which means, if the spy's intelligence is true, the enemy will not only be baulked in his design, but may alſo be beat by the ſuperior detachment. If the enemy’s detachment has but a trifling object in view, it will be ſufficient to send just troops ſufficient to examine into the truth of the ſpy’s report. The general may alſo pretend to appoint a fora­ging within two days, and order but few troops for the chain ; in which interval, if the ſpy is falſe, he will find an opportunity of giving the enemy notice of it : but, instead of the few troops publicly ordered, the general will privately add another body to them, which will be placed in ambuſcade behind the place where the pretended forage is to be made. If the enemy, in conſequence of this information, ſhould come and attack the chain, it ſhould immediately retire, as it too inferior in number to continue the forage, toward the troops in ambuscade ; when, being joined, they will fall upon the enemy on all sides. If this attack is made with vivacity and reſolution, there may be great reaſon to expect it will terminate in a complete victory.

If, on the contrary, the ſpy does not appear intelligent, or affects stupidity, the general ſhould puniſh him with death, and cause him to be hanged in the sight of the whole army, in order to deter others, which may be diſperſed in the camp, by his fate. It would be needleſs to question him con­cerning the enemy, becauſe it would appear inhuman to ex­ecute a man who had given intelligence of importance, whether extorted from him by fear, force, or perhaps a promiſe of pardon.

Spies are as necessary to a general as arms are to an army : but it is money only that can ſecure their fidelity ; and if a general finds himſelf ill ſerved, it is becauſe he has been too ſparing of the funds intended by his ſovereign for that purpoſe. Notwithstanding it is the duty of a good subject to manage his master’s finances as much as it is in his power, yet there are intelligences of ſo great importance, that it is ſcarcely poſſible to pay ſufficiently for them. A man is ſufficiently indemnified when, by means of the in­telligence he has received, he has conceited his meaſures in ſuch a manner as to beat the enemy, gain ſome marches over him, or to be beforehand with him in ſome enterpriſe.

Spies, when diſcovered, ſhould not always be puniſhed with death ; great advantage may be made of them by pre­tending ignorance of their real quality, eſpecially if they are not ſufficiently diſguiſed. Tacitus, in his Annals, says, that Vitellius’s party got information of Otho’s designs by means of his ſpies, who, by endeavouring to dive too mi­nutely into their enemy’s ſecrets, did not ſufficiently conceal their own. Vigetius’s method for diſcovering ſpies who are ſuſpended to be ranging about in a camp, is to order all the ſoldiers and ſervants into their tents during the day, and the ſpies will be taken immediately.

When a general is ignorant of the enemy’s designs he ſhould always affect a knowledge of them ; but whenever he is informed of them, he ſhould, on the contrary, pretend to be ignorant of them ; by which means the enemy, being eaſy with regard to his ſpies, will not alter his designs, or ſuſpect the general of having any knowledge of them.

If the general can procure ſuch ſpies as, by their em­ployment, are near the perſon of the enemy’s general ; as, for example, a ſecretary, or any others who are near him, and who conſequently can give intelligence more to be relied upon than those who are constantly passing from one army to another ; their ſervice may be turned to a very great account.

If a general diſcovers an enemy’s ſpy to be one of thoſe who, by their employment, are near his perſon, he can re­ceive great advantage, by forcing him to write a letter of false intelligence, thereby to divert the enemy’s attention from the plan he would execute ; but he ſhould cause him to be hanged immediately after, for it would be very im­prudent to uſe him above once. The prince of Orange, when he came to attack Μ. Luxemburg at Steinkirk, ha­ving diſcovered one of his musicians who gave the enemy intelligence of every thing he intended, made uſe of this stratagem ; and although it was rendered abortive by the vigilance of Μ. de Luxemburg, and the courage of his troops, there are nevertheleſs but very few instances where it hath failed : and even Μ. de Luxemburg would have been beaten, if he had not had early notice given him by his advanced detachments ; by which means he had time ſufficient to make his diſpositions, and to avoid being ſurpriſed.

There is a stratagem which may be made uſe of when ſpies are wanting, and which is leſs expensive ; that is, to send ſupposititious letters by the first peaſant that comes in the way, who will have nothing to fear ; and ſo far from concealing himſelf, he must take a road where he will be ſure of falling into the enemy’s hands : theſe letters ſhould be directed to the general officers commanding a body of troops, or even to the general of the army, ſupposing they come from an advanced body. They ſhould contain ſchemes that are good, and practicable in their execution, but quite oppoſite to what is intended and will really be undertaken : it often happens that the enemy, too credulous, abandons his original designs to purſue chimerical ones, which to him appear very good, and do not preſent any obstacle to thoſe which the general designs to execute. Prince Eugene ſucceeded, by this stratagem, in raising the siege of Coni, formed by the French in 1691.

But nevertheleſs a general ſhould take care that, through a fear of being deceived by ſupposititious letters, he does not himſelf too much neglect the intimations which are given him: a general ought, says Onozander, to listen to every body at all times, and upon all occasions. Alexander, when at a great distance from his own country, not being able to receive his couriers till very late, refuſed to give attention to a peaſant, who came to inform him of a shorter route ; but ſoon repenting of what he had done, he ſent to ſeek after him, but in vain.

The same reaſon that ſhould make a general always have ſpies in the enemy’s army, ſhould alſo make him suspect that the enemy has ſome in his ; therefore he ſhould endeavour to deceive them, he ſhould keep his intentions ſecret, mention them to very few, and always talk openly, contrary to what is really designed. Onozander obſerves, that it ſhows great folly in a general to mention his designs publicly, eſpecially when they are on the eve of execution ; for deſerters generally go over to the enemy at the time an action is unavoidable.

But if it is diſcovered that the enemy has received in­formation, Vigetius says, that the diſpositions must be im­mediately changed. Polybius, on like occasions, particular­ly recommends silence and dissimulation ; he even stretches this rule as far as the thoughts themſelves, which he says must ſometimes be repressed, for fear our actions ſhould ſometimes betray and diſcover them. Metellus anſwered one of his friends, who, on an important occasion, asked him the reaſon of certain diſpositions, “that if his shirt knew what he thought, he would burn it.”

To avoid the danger of treachery, ſealed orders have been uſed with great ſucceſs, which have been ſent to of­ficers, with expreſs orders not to open them till at ſuch a time and at ſuch a place : this is an eftabliſhed rule at ſea, and can alſo be practised on ſhore when employed in an expedition which it is essential to conceal from the enemy.