

Architectural Modeling and Analysis for Safety Engineering

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Abstract

Model-based development tools are increasingly being used for system-level development of safety-critical systems. Architectural and behavioral models provide important information that can be leveraged to improve the system safety analysis process. Model-based design artifacts produced in early stage development activities can be used to perform system safety analysis, reducing costs and providing accurate results throughout the system life-cycle.

As critical systems become more dependent on software components, analysis regarding fault propagation through these software components becomes more important. The methods used to perform these analyses require understandability from the side of the analyst, scalability in terms of system size, and mathematical correctness in order to provide sufficient proof that a system is safe. Determination of the events that can cause failures to propagate through a system as well as the effects of these propagations can be a time consuming and error prone process. In this research, we introduce a safety analysis tool extension to the AADL modeling language, describe a technique for determining failure events with the use of Inductive Validity Cores (IVC), and show how an analyst can use these methods to produce compositionally derived artifacts that encode pertinent system safety information.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

System safety analysis is crucial in the development life cycle of critical systems to ensure adequate safety as well as demonstrate compliance with applicable standards. A prerequisite for any safety analysis is a thorough understanding of the system architecture and the behavior of its components; safety engineers use this understanding to explore the system behavior to ensure safe operation, assess the effect of failures on the overall safety objectives, and construct the accompanying safety analysis artifacts [39,40]. Developing adequate understanding, especially for software components, is a difficult and time consuming endeavor which has traditionally been performed manually. Model-based development is getting increased adoption in the critical systems domain [8, 23, 24, 28, 32]. In model-based development, the development efforts are centered on a model of the intended system behavior and various techniques, for example, formal verification, testing, test generation, execution and animation, etc. can be used to validate and verify the proposed system behavior. Given this increase in model-based development in critical systems, leveraging the resultant models in the safety analysis process and automating the generation of safety analysis artifacts, holds great promise in terms of accuracy and efficiency. Many of these artifacts are representation of the functionality of the system in the presence of faults and can be effectively used to find *minimal cut sets*, the minimal sets of faults that lead to a violation of a safety property. Some research groups have introduced automating the safety assessment process and have developed tools to support the automated generation of these artifacts [8, 12, 26]. Nevertheless, there are gaps in current capabilities we aim to address.

Many of the techniques developed require the development of models specific for the safety analysis task, that is, the techniques do not rely on extension of existing system models, but instead require new models that are separate entities [6, 11, 23, 25]. This requires extra manual

labor and clear understanding of the system in order to create a separate fault model that accurately describes the system in question. As systems become more complex, it becomes difficult to ensure that the fault model developed for safety analysis conforms with the the model created for the development efforts.

The propagation of faults throughout the system can be handled in two main ways: one is to explicitly define the propagations and the other is to use a behavioral approach to the propagations. Given many possible faults in an industrial sized system, explicit propagation becomes complex and unwieldy. That being said, it is sometimes beneficial to also explicitly define fault propagations between components that are not logically connected, e.g., co-located components may fail together even though they are not logically connected, threads running on a processor will fail together if the processor fails, etc. Thus, it is beneficial to provide both options to an analyst.

Using a compositional approach—analyze the system components individually and combine the results—to fault modeling improves scalability compared to a monolithic approach—the components are all analyzed together. The compositional generation of the combinations of faults that can cause system failure is something that no other research has fully addressed and a scalable automatic generation of these artifacts is a major bottleneck in using automated approaches in industry. Given recent research in the area of formal verification, this has become theoretically possible.

Probabilistic evaluations of the faults and their overall impact on the system is a large part of the safety assessment process. Utilizing a compositional approach for the generation of minimal cut sets shows promise in compositional probabilistic computations as well.

In this proposal, we outline a novel way to utilize the verification information used during the system development process in order to automate the generation of both qualitative and quantitative safety analysis artifacts. Furthermore, we describe a Model Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) approach to critical system development in which the safety analysis is tied directly to the system model and the flexibility of the analysis provides various ways of capturing error propagation information, single points of failures, and minimal cut sets.

Our **long range goal** is to increase system safety through the support of a model-based safety assessment process backed by formal methods to help safety engineers with early detection of design issues and automation of the artifacts required for certification. The **objective of this proposal**, which is a logical step towards our goal, is to formally prove a relationship between formal verification results and safety analysis artifacts to allow for compositional generation of minimal cut sets and associated probabilities, define a modeling process that allows

for flexible fault modeling in the MBSA approach, and finally to support these goals with relevant tools. We plan to accomplish the objectives of this proposal by pursuing the following aims:

Define and implement a Safety Annex to enable fault modeling in AADL. Research the modeling needs of a safety analyst and define a grammar that extends the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL). Implement a tool that uses this grammar extension and a backend SMT model checker for compositional verification purposes.

Define compositional verification capabilities in the face of component failures. Define analysis procedures to allow an analyst to investigate system behaviour under a predetermined max number of faults or a max probability threshold for fault combinations, and develop and implement analysis procedures for these analyses.

Define compositional computation of minimal cut sets. Formally prove the relationship between verification results of compositional analysis and minimal cut sets, and implement the algorithms in the analysis tools supporting the Safety Annex.

Determine accurate compositional probabilistic computations for the top-level events. Define the computations, show that the computations are accurate, and implement the algorithms in the analysis tools supporting the Safety Annex.

Evaluate the results using representative models in AADL. Gather the safety analysis artifacts generated by these algorithms and discuss how they may be used within the safety assessment process.

The beginning phase of this dissertation research included research into the needs of safety analysts and resulted in the definition of the Safety Annex, the implementation of the Safety Annex parser in the OSATE tools, and the support for analysis of AADL models extended with the Safety Annex. The remaining steps of this research include completion of the theory behind the relationship between verification results and fault analysis artifacts and a full implementation of these algorithms in the tools supporting the Safety Annex.

