was to begin its march, with orders to march on the side of Ramillies. At the same time, he caused another de­tachment to set out from the camp of his ſerene highneſs the prince of Clermont, with orders to march on the side of the abbey of Rame : theſe two detachments, by amusing the enemy on one side, and by entirely concealing the march of the convoy on the other, enabled it to proceed in ſecurity, and it arrived in the camp without having been at all molested.

In the beginning of the campaign in 1748, the same ge­neral having a design to lay siege to Maestricht, and conſequently having occasion for all his troops, was willing to throw a ſupply of provisions into Bergen-op-Zoom, as he was going to a distance from that place, and could no longer be in a situation of assisting it. For that purpoſe he ordered a considerable convoy, which ſet out from Ant­werp for that town under a good eſcort ; but in order to prevent an attack, which circumstance had often happened during the winter, and that with loſs, the allies at that time occupying a chain of quarters from Breda as far as Voude, he detached the count d’Estrees with a considerable body of cavalry to march on the side of Breda, with orders to push on detachments almost to Voude. This detachment had two objects in view ; one of which was to keep the allies in ſuſpenſe with regard to the siege that was to be formed, and the other to cauſe them to remain near Breda. This large body of cavalry kept the allies, who were in the neighbourhood of that town, in ſuſpenſe ; during which interval marſhal Saxe marched to Maestricht, the allies not daring to attack the convoy, because they would have put themselves between the eſcort and the troops under count d’Estrees. From theſe two examples may be concluded the necessity of covering convoys of importance by detach­ments, independent of the eſcort assigned them. In short, a general ſhould do every thing that will contribute to the security of his diſpoſitions ; and precautions ought never to be thought superfluous when they are managed with prudence, and have for their end the ſucceſs of a well-con­certed plan.

Sect. VIII. *Of Detachments for forming a Chain of green Forage.*

It is very difficult to provide a large army with forage ; and a general often expoſes it to inevitable danger, if he is not thoroughly experienced in this operation, or if he is destitute of that knowledge which at once preſents all the wants of an army, and the means of supplying them, to his view.

Foraging parties, like convoys, are attended with a greater or lesser degree of danger, according as the country is more or leſs accessible, and the forage at a distance or near at hand. The disposition for the chain in an open country is different from what it must be in a mountainous one. When forage is within reach of the camp, and the enemy at a distance, fewer troops and attendants are required ; because, in case of an attack, there is assistance near at hand : but in proportion as the forage is farther from the camp and nearer to the enemy, the precautions ſhould be increaſed, and more troops ſhould be allotted to the chain, which ſhould alſo ſometimes be furniſhed with cannon.

A general ſhould never forget that maxim which says, The enemy must always be oppoſed by troops of the same nature as thoſe with which he makes the attack : if the forage, therefore, is in an open country, the chain, as it is certain the enemy will be more numerous in cavalry than infantry, ſhould consist chiefly of cavalry, and only have infantry ſufficient to occupy ſuch posts as are necessary to be guarded : in a mountainous country the dispositions will be quite different ; because, as it is impossible for cavalry to move easily, the chain ſhould be strongest in infantry. In ſhort, the number and quality of the troops for the chain ſhould be regulated in the same manner as in regard to the convoys; in proportion to the nearneſs or distance of the enemy ; by the extent of ground to be foraged ; and by the nature of the country : and as marſhal Puyſegur obſerves, before the ground to be foraged is examined, there ſhould be a calculation made of the number of horſes to be fed, and of the fertility of the ground that is to be fora­ged ; for if it is a plentiful ſpot, a leſs extent will be ſufficient ; if it is not plentiful, a larger must be taken ; but in either case the chain must be always proportionable.

Before a forage is undertaken, the ground on which it is to be performed ſhould be always thoroughly known ; in order for which the general ſhould send out in the even­ing, or the day before, the officer who is to command it, with a detachment, to ſurvey the situation of the country ; the places where he must post his troops of cavalry and dragoons ; the posts which the infantry must occupy ; the ground necessary for the foragers ; that where the corps of reserve must be posted ; and what part in the front of the chain it will be necessary for the hussars to ſcour. After having examined all theſe particulars, the officer makes his report to the general, who, from the account given him, will order the troops necessary to ſecure the forage, and render the execution of it eaſy. The chain of forage ſhould be in proportion to the number of troops that are to forage, as well as to the quantity of ſown fields and the thickneſs of the grain. Besides the horſe, dragoons, and infantry, there ſhould be hussars to ſcour the country in the front of the chain : the number of them is undetermined, as it will be ſufficient for them to cover and protect the front, and give the commanding officer immediate notice of every thing that makes its appearance.

if the forage is to be made at a distance from the camp, the troops destined for the chain ſhould ſet out at day-break, or the evening of the foregoing night. The commanding officer must take care to establiſh the chain before the fo­ragers arrive, and alſo that the hussars have ſcoured the country ; first, because the foragers ſhould not, by waiting, fatigue the horſes ; and ſecondly, that no trooper or servant ſhall paſs; which will undoubtedly be the case if there is any vacancy where troops are not placed.

The whole of the troops ſhould be diſpoſed after ſuch a manner as to be able to see one another ; and the vedets alſo, that are placed between the troops to prevent the fo­ragers from passing, ſhould be within hearing. The infan­try ſhould be posted in hollows and villages and behind hed­ges, with horſe or dragoons to ſustain it and ſupport the flanks ; and the diſposition of the chain will be still better, if theſe troops can be mixed with it, provided the infantry can be flickered by any hollows, hedges, or buſhes.

Grenadiers, ſustained by horſe and cannon, if there are any, ſhould be polled on thoſe sides which, either from the situation of the country or the nearneſs of the enemy, are most liable to be attacked : but in reinforcing theſe posts, the commanding officer must be careful not to weaken the chain too much in any particular part. When an ene­my attacks a foraging party, he generally attempts to pe­netrate at different parts ; but if he forms only one attack, the diſposition of the chain becomes uſeleſs, as all the troops mull be brought to that part where the attack is made. But as it is naturally to be ſuppoſed the enemy will form many attacks, particularly if his general acts like a man