other obstacles, form their constituents. *Manoeuvring lines* are the dispositions of the general to traverse them offensively, or cover them defensively. Both these lines of operations are intimately connected. In offensive war, the line is an imaginary perpendicular upon the base, along which an army operates against the enemy ; in defensive war, it is often the same, but still oftener parallel to the territorial line. *A line of communication* is either the same as that of operations, or any other by which the army receives its supplies, and communicates with the base.

Some examples will render the definitions more intelligi­ble. France and Austria have three great lines of operations against each other ; by Italy on one side, Switzerland and Tyrol in the centre, and by Germany on the other. In these thc Po, the Maine, the Danube, or a principal road, constitutes the *materiel* of lines; which are amenable to only a few rules prescribed by their nature. Between Prussia and Austria again are three lines, through Moravia, Lusatia, and Saxony. Lines of operations are divisible into collateral or separate points. Frederick entered Bo­hemia by his central line, upon four points. The French invaded Germany in 1796 and 1799 upon two subdivided lines. Napoleon always operated upon one principal line, as did the duke of Wellington in Spain.

Thus far no great variety of combinations seems to per­plex the view ; but in the selection of the particular line, the problem becomes difficult, because a great multiplicity of circumstances, many of them not purely military, inter­pose. The political situation of the belligerents ; their re­lative resources ; character and situation of the fortresses ; accidental strength of their forces ; distance by sea ; course of a considerable river ; direction of a chain of mountains ; nature of the country ; political state of either party ; jealousy of a neutral, or apprehensions of an ally ; all in their turn claim consideration. In general, however, the initial application of military masses should be, when the belligerents are neighbours, upon some part of the frontier which projects into the hostile state, as Bohemia with re­gard to Prussia, or Silesia with regard to Austria. But it is a maxim that lines of operations have their key as well as fields of battle : in the former, the great strategical points are decisive ; as, in the latter, the points which command the weak part of a position constitute the key. Where there exists a vast superiority of force on one side, the key, or great strategical point, may be sought at a considerable depth in the line of operations ; but where the masses are nearly balanced, it is necessarily reduced to a relative proportion with the breadth of the base. Thus, for instance, the destruction of a French army on the frontier of the Netherlands, would not immediately pro­duce the consequence of the victors marching to the capi­tal, unless they had sufficient superiority to mask the principal fortresses which cover her line of defence in that quarter, or some other accidental circumstance rendered such a measure practicable. As further proofs of the re­lative proportion between the depth and base of a line of operations, that of Napoleon in Russia failed on both its pivots, before the summit was defeated ; and those in Spain, although they were supported by intermediate fortresses, immediately contracted, when the battle of Salamanca produced consequences which endangered the western communication with the base.

Although it is absolutely necessary to move with a mass of force near the enemy, it is more advantageous to march in separate corps while still at a distance from him, if he has not a concentrated mass ready to act, and there be se­veral roads leading concentrically towards the point intend­ed to be occupied. It is evident that five corps, of twenty thousand men each, will move forward more rapidly to­wards any point, than a hundred thousand men, marching on the same road, who can only advance with the tardiness inherent in large bodies, and besides are encumbered with the immense train of their subsistence. Celerity of move­ment, multiplying the force of an army by enabling the mass to be carried alternately upon every point of the line, is an advantage of invaluable consequence ; but this is not the only reason for recommending this method. There are two others, viz. the increased facility of subsist­ence, and the uncertainty into which it throws the enemy.

An army of 20,000 men can find subsistence, in central Europe, on every part of their march, by merely causing the country within some leagues to contribute to their wants; and if they convey with them biscuit for eight or ten days, that is, during the first period, while corps are in position, or manœuvring in a contracted area with other columns, they will be enabled to subsist till the magazines are form­ed. Thus military operations are in a great degree eman­cipated from the necessity of pre-arranged magazines, and the regular encumbrance of field-ovens.

The army which commences offensive operations takes the lead in all the movements, and those of the enemy are necessarily subordinate to them. If therefore it occupies with a corps each of the great avenues leading to the enemy, he will be in a state of uncertainty along his whole line of defence or operations, and remain in suspense as to the point upon which he ought to collect his masses to op­pose them. Upon these facts, the following series of maxims is founded

1. When an army undertakes an invasion, or acts offen­sively, it takes the lead (or, as the French term it, *l'initia­tive)* in the movements.

2. This advantage precludes the necessity of marching in mass, until near the point where the enemy is to be found and attacked. Until then it is preferable to move in several strong corps, in proportion to the collective strength of the army, and to direct them upon the communications which lead concentrically to the point.

3. The general direction can only be upon the centre, one of the extremities, or the rear, of the hostile line. An extremity will usually be found most eligible, because from that point the rear is easily attained; the centre only in the case where the enemy’s line is scattered, and his corps separated by great intervals.

4. In this case the greater number of the corps should advance upon one of the isolated parts, and endeavour to surround it, while the remainder should occupy a central point to keep the rest of the hostile army in check.

5. When the principal mass of these corps is directed into the rear of an enemy, by passing one of the extremi­ties of his line, one corps should remain upon that extre­mity, in order to keep open the communication with the line of operations, while the opponent is cut off from his. This corps serves likewise to attack him in flank, and to prevent him from withdrawing out of a faulty position by a secret movement.

6. These operations are most advantageous when the enemy is at a great distance from his own base. The principle may however be applied to positions less distant (two or three marches), provided the different corps have no greater distance to traverse to the point of reunion, than that which separates them from those of their own advanced posts which face the enemy. But this rule should not be understood as applying to isolated divisions upon an extended front of ninety or a hundred miles, unable to unite on a day of action, and whose movements cannot be simultaneous upon the decisive point. The difference is easily perceived between such operations and those of se­veral corps concentrated in a position the depth of which equals the extent of front, and whose simultaneous co-ope­ration is certain before the enemy can make an attempt upon their line.

7. By means of this system, the army, occupying a