This proposal is organized in three chapters. The background in Chapter ?? broadly discusses related work, the tools and modeling language used in this project, and some useful formal definitions. Chapter 3 describes the proposed approach and outlines the contributions of this dissertation. Lastly, the conclusion summarizes the approach of the project.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries and Related Work

2.1 Safety Critical Systems Development

As the capabilities of technology grows, so does the complexity and capabilities of mechanical and electrical systems. Many of these systems are safety critical; the loss of correct functioning leads to loss of life, substantial material or environmental damage, or large monetary losses. The development of such complex systems requires a process with clearly defined design and implementation phases which are subdivided into several sub-processes and phases. Certain sets of analyses are required for each of the phases and when the analyses provide satisfactory outcomes, the process transitions into the next phase.

In general, each field relies on various interpretations of the development process. In the field of aerospace technologies, the Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) is what is commonly used. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) is an association of engineers and professionals devoted to the standards that guide the development of transportation systems [39,40].

2.1.1 The V Model

The development of safety critical systems is guided by the V model process as defined in ARP4754 [40]. The V model relates steps of the design phase with a post-implementation phase. It describes how the requirements are produced in the design phase and then how those requirements are verified against the implementation in the post-implementation phase. The left side of the V describes the requirements, architecture, and expected component behavior of the system (see Figure 2.1). The right side of the V describes the evaluation of the system implementation in light of the requirements.




Figure 2.1: The V Model in System Development

2.1.2 Traditional Safety Assessment Process

ARP4754A, the Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems [40], provides guidance on applying development assurance at each hierarchical level throughout the development life cycle of highly-integrated/complex aircraft systems. It has been recognized by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an acceptable method to establish the assurance process. The safety assessment process is a starting point at each hierarchical level of the development life cycle and is tightly coupled with the system development and verification processes. It is used to show compliance with certification requirements and for meeting a company's internal safety standards.

The safety assessment shown in Figure 2.2 integrates each phase of the V model with analyses specific to system hazards and their severity. It also shows how these hazards should be addressed within the design phase. The safety assessment process is defined in ARP4754A by the following phases:

Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) examines the functions of the system to identify potential functional failures and classifies the potential hazards associated with them. This includes identification of failure conditions, identifying the effects of those failures, classification of each failure condition, and assignment to safety objectives.




Figure 2.2: The V Model in Safety Assessment

Common Cause Analysis (CCA) verifies and establishes physical and functional separation, isolation, and independence requirements between subsystems and verifies that these requirements have been met.

Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA) establishes aircraft safety requirements and provide a preliminary indication that the aircraft can meet those safety requirements.

Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) examines the proposed architecture(s) to determine how failures could cause the failure conditions determined by the FHA. The objective is to complete the safety requirements of an aircraft or system and show that the proposed system architecture satisfies the safety requirements. The PSSA is an iterative process that is performed at multiple stages of system development.

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is performed to find combinations of faults that lead to the violation of a safety requirement. The fault tree itself shows the logical relation between the sets of faults and the violation of a safety requirement.

Common Mode Analysis (CMA) analyzes designs and implementations for elements that may defeat the redundancy or independence of functions within the design, i.e. if elements are shown as independent in FTA, make sure they are truly independent in the system under consideration.

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) aims at finding the causality relationship between sets of faults, intermediate events, and undesired states in the system. Usually this is represented in tabular form and called an *FMEA table*.

Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA)/System Safety Assessment (SSA) verifies that the system (or aircraft), as implemented, meets the safety requirements specified by the PSSA.

These processes all produce important artifacts that are used together for certification of the system, but those of importance to this thesis are *Fault Trees* and associated sets called *Minimal Cut Sets*. For this reason, more information is provided in the following section on these artifacts.

2.1.3 Fault Trees and Minimal Cut Sets

The use of fault trees are common in many safety assessment processes and the ability to generate the cut sets needed for the construction of the fault tree is a useful part of any safety analysis tool. The fault tree is a safety artifact commonly referenced in requirement protocol documents such as ARP4761, ARP4754, and AIR6110 [2, 39, 40].

A Fault Tree (FT) is a directed acyclic graph whose leaves model component failures and whose gates model failure propagation [38]. The system failure under examination is the root of the tree and is called the Top Level Event (TLE). The node types in a fault tree are *events* and *gates*. An event is an occurrence within the system, typically the failure of a subsystem down to an individual component. Events can be grouped into *basic events* which occur independently, and *intermediate events* which occur dependently and are caused by one or more other events [20]. These events model the failure of the system (or subsystem) under consideration. The gates represent how failures propagate through the system and how failures in subsystems can cause system wide failures. The two most common logic symbols used in an FT are the Boolean logic AND-gates and OR-gates. An AND-gate is used when the undesired top level event can only occur when all the lower conditions are true. The OR-gate is used when the undesired event can occur if any one or more of the next lower conditions is true. This is not a comprehensive list of gate types; others include voting, inhibit, or negation gates [38].

Figure 2.3 shows a simple example of a fault tree based on SAE ARP4761 [39]. In this example, the top level event corresponds to an aircraft losing all wheel braking. In order for this event to occur, all of the basic events must occur. This is seen through the use of the AND gate below the top level event. The gates in the fault tree describe how failures propagate through the system. Each gate has one output and one or more inputs. In Figure 2.3, the AND gate has three




Figure 2.3: A simple fault tree

inputs and one output. The leaves of the tree represent the basic events of the system. In the case of this fault tree, these three events are also the Minimal Cut Sets (MinCutSets) for this top level event. A MinCutSet is the minimal set of basic events that must occur together in order to cause the TLE to occur. Generating and analyzing these MinCutSets is central to FTA and has been an active area of interest in the research community since fault trees were first described in Bell Labs in 1961 [20, 38].

There are two main types of fault tree analysis that we differentiate here as *qualitative* analysis and *quantitative* analysis. In qualitative analysis, the structure of the fault tree is considered and the MinCutSets are a way to indicate which combinations of component failures will cause the system to fail. On the other hand, in quantitative analysis, the probability of the TLE is calculated given the probability of occurrence of the basic events.

