proper distances, which are to follow the columns at 42 or 50 paces distance, without ever losing sight of them.

Plate DXVI. repreſents the march of an army through a woody country. A, Is the army formed in order of battle previous to the commencement of the march. B, The cavalry, which hath marched ſome paces in advance, in order to make room for the infantry. C, The infantry, which, by facing to the right, forms the column upon the right. D, The infantry, which, by facing to the left, forms the column upon the left. E, Bodies of infantry, which are to march at the head of the columns of cavalry. F, The park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and the eſcorts, also are assembled. G, The march of the infantry, forming in columns. H, The march of the cavalry, forming in columns. I, The march of the artille­ry and baggage with their eſcorts, forming in column. K, The army in march. L, Hussars of the advanced guard keeping the roads, marked out by the detachments ſent on before. M, Infantry, forming the advanced guard of the columns. N, Small parties of infantry, marching upon the flanks of the columns. 0, Parties of hussars, marching up­on the flanks of the army. P, Infantry of the reserve form­ing the rear-guard of the army.

If by the knowledge which the general has of the coun­try, or rather from the report of the officers who command­ed the detachment ſent out to view, open, and repair the roads, he knows that the country is interrupted by woods and little plains, the diſposition ought to be wholly chan­ged ; it will then be ſufficient that the second detachment, which in other cases ought to let out the evening before, ſets out only two hours before the campement. This de­tachment ſhould be compoſed of infantry, light horſe, and dragoons ; the infantry to scour the villages and the woods, the light horſe to penetrate into the woods wherever they can enter, and clear the march of the infantry, and the dra­goons to ſustain the whole.

When the diſposition for the march of the army is ſuppoſed to be in five columns, the infantry should form two, the cavalry two more, and the artillery and baggage the fifth. If it is thought there will be any occasion for artil­lery, a brigade or two may be distributed to the columns of infantry ; and the remainder may march at the head of the eſcort of the baggage, which is to be defended by the regi­ment of artillery ; to which must be added a detachment of infantry, which will form the advanced guard. The caval­ry and dragoons are to keep the open country as much as poſſible, and the infantry the incloſed ; and the best and most accessible road ſhould always be given to the artillery and baggage. In order that the columns may preſerve the same length in marching, a brigade of infantry ſhould be placed at the heads of the columns of cavalry ; if this pre­caution, which fixes the head of the columns of cavalry, is neglected, the cavalry will extend a great way before the columns of infantry, which ſhould always be avoided. The rear-guard ſhould conſist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons : the light horſe ſhould always march on the flanks on the right and left, and before the army.

It is after this manner that the march of an army may be diſpoſed through a woody and a mountainous country ; but an army must always suit its motions to circumstances, and to the situation of the country where the war is carried on. If the general is inferior in point of number, he ſhould make choice of defiles ; becauſe in them he can always pre­sent a front equal to the enemy’s. Who can be ignorant that Leonidas with 8000 Greeks, at the straits of Thermopylæ, stopped the almost innumerable army of Xerxes, who was unable to force him?

A mountainous and woody country, when thoroughly known, becomes a more favourable theatre for practising the wiles and ſtratagems of war than an open country ; it is true that the knowledge of it is more difficult to attain, and that it requires more vigilance and readineſs in the general. Hannibal was even drawn into ambuſcades by his own guides ; an example worthy the notice of a general who takes guides that have either but little regard for him, or are unac­quainted with the country : it is impossible to try them too much ; and their ignorance is often more fatal than treachery itſelf.

The marches that require most precaution are thoſe made in the night, thoſe made in sight of the enemy, and thoſe that ſhould be kept ſecret.

The first ſhould be avoided as much as poſſible ; but if circumstances require and force an army to march over a mountainous country in the night, care ſhould at least have been taken to ſurvey the roads during the day ; to make the guides march at the head of the army ; to keep the ranks very cloſe together, that the men may not loſe fight of each other ; and that part of the troops do not miſtake one de­file for another, which may easily happen in the dark, if the advanced guard has marched a little too, fast, and the offi­cers hastened too much. The Greeks, according to Xeno­phon, on like occasions, gave the heaviest arms to the troops that marched at the head, thereby to oblige them to proceed leiſurely,

In theſe marches that are made in sight of the enemy, beside the precautions necessary to be taken for the ſafety of the troops, and which have already been mentioned, the general ſhould endeavour to deceive them by false appear­ances, and by an ostentation, often in ſuch circumstances, necessary : as extensive a front as poſſible ſhould be given to the army ; the intervals of the ranks and columns ſhould be widened, but not ſo as to weaken them ; the general ſhould take advantage of an height, posseſs himſelf of it, and post ſome troops on it, in order to make the enemy ſuſpect there may be ſtill more behind: advantage ſhould be taken of a wood, and, by marches and countermarches, the same troops ſhould be made to pass and repaſs, in order to make the ene­my believe the army ſtronger than it really is. I here have been instances of generals, who, on like occasions, have made ſuch good uſe of their ground, that, by the arrange­ment of troops, they have ſeemed to multiply them in the enemy’s eyes ; and who, although inferior in ſtrength, ap­pearing to have the advantage of numbers, have kept the enemy in awe.

But ſtill, unleſs it is to deceive the enemy, a general ſhould conceal his force and management ; his force, be­cauſe, if ſuperior, he will not fail to profit by that advan­tage ; and if inferior, he ſhould avoid a battle : he will con­ceal his management, became he will prevent the designs of the enemy’s general, who will receive as much information from his ſuccesses as from his miſcarriages. Pyrrhus, who taught the art of war to the Romans, was in the end con­quered by them. The Mexicans often turned the arts and wiles of Cortez and the Spaniards against them ; and the Czar Peter I. never regretted a defeat when it became the means of instructing him how to conquer in his turn.

It is impossible to lay down fixed rules for ſecret marches: it is by his addreſs that a general will improve circumstances; it is by art and contrivance that he will evade the enemy’s vigilance, and deceive his ſpies.

General rules only can be given for the diſpoſitions to be made of troops upon a march ; particular ones would be merely conjectural, becauſe the general of an army must always depend upon circumstances : it is the situation and nature of the country, the number of troops, the nearness of the enemy, the facility of foraging, and the passes