number of the enemy by which it is liable to be attacked, yet the general ſhould never neglect, whatever his situation may be, to secure the head, centre, and rear. Before the convoy begins its march, the diſposition in case of an at­tack ſhould be settled ; by which means the commanding officers of different corps will know where to post them­ſelves, and after what manner to act at the time the attack is made. By the knowledge which the commanding of­ficer ought to have of the country, he will form a judgment of thoſe places where it is most probable he may be attack­ed, and of course make his dispoſitions accordingly. In any diſposition that may happen, a general ſhould always foresee in what manner the attack, defence, and retreat, will be conducted.

When a convoy marches through an open country, the advanced and rear guards ſhould consist of cavalry ſustained by infantry ; the infantry in the centre ſhould be continued on the right and left of the waggons, and the cavalry di­vided into troops ſhould be distributed on the flanks, at 100 or 150 paces from the infantry; squadrons of horse, in­termixed with platoons of infantry, ſhould be placed at pro­per distances on the flanks of the remaining part of the con­voy. By this position, if the convoy ſhould be attacked in head, centre, or rear, these squadrons and platoons should have orders to march immediately to the assistance of the party that is attacked.

The advanced detachments of hussars, and thoſe upon the flanks, by giving notice that the enemy is at hand and coming to attack, will furnish time for parking the wag­gons and uniting the troops ; in which case the infantry must form in the park, and the cavalry post itself on the flank of that front which expects to be attacked, and the hussars place themſelves upon the flanks of the cavalry.

The attack of a convoy is always sudden and rapid, and the ſuccess of it is generally decided in the first onset ; and as the enemy, whether he ſucceeds in his attempt or not, must retire with great expedition, for fear of any ſuccour that may arrive, it is evident that it can be attacked only by cavalry, hussars, or dragoons ; there have indeed been ſome instances where the cavalry have brought infantry be­hind them. If the convoy has had time to park itself, the effort of the infantry can only be turned against that which it intrenched behind the waggons. The enemy’s cavalry and that belonging to the effort attacking each other, will fight upon equal terms : but with regard to the infantry, it will be different ; that which is ſheltered by the carriages having a great advantage over that which attacks it. On the contrary, if the enemy’s infantry is ſustained by hussars only, they will be briſkly attacked by the cavalry and hussars belonging to the effort, who will take them in flank and rear. The enemy’s hussars being hemmed in, his in­fantry, for want of being ſustained, will be easily beaten : part of the cavalry and hussars belonging to the effort ſhould be left in pursuit of the enemy’s hussars, and the re­mainder ought to take his infantry in flank. If the enemy is beaten, as it is probable he will, his retreat seems imprac­ticable, or at best very difficult ; because, being deprived of his cavalry, he will be forced to make head against the in­fantry that attacks him in front, and to repulse the cavalry that harasses him in flank.

It the enemy gives ground, the general ſhould be cauti­ous of purſuing him too far, lest, if he ſhould receive a re­inforcement, the troops in pursuit of him, finding themselves at too great a distance, will not only be beat, but also be deprived of every method of retreating.

There are ſome occasions on which the enemy must not be purſued at all ; ſuch as when the armies are very close to each other, or the convoy draws near to ſome of the ene­my’s posts ; because then, by the nearness of the army, the enemy’s infantry can come to the attack without being under the necessity of mounting behind the cavalry. A ge­neral, to whole care a convoy is intruded, ſhould never seek any other advantage than the conducting it in ſafety, even though he ſhould be sure of beating and taking a detach­ment belonging to the enemy ; a real advantage is often given up by endeavouring to follow an uncertain victory. There is leſs ſhame in being beat, when an officer hath done his utmost, and acted with propriety, than there is glory acquired in conquering when he hath exceeded the limits of his duty. An officer is no longer praise-worthy, than whilst he acts up to the orders he hath received with exactness and diſcretion ; whereas he who, depending too much ou his own courage, raſhly suffers himself to be drawn on by the appearance of ſucceis, is not only charged with, but ought to be answerable for, the consequences.

There still remains another diſpofition to be made in an open country, whether the convoy marches on a causeway or in the high road, which is to divide the effort into many equal parts, with troops of every sort belonging to each ; the full body ſhould let out an hour before the convoy is to begin its march, the second half an hour after, with or­ders to the commanding officers to scour the adjacent country with great exactness, and to be careful not to be cut off by any detachments the enemy may have in the country ; for which reaſon these two bodies ſhould never be more than three quarters of a league distant from each other, by which means they will be within reach of assisting each other. The body which lets out last ſhould never be more than half a league before the advanced guard of the effort.

As the convoy is ſupposed to march through an open country, the above-mentioned distances are allotted between the first and second bodies, and between the second body and the advanced guard of the convoy ; but if the country ſhould grow rough and unequal, these bodies ſhould draw closer together, and always keep sight of each ocher, ſo as to be able to assist one another in case of an attack.

When these bodies are set out, the general must put the convoy in motion, and form the advanced guard of one of the divided detachments belonging to the effort ; the in­fantry of which detachment will remain at the head of the waggons, the cavalry ſhall march by troops 300 paces iu advance, and the rear-guard must be formed equal to the advanced ; but besides this rear-guard, there ſhould be a body of hussars and dragoons reserved, to march a quarter of a league or more, according to the nature of the country, in the rear of the convoy ; the remainder of the infantry ſhall be distributed at proper distances on the sides of the convoy, and the remainder of the cavalry ſhall be placed on the flanks of the convoy, about 300 paces distance.

When a convoy happens to be of ſuch importance that its being taken may influence the operations during the re­mainder of the campaign, the general ſhould not only assign a stronger or more numerous effort to it, but ſhould also fend off detachments, which, without having orders to attack the enemy, ſhould keep between him and the road that the convoy keeps, in order to oppoſe and baffle any designs the enemy may have formed to carry it off. The following examples will ſhow both the security and necessity of this method.

During the campaign of 1746, marſhal Saxe, being encamped on the Orne, was in expectation of a considerable convoy from Judoigne. As its safe arrival in the camp was of great consequence, he caused the marquis of d’Armentieres, then major-general, to set out with a large detach­ment in the night preceding the day on which the convoy