situated ; all the troops are a mutual ſupport to each other: the flanks are ſecured and well guarded ; artillery is plant­ed along the whole front ; and the passes are entrenched, and troops posted in them.

In the front of the enemy’s army is a large plain, which runs from the mountains as far as the river ; but the largeness of it is broke into by ſome thickets, where nevertheless cavalry may act : in order to attack this army, thus advantageouſly posted, a diſposition must be made, entirely dif­ferent from that which it is in. If the village, which is en­trenched and well furniſhed with troops and artillery, is at­tacked, the forcing it will be doubtful : but ſupposing it ſhould be forced, it will not be without losing a great number of men ; which ſhould be avoided, becauſe it is the duty of a general to spare the blood of his ſoldiers as much as poſſible, and even, if practicable, to employ but few of his troops against a greater number of the enemy’s. If the paſſes only are attacked in order to take the enemy in flank, it is very certain he can send assistance to it without weakening his front, having it in his power to cause the eight battalions in reſerve behind the village to march there, and to cauſe the 18 ſquadrons of dragoons to diſmount. If only the left wing next the river is attacked, it is true that attack is more practicable, there being no obstacle or entrenchment to pre­vent coming up with the enemy : but still there is but one wing beaten ; and that, by falling back upon the troops in the village, can retreat by the mountains of which the enemy is master. There is great reaſon to imagine it will be beat; but the general must endeavour to reap as much profit from that victory as he can : it is therefore thought that, not to lose the fruit of it, the enemy ſhould be attacked on the left wing, from the centre to within about 200 toiſes of the river, at the same time that the entrenched paſſes are attacked. During theſe two attacks, a briſk cannonade ſhould be kept up upon the village, the infantry and cavalry upon the right, the infantry that is posted in the iſland, and that which is next the river : by theſe two attacks the enemy’s front and right wing will be equally annoyed ; he will not know where to send assistance, and in that state of uncertain­ty may probably send it to a part where the danger is not ſo pressing. But ſuppoſe he ſhould act in the most proper and prudent manner, as it ſhould always be imagined he will, the assistance which he will send to that part, cannot be effected without unfurnishing or weakening ſome other : if he strengthens the paſſes and the heights with the eight battalions behind the village, they perhaps will not be forced ; but he will ſcarcely venture to take any troops from the village, in order to send them to the assistance of the front that is attacked. But if he ſhould unfurniſh the vil­lage, it must then be attacked, and that vigorouſly ; which may be the eaſier done, as it hath been for ſome time can­nonaded, and conſequently the earth hath been tumbled down, and openings made, at least large enough for the in­fantry to enter it : this attack will not at all prevent that at the front from going on.

In order to execute the attack upon the enemy’s army, it is imagined the troops ought to be distributed after the following manner : all the infantry ſhould be placed in the first line, excepting that of the reserve, which ſhould consist of 20 battalions ; the second line ſhould consist of the cavalry ; and the third ſhould be formed of the dragoons and hussars. The 20 battalions on the left, forming five brigades, ſhould remain in order of battle at the coming out of the thickets, with artillery distributed between the intervals of each bri­gade; the 28 battalions, after making ſeven brigades as ſoon as they come out of the thickets, will form in column : then the 24 ſquadrons which are in the rear of the infantry, formed in column, will post themſelves, four ſquadrons in the intervals of each brigade, The brigade ſupporting the right flank will advance on the side of the river : and then the ſeven columns and the 24 ſquadrons will march up to the enemy and attack him with their bayonets, without losing time in firing. As ſoon as the columns have broken or staggered the enemy’s first line, the cavalry will fall furiouſly upon them, ſword in hand ; a part of the dragoons and hussars ſhould follow, in order to be within distance of ſustainmg the troops who have attacked, or to join themſelves to the cavalry who have broken in among the enemy : it ſhould be obſerved, that as ſoon as the hussars are enga­ged and purſuing the enemy, the cavalry ſhould rally in order to ſustain them, or to flank the infantry which may still make resistance. The brigade of infantry which ſupported the right, followed by the ſeven ſquadrons, ſhould attack the four battalions on the left of the first line, and the ſeven ſquadrons will take them in flank ; which they can with the greater eaſe effect, as the cavalry hath been put to flight. The ſeventh column ſhould, with four ſquadrons, attack the four battalions of the second line, at the same time that this attack is executed from the front as far as the river ; 16 battalions of the 20 in reserve ſhould attack the passes, and alſo the heights ; the remaining four will march under cover of the mountains, ſustained by a brigade of in­fantry and eight ſquadrons, in order to attack the cavalry on the right ; thus of the whole front of the enemy’s army, there will remain only the village that hath not been attack­ed, unleſs there hath been ſuch a number of troops drawn from it, as to render the carrying of it not difficult. It is to be ſuppoſed that one of theſe attacks will ſucceed ; that made by the columns ſooner than the rest : the disposition of columns intermixed with cavalry is very formidable, becauſe each body is ſupported without confusion : besides, it is to be ſuppoſed that a column four battalions in depth, and from 18 to 20 men in front, ought to break through a line that is only four deep, and which being once penetrated, the cavalry will find no difficulty in breaking through it. See Plate DXXIII.

The movement of the infantry to form itſelf in column, and the evolutions of the cavalry to fill up the intervals of each column, ought to be performed with great quickneſs, and near enough to the enemy to ſurpriſe him, but not at ſuch a distance as to give him time to remedy it.

The nature of the ground, which is continually chan­ging, cannot be followed through all its various ſhapes ; the author from whoſe work we take this article hath therefore endeavoured to form his diſpositions in thoſe situations which most ordinarily occur, in order that theſe general diſpositions may be assistant to the ideas in more particular and critical situations. Mountainous countries have not been mentioned, becauſe it is very rare that they present an op­portunity of coming to a general action : the affairs which happen among them are generally with regard to ſome post, which can never decide the fate of an army, however briſk they may be. The four diſpositions now mentioned are ideal ; and although the propriety of them may be defend­ed, it would be very imprudent to anſwer for their ſucceſs ; becauſe with regard to the busineſs of war, the whole de­pends upon circumstances, and the least accident often ren­ders a diſposition, ſeemingly the best, the most prejudicial that can be taken. A motion of the enemy’s troops ill conducted by their commanders, too much ſloth or too much eagerneſs in the execution of orders, an accidental word falling from the mouth either of an officer or a ſoldier, and which is always increaſed when told again, may occasion the defeat of an army, however well diſpoſed or advantageously situated. The epithet “ best” ſhould be given to that general who commits the fewest faults ; for