in order to supply the offices of thoſe who are killed : but can a man possessed of any degree of humanity approve of what he adds, that this number ſhould be increaſed in time of war, and reduced in time of peace ? What a proſpect for a soldier, who, after having laviſhed his blood for the ſafety of his country, and the glory of his prince, sees himſelf expoſed to the fate of Beliſarius ! Whatever were the virtues of his matter Justinian, can any one, without indignation, see this general, after having overcome the Persians, reu­nited Africa to the empire, published the Vandals, driven the Goths out of Italy, ravaged Assyria, ſcattered at a distance from both empires that throng of barbarians by which they were overrun, and preſerved the throne, and the life of the emperor ; upon the bare ſuſpicion, or rather under the pretence of a conspiracy, deprived of sight, and reduced to beg alms of passengers in the streets of that city which he had so often ſaved ?

It has been already ſeen, that the dispositions in a moun­tainous country change according to the situation of the ground. Vigetius repeats, ſpeaking of a field of battle, what has been ſo often establiſhed in the foregoing ſections, that an open country is always most advantageous for an army that is strongest in cavalry ; and that an encloſed ſpot, divided by ditches and marshes, covered with mountains and woods, is most convenient for infantry. In this last, the knowledge of the country, the art, the ability of the general, and the understanding of the general officers under his orders, ſooner ascertain the succeſs, than a ſuperiority of troops in an open country, which presents little or no variety of ground, and which allows the greatest part, or indeed the whole, of the troops to act ; the ſuperiority in troops is attended with great advantage, provided alſo the diſposition is good.

The different diſpositions for troops are ſo many, the circumstances differ ſo greatly, that were it even possible to connect in one body only all the battles which have been fought since the time mankind reſolved to regulate their properties by the law of the strongest, the number of con­trivances which remained to be collected would be greater than of thoſe which have been actually executed. It is impossible to give a detail of every thing ; for in that case every particular spot, and the diſposition proper for it, every country, and all the circumstances that may oblige these diſpositions to vary, must be deſcribed. Thoſe row going to be mentioned, are only with a view of giving the rules, and of more clearly demonstrating thoſe precepts which lead to the knowledge of all others.

Disp. I. Let two armies of equal force be ſupposed, in an open country divided by a river, consisting of 57 battalions and 72 ſquadrons each, cavalry, hussars, and dra­goons. The two armies are on the same side, the right of the one, and the left of the other, to the river. The left of the army whoſe right is to the river is unsupported ; and that whoſe left is ſupported, has a wood on its right. By this diſposition may be ſeen the necessity of covering the wing of the army A, that is expoſed. Plate DXX.

The army I, whoſe right and left are ſupported, is form­ed upon two lines, and preſents the same front as the army A, with a reserve in the rear. The following is therefore thought to be nearly the diſposition which ſhould be made by the general commanding the army whole left is unsupported. The first line ought to consist of 20 battalions, with intervals of about three toiſes between each battalion ; 12 ſquadrons on the right, with their proper intervals ; four battalions on the right of the cavalry, 10 pieces of cannon, and a battalion in column cloſe to the river ; 12 ſquadrons on the left of the first line, with their proper intervals ; *16* battalions in the ſecond line, 300 paces distance from the first ; 11 ſquadrons on its right, placed behind the in­tervals of those in the first line ; and on their right, six ſquadrons of dragoons next the river, in order to sustain the infantry and cannon covering the right; 11 ſquadrons on the left, placed in the same manner as thoſe on the right ; 10 pieces of cannon, supported by a battalion in column, between the infantry and the cavalry of the right ; 10 others, ſupported also by a battalion between the infantry and the cavalry of the left ; four battalions in the rear of the second line on the left, with orders to tranſport itself obliquely, or sidewiſe, as ſoon as the army moves to attack that which is drawn up against it ; 12 ſquadrons of cavalry in the rear of the first line upon the left, to post themſelves obliquely upon the flank, at 100 paces distance from the first ſquadron on the left, next to the four battalions and the cannon; the reserve, consisting of 10 battalions and eight ſquadrons of dragoons, in the third line upon the left flank, ſo that it may fall into the first line as ſoon as the squadrons of ca­valry, which were in the rear of thoſe of the first line, ſhall be posted obliquely : in this position, the army will move forward, the right never quitting the banks of the river.

If the enemy’s army ſhould advance, the diſposition of the army A will become still better, because the army I will quit the support it had on its right ; but if, on the con­trary, it remains in its post, in order to keep this ſupport, then the 10 battalions of the reserve, followed by the eight ſquadrons of dragoons, will join the four which ſupport the flanks of the cavalry which is posted obliquely. When marching, this line posted sidewiſe ſhould proceed oblique­ly; and when the cannon ſhall be near enough to cannonade with effect, it ſhould make ſeveral diſcharges, in order to break and beat down the entrenchments, or felled trees, which the enemy may have made, and alſo to destroy their disposition. As soon as the army A ſhall be near enough to cannonade the army I with ſuccess, it must halt, and amuſe it with a continual fire of the cannon. The principal attack ought to be made at the wood by the 14 battalions : in order to give more strength and certainty to this attack, six other battalions, with 10 pieces of cannon, ſhould be detached to it from the second line, always keeping up a fire from the front. If during this attack, it is perceived that the enemy weakens his line, in order to carry assistance to the wood that is attacked, then the centre and the right of the army ſhould march up and charge him briſkly. The troops who cannonade the wood ought not to advance, but ſhould only keep the troops posted in it at bay ; because that part which the enemy has weakened will then become the principal object of attack ; it is probable, that the ene­my having weakened his front, will certainly be broke. If the enemy ſhould not weaken his front, and the attack of the wood ſhould ſucceed, as ſoon as the enemy is driven out of it, the troops which attacked it ſhould take the ene­my in flank; then the body of the army, by advancing, ought to determine an affair already half gained. If by the intelligence the general hath received, and the number which he knows the enemy’s army to consist of, and which he sees before him, he judges the wood is filled with infan­try, and that conſequently the attack of it will be attended with difficulty, he must attack on the side of the river, by marching by degrees from the right, as if to ſustain the left. For the greater certainty of ſucceeding in this at­tack, he ſhould reinforce the five battalions upon the right with ſome others from the second line: the left ſhould continue in the position already mentioned, to keep back the enemy. It it ſhould happen that the enemy, seeing his left attacked, causes the troops to leave the wood in order to replace thoſe of the centre, which he caused to march to the assistance of the left, the 14 battalions