der to attack the troops lining the convoy ; after which they must join those who attack the advanced and rear­guards. The troops, when re-united, ought to make this attack with vigour, and entirely determine the defeat of the eſcort, and conſequently the taking of the convoy.

A convoy that is divided is half taken, as ſoon as the detachment of the centre is beaten ; because the victori­ous troops can be divided, and part ſent in purſuit of the body that is beaten, and the other part employed to rein­force thoſe who still meet with resistance ; whereas, if only one part is attacked, that which is not attacked can readily send assistance, eſpecially in an open country, where there is nothing to prevent either cavalry or infantry from acting, and being a mutual assistance to each other.

A general who would attack a convoy never runs any hazard by dividing his troops, in order to divide thoſe of the enemy : the more the troops of an eſcort are divided, with the greater eaſe will they be beaten. An officer who would attack, ſhould know the strength of the eſcort, in or­der to regulate the number of his troops by the enemy’s, and to be proportionably stronger. He who is attacked, being ignorant of his enemy’s force, and being charged on all sides, is at a loss where to send assistance, and how to take care of every part : he who attacks by the knowledge be ſhould have of the country, is enabled to post his troops after ſuch a manner as to employ all thoſe belonging to the enemy, without weakening himſelf. The troops which at­tack have certainly great advantages, because, in dividing them, they are still stronger than the body attacked ; and then they can chooſe the place most favourable for the at­tack: whatever may be the precautions taken by the officer commanding the eſcort, whatever may be his vigilance, it will be very difficult for him, considering theſe different attacks and the number of the enemy’s troops, to diſpoſe his own with ſufficient quickneſs to place the convoy in ſecurity, eſpecially if the attack is made with great quickneſs and vigour.

When a convoy is to be attacked as it passes a bridge, the commanding officer ſhould divide his troops into three bodies, placing two of them in ambuſcade on that side of the bridge to which the convoy is advancing, and the third on the side from which it is marching. All the three bodies ſhould remain concealed, if poſſible, till the advanced guard of the convoy, the body at the centre, and ſome of the wag­gons, have passed the bridge ; when they ſhould instantly advance and attack, each that division of the convoy pro­perly oppoſed to it. Three ſuch attacks, made at the same time by ſuperior force, will have the whole advantage of the action ; and the more ſo as the troops of the eſcort be­ing everywhere employed, cannot fend assistance to any par­ticular part. If the two bodies which attacked the advan­ced guard and the centre ſhould break them and put them to flight, there ſhould be troops enough left in purſuit of them to finiſh their entire defeat, without any fear of being repulſed ; the remainder ought to march to the bridge, and cauſe the waggons that are upon it to be ranged in order, and march to the rear-guard, in order to finiſh its defeat, if it still continues to make resistance.

It is necessary to obſerve, that ſome troops ought to be left at the head and along the convoy, in order to take care that the horſes are not taken off from the waggons, and that none of the soldiers or drivers make use of that me­thod to escape.

If the general has not troops ſufficient to be divided into three bodies, he can place ambuſcades to attack only the ad­vanced guard and the centre. This must be done with vi­gour, but not till the troops of the centre ſhall have passed ; and the attack ſhould always be executed by the infantry with the bayonets fixed, and without firing, and by the ca­valry, hussars, and dragoons, ſword in hand. The gene­ral ſhould not then stay to make prisoners ; but ſhould put to death all thoſe whom he finds armed. If the two first detachments are beaten, he ſhould march with the remain­der to the rear-guard, which, not being strong enough to resist a body of troops much more numerous, will undoubt­edly betake itſelf to a retreat. As it is the convoy, and not the troops of the effort, that is the principal object, the general ſhould leave only ſome troops of hussars to purſue the rear-guard ; he ſhould make the waggons file off as fast as possible, and conduct them the nearest way to the camp or the neighbouring town ; or if this cannot be done, he must burn them and carry away the horſes.

Sect. VI. *Of the Attack of green and dry Forages.*

Next to the convoys, the forages become most necessary for the ſubsistence of an army, as it is by them that the ca­valry is ſupported ; and if a general can contrive to deprive the enemy of them, or to molest him in the making of them, his cavalry will ſoon be without reſource, his infantry without baggage, and his artillery without the means of be­ing conveyed.

The detachment destined to attack a party on a green fo­rage, made in an open country, ſhould be compoſed of in­fantry, cavalry, and hussars : the infantry ſhould not appear, but ought to remain in ambuſcade in ſome hollows, behind ſome hedges, or other favourable places ; and it ſhould be careful not to ſhow its arms ; because, by the glittering of the steel, they may be discovered : the cavalry ſhould be di­vided into two bodies, three quarters of a league one from the other, taking care to be able to join in case of necessity. As for the hussars, they ſhould be distributed about in many ſmall detachments to the right and left, and in the centre of the two bodies of cavalry ; upon one of the flanks there ſhould be a more numerous body of hussars placed in ambush, at a greater distance than the ſmall detachments. Every one of thoſe ſmall troops ſhould have a number of trumpets with them ; and when the chain is formed, and the foragers ſpread over the plain, a part of theſe detachments ſhould leave the ambuſcades, making a great noiſe, and attack thoſe belonging to the enemy which are advan­ced ; and theſe detachments will charge them with ſo much the more vigour, as they will be ſustained by the large body of hussars in ambuſcade behind them, and which ſhould march to ſustain them, and attract the attention of the officer com­manding the eſcort. It may happen that this first attack, made on one side only, may induce the enemy to unfurniſh the chain in ſome place, by which it will conſequently be weakened ; and if ſo the other detachment of hussars ſhall instantly advance, followed by one of the bodies of cavalry, in order to attack that part that has been unfurniſhed. If the enemy, more prudent, does not weaken the chain in any particular part, but contents himſelf with making the reserve march to the assistance of the troops which have been at­tacked, the second attack ought always to take place ; but in order to employ the enemy everywhere, the second body of cavalry ſhould march and attack the centre. This at­tack ought to be made with great briſkneſs ſword in hand, whether the enterprise ſucceed or not : if it ſucceed, a great advantage may be drawn from the rout of the chain. Whilst the cavalry and part of the hussars are purſuing the troops of the chain, the other part ſhould sail upon the foragers, where they will without doubt find but little resistance. If the attack do not ſucceed, and that, by the good diſposi­tion of the troops of the chain, the detachment has not been able to force it, it ſhould retire to the infantry that has re-