2.2 Model Based Safety Assessment

The lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces safety analysts to devote significant effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from multiple sources. Furthermore, this investigation typically stops at system level, leaving software function details largely unexplored. Typically equipped with the domain knowledge about the system, but not detailed knowledge of how the software applications are designed, practicing safety engineers find it a time consuming and involved process to acquire the knowledge about the behavior of the software applications hosted in a system and its impact on the overall system behavior. Industry practitioners have come to realize the benefits of using models in the safety assessment process, and a revision of the ARP4761 to include Model Based




Figure 2.4: Use of the Shared System/Safety Model in the ARP4754A Safety Assessment Process

Safety Analysis (MBSA) is under way.

2.2.1 Suggested Model Based Safety Assessment Process Supported by Formal Methods

We propose a model-based safety assessment process backed by formal methods to help safety engineers with early detection of the design issues. This process uses a single unified model to support both system design and safety analysis; this is shown in Figure 2.4 and is based on the following steps:

1. System engineers capture the critical information in a shared model: high-level hardware and software architecture, nominal behavior at the component level, and safety requirements at the system level.
2. System engineers use a model checker to check that the safety requirements are satisfied by the nominal design model.
3. Safety engineers augment the nominal model with the component failure modes. In addition, safety engineers specify the fault hypothesis for the analysis which corresponds to how many simultaneous faults the system must be able to tolerate.

4. Safety engineers use a model checker to analyze if the safety requirements and fault tolerance objectives are satisfied by the design in the presence of faults. If the design does not tolerate the specified number of faults (or probability threshold of fault occurrence), then the tool produces counterexamples or minimal sets of fault combinations that can cause the safety requirement to be violated.
5. The safety engineers examine the results to assess the validity of the fault combinations and the fault tolerance level of the system design. If a design change is warranted, the model will be updated with the latest design change and the above process is repeated.

2.3 Formal Methods in Safety Analysis

As the complexity of systems increase, the cost of development and validation consumes more time and resources than ever before; nevertheless, these processes are vital in safety critical systems when the loss of functionality of the system can result in loss of life. Authorities have put in place various thresholds for the likelihood of such events and it is the responsibility of the system developers to show that this is incredibly unlikely to occur [21]. Utilizing the recent advancements in automated formal verification within the validation process has become essential to the certification of critical systems [1, 31, 35]. This section provides a summary of the formal method techniques that are commonly used in the system development and safety assessment processes.

2.3.1 Formal Validation and Verification

Formal validation and verification is a proof-based methodology used to assess the correctness of requirements, system design, and implementation. In the past, this has been performed through manual means, but with the advancement in automated theorem proving and other formal methods, automated formal analyses not only guarantees a higher degree of confidence, but also reduces the time (and thus cost) of carrying out the proofs of correctness. Techniques used in formal validation and verification include automated theorem proving, model checking, and abstract interpretation.

Formal Specification

Formal specification process translates the informal system requirements into a mathematical logic to determine if the system design is correct. This process guarantees an unambiguous

description of the requirements which is not possible when using an informal natural language. This formal definition of system requirements includes the system design and its expected behavior as well as the assumptions on environment. A design or implementation can never be considered correct in isolation; it is only correct with respect to the specifications. The expected behavior, system design, and environmental assumptions change and are refined as the system goes through the various stages of development.

Formal Verification

Formal verification is the use of proof methods to show that given the environmental assumptions stated in the formal specification, the formal design of the system meets the requirements. The proofs are generated over an abstract mathematical model of the system, such as finite state machines, labeled transition systems, or timed automata. There are a couple of main approaches used to provide these proofs: deductive methods or an exhaustive exploration of the model known as model checking.

A systematic exploration of the model usually consists of exploring states and transitions of a model and taking advantage of domain specific abstraction techniques to consider multiple states in one operation, which lessens computation time considerably. Nevertheless, the biggest limiting factor of model checking is scalability and many model checkers do not perform well given industrial sized models. On the other hand, an advantage is that model checking is often fully automated.

Deductive methods of verification consists of generating proof obligations from the specifications of the system and using these obligations in a theorem prover setting. This includes theorem provers (e.g., Coq, Isabelle) and satisfiability modulo theories (e.g., SMTInterpol, Z3, Yices).

2.4 Satisfiability and Model Checking

??

Chapter 3

Compositional Minimal Cut Set Generation

??

Chapter 4

Fault Modeling and the Safety Annex

?? This chapter covers modeling techniques/needs, the safety annex, and its capabilities.

4.1 Component Fault Modeling

The usage of the terms error, failure, and fault are defined in ARP4754A and are described here for ease of understanding [40]. An *error* is a mistake made in implementation, design, or requirements. A *fault* is the manifestation of an error and a *failure* is an event that occurs when the delivered service of a system deviates from correct behavior. If a fault is activated under the right circumstances, that fault can lead to a failure. The terminology used in EMV2 differs slightly for an error: an error is a corrupted state caused by a fault. The error propagates through a system and can manifest as a failure. In this report, we use the ARP4754A terminology with the added definition of *error propagation* as used in EMV2. An error is a mistake made in design or code and an error propagation is the propagation of the corrupted state caused by an active fault.

The Safety Annex is used to add possible faulty behaviors to a component model. Within the AADL component instance model, an annex is added which contain the fault definitions for the given component. The flexibility of the fault definitions allows the user to define numerous types of fault *nodes* by utilizing the AGREE node syntax. A library of common fault nodes has been written and is available in the project GitHub repository [43]. Examples of such faults include valves being stuck open or closed, output of a software component being nondeterministic, or power being cut off. When the fault analysis requires fault definitions that are more complex, these nodes can easily be written and used in the model.

When a fault is activated by its specified triggering conditions, it modifies the output of the

component. This faulty behavior may violate the contracts of other components in the system, including assumptions of downstream components. The impact of a fault is computed by the AGREE model checker when the safety analysis is run on the fault model.

