that the enemy, not finding the ambuscade in the places pointed out by the deserters, will imagine it to be retired, and, in that belief, will neglect the precautions necessary in ſuch a situation.

An ambuscade that is ſucceſsful may cauſe the destruction of a whole army. The example cited by Μ. de Feuquieres, in his Memoirs, on that head, is linking. Μ. de Luxemburg, Hill attached to the prince, took all the bag­gage belonging to Μ. Turenne’s army, becauſe the lieu­tenant-general who commanded the eſcort did not foreſee that the enemy, ſhut up in his lines of circumvallation be­fore Arras, having two armies near his camp with a design of attacking him in his lines, could think of sending out a large detachment of cavalry on an enterpriſe of ſuch a sort. In the mean time Μ. Luxemburg, who was in ambuscade, within reach of the column of baggage, seeing that the lieutenant-general was gone on before with the head of the eſcort, imagining the baggage in ſecurity, marched ſpeedily to the head of that column, whoſe march he ftopped, and turned toward St Pol, where he conducted the whole bag­gage belonging to Μ. Turenne’s army, without his know­ing any thing of the matter. It is thus that, by the negli­gence of an officer, and by an ambuscade ſeaſonably placed, an army finds itſelf stripped of all its baggage, and, as may be ſaid, not in a condition of continuing the campaign.

If this lieutenant-general had been provided with ſpies, detachments in front and on the flanks, theſe detachments would have diſcovered the ambuſcades, and, by the precau­tions uſual on ſuch occaſions, he would have placed the baggage of the army in ſafety. Again, his ſpies would have given him notice, that a large body of cavalry was detached from the camp before Arras, conſequently he would have been upon his guard ; instead of which, being full of a falſe confidence, he marched as if in a champaign country, and, by this unpardonable remissness, occasioned the loss of the whole baggage. An officer who commands a detachment for any expedition whatever, cannot possibly take too much care to foreſee the checks that may happen to him ; if he is beaten, it ſhould be wholly owing to a ſuperiority of force. He who, after having taken all the precautions poſſible, is beaten by an enemy who has the advantage of number, has nothing to reproach himſelf with: but he who, with ability, has nevertheleſs neglected certain precautions, and is beat becauſe they were not taken, is certainly culpable in the eyes of intelligent men.

Sect. III. *Of Camps in offensive War.*

To take an advantageous position for an army; to make choice of a ſpot that by its situation is strongly ſecured ; to establiſh a camp there, and to be alſo able to have the army within distance of marching easily to the enemy, without fear of being molested ; in short, to throw such difficulties in the enemy’s way as may prevent his harassing the army, is one of the most essential branches of know­ledge for a general. He who is endowed with this talent can, with an inferior army, not only make head against the enemy, but alſo cauſe his designs to miſcarry ; fatigue him the whole campaign by marches and counter-marches, which lead to nothing ; oblige him to remain inactive, and at length draw him into a favourable poſition, where he will be morally sure of beating him. All this was done by Μ. Turenne in 1675, who, after having exhausted every expe­dient wherewith his military knowledge could furniſh him to draw Μ. de Montecuculi into a diſadvantageous post, at length ſucceeded, found an opportunity of attacking him, and gloriously tell at the instant victory declared itſelf in his favour.

Before a general takes the field, he ought to be very certain what number of troops he ſhall have, that his magazines both of war and provision are ready, as well as the waggons, pontons, and all other implements whatever that are neceſſary for an army ; for events may happen that it is almost impossible to foreſee, and which often alter the best concerted deſigns. But when every thing is in order, a ge­neral possessed of the neceſſary talents can foreſee the event even before taking the field : he will know beforehand the marches he is to make, the camps he is to occupy, and thoſe which the enemy will endeavour to ſeize in order to oppoſe his designs.

An offensive war is undoubtedly carried on with greater eaſe in an open than in a mountainous country. But whether in the one or in the other, no ſuperiority of number ſhould make a general neglectful of the ſafety of his troops in their camp ; he ſhould always be assiduous in preſerving the ſtrictest order and diſcipline among them ; one or two checks are generally ſufficient to diſcourage the ſoldier, and take away that confidence which he ought to have in his general; the advanced posts ſhould be well guarded, the flanks ſecured, and detachments frequently ſent out towards the enemy ; for as ſucceſs is inſured by vigilance and care, ſo negligence and slack diſcipline are ruin to the most for­midable army, and entertaining a contemptible opinion of an enemy renders him more daring.

It is to be obſerved, that a camp ought never to be fixed on the banks of rivers ; but a ſufficient ſpace ſhould always be left between them and the camp, to draw out the army in order of battle. If this precaution is not taken, it may happen that the enemy, encamped either near to or at a distance from the other side of the river, being informed of the position of the army, will come in the night to alarm the camp, and by a diſcharge of artillery and ſmall arms throw the whole camp into confusion, without risking the loſs of a single man. For this reason, a camp ſhould always be placed at leaſt eight or ten hundred yards from a river ; ſo that the guards may be advanced without being expoſed, and within the circumſerence of the camp and compaſs of the guards the army may be ſupplied with forage for at leaſt four days, and more if poſſible.

There are ſome situations for a camp which are in ap­pearance strong, but may notwithstanding prove very dan­gerous, if care be not taken to examine whether or not the army can with eaſe come out of it, to form itſelf in order of battle ; or whether the enemy can prevent it, by block­ing up the avenues and outlets. If this precaution be not taken, an army may be the means of ſhutting itſelf up ; as was done at Seneff in 1674, and by the allies at Aſchaffenbourg in 1743.

The choide and strength *of* a camp depend on the position of the enemy and situation of the country ; a general ſhould always avoid encamping the cavalry in a wood, and ſhould be particularly careful that the wings are ſheltered ; the woods ſhould be occupied by the infantry, and entrench­ments thrown up in front, according to the deſigns intended to be put in execution. If the wings are ſheltered by a village, it ſhould be entrenched, and infantry ported in it ; and the camp ſhould be covered by a river as much as poſ­ſible, unless the intention is to march towards the enemy ; then all the obstacles that can prevent the army coming up with him ſhould be avoided : but if, from some ſuccesses of the enemy, or from his ſuperiority of troops, the general cannot determine upon opening the campaign offensively,he must use other means to bring it about; and in the mean time should-strengthen himſelf in his camp, establiſh posts on the banks of the river, and cover them by continual detachments of light horse; who, by extending themselves,