attempt is made, or is indeed practicable, to rob a man at once of all that he possesses. The question, then, of any im­portance is, may a man put a robber to death rather than part with a small portion of his property ? Paley doubts whether he could innocently do so in a state of nature,

“ because it cannot be contended to be for the augmenta­tion of human happiness, that one should lose his life or limb, rather than another a pennyworth of his property.” He allows, that in civil society the life of the aggressor may always be taken away by the person aggrieved, or meant to be aggrieved, when the crime attempted is such as would subject its perpetrator to death by the laws of his country.

To us, however, he seems to lose sight of his own prin­ciples. No legislature can have a right to take away life in civil society, but in such cases as individuals have the same right in a state of nature. If therefore a man in the state of nature have not a right to protect his property by killing the aggressor, when it cannot be otherwise protect­ed, it appears to us self-evident that no legislature can have a right to inflict the punishment of death upon such of­fences ; but if the laws inflicting death upon the crime of robbery be morally evil, it is certain that an individual cannot be innocent when he prevents robbery by the death of the robber, merely because he knows that the laws of his coun­try have decreed that punishment against those convicted of the crime. But we think that the protection of property by the death of the aggressor may be completely vindicated upon much more general principles. It is necessary in every state, that property be protected, or mankind could not subsist ; but in a state of nature every man must be the defender of his own property, which in that state must ne­cessarily be small ; and if he be not allowed to defend it by every means in his power, he will not long be able to protect it at all. By giving him such liberty, a few indivi­duals may, indeed, occasionally lose their lives and limbs for the preservation of a very small portion of private pro­perty; but we believe that the sum of human happiness will be more augmented by cutting off such worthless wretches than by exposing property to perpetual depreda­tion ; and therefore, if general utility be the criterion of moral good, we must be of opinion that a man may in every case lawfully kill a robber rather than comply with his un­just demand.

But if a man may without guilt preserve his property by the death of the aggressor, when it cannot be preserved by any other means, much more may a woman have re­course to the last extremity to protect her chastity from forcible violation. This, indeed, is admittcd by Paley hiιn- self, and will be controverted by no man who reflects on the importance of the female character, and the probable consequences of the smallest deviation from the established laws of female honour.

Self-Love is that instinctive principle which impels every animal, rational and irrational, to preserve its life and promote its own happiness. It is very generally confound­ed with selfishness ; but we think that the one propensity is distinct from the other. Every man loves himself, but every man is not selfish. The selfish man grasps at all im­mediate advantages, regardless of the consequences which his conduct may have upon his neighbour. Self-love only prompts him who is actuated by it to procure to himself the greatest possible sum of happiness during the whole of his existence. In this pursuit the rational self-lover will often forego a present enjoyment to obtain a greater and more permanent one in reversion ; and he will as often submit to a present pain to avoid a greater one hereafter. Self-love, as distinguished from selfishness, always compre­hends the whole of a man's existence, and in that extended sense of the phrase, we hesitate not to say that every man is a self-lover ; for, with eternity in his view, it is surely

not possible for the most disinterested of the human race not to prefer himself to all other men, if their future and everlasting interests could come into competition. This indeed they can never do ; for though the introduction of evil into the world, and the different ranks which it makes necessary in society, put it in the power of a man to raise himself, in the present state, by the depression of his neigh­bour or by the practice of injustice, yet in the pursuit of a prize which is to be gained only by soberness, righteous­ness, and piety, there can be no rivalship among the dif­ferent competitors. The success of one is no injury to another ; and, therefore, in this sense of the phrase, self- love is not only lawful, but absolutely unavoidable. It has been a question in morals, whether it be not likewise the incentive to every action, however virtuous or apparently disinterested ?

Those who maintain the affirmative side of this question say, that the prospect of immediate pleasure, or the dread of immediate pain, is the only apparent motive to action in the minds of infants, and indeed of all who look not before them, and infer the future from the past. They own, that when a boy has had some experience, and is capable of making comparisons, he will often decline an immediate enjoyment which he has formerly found productive of fu­ture evil more than equivalent to all its good ; but in doing so they think, and justly, that he is still actuated by the principle of self-love, pursuing the greatest good of which he knows himself to be capable. After experiencing that truth, equity, and benevolence in all his dealings is the readiest, and indeed the only certain method of se­curing to himself the kindness and good offices of his fel­low-creatures, and much more when he has learned that they will recommend him to the Supreme Being, upon whom depend his existence and all his enjoyments, they admit that he will practise truth, equity, and benevolence, but still, from the same principle, pursuing his own ulti­mate happiness as the object which he has always in view-. The prospect of this great object will make him feel an exquisite pleasure in the performance of the actions which he conceives as necessary to its attainment, until at last, without attending in each instance to their consequences, he will, by the great associating principle which has been elsewhere explained, feel a refined enjoyment in the actions themselves, and perform them, as occasions offer, without deliberation or reflection. Such, they think, is the origin of benevolence itself, and indeed of every virtue.

Those who take the other side of the question can hardly deny that self-love thus modified may prompt to virtuous and apparently disinterested conduct ; but they think it de­grading the dignity of a man to suppose him actuated solely by motives which can be traced back to a desire of his own happiness. They observe, that the Author of our nature has not left the preservation of the individual, or the con­tinuance of the species, to the deductions of our reason, computing the sum of happiness which the actions neces­sary to these ends produce to ourselves. On the contrary, he has taken care of both, by the surer impulse of instinct planted in us for these very purposes. And is it conceiv­able, say they, that he would leave the care of our fellow- creatures a matter of indifference, until each man should be able to discover or be taught that by loving his neigh­bour, and doing him all the good in his power, he would be most effectually promoting his own happiness ? It is dis­honouring virtue, they continue, to make it proceed in any instance from a prospect of happiness or a dread of misery ; and they appeal from theory to fact, as exhibited in the conduct of savage tribes, who deliberate little on the conse­quences of their actions.

Their antagonists reply, that the conduct of savage tribes is to be considered as that of children in civilized nations, regulated entirely by the examples which they have before