The majority of faults that are connected to outputs of components are known as *symmetric*. That is, whatever components receive this faulty output will receive the same faulty output value. Thus, this output is seen symmetrically. An alternative fault type is *asymmetric*. This pertains to a component with a 1-n output: one output which is sent to many receiving components. This fault can present itself differently to the receiving components. For instance, in a boolean setting, one component might see a true value and the rest may see false. This is also possible to model using the keyword *asymmetric*. For more information on fault definitions and modeling possibilities, we refer readers to the Safety Annex Users Guide [43].

As an illustration of fault modeling using the Safety Annex, we look at one of the components important to the inadvertent braking property: the brake pedal. When the mechanical pedal is pressed, a sensor reads this information and passes an electronic signal to the BSCU which then commands hydraulic pressure to the wheels.

Figure 4.1 shows the AADL pedal sensor component with a contract for its nominal behavior. The sensor has only one input, the mechanical pedal position, and one output, the electrical pedal position. A property that governs the behavior of the component is that the mechanical position should always equal the electronic position. (The expression $true \rightarrow property$ in AGREE is true in the initial state and then afterwards it is only true if property holds.)

```

system SensorPedalPosition
  features
    -- Input ports for subcomponent
    mech_pedal_pos : in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
    elec_pedal_pos  : in data port Base_Types::Boolean;

    -- Behavioral contracts for subcomponent
  annex agree {**

    guarantee "Mechanical and electrical pedal position is equivalent" :
      true -> (mech_pedal_position = elec_pedal_position;
    };

```

Figure 4.1: An AADL System Type: The Pedal Sensor

One possible failure for this sensor is inversion of its output value. This fault can be triggered with probability 5.0×10^{-6} as described in AIR6110 (in reality, the component failure probability is collected from hardware specification sheets). The Safety Annex definition for this fault is shown in Figure 4.2. Fault behavior is defined through the use of a fault

node called *inverted_fail*. When the fault is triggered, the nominal output of the component (*elec_pedal_position*) is replaced with its failure value (*val_out*).

```

annex safety {**
  fault SensorPedalPosition_ErroneousData "Inverted boolean fault" : faults.inverted_fail {
    inputs: val_in <- elec_pedal_position;
    outputs: elec_pedal_position <- val_out;
    probability: 5.0E-6 ;
    duration: permanent;
  }
};

```

Figure 4.2: The Safety Annex for the Pedal Sensor

The WBS fault model expressed in the Safety Annex contains a total of 33 different fault types and 141 fault instances. The large number of fault instances is due to the redundancy in the system design and its replication to control 8 wheels.

4.2 Error Propagation

4.2.1 Implicit Propagation

In the Safety Annex approach, faults are captured as faulty behaviors that augment the system behavioral model in AGREE contracts. No explicit error propagation is necessary since the faulty behavior itself propagates through the system just as in the nominal system model. The effects of any triggered fault are manifested through analysis of the AGREE contracts.

On the contrary, in the AADL Error Model Annex, Version 2 (EMV2) [22] approach, all errors must be explicitly propagated through each component (by applying fault types on each of the output ports) in order for a component to have an impact on the rest of the system. To illustrate the key differences between implicit error propagation provided in the Safety Annex and the explicit error propagation provided in EMV2, we use a simplified behavioral flow from the WBS example using code fragments from EMV2, AGREE, and the Safety Annex.

In this simplified WBS system, the physical signal from the Pedal component is detected by the Sensor and the pedal position value is passed to the Braking System Control Unit (BSU) components. The BSU generates a pressure command to the Valve component which applies hydraulic brake pressure to the Wheels.

In the EMV2 approach (top half of Figure 4.3), the “NoService” fault is explicitly propagated through all of the components. These fault types are essentially tokens that do not capture

EMV2 Approach

```
pedal_out : out
propagation{NoService}
};
```

```
pedal : in propagation
{NoService};
cmd : out
propagation{NoValue};
```

```
in_pressure : in
propagation {NoValue};
out_pressure : out
propagation{NoValue};
```


**Error
Propagation
through
Component**

```
error source
signal{NoService};
```

```
error path
pedal{NoService}
-> cmd{NoValue};
```

```
error path
in_pressure{NoValue} ->
out_pressure{NoValue};
```

Error Flow



```
signal.val
>= 0.0;
```

```
pedal_out.val =
pedal_in.val;
```

```
(pedal.val > 0.0)
=> (cmd.val > 0.0)
```

```
out_pressure.val =
in_pressure.val;
```

**Nominal Behavior
in AGREE**

"sensor output stuck at zero"

```
pedal_out = if
fault_trigger then
0.0 else pedal_in;
```

**Faulty Behavior in
Safety Annex**

"pedal pressed implies valve pressure"

```
(Pedal.signal.val > 0.0) =>
(Valve.out_pressure.val > 0.0)
```

**System safety
property in AGREE**

Safety Annex Approach

Figure 4.3: Differences between Safety Annex and EMV2

any analyzable behavior. At the system level, analysis tools supporting the EMV2 annex can aggregate the propagation information from different components to compose an overall fault flow diagram or fault tree.

When a fault is triggered in the Safety Annex (bottom half of Figure 4.3), the output behavior of the Sensor component is modified. In this case the result is a “stuck at zero” error. The behavior of the BSCU receives a zero input and proceeds as if the pedal has not been pressed. This will cause the top level system contract to fail: *pedal pressed implies brake pressure output is positive*.

4.2.2 Explicit Propagation

Failures in hardware (HW) components can trigger behavioral faults in the system components that depend on them. For example, a CPU Failure may trigger faulty behavior in the threads bound to that CPU. In addition, a failure in one HW component may trigger failure in other HW

components located nearby, such as overheating, fire, or explosion in the containment location. The Safety Annex provides the capability to explicitly model the impact of hardware failures on other faults, behavioral or non behavioral. The explicit propagation to non behavioral faults is similar to that provided in EMV2.

