

Car Hacking 101

HOW TO GET STARTED IN AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY ?
A SOFTWARE ENGINEER'S PERSPECTIVE.

BY DJNN

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whoami

DJNN --- [HTTPS://DJNN.SH/ABOUT](https://djnn.sh/about)

- CS student from France interested in Cybersecurity
- Mostly interested back-end / systems stuff
- C, Golang, Python, Haskell, Elixir (struggling at learning Rust)
- Not a lot of experience with hardware

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Presentation Overview

Attack surface overview

Overview of the different attack surfaces we can find in a car, along with a brief overview of the history of the automotive cybersecurity landscape.

How to get started ?


What kind of tooling do you need to get started ? Where to look first ? Description of the main protocols used in automotive systems.

Tips and tricks


Where do you get information regarding Car systems ?
How can you perform attacks.
Overview of the last important CVEs you should be looking at.

Catching up...


- car alarms & security systems have been around since 1920s
- mostly mechanical until end of 1990s
- automotive security for OEMs wasn't a thing until 2015



Attack surfaces



CAR PROTOCOLS (CAN / CAN-FD)



- Referred to as CAN bus
- Designed by Bosch about 50 years ago
- Very reliable and flexible
- No authentication required to listen on the bus
- Efforts done recently to encrypt messages using SecOc (Secure On-Board Communications)


```
1  #!/bin/python3
1
2 import can
3
4 bus = can.Bus() : Bus
5 while True:
6     msg = can.Message(12, data=[0 for _ in range(8)]) : Message
7     bus.send(msg)
```

CAR PROTOCOLS (UDS)

UDS service identifiers (SDIs)

UDS SID (request)	UDS SID (response)	Service	Details
Diagnostic and Communications Management	0x10	Diagnostic Session Control	Control which UDS services are available
	0x11	ECU Reset	Reset the ECU ("hard reset", "key off", "soft reset")
	0x27	Security Access	Enable use of security-critical services via authentication
	0x28	Communication Control	Turn sending/receiving of messages on/off in the ECU
	0x29	Authentication	Enable more advanced authentication vs. 0x27 (PKI based exchange)
	0x3E	Tester Present	Send a "heartbeat" periodically to remain in the current session
	0x83	Access Timing Parameters	View/modify timing parameters used in client/server communication
	0x84	Secured Data Transmission	Send encrypted data via ISO 15764 (Extended Data Link Security)
	0x85	Control DTC Settings	Enable/disable detection of errors (e.g. used during diagnostics)
	0x86	Response On Event	Request that an ECU processes a service request if an event happens
Data Transmission	0x87	Link Control	Set the baud rate for diagnostic access
	0x22	Read Data By Identifier	Read data from targeted ECU - e.g. VIN, sensor data values etc.
	0x23	Read Memory By Address	Read data from physical memory (e.g. to understand software behavior)
	0x24	Read Scaling Data By Identifier	Read information about how to scale data identifiers
	0x2A	Read Data By Identifier Periodic	Request ECU to broadcast sensor data at slow/medium/fast/stop rate
	0x2C	Dynamically Define Data Identifier	Define data parameter for use in 0x22 or 0x2A dynamically
	0x2E	Write Data By Identifier	Program specific variables determined by data parameters
DTCs	0x3D	Write Memory By Address	Write information to the ECU's memory
	0x14	Clear Diagnostic Information	Delete stored DTCs
	0x19	Read DTC Information	Read stored DTCs, as well as related information
	0x2F	Input Output Control By Identifier	Gain control over ECU analog/digital inputs/outputs
Upload/ Download	0x31	Routine Control	Initiate/stop routines (e.g. self-testing, erasing of flash memory)
	0x34	Request Download	Start request to add software/data to ECU (incl. location/size)
	0x35	Request Upload	Start request to read software/data from ECU (incl. location/size)
	0x36	Transfer Data	Perform actual transfer of data following use of 0x74/0x75
	0x37	Request Transfer Exit	Stop the transfer of data
	0x38	Request File Transfer	Perform a file download/upload to/from the ECU
	0x7F	Negative Response	Sent with a Negative Response Code when a request cannot be handled

CAR PROTOCOLS (XCP)



- Mostly useful for debugging and calibrations
- Usually password-protected
- allows for arbitrary memory-read


SUPPLY CHAIN

Firmware can be delivered
OTA (over the air)
or by aftermarket repair shops

-> OTA support depends a lot on
OEMs



HARDWARE ATTACKS (TLDR)



GETTING STARTED

Enterprise-level



- can simulate a whole car
- supports all types of protocols (XCP, CAN/CAN-FD, Flexray, UDS)
- Fully integrated suite
- Ultra-mega expansive

Researcher tooling




- can range from very cheap, to a bit expansive
- Usually only support CAN/CAN-FD
- Some can communicate wirelessly
- Cannot do RF stuff

- > Supported since Linux 4.5
- > no dependencies required ! (though can-utils is a useful package)
- > Support for CAN-FD is available through additional configuration

All you need is Python and any type of connector to get started

(Metasploit actually has some Car hacking modules but I have not tried them)



The screenshot shows the Python-can 4.1.0 documentation page. The header includes the title "python-can 4.1.0 documentation" and a search bar. The main content area features a large heading "python-can" and a brief description: "The **python-can** library provides Controller Area Network support for [Python](#), providing common abstractions to different hardware devices, and a suite of utilities for sending and receiving messages on a CAN bus." Below this, there's a section titled "python-can runs anywhere" followed by a list of example uses.

