will prevent parties of the enemy from passing to ſeize on the hind-parts of the camp, molest the convoys, and attack the foragers.

Whatever may be the nature of the country, it is often neceſſary to have corps detached from the body of the army, to cover or keep open a communication with some place, in order to prevent the enemy from foraging too near the camp ; to preserve the forage ; to raise contributions at a distance ; to occupy ſome advantageous post ; to oblige the enemy to divide his forces in order to oppoſe that body ; to cover the camp either in the front or on the flanks, ac­cording to that side which is left moſt unguarded and expoſed : in a word, there ſhould always be continual detach­ments toward the enemy, as hath been the practice of many generals, and particularly of marſhal Saxe. The strength of this body is to be proportioned to the uſe designed for it by the general ; but it is uſually compoſed of light horſe, ſome regiments of light infantry, and a brigade or two of dragoons. In the end will be ſeen what uſe ſhould be made of this body ; but in whatever ſituation it is to be placed, the communication between it and the army must always be kept open, that it may at any time be able to join it on the first order ; and its camp must be ſo choſen, that the ge­neral may always receive intelligence from it of the least movements made by the enemy. See Plate DXVII,

In every country, and on every occasion, a camp is al­ways defective if the wings are not sheltered, or can be easily distressed by the enemy ; if the front is not guarded and the rear well covered ; if the communications with the frontier towns are not ſecure and eaſy ; if there is any want of forage, wood, and water ; and if there are not de­tachments in front, to prevent the enemy from approach­ing the camp.

A general who joins experience and ſtudy together, ought to see into the intention of the enemy’s general, and judge of his designs by any of his proceedings, however trifling. All thoſe who are destined to the command of armies can­not indeed be endowed with this quick and exact eye, that ready power of judging of a good motion or a good position upon the ſpot. Some generals have excelled in marches, others in the position of camps; theſe in the arrangement of troops in order of battle, thoſe in their conduct in time of action ; others in providing ſubsistence, others in projecting a campaign. There have nevertheleſs been ſome of theſe great men, whoſe genius and temper have united and carried all theſe qualifications to the greatest degree of perfection ; but the rarer theſe examples are, the more a man ought, by continual study, to endeavour to augment their number, and strive to merit the honour of being enrolled among thoſe heroes, the ornament of mankind, their coun­try’s ſupport, and their maker’s glory.

Sect. IV. *Of the Attack of an Army on its March.*

However difficult certain operations in war may appear, they are nevertheleſs not impraticable when a general knows how to take the neceſſary precautions for lessening thoſe difficulties. The attack of an army on its march ſeems to be above all reach of attempting ; whereas the ſucceſs of such an attempt depends only upon knowing how to take proper meaſures, on choosing the ground, and on ſeizing a favourable opportunity.

When an army would attack another upon its march, it ſhould endeavour to be beforehand with it, and, by the means of stolen marches, come up with it before it can know any thing of the matter : ſome parties ſhould be detached, who must place themſelves in ambuscade, in order to stop all the comers and goers, ſo that the march and designs of the army may be kept ſecret from the enemy. Whenever a general hath determined to attack his enemy, he ſhould send off all the baggage, both great or small, belonging to the army ; and it ſhould be left in the rear under a good eſcort, near enough to join after victory, without the army’s being obliged to wait three or four days for it.

The general ſhould be well aſſured of the day on which the enemy’s army ſets out ; of the country through which it is to march ; whether it is an open, mountainous, or woody country’ ; if it is divided by rivers ; whether there are many bridges to paſs ; and in how many columns it marches : he ſhould also get all poſſible information of the diſposition of it. In the third ſection of the first part, re­lative to the march of an army in an open country, the diſ­position which it ought to make, in case it preſents its front or flank to the enemy, hath been laid down. The general designing to attack ought to regulate his diſpositions by thoſe which the enemy hath taken, and which he can only know from his ſpies ; but if he cannot receive any informa­tion concerning them, the best rule for him is to suppoſe them good, and to form his own accordingly.

As in the case of a ſurprise there cannot be signals given, without running the risk of the enemy’s diſcovering that he is going to be attacked ; it is therefore necessary, that every general officer leading columns ſhould have a watch, regu­lated by the general’s, ſo as to march all at the same time, at the hour agreed on and ordered. The ancients, destitute of watches, regulated their motions by the course of the stars ; and it is, without doubt, on that account that Polybius, Onozander, Ælian, and many others, exhorted military men to the study of astronomy : but as it is not often that an army marches by night, this knowledge would be very uselels for an attack in the day-time ; besides, the sun, by which they were alſo regulated, could be no way ſerviceable to them, ſhould the ſky be overcast.

If the general’s intention is to attack the enemy’s army in front, he must detach all his light troops, ſustained by a large body of cavalry and ſome battalions, with orders to haraſs the flanks, in order to perplex the enemy with re­gard to the real attack. It is impossible to give the enemy too many falſe alarms with regard to what is really designed : the hussars, from their readineſs in retreating, and their quickneſs in passing from one ſpot to another, are the fittest troops for theſe sort of expeditions. The same rule ought to be obſerved if the real attack is designed to be upon the flank ; then the falſe attacks ſhould be upon the front. In Santa Cruz may be ſeen the diſpositions which he has made to attack an army on its march.

Stratagem, and the means of ſurprising an army, are al­lowable in war, provided treachery is avoided. Whilst the law of nations is not infringed, ſucceſsful stratagems add lustre to the genius of the general ; but there is no profession in which rectitude of mind is more neceſſary than in that of war.

In order to carry on a ſurpriſe by stratagem, one of the most certain methods is, to calculate what time is necessary for the army to arrive at day-break near the road by which the enemy is to paſs, ſo as to be able to examine the coun­try, and make the neceſſary diſpositions for the attack. In an open country the army may be concealed behind corn, or behind a rising ground. Prince Eugene, in 1702, after the battle of Crostolo, having gained ſome days march of the king of Spain, posted himſelf between the Zero and the Po. He ſo well concealed his army behind the bank of the Zero, that the combined army of France and Spain, which was on its march, and ready to enter into its camp, was obliged to range itſelf in order of battle, and to fight, without having ſcarcely time to make any diſposition.