To better model faults at the system level dependent on HW failures, a fault model element is introduced called a *hardware fault*. Users are not required to specify behavioral effects for the HW faults, nor are data ports necessary on which to apply the fault definition. An example of a model component fault declaration is shown below:

```
HW_fault Pump_HW_Fault "Colocated pump failure": {
    probability: 1.0E-5;
    duration: permanent;
}
```

Users specify dependencies between the HW component faults and faults that are defined in other components, either HW or SW. The hardware fault then acts as a trigger for dependent faults. This allows a simple propagation from the faulty HW component to the SW components that rely on it, affecting the behavior on the outputs of the affected SW components.

In the WBS example, assume that both the green and blue hydraulic pumps are located in the same compartment in the aircraft and an explosion in this compartment rendered both pumps inoperable. The HW fault definition can be modeled first in the green hydraulic pump component as shown in Figure ???. The activation of this fault triggers the activation of related faults as seen in the *propagate_to* statement shown below. Notice that these pumps need not be connected through a data port in order to specify this propagation.

```
annex safety{**
    analyze : probability 1.0E-7
    propagate_from:
        {Pump_HW_Fault@phys_sys.green_hyd_pump} to {HydPump_FailedOff@phys_sys.blue_hyd_pump};
**};
```

The fault dependencies are specified in the system implementation where the system configuration that causes the dependencies becomes clear (e.g., binding between SW and HW components, co-location of HW components).

4.3 Fault Analysis Statements

The fault analysis statement (also referred to as the fault hypothesis) resides in the AADL system implementation that is selected for verification. This may specify either a maximum number of faults that can be active at any point in execution:


```
annex safety {**
    analyze : max 1 fault
**};
```

or that the only faults to be considered are those whose probability of simultaneous occurrence is above some probability threshold:

```
annex safety {**
    analyze : probability 1.0E-7
**};
```

Tying back to the fault tree analysis in traditional safety analysis, the former is analogous to restricting the cutsets to a specified maximum number of terms, and the latter is analogous to restricting the cutsets to only those whose probability is above some set value. In the former case, we assert that the sum of the true *fault_trigger* variables is at or below some integer threshold. In the latter, we determine all combinations of faults whose probabilities are above the specified probability threshold, and describe this as a proposition over *fault_trigger* variables. With the introduction of dependent faults, active faults are divided into two categories: independently active (activated by its own triggering event) and dependently active (activated when the faults they depend on become active). The top level fault hypothesis applies to independently active faults. Faulty behaviors augment nominal behaviors whenever their corresponding faults are active (either independently active or dependently active).

4.4 Asymmetric Fault Modeling

A *asymmetric* or *Byzantine* fault is a fault that presents different symptoms to different observers [19]. In our modeling environment, asymmetric faults may be associated with a component that has a 1-n output to multiple other components. In this configuration, a *symmetric* fault will result in all destination components seeing the same faulty value from the source component. To capture the behavior of asymmetric faults (“different symptoms to different observers”), it was necessary to extend our fault modeling mechanism in AADL.

Implementation of Asymmetric Faults To illustrate our implementation of asymmetric faults, assume a source component A has a 1-n output connected to four destination components (B-E) as shown in Figure 4.4 under “Nominal System.” If a symmetric fault was present on this output, all four connected components would see the same faulty behavior. An asymmetric fault should be able to present arbitrarily different values to the connected components.

To this end, “communication nodes” are inserted on each connection from component A to components B, C, D, and E (shown in Figure 4.4 under “Fault Model Architecture.” From

the users perspective, the asymmetric fault definition is associated with component A's output and the architecture of the model is unchanged from the nominal model architecture. Behind the scenes, these communication nodes are created to facilitate potentially different fault activations on each of these connections. The fault definition used on the output of component A will be inserted into each of these communication nodes as shown by the red circles at the communication node output in Figure 4.4.




Figure 4.4: Communication Nodes in Asymmetric Fault Implementation

```

fault asymmetric_fault_Comp_A "Component A output asymmetric" : faults.fail_to {
  inputs: val_in <- Output, alt_val <- prev(Output, 0);
  outputs: Output <- val_out;
  probability: 5.0E-5;
  duration: permanent;
  propagate_type: asymmetric;
}

```

Figure 4.5: Asymmetric Fault Definition in the Safety Annex

An asymmetric fault is defined for Component A as in Figure 4.5. This fault defines an

asymmetric failure on Component A that when active, is stuck at a previous value ($prev(Output, 0)$). This can be interpreted as the following: some connected components may only see the previous value of Comp A output and others may see the correct (current) value when the fault is active. This fault definition is injected into the communication nodes and which of the connected components see an incorrect value is completely nondeterministic. Any number of the communication node faults ($0 \dots all$) may be active upon activation of the main asymmetric fault.

Process ID Example The illustration of asymmetric fault implementation can be seen through a simple example where 4 nodes report to each other their own process ID (PID). Each node has a 1-3 connection and thus each node is a candidate for an asymmetric fault. Given this architecture, a top level contract of the system is simply that all nodes report and see the correct PID of all other nodes. Naturally in the absence of faults, this holds. But when one asymmetric fault is introduced on any of the nodes, this contract cannot be verified. What is desired is a protocol in which all nodes agree on a value (correct or arbitrary) for all PIDs.

The Agreement Protocol Implementation in AGREE In order to mitigate this problem, special attention must be given to the behavioral model. Using the strategies outlined in previous research [16, 19], the agreement protocol is specified in AGREE to create a model resilient to one active Byzantine fault.

The objective of the agreement protocol is for all correct (non-failed) nodes to eventually reach agreement on the PID values of the other nodes. There are n nodes, possibly f failed nodes. The protocol requires $n > 3f$ nodes to handle a single fault. The point is to achieve distributed agreement and coordinated decisions. The properties that must be verified in order to prove the protocol works as desired are as follows:

- All correct (non-failed) nodes eventually reach a decision regarding the value they have been given. In this solution, nodes will agree in $f + 1$ time steps or rounds of communication.
- If the source node is correct, all other correct nodes agree on the value that was originally sent by the source.
- If the source node is failed, all other nodes must agree on some predetermined default value.