The sidebar on the left contains a navigation menu with the following items:

- Search
- Installation
- Configuration
- Library API
- Hardware Interfaces
- Virtual Interfaces
- Plugin Interface
- Scripts
- Developer's Overview
- History

```
~ sudo apt install can-utils
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree... Done
Reading state information... Done
can-utils is already the newest version (2020.11.0-1).
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
~ sudo modprobe vcan
~ sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan
~ sudo ip link set up vcan0
```

CAN databases

Each OEM uses different message and checksum algorithms, which are often stored in CAN *databases*

Most common formats are *.dbc*, *.REF*

Depending on models, you can find some that have already been reverse-engineered

```
SG_ CR_Yrs_LongAc : 0|16@1+ (0.000127465,-4.17677312) [-4.17677312|4.17651819] "g" CGW,iBAU
BO_ 1173 YRS13: 8 ACU
SG_ YRS_SerialNo : 16|48@1+ (1,0) [0|281474976710655] "" iBAU

BO_ 870 EMS_366: 8 EMS
SG_ TQI_1 : 0|8@1+ (0.390625,0) [0|99.6094] "%" MDPS
SG_ N : 8|16@1+ (0.25,0.0) [0.0|16383.75] "rpm" MDPS
SG_ TQI_2 : 24|8@1+ (0.390625,0) [0|99.6094] "%" MDPS
SG_ VS : 40|8@1+ (1,0) [0|255] "km/h" MDPS
SG_ SWI_IGK : 48|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" XXX

BO_ 854 M_356: 8 XXX
SG_ PAINT1 : 32|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" XXX
SG_ PAINT2 : 34|2@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" XXX
SG_ PAINT3 : 36|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" XXX
SG_ PAINT4 : 38|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" XXX


BO_ 1042 ICM_412h: 8 ICM
SG_ T_Outside_input : 0|9@0+ (0.01,0) [0|5] "V" Vector__XXX
SG_ WarningSoundOutput_1Group : 5|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ WarningSoundOutput_2Group : 6|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ WarningSoundOutput_3Group : 7|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ TRIP_A_DT_Display_clock : 22|7@0+ (1,0) [0|99] "clock" Vector__XXX
SG_ TRIP_A_DT_Display_minute : 29|6@0+ (1,0) [0|59] "minute" Vector__XXX
SG_ TRIP_B_DT_Display_clock : 38|7@0+ (1,0) [0|99] "clock" Vector__XXX
SG_ TRIP_B_DT_Display_minute : 45|6@0+ (1,0) [0|59] "minute" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_1Level : 48|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_2Level : 49|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_3Level : 50|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_4Level : 51|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_5Level : 52|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_6Level : 53|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_7Level : 54|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX
SG_ PopupMessageOutput_8Level : 55|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" Vector__XXX

BO_ 1348 Navi_HU: 8 XXX
SG_ SpeedLim_Nav_Clu : 7|8@0+ (1,0) [0|255] "" XXX

CM_ "BO_ E_EMS11: All (plug-in) hybrids use this gas signal: CR_Vcu_AccPedDep_Pos, and all EVs use the Accel_Pedal_Pos signal. See hyundai/values.py for a specific car list";
CM_ SG_ 1348 SpeedLim_Nav_Clu "Speed limit displayed on Nav, Cluster and HUD";

VAL_ 274 CUR_GR 1 "D" 2 "D" 3 "D" 4 "D" 5 "D" 6 "D" 7 "D" 8 "D" 14 "R" 0 "P";
VAL_ 871 CF_Lvr_Gear 12 "T" 5 "D" 8 "S" 6 "N" 7 "R" 0 "P";
VAL_ 882 Elect_Gear_Shifter 5 "D" 8 "S" 6 "N" 7 "R" 0 "P";
VAL_ 905 ACCMode 0 "off" 1 "enabled" 2 "driver_override" 3 "off_maybe_fault" 4 "cancelled";
VAL_ 909 CF_VSM_Warn 2 "FCW" 3 "AEB";
VAL_ 916 ACCEnable 0 "SCC ready" 1 "SCC temp fault" 2 "SCC permanent fault" 3 "SCC permanent fault, communication issue";
VAL_ 1057 ACCMode 0 "off" 1 "enabled" 2 "driver_override" 3 "off_maybe_fault";
VAL_ 1157 HDA_Icon_State 0 "no_hda" 1 "white_hda" 2 "green_hda";
VAL_ 1157 LFA_SysWarning 0 "no_message" 1 "switching_to_hda" 2 "switching_to_scc" 3 "lfa_error" 4 "check_hda" 5 "keep_hands_on_wheel_orange" 6 "keep_hands_on_wheel_red";
VAL_ 1157 LFA_Icon_State 0 "no_wheel" 1 "white_wheel" 2 "green_wheel" 3 "green_wheel_blink";
VAL_ 1157 HDA_SysWarning 0 "no_message" 1 "driving_convenience_systems_cancelled" 2 "highway_drive_assist_system_cancelled";
VAL_ 1322 CF_Clu_Gear 1 "P" 2 "R" 4 "N" 8 "D";
```

