But yet the reward that follows ſuch irksome labours ought to animate men to undertake them. Obstacles, how­ever numerous they may be, are not insurmountable, since ſo many great men have got the better of them : difficulties ſhould stir up a ſoldier’s emulation, but ſhould never terrify him ; he ſhould endeavour to copy ſuch great originals, though he ſhould not be able to equal them.

This treatife is divided into four parts.

In the first are mentioned all the greater operations of a campaign ; and the means of executing thoſe operations, in any kind of country, are endeavoured to be laid down.

In the second, the precautions that are to be taken to attack the enemy in all the forementioned operations, are considered.

The third treats of the *Petite Guerre,* or the operations of detached parties, and the war of posts.

The fourth, of sieges, both with regard to attack and defence.

Part I. Of the GREATER OPERATIONS in DEFENSIVE WAR.

Sect. I. *Of the Knowledge of a Country.*

A Campaign of which the plan is well formed, and the diſpositions well concerted, may nevertheleſs prove ſucceſsful, if the general, to whole direction the opera­tions are intruded, hath not a thorough knowledge of the country in which they are to be carried into execution.

There is one knowledge of a country, which for an officer to be without ſhould be considered as a reproach ; that of the situation of cities, towns, villages, forests, streams, rivers, which is to be acquired by studying of geographical maps. There is another branch of knowledge yet more particular, such as, of the passes, or the boundaries of the country, the situation, the nature of the ground, whether it is plain, or divided by hollows, rivulets, hills, &c. which is to be acquired by the assistance of topographical maps. In the study of these last, care must be taken, not blindly to follow the marks they lay down. It very ſeldom hap­pens, that topographical maps are perfectly exact : for, besides the many circumstances which may ſometimes in a year alter a large extent of country, they ſeldom take notice of fords, bridges over the ſmall rivulets, ſmall hills, and hol­lows of little importance ; neither can they mark whatever may be occasioned by recent inundations and diſruptions of the earth : whereas any of thefe unforeseen circumstances tray prove an obstruction to a great design, either by re­tarding the march of an army, preventing a column of troops from advancing, or leaving the enemy in possession of ſome passes from which he might have been driven.

In order to avoid the errors into which a general may be drawn by the maps, the ſafest method is to apply to the inhabitants of the country, go over it with the most intel­ligent of them, and remark every obstacle, however trifling it may appear.

For marching with greater security, a general ought to form a company of guides of the peaſants, be assured of their fidelity, and attach them to him by all poſſible me­thods, particularly by unbounded liberality. It is by money only that trusty ſpies and faithful guides can be ſecured ; the latter are less expensive, but full as necessary as the former. Parsimony ſhould be avoided in war ; for, as Vigetius obſerves, money ſhould never be spared when expence is necessary to ſecure possession. In proportion as an army advances into a country, great care must be taken to change the guides.

The general ſhould send out detachments along with ſome of these guides to examine the streams which cross the country, whether or no their mouths are at a distance, into what river they empty themſelves, from whence they take their ſource, whether they may be easily forded, if their banks are steep or Hoping, marſhy or covered with buſhes ; other detachments ſhould be employed in examining the woods, in order to find out whether troops can pass through them or not.

A general ought himſelf to examine into the truth of the reports made to him by these ſmall detachments, or send out others more considerable under the command of gene­ral officers : however certain a general may be of the fi­delity of his ſpies and guides, yet he ſhould not always rely upon their reports : mistrust, which in general is ac­counted a vice, may almost be esteemed a virtue in the busineſs of war.

Furnished with these lights, a general can allot the easiest road to the artillery and baggage, the shortest to the infan­try, and longest to the cavalry : he can at once judge, from the nature of the ground, into how many columns the army can be divided in order to expedite the march, and what dispositions will be necessary for the columns with re­gard to the enemy’s position,

By the knowledge of the country, a general is informed of what camps the enemy doth or can occupy, and of those necessary to be taken to oppoſe his designs ; whether the enemy’s detachments can easily approach, or how he can himself advance towards him, without being discovered ; if there is forage in the neighbourhood of the enemy’s camp, or whether he is obliged to draw it from a distance ; where he hath fixed his magazines, and whether an attempt to carry them off is praticable or not ; in what manner his quarters are dispoſed, and which of them is most expofed ; what distance there is between himself and the enemy; where the enemy hath establiſhed posts, and which thoſe are that himself ought to occupy with regard to the situation of his own camp and quarters, and thoſe belonging to the enemy; which is the properest road for the detachments and the patrols to keep, in order to gain intelligence ; and lastly, with what degree of eaſe the enemy can attack the army on its march, and whether in front or flank. This knowledge is essential to a general in every kind of country ; but in a woody or mountainous country it would become more par­ticularly dangerous, and even impossible for him to march an army, it unacquainted with it.

In 1702, the duke of Burgundy, being desirous to attack the enemy who were behind Cleves, but not being perfectly acquainted with the forest in his front, he detach­ed the marquis d’Alegre with 500 grenadiers, and 800 horſe, to see if it was not poſſible to find ſome passage thro’ it. Μ. d’Alegre met with a defile which was occupied by the enemy : he attacked and forced it ; but being advanced beyond it, found it was not posible to proceed farther, by reaſon of the great number of defiles that ſucceeded to each other : he thereupon turned back, ſent, and had, another passage surveyed, where there were found still greater obstacles. He gave an account of this to the duke of Bur­gundy, who, not choosing to miſs the opportunity of at­tacking the enemy, ſent him out again with a larger de­tachment, that he might examine whether, by keeping along the side of the forest, it would not be practicable for him to march up to them by way of the heaths of Mook, on