easily conceal from the enemy the road you have taken ; for which reaſon you ſhould not fire, but open to yourſelves a passage ſword in hand, lest the enemy come where they hear the noiſe.

Officers ſhould be attentive to distinguiſh between the true and false attacks, and not deſpair when beat from their first intrenchments. The defence of posts is ſo easy, that it is ſurprising they do not hold out longer than they com­monly do. There wants only reſolution and vigilance, ta­king every advantage of the ground, and perſuading the ſoldiers that nothing but the most manifest baſeneſs can, let the enemy penetrate. The example of Cremona, ſurpriſed by prince Eugene in 1702, will remain a proof to posterity of what determined bravery can do ; and ſhow, that though an enemy is master of half the ramparts, and part of the town, he is not master of the whole.

Prince Eugene having formed the design of ſurprising this town, which was defended by a garriſon of French and Iriſh, got ſome thouſand Austrian ſoldiers admitted at a ſecret passage by a priest. Theſe troops ſeized the two gates, and a great part of the town ; the garriſon buried in ſleep were awaked by the assault, and obliged to fight in their ſhirts ; but by the excellent manœuvres of the officers, and reſolute bravery of the men, they repulſed the Imperialists from ſquare to ſquare, from street to street, and obli­ged Prince Eugene to abandon the part of the town and ramparts of which he had been in possession.

Posts have often refilled the first and greatest efforts of the assailants, and have yielded or been abandoned to ſubſequent attacks, though much leſs ſpirited. How comes this ? It is owing to an officer’s not daring to abandon his post at the first attack : he repulſes the enemy, becauſe if forced they will be put to the ſword with their whole party; but when the enemy comes back, he thinks he has nothing to reproach himſelf with, having defended it for ſome time, ſo retires, or ſurrenders. Since he could repulſe the ene­my when in good order and quite fresh, how much more eaſy and leſs to be dreaded when they return harassed with fatigue ?

Is not the great cauſe of miſconduct among military men the want of encouragement to excite emulation ? An officer who is not protected, who is never ſure of the least favour, neglects himſelf, and takes leſs trouble to acquire glory, rarely heard of, though merited by the bravest actions, than to enjoy the tranquillity of an ordinary reputation.

It is not expedited that an officer who is placed in a post ſhould ſeek to engage ; but that he ſhould steadily refill when he is pressed, and die rather than abandon his intrenchment.

Historians have been very silent about posts being well defended ; though the lessons to be drawn from them may be more generally instructive, and as agreeable to read, as thoſe left us of the bell fortified places of a state. We are astonished at the account of 100,000 men periſhing before Ostend in 1604, and their general, the archduke Albert, with the ruins of his army, not making himſelf master of it, till after a three years siege : nor is our wonder less, to see Charles the XII. of Sweden, in the year 1713, with ſeven or eight officers and ſome domestics, defend himſelf in a houſe of wood near Bender against 20,000 Turks and Tartars.

Several historians mention the defence of this houſe becauſe it was done by a crowned head ; but brave actions, whoever are the authors, ſhould never be buried in oblivion, as they excite emulation, and are full of instruction.

Sect. VI. *Of the Attack of Posts.*

Although the taking of a post is always difficult when you have to do with people who know how to defend it, nevertheleſs you may ſucceed in attacking them by ſurpriſe and stratagem. We ought never to form a ſcheme for an attack upon ſimple ſpeculation, becauſe from reasoning we often think that things are feasible, which we find impoſsible in the execution. When you intend to undertake an action of this kind, you ought to form a just idea of it, by examining all the branches separately, and the dif­ferent means you can uſe, ſo that, by comparing them together, you may see if they concur, and anſwer to the general purpoſe ; and lastly, you are to take ſuch meaſures as may in a manner render you certain of ſucceſs before you begin.

As it is not the practice of the army to choose a parti­cular officer for the attack of an intrenched post if he does not offer himſelf, ſo an officer ſhould not embark in ſuch an enterpriſe, without having examined the means of ſucceeding, and being capable of ſhowing the general a plan of what he has projected, to see if he will consent to the exe­cution of it. If the general approves the plan, he must beg leave to go to reconnoitre the post with a man or two, that he may take his meaſures more justly.

When he has been to reconnoitre, as is directed in a former ſection, and has got every neceſſary information, he ſhould go to give the general an account of his diſcoveries, and receive his last orders for the attack, for the ſoldiers of his party, and for thoſe who are to march to ſustain him.

The choice of men that are to go upon the attack of a post, is ſo much the more essential, as the ſucceſs of the enterprise depends on it. None but volunteers of determined bravery ought to be taken, men who are not stupid, and have no colds upon them ; becauſe he who does not attend to the orders of his officers, runs on with blind zeal ; and he who coughs or ſpits, may diſcover the party to the ene­my’s ſentries, and cauſe the best concerted ſcheme to fail. As to thoſe who are to ſupport them, they may be taken according to their rank in the guard or detachment, as the general judges proper.

The diſposition for an attack must depend on the diſcoveries that are made, ſo as not to be obliged to return in the midst of the execution. The men being choſen, they must be inſpected, to see that nothing is wanted which can contribute to their ſucceſs ; becauſe, if the post is fortified with an intrenchment of earth or faſcines, the two first ranks ſhould be provided with ſpades and pickaxes beside their arms; if fraiſed or palliſadoed, they must likewiſe have hatchets ; and if covered with maſonry, they must have ladders.

The men ſhould be in their waistcoats, to be leſs constrained. If they propoſe to make one or two true, and as many false attacks, ſo many platoons must be formed of the choſen party, as they are to make true ones, and the ſustaining party to make the false attacks, ſo as to divide the enemy and share their fire. A man must be placed at the head of each platoon, who is capable of commanding them, and, if poſſible, the same who had been employed before to make diſcoveries, as he may more easily guide the division. The orders which ſhould be given to thoſe leaders are to march together to the place where they are to ſeparate, and then each to go to the ſpot which is appointed for him, in the neighbourhood of the post, and wait there, with their bellies on the ground, for the signal to jump into the ditch and ſcale the post.

If you are to be conducted by ſpies or guides, they ſhould be examined about every thing that can be of use,before they are employed, eſpecially about the road by which they propoſe to conduct you. The reaſon of this