The updated architecture of the PID example is shown in Figure 4.6.

Each node reports its own PID to all other nodes in the first round of communication. In the second round, each node informs the others what they saw in terms of everyone's PIDs. The




Figure 4.6: Updated PID Example Architecture

outputs from a node are described in Figure 4.7. These outputs are modeled as a nested data




Figure 4.7: Description of the Outputs of Each Node in the PID Example

implementation in AADL and each field corresponds to a PID from a node. The AADL code fragment defining this data implementation is shown in Figure 4.8.

```
data implementation Node_Msg.Impl
subcomponents
    Node1_PID_from_Node1: data Integer;
    Node2_PID_from_Node2: data Integer;
    Node3_PID_from_Node3: data Integer;
    Node4_PID_from_Node4: data Integer;
end Node_Msg.Impl;
```

Figure 4.8: Data Implementation in AADL for Node Outputs

The fault definition for each node's output can effect the data fields arbitrarily. This is a nondeterministic fault in two ways. It is nondeterministic how many receiving nodes see incorrect values and it is nondeterministic how many of the data fields are affected by this fault. This can be accomplished through the fault definition shown in Figure 4.9 and the fault node

definition in Figure 4.10.

```

fault Asym_Fail_Any_PID_To_Any_Val "Node output is asymmetric":
    Common_Faults.fail_any_PID_to_any_value {
        eq pid1_val: int;
        eq pid2_val: int;
        eq pid3_val: int;
        eq pid4_val: int;
        inputs: val_in <- Node_Out,
                pid1_val <- pid1_val,
                pid2_val <- pid2_val,
                pid3_val <- pid3_val,
                pid4_val <- pid4_val;
        outputs: Node_Out <- val_out;
        duration: permanent;
        propagate_type: asymmetric;
    }

```

Figure 4.9: Fault Definition on Node Outputs for PID Example

```

--allow each field of the output record to fail to random value
node fail_any_PID_to_any_value (val_in: Node_Msg.Impl, pid1_val: int, pid2_val: int,
    pid3_val: int, pid4_val: int, trigger: bool) returns (val_out: Node_Msg.Impl);
let
    val_out =
        if (trigger)
        then(val_in{Node1_PID_from_Node1 := pid1_val}
            {Node2_PID_from_Node2 := pid2_val}
            {Node3_PID_from_Node3 := pid3_val}
            {Node4_PID_from_Node4 := pid4_val})
        else val_in;
tel;

```

Figure 4.10: Fault Node Definition for PID Example

Once the fault model is in place, the implementation in AGREE of the agreement protocol is developed. As stated previously, there are two cases that must be considered in the contracts of this system.

- In the case of no active faults, all nodes must agree on the correct PID of all other nodes.
- In the case of an active fault on a node, all non-failed nodes must agree on a PID for all other nodes.

These requirements are encoded in AGREE through the use of the following contracts. Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show example contracts regarding Node 1 PID. There are similar contracts for each node's PID.

```

lemma "All nodes agree on node1_pid1 value - when no fault is present" :
  true -> ((n1_node1_pid1 = n2_node1_pid1)
    and (n2_node1_pid1 = n3_node1_pid1)
    and (n3_node1_pid1 = n4_node1_pid1)
  );

```

Figure 4.11: Agreement Protocol Contract in AGREE for No Active Faults

```

lemma "All non-failing nodes agree on node1_pid1 value in 2nd step." :
  true -> (if n1_failed
    then ((n2_node1_pid1 = n3_node1_pid1)
      and (n3_node1_pid1 = n4_node1_pid1))
    else if n2_failed
      then ((n1_node1_pid1 = n3_node1_pid1)
        and (n3_node1_pid1 = n4_node1_pid1))
      else if n3_failed
        then ((n1_node1_pid1 = n2_node1_pid1)
          and (n2_node1_pid1 = n4_node1_pid1))
        else if n4_failed
          then ((n1_node1_pid1 = n2_node1_pid1)
            and (n2_node1_pid1 = n3_node1_pid1))
          else ((n1_node1_pid1 = n2_node1_pid1)
            and (n2_node1_pid1 = n3_node1_pid1)
            and (n3_node1_pid1 = n4_node1_pid1))
    );

```

Figure 4.12: Agreement Protocol Contract in AGREE Regarding Non-failed Nodes

Referencing Fault Activation Status To fully implement the agreement protocol, it must be possible to describe whether or not a subcomponent is failed by specifying if any faults defined for the subcomponents is activated. In the Safety Annex, this is made possible through the use of a *fault activation* statement. Users can declare boolean *eq* variables in the AGREE annex of the AADL system where the AGREE verification applies to that system's implementation. Users can then assign the activation status of specific faults to those *eq* variables in Safety Annex of the AADL system implementation (the same place where the fault analysis statement resides). This assignment links each specified AGREE boolean variable with the activation status of the specified fault activation literal. The AGREE boolean variable is true when and only when the fault is active. An example of this for the PID example is shown in Figure 4.13. Each of the *eq* variables declared in AGREE (i.e., *n1_failed*, *n2_failed*, *n3_failed*, *n4_failed*) is linked to the fault activation status of the *Asym_Fail_Any_PID_To_Any_Value* fault defined in a node subcomponent instance of the AADL system implementation (i.e., *node1*, *node2*, *node3*, *node4*).

```

annex safety {**
  fault_activation: n1_failed = Asym_Fail_Any_PID_To_Any_Val@node1;
  fault_activation: n2_failed = Asym_Fail_Any_PID_To_Any_Val@node2;
  fault_activation: n3_failed = Asym_Fail_Any_PID_To_Any_Val@node3;
  fault_activation: n4_failed = Asym_Fail_Any_PID_To_Any_Val@node4;

  analyze: max 2 fault

**};

