an attack, he may be able to ſustain the efforts of the enemy without great loss."

It may not be improper, in this place, to relate a diſposition of Μ. de Valiere’s, formed upon this principle.

He says, “ After the cannon are planted, a parapet ſhould be raised upon the banks of the river, 200 yards in length or thereabouts, behind which ſome infantry ſhould be immediately launched from the centre of the parapet, and ſome ſoldiers with labourers ſent over, who must imme­diately erect a ſmall half moon: as ſoon as that is done, more ſoldiers ſhould be ſent in order to defend it in case it ſhould be attacked ; more labourers ſhould alſo be ſent to erect another half-moon, both upon the right and the left.

“ If the labourers are not annoyed by the enemy, they ſhould at the same time erect an horn-work, whoſe wings ſhould be flanked by the first parapet, and the cannon plant­ed in it : if the river is ſo large that the wing of the horn­work cannot be defended by muſquetry, it must be defend­ed from the half-moon, made from thence to the water.”

In the mean time, the general ſhould cauſe the bridge to be continually worked at ; and, as ſoon as it is finiſhed, make the troops paſs over it, if the enemy is not in sight ; but if he is, the horn-work must be completed, to prevent the enemy from falling upon the troops as they paſs. The horn-work being made as strong as is judged necessary, as much infantry as it will hold ſhould be lodged in it, with ſome field-pieces ; and as the cannon upon the rising will keep the enemy at a distance, the general may order the ca­valry to paſs : but still all this cannot be effected but be­fore an army very inferior. If the enemy’s army is of ſuperior force, the ſafest method is to try a passage at ſome farther distance, still keeping the army in light as long as possible, and concealing from the enemy that any troops have been detached.

It is impossible to foreſee every stratagem that may be employed, as they depend upon many circumstances ; but it is always right to send, if poſſible, ſome trusty ſpy to diſcover the enemy’s poſition on the other side of the river, what obstacles he can place in the passage, what methods are to be uſed to avoid them, and what parts of the bank are most accessible or best guarded.

A general ſhould make many false attempts, particularly at thoſe parts where he least intends parting ; they ſhould be made as ſecretly as poſſible ; and alſo, in order to deceive the enemy, the general may throw over two or three bridges at hazard, in sight of the enemy, at thoſe very places where he has reſolved not to paſs : the enemy’s whole attention will be directed to that side ; and a constant fire ſhould be made on him from the other side, ſo that he may not be mistrustful of the stratagem. There is no doubt of theſe bridges being taken, which is of no conſequence, provided the enemy is amuſed, and the general has time to throw over another bridge at a distance from that place, by which he can paſs.

We cannot pretend to recapitulate every stratagem which a general may practiſe ; in the histories of prince Eugene and Charles XII. the reader may see the different methods which they made uſe of ; it will be sufficient here to relate the rules laid down by Montecuculi, with ſome modern ex­amoles, by which they ſeem to be corroborated.

I. The general must plant artillery upon the bank oppo­ſite to the post he intends taking ; which will be attended with great advantage, if the river forms a re-entering angle, and if there is any ford near it. 2. In proportion as the construction of the bridge advances, he ſhould post ſome in­fantry upon it, in order to keep a fire upon the oppoſite shore. 3. When the bridge is completed, he must cauſe a body of infantry, ſome cavalry, ſome field-pieces, and ſome pioneers, to pass it, in order to fortify the head of the bridge on the other side. 4. The general must take great care that the enemy has not posted armed barks, or other machines, to break down the bridge when half the army ſhall be parted. 5. If the general would preserve the bridge, he must fortify it at both ends, and place ſufficient guards in it.

In 1743, prince Charles intending to paſs the Rhine, kept a continual, fire upon all the French ports from 11 o’clock at night till three in the morning, in order to con­ceal his real design with regard to the partage. Marſhal de Coigny assembled his army in three large bodies, and lay all night upon his arms, the only prudent step he could take on that occasion. By this diſposition he found himſelf in a condition of tranſporting himſelf oppoſite to the iſle of Raignac, of which the enemy was in possession ; and it is well known that they ended the campaign there, without being able to penetrate into Alſace.

The number of columns ought to be regulated by the breadth of the ford, or by the number of bridges that are establiſhed.

The third of June 1747, at day-break, the army com­manded by Μ. de Beileide parted the Var in five columns. This partage was effected without any resistance on the part of the enemy, and Μ. Beileide had 15 men drowned, al­though there was a chain formed of peaſants, acquainted with the fords, to direct the march of the columns, and to assist the ſoldiers who were carried away by the rapidity of the current.

III. All partages of this nature, whether in a march, in defence, or for an attack, may be foreſeen. A gene­ral may, at a distance, make all the preparations necessary for theſe operations ; he may anticipate or foreſee the diſpositions of the enemy : in regard to a retreat it is otherwise ; for although it may have been provided for, a gene­ral cannot be certain whether it can be effected after the manner he hath intended ; beſides, he must, in a retreat, unite all the different diſpositions already mentioned : the least negligence becomes irreparable, and gives the enemy a very great advantage. A moment lost, a movement diſco­vered, may also be the cauſe of a rout, and render the re­treat impossible, or at least very bloody ; therefore if a ge­neral, in theſe circumstances, has not a perfect knowledge of the river he has to paſs, if he has not been careful to pre­ſerve the bridges, or to keep the materials and instruments proper for the throwing over of new ones, he will be unable to paſs in sight of the enemy. Xenophon’s retreat with the 10,000 Greeks, furniſhes examples of the passages of ri­vers, which a general ſhould always have present to his view. What prudence, what activity in sounding the fords himself, whenever he met with any stream or river to be crossed ! What orders to prevent confusion among his troops, and what stratagems to avoid being repulſed !

It a general is certain of returning by the same place at which he has formerly parted, the best way would be, as Vigetius says, to have the bridges guarded, and to erect a fort with large ditches at the head of each, for their ſecurity, and to place troops in it to guard the bridges and the partage, as long as ſhall be thought necessary.

Thus circumstanced, a general ſhould entrench the heads of the bridges in the manner already directed ; and that the troops may paſs the bridges without confusion, according as one brigade of infantry ſhall enter the circle formed by the redoubts, another ſhall paſs the bridge, and that which enters ſhall take possession of the ports which that which partes occupied ; he must be careful to establiſh batteries of cannon to the right and the left, on the other side of the ri­ver, to flank the redoubts, and defend the approach to them ;