at all times maſters of themſelves. This, ſays he, was peculiarly the caſe of St Paul, who often confirms his doctrine by *reaſoning,* which the Jewish prophets never condeſcended to do, as it would have ſubmitted their dogmas to the examination of *private judgment.* Yet, with singular inconſiſtency, he affirms, that the Jewiſh prophets could not know that the impreſſions made on their imaginations proceeded from God, but by a ſign given them, which by their own *reaſon* or *judgment* they knew would never be vouchſafed to an impious or a wicked man.

After theſe very free remarks on the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtaments, he naturally enough expreſſes a ſuſpicion, that by thoſe who conſider the Bible as the epiſtle of God ſent from heaven to men, he will be thought to have sinned againſt the Holy Ghoſt by vilifying his dictates. This leads him to inquire in what ſenſe the Scriptures are the word of God ; and he gravely determines them to be ſo only as they *actually* contribute to make men more virtuous and holy. It is not enough that they are *calculated* to improve virtue and holineſs : for ſhould the words of the languages in which they are written acquire in proceſs of time a ſignification different from what they had originally; ſhould mankind loſe all knowledge of theſe languages; or even ſhould they agree to neglect the books, whether from ignorance or from wilfulneſs— thoſe books would ceaſe to be the word of God, and become nothing better than waste paper and ink ; juſt as the two tables, which Moſes broke on obſerving the idolatry of his countrymen, were not the covenant between Jehovah and the Iſraelites, but merely two pieces of ſtone ! The Scriptures, however, are the word of God, becauſe they teach the true religion of which God is the author ; and they have taught it in ſuch a manner, he ſays, that it can never be loſt or corrupted whatever become of the books of the Old and New Teſtaments, or of the languages in which they are written. The whole of religion, as the Scriptures themſelves teſtify, conſiſts in the love of God above all things, and of our neighbours as ourſelves : whence it follows, that we muſt believe that God exiſts, and watcheth over all things by his provi­dence ; that he is omnipotent, and has decreed the pious to be ultimately happy, and the impious miſerable ; and that our final ſalvation depends ſolely on His grace or favour. Theſe truths, with their necessary conſequences, are the word of God : they are clearly taught in the Scriptures, and can never be corrupted ; but every thing elſe in theſe volumes is vain, he ſays, and of no greater importance to us than facts related in any other ancient and authentic hiſtory.

Such are the opinions which were entertained of re­velation by a man whom a critic, writing in a Chriſtian country, and profeſſing to be a zealous Chriſtian himſelf, has lately pronounced to have been a *chosen vessel.* For what purpoſe he was *chosen* it is not eaſy to con­ceive. His religion, as it appears in the *Tractatus,* is the worſt kind of Deiſm ; and his politics are ſuch as our monthly critics are not wont to teach, and ſuch as we truſt ſhall never be ſeriouſly taught by any Britiſh subject. By the law of nature, he ſays, every man be­fore the formation of civil government has an unqueſtionable right to whatever appears eligible either to his reaſon or to his appetites ; and may get posseſſion of it by *intreaty,* by *violence, by fraud,* or by *any other means* attended with less trouble to himſelf *(sive vi, sive dolo, sive precibus, sive quocunque demum modo facilius poterit ) ;* and may treat as an enemy every perſon who ſhall at­tempt to obſtruct his purpoſe. But when men agree to devolve this right upon others, and to conſtitute a political ſtate, which both reaſon and appetite muſt perſuade them to do, then are they in duty bound to obey every mandate of the government, however absurd it may be *(omnia mandata tametsi abſurdissima ),* as long as that government can enforce its edicts, and no longer ; for, according to him, right and power are ſo inſeparably united, that when a government loses its power, it has no longer the ſmalleſt claim to obedience. This doctrine, he ſays, is moſt *obviously* juſt when taught of democratical governments; but it is in fact equally true of monarchies and ariſtocracies : “ Nam quiſquis ſummam habet poteſtatem, five unus fit, five pauci, five de­nique omnes, certum eſt ei summum jus *quicquid velit imperandi,* competere : et præterea quiſquis poteſtatem ſe defendendi, five ſponte, live vi *coactus,* in alium tranſtulit, eum ſuo jure naturali plane ceſſisse, et conſequenter eidem ad omnia abſolute parere decreviſſe quod om­nia præstare tenetur, quamdiu rex, five nobiles, five po­pulus ſummam, quam acceperunt, poteſtatem, quæ juris transferendi fundamentum suit, conſervant; nec his plu­ra addere opus eſt@@\*.” We heartily agree with him, that to this precious concluſion it is needleſs to add a single word.

Taking our leave therefore of his *Tractatus Theοlοgico-politicus,* we ſhall now give our readers a ſhort ac­count of his *Opera Posthuma.* Theſe conſiſt of, 1. Ε­τηκα, *more geometrico demonstrata ;* 2. Politica; 3. De Emendatione Intellectus; 4. Epistolæ, *et ad eas* Responsiones; 5. Compendium Gramma­tices Linguæ Hebrææ.

The Ethica are divided into five parts, which treat in order, *de* Deo ; *de natura et origine* mentis ; *de ori­gine et natura* affectuum ; *de* servitute *humana, seu de* affectuum Viribus ; *de* potentia intellectus, s*eu de* libertate *humana.* As the author professes to tread in the footſteps of the geometers, and to deduce all his conclusions by rigid demonſtration from a few ſelf-evident truths,he introduces his work, after the manner of Euclid, with a collection of *definitions* and *axioms.* Theſe are couched in terms generally ambi­guous ; and therefore the reader will do well to con­ſider attentively in what ſenſe, if in any, they can be admitted ; for it will not be found easy to grant his premiſes, and at the ſame time refuſe his concluſions. His definition of ſubſtance, for inltance, is ſo expreſſed as to admit of two ſenſes ; in one of which it is juſt, whilſt in the other it is the parent of the moſt impious abſurdity. We ſhall give it in his own words ; “ Per ſubſtantiam intelligo id, quod in ſe eſt, et per ſe conci­pitur : hoc eſt id, cujus conceptus non indiget concep­tu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.” If by this be meant, that a ſubſtance is that which we can conceive by itſelf without *attending* to any thing elſe, or *thinking* of its formation, the definition, we believe, will be ad­mitted by every reflecting mind as sufficiently diſtinguiſhing the thing defined from an attribute, which, he ſays, is that which we perceive *of* a ſubſtance, and which we certainly cannot conceive as exiſting by it­ſelf. Thus the writer of this article can ſhut his eyes and contemplate in idea the ſmall 4to volume now be­

@@@[m]\* Tract. cap. xvi. p. 181