update view




Gossip-based peer sampling service


- Each node has a local **View**
- Periodically:
 - Exchange **Push** and **Pull** requests
 - Update view
- Global network connectivity



- Group of malicious/Byzantine nodes
- Promote nodes within their member group




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- Promote nodes within their member group
- Increase their representation in honest nodes views




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
Eg: Bitcoin Eclipse attack

- Corrupted version of blockchain
- Manipulate their tokens



- Group of malicious/Byzantine nodes
- Promote nodes within their member group
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Fault-detection

- Identify malicious nodes based on misbehavior proofs
- Punish faulty nodes
- Lead to major disruption

- Tolerate malicious nodes
- Prevent them from polluting the system

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- Brahms, extension Basalt

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Brahms

f=26% malicious nodes

77% malicious IDs in honest node views

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Brahms

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Basalt


Better than Brahms for f < 20%

Results get worse rapidly

BRAHMS overview

Gossip component

- Handle push/pull requests
- View update




BRAHMS overview

Gossip component

- Share knowledge
- View update


Sampling component

• Uniform sample of seen nodes



Motivation

- → Received streams of identifiers are source of bias
- → Mitigate Byzantine over representation




AUPE Protocol

- Based on BRAHMS components
- **AUPE Set Cleaner**



Produces less biased streams




Dynamic View

AUPE Protocol

- Based on BRAHMS components
- AUPE Set Cleaner



- Produces less biased streams
- AUPE Secret Collaborative debiasing
 - Enhance the local debiasing mechanism





Tracking component

Record occurrences of received IDs in a tracking data-structure



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Tracking data-structure

Key-value store

- Give real occurrences
- Same size as the system


Count-min-sketches

- Probabilistic data-structure
- Give estimate occurrences
- Fixed-size



Tracking component

Record occurrences of received IDs in a tracking data-structure



Occurrence of node i (real or estimated): Occ.



Debiasing component

- Transforms received stream to a more uniform one
- Probability of inserting into sample memory

Probability of insertion of ID i: P. Minimum of all occurrences: min

$$p_i = rac{min}{Occ_i}$$



Debiasing component

- Transforms received stream to a more uniform one
- Probability of inserting into sample memory
- Sample memory IDs form the output stream


Probability of insertion of ID i: P. Minimum of all occurrences: min

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AUPE Set Cleaner > review




- Choose infrequent IDs more often
- Improve correct node tolerance to malicious over-representation



AUPE Set Cleaner > review



- Choose infrequent IDs more often
- Improve correct node tolerance to malicious over-representation



Increase of Brahms tolerance by up to 60%




- System is equipped with **Trusted nodes**
 - Based on TEE technology: authenticity of the code
 - Secure mutual authentication to recognize trusted peers



- System is equipped with **Trusted nodes**
 - Based on TEE technology: authenticity of the code
 - Secure mutual authentication to recognize trusted peers
- **Exchange** and **merge** their tracking components
- Enhance the debiasing mechanism of the Set Cleaner



- Merge +: Aggregate two tracking components
 - Average computation of each corresponding entries





- Merge +: Aggregate two tracking components
 - Average computation of each corresponding entries
- Trusted peer list
 - M last known trusted peer IDs to recontact

Evaluation questions

- To what extent does Aupe-simple (without Merge) improve the tolerance?
- What is the impact of the secret collaborative debiasing?
- Compare to Brahms, Basalt

Experimental evaluation

Metric

- Resilience: proportion of Byzantine IDs in honest node views at last round
- Optimal Case: system resilience is equal to system proportion of Byzantine nodes


Experimental evaluation

Parameters

- System size **N**=10,000
- Fraction **f** of faulty nodes
- Fraction t of trusted nodes
- Tracking component : Key-value store


System Tolerance improvement

Aupe-simple




System Tolerance improvement


Aupe-simple



View parts tolerance improvement

Aupe-simple






View' Pull part

Collaborative debiasing

Aupe with t=10%, 20% and 30%

• Good impact of collaborative debiasing



Conclusion

• AUPE





- The first peer sampling that utilizes Collaborative trusted debiasing to achieve Byzantine-tolerance
- Near-perfect resilience
 - Even with adversary controlling **26%** of nodes

Conclusion

• AUPE





- The first peer sampling that utilizes **Collaborative trusted debiasing** to achieve Byzantine-tolerance
- Near-perfect resilience
 - Even with adversary controlling **26%** of nodes
- Study trusted node re-identification attack







AUPE:

Collaborative Byzantine fault-tolerant peer-sampling

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References

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- A. Auvolat, Y.-D. Bromberg, D. Frey, D. Mvondo, and F. Taïani, "Basalt: A rock-solid byzantine-tolerant peer sampling for very large decentralized networks," in Proceedings of the 24th International Middleware Conference, ser. Middleware '23. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023, p. 111–123.