A woody country offers more expedients for the conceal­ing of troops : but as it is to be supposed the enemy’s ad­vanced guard will be advanced at least a half or three quar­ters of a league, to scour the country ; therefore, if the general’s design is to attack the enemy’s flank, he must preſent ſome cavalry and hussars in the front of the enemy’s army, ſo as to engage his attention. Some infantry ſhould be placed in the woods, in the rear of theſe troops, in order to ſustain them : this cavalry and the hussars ſhould retire in proportion as the advanced guard advances, in or­der to induce the enemy to believe they are not ſufficiently strong, and that the reason of their advancing was only to examine the march of the army. As ſoon as the enemy ſhall have reached the place agreed on by the generals lead­ing columns that are to attack, the body of infantry that is in ambuſcade in the wood, the number of whoſe columns ſhould be regulated according to the situation of the coun­try, will march silently, and near enough to the enemy, and will charge him with bayonets, without giving him time to recover himself : during this attack the cavalry, dragoons, and huſſars, who keep the enemy’s front in awe, will charge the troops who have paſſed the wood and spread themſelves over the plain. Theſe troops of cavalry must be ſustained by the infantry which was in their rear in the wood, and which ſhould be furniſhed with cannon. Theſe two attacks, made one after the other, but at ſome ſmall distance of time, will render the enemy doubtful with re­gard to the diſpositions he is to make ; he will be unde­termined where to send assistance, as the cannon which he will hear at the head will induce him to believe that attack the real one : he will fly to that part, and will conſequently weaken the flank, which is deſigned to be attacked by all the infantry. By this diversion the flank will with greater eaſe be broken through, and the enemy taken in rear : the enemy thus ſurrounded, and finding himſelf between two fires, cannot avoid being beaten.

It is more difficult to form ambuſcades in an open coun­try, particularly for a whole army, unleſs it ſhould find a bank like that at Zero ; then the general ſhould consider whether or not the attack of the army on its march is prac­ticable. If the general by his ſuperiority can, without weakening himſelf, divide his army, and find means to con­ceal it, he will attempt the attack, provided that each de­tached body is posted before the enemy has begun his march, and that they can all join on the first order, without a poſsibility of being cut off or finding any obstacle to prevent their marching up to the enemy : but, in order to a greater certainty of ſuccess, theſe first diſpositions being made, great exactness in giving, and diligence in the execution of the orders, is necessary ; each ſeparate body ſhould charge at the same time, and at different parts. But as the attack may prove unſucceſsful, whether owing to the good diſpo­sition of the enemy, or whether becauſe the attacks were not made together or executed with equal vivacity, it is necessary that the general ſhould have provided for a retreat, and that the officers commanding different bodies ſhould know after what manner and from what part it is to be­gin. For the greater ſecurity, the general officers ought to communicate their instructions to the commanding of­ficer of each body composing that which they command, ſo that at the time of the attack or of the retreat, they may instantly comprehend the meaning of whatever they are ordered to perform.

If the army intending to attack the enemy on his march is weaker, or equal, either in number or in the nature of the troops, it is then only the situation of the country, and the facility with which the enemy may be ſurpriſed, that should determine the attempt of this grand enterpriſe : the prudence of the general, his experience ; that of the gene­rals who are under his command; the quality of his troops ; whether they are well diſciplined or not; whether they are compoſed of one or of many nations ; the quality of the troops to be attacked ; and, in ſhort, the genius of their ge­neral, are circumstances by which the attacking or not at­tacking ſhould be decided. It is impossible to be decisive upon theſe circumstances, which depend entirely upon the ground, upon the vigilance of the enemy’s general, upon the order which he cauſes his troops to obſerve in their march, and in ſhort upon the troops under his command. A general, at the head of a well-diſciplined army, compoſed of veterans and good general officers, will undertake and execute designs which he would not even dare think of with a new- raiſed army, however numerous : it is alſo very difficult to ſurpriſe a vigilant general, who is besides a good soldier, and who is alſo assisted by the counſels of able and in­telligent officers.

A general ſhould alſo be guided, in attacking the enemy on a march, by the country and the nature of the troops of which his army is compoſed. If the enemy marches through an open country, and the general is equal to him in infan­try but ſuperior in cavalry, he ſhould make no hesitation in attacking him ; but if the country is woody or mountain­ous, and the enemy’s army is more numerous in cavalry than infantry, the general has still the same advantage with a ſuperiority of infantry ; becauſe the enemy’s cavalry in thoſe kind of countries is unable to act against infantry ; and the infantry alſo which the enemy may have will never be ſufficiently strong to maintain itself upon the heights against forces ſo ſuperior : and if the heights are forced, there can be no doubt of the enemy’s being beaten, of his cavalry being ruined and cruſhed to pieces, or that his retreat will be attended with great difficulty, and that he will lose the greater part, if not the whole, of his army.

Sect. V. *Of the Attack of entrenched Camps.*

The principles of war among all nations and in all times have been still the same ; but the little experience of the early ages of the world would not permit thoſe principles to unfold themſelves, as they have since done, and to which it is owing that new expedients both for attack and defence have been diſcovered.

What a ſensible difference is there in the military art, ſuch as it at preſent is, compared with that of which the rules are handed down to us by Onozander, Vigetius, the emperor Leo, Frontinus, Ælian, and many others ? The towns, in their times, had no other defence than walls, raiſed at a great charge, flanked at little distances with towers, and a large ditch in front : it is true that the little force of their weapons contributed much to the advantages of their fortifications. Their entrenched camps had only a large ditch with ſome waggons placed behind it ; and whenever the ancients were willing to practise all the arc at that time known in war, they ſurrounded the camp with walls, in the same manner as they did their towns, with towers at little distances. Of this kind was Pompey’s camp at Dyrachium in Epirus, the plan of which is given in the marſhal de Puyſegur’s Art of War : the wall by which it was ſurrounded was 15,000 paces in extent.

The emperor Leo was unacquainted with any other me­thod of entrenching a camp, than by heaping faſcines to­gether, putting trees upon one another, and posting advan­ced guards.

The experience which hath been since acquired, hath, without increasing the labour, rendered the works of places stronger, and easier to be defended ; the labour of the en-