```

Figure 4.13: Fault Activation Statement in PID Example

PID Example Analysis Results The nominal model verification shows that all properties are valid. Upon running verification of the fault model (*Verify in the Presence of Faults*) with one active fault, the first four properties stating that all nodes agree on the correct value (Figure 4.11) fail. This is expected since this property is specific to the case when no faults are present in the model. The remaining 4 top level properties (Figure 4.12) state that all non-failed nodes reach agreement in two rounds of communication. These are verified valid when any one asymmetric fault is present. This shows that the agreement protocol was successful in eliminating a single point of asymmetric failure from the model. Furthermore, when changing the number of allowed faults to two, these properties do not hold. This is expected given the theoretical result that $3f + 1$ nodes are required in order to be resilient to f faults and that $f + 1$ rounds of communication are needed for successful protocol implementation. A summary of the results follows.

- Nominal model: All top level guarantees are verified. All nodes output the correct value and all agree.
- Fault model with one active fault: The first four guarantees fail (when no fault is present, all nodes agree: shown in Figure 4.11). This is expected if faults are present. The last four guarantees (all non-failed nodes agree) are verified as true with one active fault.
- Fault model with two active faults: All 8 guarantees fail. This is expected since in order to be resilient up to two active faults ($f = 2$), we would need $3f + 1 = 7$ nodes and $f + 1 = 3$ rounds of communication.

This model is in Github and is called PIDByzantineAgreement [43].

Chapter 5

Case Studies

??

5.1 Wheel Brake System

?? To demonstrate the fault modeling capabilities of the Safety Annex we will use the Wheel Brake System (WBS) described in AIR6110 [2]. This system is a well-known example that has been used as a case study for safety analysis, formal verification, and contract based design [8, 12, 13, 26]. The preliminary work for the safety annex was based on a simple model of the WBS [45]. To demonstrate a more complex fault modeling process, we constructed a functionally and structurally equivalent AADL version of the more complex WBS NuSMV/xSAP models [13].

The WBS is composed of two main parts: the Line Replaceable Unit control system and the electro-mechanical physical system. The control system electronically controls the physical system and contains a redundant channel of the Braking System Control Unit (BSCU) in case a detectable fault occurs in the active channel. It also commands antiskid braking. The physical system consists of the hydraulic circuits running from hydraulic pumps to wheel brakes as well as valves that control the hydraulic fluid flow. This system provides braking force to each of the eight wheels of the aircraft. The wheels are all mechanically braked in pairs (one pair per landing gear). For simplicity, Figure 5.1 displays only two of the eight wheels.

There are three operating modes in the WBS model:

- In *normal* mode, the system is composed of a *green* hydraulic pump and one meter valve per each of the eight wheels. Each of the meter valves are controlled through electronic




Figure 5.1: Wheel Brake System

commands coming from the active channel of the BSCU. These signals provide braking and antiskid commands for each wheel. The braking command is determined through a sensor on the pedal and the antiskid command is determined by the *Wheel Sensors*.

- In *alternate* mode, the system is composed of a *blue* hydraulic pump, four meter valves, and four antiskid shutoff valves, one for each landing gear. The meter valves are mechanically commanded through the pilot pedal corresponding to each landing gear. If the selector detects lack of pressure in the green circuit, it switches to the blue circuit.
- In *emergency* mode, the system mode is entered if the *blue* hydraulic pump fails. The accumulator pump has a reserve of pressurized hydraulic fluid and will supply this to the blue circuit in emergency mode.

The WBS architecture model in AADL contains 30 different kinds of components, 169 component instances, and a model depth of 5 hierarchical levels.

The behavioral model is encoded using the AGREE annex and the behavior is based on descriptions found in AIR6110. The top level system properties are given by the requirements and safety objectives in AIR6110. All of the subcomponent contracts support these system safety objectives through the use of assumptions on component input and guarantees on the output. The WBS behavioral model in AGREE annex includes one top-level assumption and 11 top-level system properties, with 113 guarantees allocated to subsystems.

An example system safety property is to ensure that there is no inadvertent braking of any of the wheels. This is based on a failure condition described in AIR6110 is *Inadvertent wheel braking on one wheel during takeoff shall be less than 1E-9 per takeoff*. Inadvertent braking means that braking force is applied at the wheel but the pilot has not pressed the brake pedal. In addition, the inadvertent braking requires that power and hydraulic pressure are both present, the plane is not stopped, and the wheel is rolling (not skidding). The property is stated in AGREE such that inadvertent braking does *not* occur, as shown in Figure 5.2.

```
lemma "(S18-WBS-0325) Never inadvertent braking of wheel 1" :
  true -> (not(POWER)
    or (not HYD_PRESSURE_MAX)
    or (mechanical_pedal_pos_L
    or (not SPEED)
    or (wheel_braking_force1 <= 0)
    or (not W1ROLL)));
```

Figure 5.2: AGREE Contract for Top Level Property: Inadvertent Braking

Chapter 6

Related Work

A model-based approach for safety analysis was proposed by Joshi et. al in [26–28]. In this approach, a safety analysis system model (SASM) is the central artifact in the safety analysis process, and traditional safety analysis artifacts, such as fault trees, are automatically generated by tools that analyze the SASM.

The contents and structure of the SASM differ significantly across different conceptions of MBSA. We can draw distinctions between approaches along several different axes. The first is whether they propagate faults explicitly through user-defined propagations, which we call *failure logic modeling* (FLM) or through existing behavioral modeling, which we call *failure effect modeling* (FEM). The next is whether models and notations are *purpose-built* for safety analysis vs. those that extend *existing system models* (ESM).

