quainted with lions, will shudder at their roar ; and an ele­phant that has never seen a tiger, will in the same manner show the strongest symptoms of horror and affright at the smell of it. “ The late Lord Clive,” says an ingenious writer, “ exhibited a combat between two of these animals at Calcutta ; but the scent of the tiger had such an effect upon the elephant, that nothing could either force or allure him to go along the road, where the cage in which the tiger was inclosed, had passed, until a gallon of arrack was given him. Upon this, his horror suddenly turning into fury, he broke down the paling to get at his enemy, and killed him without difficulty.”

If riding along a road, near which a dead horse, or part of its carcass, happens to be lying, we know, that our horse although he sees it not, cannot be made to pass the place but with difficulty. Where blood has been shed, parti­cularly that of their own species, oxen will assemble, and upon smelling it, roar and bellow, and show the most mani­fest signs of horror and distress; and yet these symptoms could not arise from any associated notions of danger or death, since they appear in such as never had any oppor­tunities of acquiring them. They must therefore be in­stinctive like other instinctive antipathies and propensities. But although in their mutual intercourse, animals make much use of the sense of smell, still it does not seem to be further concerned in exciting their sexual desires, than in indicating their object.

Some of those splenetic philosophers, who are ready up­on all occasions to quarrel with the constitution of nature, have taken the liberty of condemning their Maker, because it has pleased his unfathomable wisdom to bestow in some instances upon the brutes senses and instincts more perfect than he has given to man, without reflecting that he has given to man an ample equivalent; for it may be asked with the poet,

Is not bis reason all these powers in one ?

Is Heaven unkind to man and man alone ? Shall be alone, whom rational we call. Be pleased with nothing if not blessed with all ?

With respect to that unknown peculiarity of bodies, which is the cause of our sensations of smell, the opinions of philo­sophers have been very various. Until of late, the doctrine of Des Cartes and Locke on this subject was pretty general­ly received; but, since the publication of Dr. Reid’s works, his opinion, which we deem the most correct and satisfac­tory, has become very popular. We will endeavour to abridge his account of this matter. For this purpose, let us suppose a person, who has grown up without the sense of smell, to be immediately endowed with the use of this organ, and placed near some flowers of an exquisite savour. When he examines what he feels in such a situation, he can find no resemblance between this new sensation, and any thing with which he is already acquainted. He finds him­self unable to explain its nature, and cannot ascribe to it figure, extension, or any known property of matter. It is a simple affection, or feeling of mind, and, considered ab­stractedly, can have no necessary connection with the nerves, the nostrils, or effluvia, or with any thing material whatever. By the nature of his constitution he is however led to re­fer this peculiar sensation to the nostrils, as its organ ; and when, from experience, and by means of touch, he learns that external objects have the power of exciting this sen­sation, he concludes, that there must exist in bodies some unknown cause by which it is excited. In the first part of this process he considers the feeling, or sensation, abstract­edly. As such, it exists in the mind only ; and cannot ex­ist there but when the mind is conscious of it. His con­sciousness soon enables him to distinguish different sorts of smells, all of them very distinct from one another, but, conformably to the nature of all sensation, extremely sim­ple. He concludes, that each of these must have a distinct cause ; and finding, by experience, that this cause is an un­known something in bodies, he concludes, that it must be a property of matter, and, for want of another, gives it the name of smell. When he removes an odorous body from the organ, the sensation vanishes ; when the body is again applied, the sensation is excited ; and hence it is, that he is led naturally to connect the sensation with this unknown peculiarity of bodies by which it is produced. But since we see, that the sensation is, in a great degree, related to other objects besides its unknown cause, to the mind in which it exists, for instance, and to the organ which is its instrument, it may be asked why it becomes associated in the mind with its cause only ? The reason seems pretty ob­vious. No single sensation, or class of sensations, is more connected with the mind, than any other of which it is sus­ceptible. Nor is the connection subsisting between the organ and any of the sensations peculiar to it, greater than that which subsists between it and every other sensation of which it is the inlet. Hence the connection between the smell of an orange and the mind, or between it and the nostrils, is very general, and cannot, in the former instance, distinguish it from any other sensation of whatever kind, nor, in the latter, from any other particular smell. But the connection between this sensation and the orange is pecu­liar and permanent ; and we accordingly find them always associated in the mind, just as we associate the notion of fire with the sensation of burning. The relation which a sensation of smell, or any sensation, bears to the mind, to an organ, or to the memory and conception of itself, is common to all sensations. The relation which any sensa­tion bears to its own cause, suppose of the sensation of smell to a particular virtue or quality of bodies, is common to it with every other sensation, when considered with respect to its peculiar cause. And finally, a sensation of any kind bears the same sort of relation to the memory and concep­tion of itself, that any other feeling or operation of mind bears to the conception and memory of that particular feel­ing or operation.

Whatever then be the nature of the minute particles of bodies by which our sensations of smell are excited, we can­not help considering their unknown cause as a virtue or quality of matter. Like all other modifications of material substance, it must be confessed, that this can have no re­semblance to the sensations of mind. But we are not there­fore to conclude with the followers of Des Cartes and Locke, that this secondary quality is a mere sensation ; especially as we can readily conceive it existing where it is not smell­ed, or even after supposing the annihilation of every sen­tient being throughout the universe. The existence of the sensation we know to be momentary and fugitive ; but in the existence of its cause we can, without difficulty or in­consistency, conceive a permanency independent of mind and of its sensations.

The doctrine which we have been illustrating has of late been called in question by a sceptical writer, who, it ap­pears to us, has upon this occasion been entirely deficient in his accustomed acuteness. Dr. Reid’s speculations seem so frill, so clear and convincing, that we are at a loss to con­ceive how his meaning can be misunderstood ; and yet the argument and objections of the writer to whom we allude, derive all their plausibility from a misinterpretation of Dr. Reid’s meaning, and from a deviation from the established use of language. “ An eminent metaphysician,” says this author, “ has declared that he has not the least difficulty in conceiving the air perfumed with aromatic odours in the deserts of Arabia ; and he has decided, that the man who maintains smells to exist only in the mind must be mad, or must abuse language and disgrace philosophy. There are some authors, nevertheless, who differ widely on this sub­ject from the learned metaphysician. Is it possible for a sensation to exist where there is no sentient ? The au­thors to whom I allude think it impossible.” And so, we may tell this learned author, does Dr. Reid, if he will take his word for it. Of the sensation of smell he remarks, “ It