the fide of Grave and Nimeguen. The marquis d’Alegre discovered a defile which led to theſe heaths : he took possesson of it, and ſent notice thereof to the duke of Bur­gundy ; who ordered the army to advance, obliged the ene­my to send their infantry into Nimeguen, and cannonaded their cavalry which had taken post on the glacis, but were unable to maintain it ; and the conſequence was, that the enemy sustained a great loss in men, artillery, waggons, and baggage.

This example tends to prove, that maps are not always to be relied on. There can be no reaſon to doubt that the duke of Burgundy was furniſhed with the most exact : but yet it is probable that he might not have succeeded in this enterpriſe, if he had neglected sending Μ. d’ Alegre to sur­vey the passes, and examine two, before he proceeded to that through which he marched.

The following is a general rule : That it is upon the ground, and not upon maps, that the roads through which an army is to march must be examined, as well as the Situa­tion of places where camps are to be fixed, and fields of battle chosen. An army ſhould never move before ways are opened for every column : with regard to a detachment it is different, as there may arise circumstances which will prevent the general from foreseeing what load it may take. The command of a detachment ſhould always be given to an intelligent officer, and one who has made his business his only study ; who hath been particularly careful to acquire a knowledge of the country, and of whose genius the ge­neral ſhould entertain no doubt. A particular choice stirs up emulation in young men, and induces them to exert their utmost endeavours to deserve so distinguishing a mark of approbation.

Into how many mistakes have even the greatest generals fallen, by not being thoroughly acquainted with a country, and by suffering themselves to be guided by general notions? Μ. de Feuquieres cites many examples of great enterprises which have miscarried by it.

Toward the end of the year 1673, when a considerable body of infantry, with only few cavalry, was on its return from Holland, under the conduct of Μ. de Luxemburg, the prince of Orange having assembled the whole force of the Dutch and the Spaniards (under his command), came upon the Maese, with an intention to fight Μ. de Luxem­burg between Maestricht and Charleroy. This march made it necessary for the court to send an order to Μ. de Schom­berg to assemble all the cavalry that were in Hainault and Flanders, and immediately join Μ. de Luxemburg, who was greatly inferior to the prince of Orange in cavalry. The prince’s aim then ſhould have been to prevent the two ge­nerals from joining, and to have sought one or other of them before their junction. The prince’s being unacquainted with the country, made him mistake for real the feints made by Μ. de Luxemburg, whilst he was upon the river Ourte; as if his intention was to march by way of the Condros and the Ardennes, in order to gain Sedan and the Mezuris. The prince of Orange drew near Huy and Namur ; and by that means was at such a distance from the high-road, that M. de Schomberg had an opportunity of advancing with his cavalry to Tongres ; at the same time that Μ. de Luxem­burg, by a forced march, passed the Maese at Maestricht, and arrived at Tongres, where the junction of the two armies was effected without any accident.

If the prince of Orange had made only two reflections upon the nature of the country, he would have avoided the mistake he fell into ; the first of which is, that Scarcely any body can be ignorant that the Condros and the Ardennes are sterile and mountainous countries; from whence it is evident, that Μ. de Luxemburg could not have subsisted his army, especially in the month of December : the roads in those parts, very bad in the Summer, are almost impassable during the winter ; consequently the carriages could not have passed but with the utmost difficulty.

The second reflection is, that if Μ. de Luxemburg had actually designed to pass through the Ardennes, why did Μ. de Schomberg advance towards Tongres, and so expose himself to the danger of being beaten, without a possibility of receiving help from Μ. de Luxemburg, who was on the other side of the Maese ? If the prince of Orange had had a thorough knowledge of the country through which M. de Luxemburg pretended he would pass, he would soon have perceived that it was only to throw him into a perplexing uncertainty with regard to the road which the enemy's general ſhould naturally take : in a word, he would not have remained a moment in doubt on the part he had to act.

By this, then, it appears, that the prince ought to have continued on the side of Liege ; by which position he would have stopped Μ. de Schomberg, who would have Scarcely dared to advance to Tongres, nor would Μ. de Luxem­burg have attempted the passage of the Maese at Maestricht : by this means, the junction would have been pre­vented ; or, if either of the two armies had advanced, the prince could have attacked and beaten it ; neither would it have been in the power of the other to have assisted it.

It hath frequently happened, and will continue to do So, that a general who knows how to take advantage of the knowledge of the country, although inferior in point of force, may change a defensive into an offensive war. In 1671, Μ. de Créqui, who began the campaign on the defensive, ended it with obliging the duke of Lorrain to pass the Rhine : that prince dispersed his army, and then Μ. de Créqui formed the siege of Fribourg.

The knowledge of a country is still more essential in retreats : there is more art and more precaution required in a retreat than in any other action ; that operation is the conclusion of all preceding ones. If a general, obliged to retreat precipitately, hath but a superficial knowledge of the country, how will he be able to reassemble his troops, re- establiſh order, or march with any degree of security ?

Xenophon’s retreat with the ten thousand Greeks is one of the moſt useful lessons a commander can study : in that undertaking were united the virtues of a consummate general, and the most intrepid courage of a soldier ; and in particular it exhibits the most profound knowledge of the country.

The knowledge of a country is as necessary for a private officer as for the commander in chief, because he is to exe­cute with part what the general performs with all the troops. When an officer, to whose conduct an expedition is intruſted, joins this knowledge, one of the chief branches of military science, to practice and experience, he will with so much the greater ease comprehend and execute the gene­ral’s intention and plan ; and he will be also enabled to take the properest measures for success : if, on the contrary, he begins a march, without being acquainted with the country, his mind misgiving him, will increase the danger, by the very means he takes to avoid it : he will suppose it in places where there is nothing to be feared, and often fall into it where he was least apprehensive of it.

The general who commands in the cantonments and win­ter-quarters, and each officer who commands a particular quarter, will never be able to take proper measures if they are unacquainted with the country : they will be unable to preserve a proper strength when separated, or to assemble without difficulty on the first order ; and for want of know­