For FEM approaches, there are several additional dimensions. One dimension involves whether *causal* or *non-causal* models are allowed. Non-causal models allow simultaneous (in time) bi-directional error propagations, which allow more natural expression of some failure types (e.g. reverse flow within segments of a pipe), but are more difficult to analyze. A final dimension involves whether analysis is *compositional* across layers of hierarchically-composed systems or *monolithic*. Our approach is an extension of AADL (ESM), causal, compositional, mixed FLM/FEM approach.

Tools such as the AADL Error Model Annex, Version 2 (EMV2) [22] and HiP-HOPS for EAST-ADL [17] are *FLM*-based *ESM* approaches. As previously discussed, given many possible faults, these propagation relationships require substantial user effort and become more complex. In addition, it becomes the analyst’s responsibility to determine whether faults can propagate; missing propagations lead to unsound analyses. In our Safety Annex, propagations

occur through system behaviors (defined by the nominal contracts) with no additional user effort.

Closely related to our work is the model-based safety assessment toolset called COMPASS (Correctness, Modeling project and Performance of Aerospace Systems) [9]. COMPASS is a mixed *FLM/FEM*-based, *causal compositional* tool suite that uses the SLIM language, which is based on a subset of AADL, for its input models [10, 14]. In SLIM, a nominal system model and the error model are developed separately and then transformed into an extended system model. This extended model is automatically translated into input models for the NuSMV model checker [18, 34], MRMC (Markov Reward Model Checker) [29, 33], and RAT (Requirements Analysis Tool) [37]. The safety analysis tool xSAP [6] can be invoked in order to generate safety analysis artifacts such as fault trees and FMEA tables [7]. COMPASS is an impressive tool suite, but some of the features that make AADL suitable for SW/HW architecture specification: event and event-data ports, threads, and processes, appear to be missing, which means that the SLIM language may not be suitable as a general system design notation (ESM).

SmartIFlow [25] is a *FEM*-based, *purpose-built*, *monolithic non-causal* safety analysis tool that describes components and their interactions using finite state machines and events. Verification is done through an explicit state model checker which returns sets of counterexamples for safety requirements in the presence of failures. SmartIFlow allows *non-causal* models containing simultaneous (in time) bi-directional error propagations. On the other hand, the tools do not yet appear to scale to industrial-sized problems, as mentioned by the authors [25]: “As current experience is based on models with limited size, there is still a long way to go to make this approach ready for application in an industrial context”.

The Safety Analysis and Modeling Language (SAML) [23] is a *FEM*-based, *purpose-built*, *monolithic causal* safety analysis language. System models constructed in SAML can be used for both qualitative and quantitative analyses. It allows for the combination of discrete probability distributions and non-determinism. The SAML model can be automatically imported into several analysis tools like NuSMV [18], PRISM (Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker) [30], or the MRMC probabilistic model checker [29].

AltaRica [5, 36] is a *FEM*-based, *purpose-built*, *monolithic* safety analysis language with several dialects. There is one dialect of AltaRica which use dataflow (*causal*) semantics, while the most recent language update (AltaRica 3.0) uses non-causal semantics. The dataflow dialect has substantial tool support, including the commercial Cecilia OCAS tool from Dassault [4]. For this dialect the Safety assessment, fault tree generation, and functional verification can be performed with the aid of NuSMV model checking [11]. Failure states are defined

throughout the system and flow variables are updated through the use of assertions [3]. AltaRica 3.0 has support for simulation and Markov model generation through the OpenAltaRica (www.openaltarica.fr) tool suite.

Formal verification tools based on model checking have been used to automate the generation of safety artifacts [6, 11, 15]. This approach has limitations in terms of scalability and readability of the fault trees generated. Work has been done towards mitigating these limitations by the scalable generation of readable fault trees [12].

Chapter 7

Conclusion

System safety analysis is crucial in the development of critical systems and the generation of accurate and scalable results is invaluable to the assessment process. Having multiple ways to capture complex dependencies between faults and the behavior of the system in the presence of these faults is important throughout the entire process. The artifacts generated from such analyses that are used in the certification process of such systems must be generated in a scalable way and provide accurate and important information. This project has developed and implemented the Safety Annex for AADL which provides a way to capture complex relationships between faults in a model and analyze their effects behaviorally through either compositional or monolithic analysis.

Furthermore, we propose the compositional generation of minimal cut sets to be used in the development of various artifacts used in system certification, such as FTA, probabilistic analysis, and single point of failure examinations. This generation is done through the collection of proof elements called *MIVCs* and their transformation. Lastly, we propose to use the minimal cut sets and resulting fault trees generated through the transformation algorithms to calculate the probability of the top level event, or violation of the safety property.

The timeline for the proposed work is as follows:

Jan 2017 - Sept 2017: Preliminary research into integration of fault information into `Lustre` code and prototype implementation of Safety Annex [45].

Sept 2017 - Feb 2018: In depth research into the needs of safety analysts and complex fault modeling capabilities [44].

March 2018 - March 2019: Further implementation of various types of fault behavior (dependent faults, asymmetric faults, etc). [42].

March 2019 - Sept 2019: Research into the theory of the *MinCutSet* transformation and preliminary implementation thereof [41].

Sept 2019 - Dec 2019: Drafts of theoretical paper showing *MinCutSet* transformations.

Dec 2019 - Feb 2020: Outline and prove probabilistic methods and algorithms for compositional computations.

Dec 2019 - Feb 2020: Complete the implementation of both minimal cut set generation and probabilistic computations.

Feb - March 2020: Complete the implementation of the graphical representation of hierarchical fault trees.

Dec 2019 - April 2020: Write the dissertation.

May 2020: Complete any requested edits on dissertation.

June 2020: Defend dissertation and complete final changes.

Upon completion of the proposed research, we will have the theoretical framework of compositional generation of minimal cut sets and associated probabilistic computations, and these will be implemented in the Safety Annex. The Safety Annex will provide safety analysts a way to represent both behavioral and explicit fault modeling in the context of the system model and provide valuable feedback in the development process. The results from the analysis provided by the Safety Annex will be mathematically sound and descriptive enough to use in the certification process for critical systems.

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