out his questions and reflections on different points, as they happened to suggest themselves on each occasion. There we find the various duties of the good man and the good citizen summarily sketched, without the formality of state­ment or systematic connexion. He inquires what is just, or pious, or temperate,—and he leads his hearers to con­sider the true definitions of the several virtues;@@\* but it is chiefly with the view of laying open their mistakes and confusion of thought on the subject, and to divert them from sophistical disquisitions on virtue, to the discharge of virtue in all its parts, rather than to give any precise idea of it himself.@@3

Certainly there are grave objections to the morality which he taught. It did not enjoin that perfect purity of sentiment and action, which, judging from its general ex­cellence, we might perhaps have expected. It forbade *excesses* of licentiousness as evil, but it did not also for­bid licentious indulgence as altogether vicious, or fix its stigma on those monstrous forms of vice which polluted Grecian society. Nor, again, did it give a right tone to the resentful feelings. It enjoined the requiting of ill to enemies,—placing retaliation as a duty on a par with the rcturn of kindness to friends.@@3 With these exceptions, the morality inculcated by Socrates, founded as it was on the indications in man’s nature of a destiny beyond the pre­sent world, bears strongly the marks of the law written by the finger of God, and proves that the Creator has not left Himself without witness, where the light of his re­velation has not shone. Supposing even that those great truths, thus taught, were the broken planks from the wreck of a primitive Faith, floated down on the stream of ages, we must yet believe a providential disposition, in the fact of that ready acceptance which they could obtain with one, brought up, as Socrates was, amidst the grossest corrup­tions of heathenism. His was an instance, how the unso­phisticated heart responds to the notices of divine truth, when once they are duly presented to it ; and how, wherever there is a sincere pursuit of right, the moral eye will be enabled to pierce the surrounding gloom, and to dis­cern, for the most part, the true outline and form of right.

It is observable, however, that, whilst Socrates correctly perceived that the laws of religion and morality possessed a sacred importance, independently of all positive enactments of men, he yet appeals to the laws of the state for the par­ticular rules of religious and moral duty. When instruct­ing Euthydemus on the worship of the gods, he cites the Delphic oracle, which enjoined the law of the state as the rule of acceptable worship.@@4 When asked by the sophist Hippias what is just, he answers, that it is what the laws prescribe. Such reference was perfectly natural in a Greek, accustomed as Greeks were to view every thing in su­bordination to politics, and to regard the duty of the citi­zen as paramount to every other duty. This feeling had its influence with Socrates, and induced him to regard the authority of the state as possessing in itself a moral force of obligation. The respect which he throughout shewed to the laws of his own state, was that of one who

not only obeyed what they commanded, but strictly referenced their authority.@@5 We must not, however, suppose, that he thus intended to place positive and moral laws on the same footing. The reference which he gives to the written law of the state, as the directory on questions of religion and morals, is the substitute in his teaching for a systematic development of the moral and religious duties. The law of the state presented, to orte who had no thought of systematizing the subject for himself, the best expres­sion of those great truths which he was drawing forth from the higher source of man’s eternal nature. He is content to point out to his hearers, in a general way, the wisest and readiest collection **of** rules for those cases which came under the great comprehensive duties of piety and justice. Evidently he is not treating the subject with the exactness of the theorist, in assigning this importance to the law of the state ; but he is enforcing the use of the law of the state as an authoritative practical guide to right conduct. —His internal view of religion, for example, was founded on observation of the signs of benevolent design through­out the material and intellectual world ; and he was thus led to the acknowledgment of a pure Theism. But in his conduct, he knew not how to realize the obligations which the perception of this truth imposed on him. With his reverence, accordingly, for the laws of his country, as well as under the influence of that superstition to which his piety habitually verged, he sought a direction to his religious sentiments from the authority of the state, and thus in practice was a polytheist.—His object was further to prevent men from trusting to the conceits of their own judgment in matters of conduct, and to recommend a pro­per deference to the wisdom and authority of their ancient laws, then so presumptuously slighted by each vain pre­tender to superior prudence and political sagacity.

In assailing, as Socrates did, the follies of his countrymen by the dexterity of an acute reason, he was ever exposing their ignorance. The impression on his own mind appears to have been, that men erred rather from the want of due information respecting their moral condition, than from the perverseness of their will,—from folly, rather than from vice. Himself an accurate observer of human life, and with a disposition to follow the path of duty wherever it might lead him, he had in his own case felt the importance of intellectual cultivation, in order to right conduct. From his own circumstances, accordingly, and a natural predilec­tion for those exercises of the mind which were his habi­tual pursuit, he overrated this importance ; and, instead of simply regarding the information of the mind as a neces­sary ingredient in moral improvement, he made it all in all. Thus, according to him; wisdom or philosophy was Virtue, and ignorance and folly, vice. He carried this view of morals so far, as to place the knowledge of duty on a foot­ing with the knowledge Of arts. Nor was he even startled with the paradox, that if such were the case—if the know­ledge of right were the whole of morality—there would be less immorality in intentional wrong conduct, than in un­intentional done through ignorance.@@®

@@@1 Xenopb. Mem. iv. 8, 11. 'Ικανόν it ml λdy\*>ettr<tv rt *κdi διopiσtur∂<u τa roιmrra,* κ.r.λ.

@@@, Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 9. ,Λλλα μd At’, *!φη, ού» aκovση, ιrpiv yl àv aiπoe anoφηvη, 5 τl voμιζ.ιtτo* δίκαιον «vet. *apκtt yàp, Sn ri>v* άλλων raταyrλαr, *ipttτi>v μ.v* ra< cλiγχ<sv rravTOs, *airτi>s δi* ovβevl d<λ<uv vtrtχvtv λόγον ούόν *γνώμην dtrθφaivtoiat 1Γtpl* ovèe- VOΓ, tc.τ∙λ∙

@@@’ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 16; ii. 6. 35. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23.

@@@4 Ibid. iv. 3, 16. Also, i. 3, 1.

@@@4 See, in the “Crito " of Plato, a beautiful address, put into the mouth of Socrates, from the personified majesty of the laws.

@@@, Xeuoph. Mem. iv. 2, 20. ∆or<t *δi σot μaiησιs* καί *ιπurrημ∣f τον δίκαιον fivaι, ώσπ.ρ ri>v γραμμάτων, κ.τ,∖,* Seneca, arguing also the need of moral information for the performance of duty, refers to the same illustration of morality from the arts, as that given by Xenophon, to βbew that there is no real analogy between the two subjects. “ Vis scire,” he says, “ quam dissimilis sit harum artium con­ditio et hujus ? In illis excusatius est, voluntate peccare, quam casu : in hac maxima culpa est, sponte delinquere. Quod dico, tale est. Grammaticus non erubescit solecismum, si sciens facit : erubescit, si nesciens. Medicus, si deficere ægrum non intelligit, quantum ad artem, magis peccat, quam si se intelligere dissimulat. At in hac arte vivendi, turpior volentium culpa est.” Ep. 95. 8. He seems to have had the argument of Socrates, as given by Xenophon, (Mem. iv. 2, 80. ) in his view. So also Aristotle says: Kol <v *μiv τiχvη ό (κών αμαρτάνων alpfτωτtpos∙ πtpi δ( φρόνησιν ijττov, ώστττρ* rat *π(pι* rùr *ap(T<κ.* Eth. Nic. vi. 5.