ry in wall, it appears that nothing is to be done but to poſt hussars, if there is not a ſufficiency of horſe, behind the ſquadrons of the first line, who, when the two armies begin to move forward in order to charge, will place themſelves on the right and the left sidewise, 100 paces distant from the first lines of cavalry : by this position, they will be able to take the enemy’s line in flank, whenever it comes to attack the cavalry. If a part of this line perceiving this motion, divides into two, one part to attack the line that has inter­vals, and the other the hussars, it is ſo much strength lost ; conſequently, the line with proper intervals has fewer troops to fight, and may expect to break them by giving the first charge. If the hussars ſhould be beat, it is of no great conſequence, the defeat of thoſe troops never deciding the success of the battle : it is the body of the army the enemy must break, and not two regiments of hussars, which retreat with great eaſe from before cavalry, and rally and return to the attack as readily as they retired. But if, instead of hussars, cavalry can be posted there, the enemy’s line, which is divided into two, will find itſelf obliged to fight upon equal terms : the certainty of ſucceſs depends upon the quickneſs with which the enemy is attacked ; and the more ſo, as he will be obliged to make a motion in the preſence of troops already posted and ready to charge. If this line without intervals advances, without showing any attention to the hussars, in order to charge the cavalry, the hussars, at least a great part of them, ought to fall upon the flanks ; and the dragoons, which are in the rear of them in reserve, ſhould take their place, to keep back the enemy’s second line, and to prevent the hussars from being taken in the rear.

Theſe two diſpositions are ideal. A general ſeldom chooſes to fight upon a ſpot where the wings are void of ſupport ; and prevents the enemy, as much as poſſible, from getting possession of an advantageous post, or at least does not attack him when he cannot prevent him doing it, eſpe­cially if the ground which he occupies is everywhere expoſed ; there are, nevertheleſs, circumstances where a gene­ral is obliged to fight, although not in a post strong by situation. By the two diſpositions just now deſcribed, the order which would be most proper to be preſerved for covering the wings, which may be expoſed by the situation of the ground, has been endeavoured to be shown ; it has been ſeen of what consequence it is for a general to know, and to ſecure all the heights, morasses, hollows, and every obstacle he may meet with. On occasions ſo important, a general ſhould take the same precautions that he would uſe under the cannon of a place, if he found heights that over­looked the works ; in which case he would not fail of constructing others more advanced, to prevent the enemy from getting there, and retarding their approaches.

If the duke of Savoy, at the battle of Marſaille, gained in 1698 by the French army, commanded by Μ. de Catinat, had been possessed of the heights of Piosaca, the two wings of that prince’s army would have been ſupported ; instead of which, his left wing was expoſed. Μ. de Catinat, pro­fiting from this fault, extended his right to the foot of those heights, of which he posseffed himſelf, and outstretched the enemy’s left : it was from theſe heights that the diſorder in the duke of Savoy’s army commenced ; it ſoon com­municated to the whole front, and got possession of the whole army : ſo true it is, that the most trifling object, be­ing neglected, changes the order of things ; that the least fault becomes essential ; that confidence in the number and in the courage of the troops is often dangerous ; and that having a contemptible opinion of an enemy is always fatal. The enemy, although inferior in troops, will soon attain a degree of ſuperiority, if he has the advantage of ground.

Armies can engage in ſo many different positions, that it is imposible to particularise all of them. In this section two armies have already been presented in an open country, without any ſupport to their wing : two others have been posted, one of which is upon a ſpot advantageouſly situated, its two wings covered ; the other hath only its right wing ſupported, and its left expoſed. It has been endeavoured to give to that, whole left wing is unſupported, the greatest strength in its whole front that is poſſible, and by the disposition of the left wing it is both strong and ſecure ; but there are ſuch a variety of spots where two armies may meet, that it will suffice to know in general the advantages they may derive from their situation.

Disp. III. A third diſposition very different from the two former is as follows. The enemy’s army is ſupposed to be advantageously posted ; it hath a hollow on its right, through which run the waters of an impassable morals, form­ing a rivulet. Its left is ſupported by a large town, crossed by a rivulet. In the centre is an height, capable of con­taining 12 battalions; in the front of it is a plain of 700 or 800 toiſes, which extends from its left to the cavalry on its right. Oppoſite to this cavalry the plain grows narrower, by reaſon of an height which reaches to the rivulet, and which the cavalry could not occupy, becauſe the enemy hath taken possession of it during the night. The town is en­trenched, and filled with infantry and artillery ; 16 batta­lions in two lines are posted next the town, in order to suſtain the troops that are in it. Behind the town there are three bridges upon the rivulet : in the front of the town, on the other side of the rivulet, are posted four battalions and five pieces of cannon, in order to flank the troops intending to attack the town: theſe four battalions are ſustained by eight squadrons of dragoons. The centre of the army consists of 20 battalions in the first line, and as many in the second ; eight of which are next to the morals, sustained by six ſquadrons of dragoons; 12 ſquadrons in the first line, and 12 in the second. The cavalry on the right consists of 11 ſquadrons in the first line, and 11 in the se­cond thirty ſquadrons of hussars, distributed half on the right, and half on the left, and the whole front of the army lined with artillery. Plate DXXII.

The army A, which was encamped a quarter of a league from the height by which it is separated from the enemy, began its march at dark ; it halted at the foot of the height, and ſent ſome detachments of infantry to take possession of the ſummit of it. The army I made the above-mentioned diſpositions, becauſe the army A was too near to be able to avoid a battle. The army I is compoſed of 78 battalions and 90 ſquadrons : theſe two armies ate nearly of equal strength.

The left of the army A hath a fine plain before it, ex­tending from the morass to that part where the height com­mences. In that place are posted eight battalions in two columns of four battalions each, next the morass, with 10 pieces of cannon between the two columns : there are 14 battalions in the first line, and 13 in the second; four battalions towards the height, and next the cavalry. Six­teen battalions occupy the height as far as the ſmall wood ; four battalions occupy the other side of the wood, and 32 battalions upon two lines very cloſe together ; 12 battalions behind the height next the rivulet ; 12 ſquadrons of horſe, and 20 of hussars, who have orders to paſs three bridges thrown over the rivulet, and attack the town with three columns of four battalions each, ſustained by the 12 ſqua­drons of horſe, and the 20 of dragoons. In the rear of the cavalry upon the left, are posted 16 ſquadrons of dragoons at a little distance, with intervals ; ſo that·, if the enemy ſhould attack this left and beat it, the cavalry may easily retire through the intervals of the dragoons, to give them the greater facility of acting, and turn their defeat into