mained behind in ambuſcade ; this infantry will facilitate the retreat of the cavalry and hussars. But ſuppose that the enemy, too eager, is carried away by this first ſucceſs, a great advantage may be derived from his imprudence, by attacking him resolutely. The whole strength, and each body being united, it is to be imagined, and even hoped, that the advantage will turn on the side of thoſe troops which were repulsed but a moment before; and the more ſo, as the general commanding the chain can have purſued only with his cavalry, his hussars, and dragoons; becauſe his infantry will have remained in the posts which it occupied, either to guard them, or to ſustain the horte, ſupposing they ſhould be repulſed.

If the forage is made in a mountainous country, the in­fantry must act alone, the cavalry being only necesſary when it can have ground on which to act, and ſustain the infantry in case it is repulſed : the infantry ſhould attack the ave­nues and the heights, and possess itſelf, as much as poſſible, of thoſe which have the greatest command, and make the attack in many places, as in an open country. Theſe dif­ferent attacks render the enemy undetermined with regard to his diſpositions ; he does not know where to send assistance : the uncertainty of the general becomes visible to every officer, and communicates itſelf to all the troops ; and thence proceeds their confusion, and conſequently their defeat.

The priſoners and horſes that have been taken ſhould be ſent off first with an eſcort ; the rest of the troops will re­tire immediately after by the ſhortest road. It is cruelty to abandon the wounded, whether friends or enemies ; and as the detachment has undoubtedly found, within the cir­cumference of the chain, ſome waggons with horſes to them, they ſhould be made uſe of to carry off the wounded, who ſhould alſo be ſent on before : if there are no waggons, the detachment must take them from the neighbouring towns.

The attack of a dry forage is conducted nearly in the same manner as that of a green one ; but it is often necessary to employ a greater number of troops ; becauſe, as the forage is made in the villages, it is almost a certainty they will all be guarded by infantry ſustained by cavalry ; where­as the chain of green forage is formed with a much greater number of cavalry than infantry, unleſs it ſhould be in a country where cavalry cannot act. It is difficult to force the villages where infantry is ſustained by cavalry ; whereas it is eaſy for cavalry to attack each other in a plain, where the affair is immediately determined ; but it is not ſo ſoon decided when entrenched infantry is attacked by infantry : but whatever resistance a commander may find, he should al­ways attempt to force it. As the principal object is to prevent the forage, it is obtained by attacking the chain briskly and in all parts ; becauſe it is certain that the gene­ral commanding the forage will cause the foragers to aſſemble ; or elſe, seeing the chain attacked, without waiting for an order, they will of their own accord diſmiſs, and fly toward the camp : but whether they assemble, retire in or­der, or ſhift for themſelves, the end is anſwered, and the fo­rage is left unperformed. If by their flight the commander cannot hope to make any priſoners, he must keep the troops of the chain at bay ſuch a length of time as to make it impossible to continue the forage for that day : he ſhould even if poſſible endeavour to force them to retire ; which if they do, he ſhould purſue them long enough to be certain of their retreat, and then collect all the waggons from the neighbouring villages, cause them to be loaded with the fo­rage intended for the enemy’s army, and conduct it to the camp : if they do not retire, the commander must remain in sight of them during the night, and send to the camp to demand a reinforcement of troops, in order to oblige the enemy to retire. For the same reaſon that a forage ſhould not be abandoned till the last extremity, the troops that would prevent the enemy from attacking it should be abtsolutely bent upon it, at the same time without exposing themſelves to the danger of being beat by any assistance that may come from the camp to the troops belonging to the chain.

Sect. XI. Of *the Passage of Rivers.*

There is hardly an operation of war more difficult than the passage of rivers, whilst war cannot be carried on in countries where there are not rivers to be passed.

Rivers may be passed by ſwimming, by fording, or upon bridges ; but ſmall bodies alone can paſs with ſafety by ſwimming, and, unleſs the stream be very ſhallow, none but the cavalry ſhould paſs at a ford ; for it is ſurely much bet­ter to throw over a bridge or two, than to expoſe the infan­try to the fatigue of wading through a deep current, or the artillery and baggage to the danger of being damaged by water. When a ford is diſcovered and intended to be made uſe of, it ſhould be ſecured in every part, and the ſoldiers employed for that purpoſe ſhould be furniſhed with proper instruments to clear the bottom of every thing which may retard the passage. Its banks ſhould likewise be examined, that it may be known whether they are of difficult or eaſy acceſs, and whether the ground on the other side be marshy, or ſuch as will permit the troops to form immediately on their landing. When bridges are to be built for the paſſage of the army, they must be laid upon boats, pontons, piles, or wooden horses (see theſe articles) ; or in ſome cases rafts may be employed instead of them ; and when a general is furniſhed with theſe necessaries, he will paſs the largest river, in the abſence of the enemy, without difficulty or the loss of a man.

It is not, however, to be ſuppoſed that the enemy will be absent. When a country is invaded, the army that is defending it will endeavour to meet the invaders with the greatest advantage ; and as in the passage of rivers the ad­vantage is wholly on the side of the defensive army, the ge­neral commanding it ſhould there, if poſſible, oppoſe the enemies of his country. We ſhall therefore, in this ſection, treat, 1st, Of the defence necesſary to be made for opposing the enemy, and preventing his passage ; *2dly,* Of the means which a general ſhould employ in order to facilitate the paſſage, notwithstanding the enemy’s opposition ; and, 3*dly,*We ſhall demonstrate by facts the ſecurest method of re­treating.

I. It would be impossible to run through every precau­tion that can be taken to dispute the passage of a river ; we ſhall therefore confine ourſelves to the principal ones, by a ſuccinct relation of the different ſystems of the authors who have treated on that ſubject.

The first precaution to be taken, according to the che­valier de Folard, is, to draw off all the boats which are up­on the river ; to obſerve whether any other river has a com­munication with it : to examine the course, the windings, and the most accessible parts of it ; to raiſe good redoubts near the banks ; to tender the bottom uneven by means of sacks and baſkets filled with ſtones, large trees with their branches, and by stopping them with flakes.

To this precaution may be alſo added another, which, executed with exactneſs, may produce great effects ; that is, to throw whole trees with their branches into the river, not ſo heavy as to sink to the bottom, but whoſe size and quan­tity ſhall be ſo considerable as not to be easily stopped ; their branches ſhould alſo be interwoven, and formed like a chain from one bank to the other ; they ſhould be held fast till the enemy’s army is engaged in the fords or upon the