

# Attack Design for Continuous and Discrete Systems

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## Constructing Continuous Time $\Delta(s)$

To design such an attack for continuous time systems we follow attack design methods from MIT Open Courseware. [?]

### Proof

Assume that  $G(s)$  is stable. In order to create a feasible attack we need to create  $\Delta(s)$  satisfying:

- $\Delta(s)$  is a viable transfer function (Matrix of rational functions)
- Stable (poles are negative)
- $\|\Delta(j\omega_0)G(j\omega_0)\|_2 = 1$  for some  $j\omega_0$

Fix  $j\omega_0$ . We construct  $\Delta(j\omega_0)$  by taking the singular value decomposition of  $G(j\omega_0) = U\Sigma V^*$  where  $*$  denotes conjugate transpose. Set

$$\Delta(j\omega_0) = V \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_1} & & \\ & 0 & \\ & & \ddots \end{bmatrix} U^*$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
\|\Delta(j\omega_0)G(j\omega_0)\|_2 &= \|V \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_1} & & \\ & 0 & \\ & & \ddots \end{bmatrix} U^* U \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1 & & \\ & \sigma_2 & \\ & & \ddots \end{bmatrix} V^*\|_2 \\
&= \|V \begin{bmatrix} 1 & & \\ & 0 & \\ & & \ddots \end{bmatrix} V^*\|_2 \\
&= 1
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, at  $s = j\omega_0$ ,  $\Delta(j\omega_0)$  will destabilize  $G(j\omega_0)$ .

We know the value of  $\Delta(s)$  at  $s = j\omega_0$  but we need to define  $\Delta(s)$  for all  $s$ . We have that

$$\Delta(j\omega_0) = V \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\sigma_1} & & \\ & 0 & \\ & & \ddots \end{bmatrix} U^* = \frac{1}{\sigma_1} v_1 u_1^* = \frac{1}{\sigma_1} \begin{bmatrix} r_1 e^{j\theta_1} \\ \vdots \\ r_n e^{j\theta_n} \end{bmatrix} [\rho_1 e^{j\phi_1} \cdots \rho_n e^{j\phi_n}]$$

when the entries of  $v_1$  and  $u_1^*$  are written in polar form. Define

$$\Delta(s) = \frac{1}{\sigma_1} \begin{bmatrix} r_1 f_1(s) \\ \vdots \\ r_n f_n(s) \end{bmatrix} [\rho_1 g_1(s) \cdots \rho_n g_n(s)]$$

with appropriate functions  $f_i(s)$  and  $g_i(s)$ .

## Continuous Time Entry Functions

Each  $f_i(s)$  and  $g_i(s)$  must have the following properties:

1.  $f_i(j\omega_0) = e^{j\theta_i}$  and  $g_i(j\omega_0) = e^{j\phi_i}$

2. The poles of  $f_i$  and  $g_i$  are negative
3. Each  $f_i$  and  $g_i$  is unitary
4. Each  $f_i$  and  $g_i$  is a rational polynomial

Therefore, if appropriate functions are used,  $\Delta(s)$  will be a minimal destabilizing attack. An obvious choice is

$$f_i(s) = e^{j\theta_i}$$

a constant function. The function has no poles, is unitary and is a polynomial of degree zero. Another option is the all-pass filter:

$$f_i(s) = \pm \frac{s - \alpha_i}{s + \alpha_i}$$

By adjusting the sign of the function, we can solve for a positive real  $\alpha_i$  such that  $\frac{j\omega_0 - \alpha_i}{j\omega_0 + \alpha_i} = e^{j\theta_i}$  for any  $\theta_i \in [0, \pi]$  and  $-\frac{j\omega_0 - \alpha_i}{j\omega_0 + \alpha_i} = e^{j\theta_i}$  for any  $\theta_i \in [0, -\pi]$ .

Finding the appropriate  $\alpha_i$  parameter is accomplished by solving the equation

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{j\omega_0 - \alpha_i}{j\omega_0 + \alpha_i} &= e^{j\theta_i} \\ \alpha_i &= j\omega_0 \frac{1 - e^{j\theta_i}}{1 + e^{j\theta_i}} \end{aligned}$$

By adjusting the sign of the function, we can solve for a positive  $\alpha_i$ , ensuring that the function's pole is negative. Furthermore, observe that for any  $\omega$  and any  $\alpha$ ,

$$\left\| \frac{j\omega - \alpha}{j\omega + \alpha} \right\| = 1$$

Thus the function is unitary and satisfies all requirements for creating a viable  $\Delta(s)$ . ■

These two examples of functions work to destabilize  $G$ , but other functions may work as well. Additionally, our SVD based construction of  $\Delta(j\omega_0)$  is

not the only construction that works. For example,

$$\Delta(j\omega_0) = \frac{G^*(j\omega_0)}{\|G(j\omega_0)\|^2}$$

also works.

### **Proof**

Let  $G(s)$  be given. Fix  $j\omega_0$ . From spectral theory, have that given a complex valued matrix  $A$ , the maximum eigenvalue of  $A^*A$  is equal to  $\|A\|^2$ . Furthermore,  $\|A^*A\| = \|A\|^2$ . We apply this to our attack design by setting

$$\Delta(j\omega_0) = \frac{1}{\|G(j\omega_0)\|^2} G^*(j\omega_0)$$

This produces

$$\|\Delta(j\omega_0)G(j\omega_0)\| = \frac{1}{\|G(j\omega_0)\|^2} \|G^*(j\omega_0)G(j\omega_0)\| = 1$$

with

$$\|\Delta(j\omega_0)\| = \frac{1}{\|G(j\omega_0)\|}.$$

Then an appropriate  $\Delta(s)$  will destabilize  $G(s)$  at  $s = j\omega_0$ .

■