to judge of the parts that can be carried with greatest eaſe, and of thoſe which are most in need of assistance, that they may march there with greater order, diſpatch, and fa­cility ; whereas, if this diſtance is not obſerved, it will hap­pen, as hath been ſometimes seen, that the troops not ha­ving ground ſufficient to range themſelves in order of battle, the diſpoſitions will be impeded by confusion and diſorder, and the enemy will have forced the lines before the troops can be in a condition of opposing him.

But in a mountainous country, it is not ſufficient for a general that he cannot be turned ; that he hath profited so well by the advantages of ground, as to render the enemy’s approach to the camp difficult ; that the assistance of art hath been joined to nature ; and that the country to be guarded is entirely covered : he must alſo be careful that the communication with the neighbouring towns where the ma­gazines of war and proviſion are establiſhed, is safe and eaſy. if any one of theſe particulars is neglected, the camp is expoſed, neither can the general continue in it the time that would be necessary to retard the march and designs of the enemy. As it hath been already obſerved, that there is ſcarcely any post that is not liable to be turned or overlook­ed, the camp ſhould be entrenched only ſo far as the entrench­ments may become an obstacle to the enemy, and as they may be a means of giving the general time to retire to occupy another post.

When the enemy undertakes the ſiege of ſome town, and the general, although with an inferior army, is willing to ſuccour it, or cauſe the siege of it to be raiſed, he ſhould ſeek out a ſpot naturally strong, and entrench it according to its situation : if an open country, according to the me­thod above mentioned ; if among mountains, according to the assistance that the nature of the country may give ; and make uſe of theſe entrenchments as a ſure aſylum from whence to. make ſallies upon the enemy, to attack his fora­ges and his convoys, and to oblige him to raiſe the ſiege as well by the fatigues of it, when it hath been drawn out to a greater length of time than was designed by the enemy, as by the want to which he is reduced by the continual in­quietudes that the entrenched army hath given him.

When an army is in an open country, it generally conti­nues in the same camp for ſome ſpace of time ; becauſe it is certain the enemy cannot conceal his designs ſo effectually from the general, but he may be able to circumvent them ; but in a mountainous country, it is uncertain whether an army will continue in the same post till morning that it oc­cupied over-night. A general must then encamp in ſuch a poſition, and after ſuch a manner, that in case the enemy conies to attack him in force and with advantage, he may be able, without danger, to proceed to another post, and evade the enemy’s designs.

It requires great skill in a general to judge when it is pro­per or improper to make choice of places which have a great many avenues on one side ; becauſe if he ſhould be attacked in a camp incloſed by rocks, or deep in a valley which hath but one or two paſſes open, it will be very difficult for him to diſengage himſelf from the enemy : on the contrary, if there are many ſmall paſſes or avenues to the ground of which he is posseſſed, and by which the enemy may easily inveſt his camp, it will require a great number of men to guard them. But on theſe occaſions a general ſhould be ever careful to make a good diſposition of his troops, to maintain strict order and diſcipline in his camp, and to send out his patroles with the greatest regularity ; by which means he will free himſelf from all apprehensions of being ſurpriſed.

There ought to be no difference between a well-govern­ed town and a well-ordered camp ; the exactest order ſhould be obſerved, and the srictest diſcipline kept up : if a soldier is at liberty to quit or enter it at pleaſure, the enemy’s ſpies will not fail to make their advantages of it. If the camp is unhealthy, or distressed for provision, water, wood, or forage, and the ſoldier hath real cauſe of com­plaint, every method ſhould be tried to avoid the danger that will attend his being diſcouraged. It is often owing to the little order exiſting in the camp, that the soldiers are ſeized with a panic, occaſioned by the abſurd and groundleſs reports that are diffuſed throughout it ; troops thus terrified, are in a manner vanquished before they come to action.

In a mountainous country, ſuch places ſhould be avoided as are ſubject to be overflowed, either by the melting of the ſnow, or by torrents, which at ſome ſeaſons appear no more than trifling rivulets, but which, at others, ſwell and carry off every thing they meet with in their way : of this nature were thoſe mentioned by Μ. de Feuquieres, which he found near the rock that he attacked and took in 1690 from the Baduais. Situations in the neighbourhood of woods are generally to be feared, becauſe the enemy may ſet them on fire, and the flames be communicated to the camp. The general ought alſo to ſatisſy himſelf with regard to the na­ture of the ſprings, which may agree very well with the in­habitants, but prove very unwholeſome to ſlrangers : ſuch, according to the reports of the French, is the nature of the ſprings in many parts of Italy. The water belonging to certain streams or rivers will be pernicious, while that belong­ing to the fountains and wells in the same country will be very wholeſome and ſalutary.

Sect. VII. *Of efcorting Convoys.*

The conducting of convoys is one of the most important and most difficult of all military operations. In the escort assigned them, and the number of horſe and foot of which this effort is compoſed, the general ought to be guided by the distance of the town from whence they ſet out ; the dan­gers to which they are expoſed from the different parties they may meet ; the distance and ſtrength of the enemy, and the extent and nature of the country they have to tra­vel over, whether an open or a mountainous one ; the num­ber of waggons, and the quality of the convoys, whether they consist of money, or ammunition for war or provision ; and whether they are extraordinary or daily. When efforts are too numerous, the troops are fatigued, and no end anſwered ; and when they are too weak, they are liable to be beaten. Μ. de Puysegur obſerves, that it is as dangerous to give an effort of 2000 men to a convoy where only 1000 are requisite, as to give but 500 to one where 1000 are absolutely necessary ; in the first, the troops are unnecessarily fatigued, and in the second, the convoy is expoſed to the danger of being carried off.

All theſe considerations ſuppoſe the general to be a man whoſe natural parts are matured by experience, and who is ſensible that, without a thorough knowledge of the country, the foundation of all conduct, it will be impossible to make a proper diſposition of troops. If a general is ignorant of the places most proper to form ambuscades ; of thoſe where there are bridges and fords ; of the paſſes which are most dangerous, and thoſe which will favour the enemy’s ap­proach in order to attack, and whether in head, flank, or rear—he acts but as chance directs, and his diſpoſitions will have no meaning, either with reſpect to the situation of pla­ces, or the nature of the ground ; the orders will be ill exe­cuted, the evolutions performed without exactneſs, and the diſposition of the troops will be faulty ; the ſeparate bodies being, conſequently, unable to ſuſtain and assist each other,