SOFTWARE ATTACKS



```
> python3 cc.py -i can3 uds_fuzz seed_randomness_fuzzer
-----
CARING CARIBOU v0.3
-----
Loaded module 'uds_fuzz'


usage: cc.py uds_fuzz seed_randomness_fuzzer [-h] [-t ITERATIONS] [-r RTYPE] [-id RTYPE]
                                              [-m RMETHOD] [-d D]
                                              stype src dst
cc.py uds_fuzz seed_randomness_fuzzer: error: the following arguments are required: stype, src, dst
```

Good write-ups

- Tesla Synacktiv Pwn2Own: https://www.synacktiv.com/sites/default/files/2022-10/tesla_hexacon.pdf
- Another Zero-click Tesla RCE: <https://kunnamon.io/tbone/tbone-v1.0-redacted.pdf>
- Tales of a former Tesla employee: <https://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3862643&userid=0&perpage=40&pagenumber=62>
- How I hacked my car: <https://programmingwithstyle.com/posts/howihackedmycar/>
- Defcon 28 Car Hacking Village: <https://www.carhackingvillage.com/defcon28talks>
- Honda / Nissan car hacking write-up: <https://twitter.com/samwcyo/status/1597792097175674880>

Reverse-engineering

From experience, IDA is the best decompiler for CAR firmware because it supports many architectures out of the box



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the assembly decompiler view. The code is written in a syntax similar to ARM assembly, with labels like 'seg008:431E' and various instructions such as bclr, bset, bfld1, mov, add, cmp, jmpr, sub, and extr. The comments next to the instructions provide descriptions of the operations, such as 'Bit Clear', 'Bit Set', and 'Bit Field'. The interface includes scroll bars on the right and bottom, and navigation buttons at the bottom left.

```
seg008:431E 8E E0          bclr  P2.8           ; Bit Clear
seg008:4320 8F E1          bset  DP2.8           ; Bit Set
seg008:4322 0A C4 FF 66    bfld1 CC8IC, #66h, #0FFh ; 'F' ; Bit Field
seg008:4326 8F E0          bset  P2.8           ; Bit Set
seg008:4328 F2 F4 52 FE    mov   r4, T1          ; Move Word
seg008:432C 00 4D          add   r4, r13         ; Integer Addition
seg008:432E F6 F4 90 FE    mov   CC8, r4         ; Move Word
seg008:4332 0A AB 0F 00    bfld1 CCM2, #0Dh, #0Fh  ; Bit Field Low Byt
seg008:4336 46 FD 00 80    cmp   r13, #8000h      ; Integer Compare
seg008:433A 9D 6A          jmpr cc_NC, loc_D000_4410 ; Relative Cond
seg008:433C F2 F4 52 FE    mov   r4, T1          ; Move Word
seg008:4340 22 F4 90 FE    sub   r4, CC8          ; Integer Subtractio
seg008:4344 46 F4 FF 7F    cmp   r4, #7FFFh      ; Integer Compare
seg008:4348 ED 63          jmpr cc_UGT, loc_D000_4410 ; Relative Con
seg008:434A 0A AB 0F 00    bfld1 CCM2, #0, #0Fh   ; Bit Field Low Byte
seg008:434E 8E E0          bclr  P2.8           ; Bit Clear
seg008:4350 DB 00          rets              ; Return from Inter-
seg008:4352                 ; -----
seg008:4352 0A C7 FF 00    bfld1 CC11IC, #0, #0FFh ; Bit Field Low By
seg008:4356 1A AB 00 F0    bfldh CCM2, #0F0h, #0 ; 'E' ; Bit Field Hi
seg008:435A D1 80          extr   #1             ; Begin Extended Reg
seg008:435C BE E1          bclr  ODP2.11        ; Bit Clear
seg008:435E BE E0          bclr  P2.11          ; Bit Clear
seg008:4360 BF E1          bset  DP2.11          ; Bit Set
```

Threat intelligence

Lot of RE efforts available online for big OEMs, you just have to look for them! :

Example: <https://github.com/ludwig-v/psa-nac-firmware-reverse-engineering>

Interesting projects

Libraries: Scapy, python-can, python cantools

Software projects: comma-ai, Wireshark, CaringCaribou, CANToolZ

Documentation: CAN-utils, OpenDBC, OpenVehicles



Thank you

GET IN TOUCH

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