which God has of the human body as actually exiſting; that this *idea* of the body, and the *body* itſelf, are one and the ſame thing ; and that thinking and extended ſubſtances are in reality but one and the ſame ſubſtance, which is ſometimes comprehended under one attribute of the Deity, and ſometimes under another@@\*.

If this impious jargon be not Atheiſm, or as it has been ſometimes called Pantheiſm, we know not what it is (ſee Pantheism). According to Spinoza, there is but one ſubstance, which is extended, infinite, and indiviſible. That ſubstance indeed he calls God ; but he labours to prove that it is corporeal ; that there is no difference between mind and matter ; that both are at­tributes of the Deity variouſly considered ; that the hu­man ſoul is a part of the intellect of God ; that the ſame ſoul is nothing but the idea of the human body ; that this idea of the body, and the body itſelf, are one and the ſame thing ; that God could not exiſt, or be conceived, were the visible univerſe annihilated ; and therefore that the viſible univerſe is either the one ſubstance, or at leaſt an eſſential attribute or modification of that ſubſtance. He ſometimes indeed ſpeaks of the *power* of this ſubſtance; but when he comes to explain himſelf, we find that by power he means nothing but blind neceſſity@@\* ; and though he frequently talks of the *wiſdom* of God, he ſeems to make uſe of the word without meaning. This we think evident from the long appendix to his 36th proposition ; in which he labours to prove that the notion of final cauſes is an idle figment of the imagination, since, according to him, nothing but the prejudices of education could have led men to fancy that there is any real diſtinction between *good* and *evil, merit* and *demerit, praiſe* and *reproach, or­der* and *confusion ;* that *eyes* were given them that they might be enabled to *ſee ; teeth for* the purpoſe of chew­ing their *food ; herbs* and *animals* for the *matter* of that *food ;* that the *ſun* was formed to give *light,* or the *ocean* to nouriſh fish*es.* If this be true, it is impoſſible to diſcover wiſdom in the operations of his *one ſubſtance;* since, in common apprehension, it is the very characteriſtic of folly to act without any end in view.

Such are the reveries of that writer, whoſe works a German philoſopher of ſome name has lately recom­mended to the public, as calculated to convey to the mind more just and ſublime conceptions of God than are to be found in moſt other ſyſtems. The recommen­dation has had its effect. A literary journaliſt of our own, reviewing the volume in which it is given, feels a peculiar ſatisfaction from the diſcovery that Spinoza, inſtead of a formidable enemy to the cauſe of virtue and religion, was indeed their warmeſt friend ; and piouſly hopes that we ſhall become more cautious not to ſuffer ourſelves to be deceived by empty names, which thoſe who *cannot* reaſon ( Sir Iſaac Newton and Dr Clarke perhaps) give to thoſe who can (Hobbes, we ſuppoſe, and Spinoza). But though we have the honour to think on this queſtion with our illuſtrious countrymen, we have no desire to depict Spinoza as a *reprobate,* which the critic ſays has often been done by ignorance and enthuſiaſm. We admit that his conduct in active life was irreproachable ; and for his ſpeculative opinions, he muſt ſtand or fall to his own Master. His *Ethics* ap­pear to us indeed a ſyſtem ſhockingly impious ; and in the tract intitled Politica, *power* and *right* are con­founded as in the former volume ; but in the treatiſe De Intellectus Emendatione, are ſcattered many precepts of practical wiſdom, as well as ſome judicious rules for conducting philoſophical inveſtigation ; and we only regret, that the reader muſt wade to them through pages of fataliſm, ſcepticiſm, and palpable contradic­tions. His *Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae,* though left imperfect, appears to have ſo much merit, that it is to be wiſhed he had fulfilled his intention of writing a philoſophical grammar of that language, inſtead of waſting his time on abſtruſe ſpeculations, which, though they ſeem not to have been injurious to his own virtue, are certainly not calculated to promote the vir­tue of others, or to increaſe the ſum of human happineſs.

SPIRÆA, in botany : A genus of plants belong­ing to the claſs of *icoſandria,* and to the order of *pentagynia ;* and in the natural ſyſtem arranged under the 26th order, *Pomacea.* The calyx is quinquesid ; there are five petals; and the capſule is polyſpermous. There are 18 ſpecies ; of which two only are Britiſh, the fili- pendula and ulmaria. 1. The fi*lipendula,* dropwort, has pinnated leaves ; the leaflets are ſerrated ; the ſtalk is herbaceous, about a foot and a half high, terminated with a looſe umbel of white flowers, often tinged with red. The petals are generally six, and the ſegments of the calyx are reflexed : the ſtamina are 30 or more ; the germina 12 or upwards. It grows in mountainous paſtures. 2. The *ulmaria,* meadow-ſweet. The leaves have only two or three pair of pinnæ, with a few ſmaller ones intermixed ; the extreme one being larger than the rest, and divided into three lobes. The calyx is reddiſh ; the petals white, and the number of capſules from six to ten twiſted *in a* ſpiral. The tuberous pea, like roots of the filipendula dried and reduced to pow­der, have been uſed inſtead of bread in times of ſcarcity. Hogs are very fond of theſe roots. Cows, goats, ſheep, and ſwine, eat the plant ; but horſes refuſe it. The flowers of the ulmaria have a fragrant ſcent, which riſes in diſtillation. The whole plant indeed is extreme­ly fragrant, ſo that the common people of Sweden ſtrew their floors with it on holidays. It has alſo an aſtringent quality, and has been found uſeful in dyſenteries, ruptures, and in tanning of leather.

SPIRAL, in geometry, a curve line of the circular kind, which in its progreſs recedes from its centre.

SPIRE, in architecture, was uſed by the ancients for the baſe of a column, and ſometimes for the aſtragal or tore ; but among the moderns it denotes a ſteeple that continually diminiſhes as it aſcends, whether coni­cally or pyramidally.

SPIRIT, in metaphyſics, an incorporeal being or

humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod Deus, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam humanæ mentis explicatur, five quatenus humanæ mentis essentiam conſtituſt, hanc vel illam habet ideam : et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere, non tantum, quatenus naturam humanæ mentis constituit ; sed quatenus simul cum mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam. *Corol.* prop. xi. part 2.

@@@[m]\* Prop. vii. iii. xxi. Part 2.

@@@[m]\* Prop. xxxiii. Part