greater space, marches more rapidly, and is enabled to sub­sist on the roads. Cattle and biscuit alone will be requir­ed to follow each corps, in sufficient quantity to subsist it when in the vicinity of the enemy, where the other corps having likewise arrived, they are obliged to live within a smaller periphery. The stock of provision will be suffi­cient if equal to the time required for collecting another.

8. Magazines are then formed in the rear as the army advances. They are collected by means of regular requisi­tions made on the neighbouring provinces, and enforced by a few troops ; contracts are entered into with the local ad­ministrations, and precautionary convoys follow from the frontiers. Cattle, rice, and biscuit are the most useful provisions ; the easiest to be transported.

In this view of the theory of initial operations, such as Jomini and other authorities consider them, no great re­gard is paid to the waste of human life, by the frequent want or irregularity of the issue of provisions, or notice taken of the indiscipline which naturally arises when fa­mine drives the soldier to marauding. A relentless con­scription system may indeed supply recruits ; but they are a very inadequate instrument when compared to formed soldiers.

It remains to examine the art of forming a plan of cam­paign or operations in reference to insular expeditions. In the application of masses on the base line of operations by sea, or by an insular force, much difficulty occurs, espe­cially if that base is to be obtained by force on a hostile coast ; because the line of communication from the port whence an expeditionary army proceeds to the point where debarkation takes place is lengthened, uncertain, and broken. The point of debarkation becomes a secondary base; and unless a friendly fortress, or a naturally advan­tageous point, left unguarded by the enemy, can be occu­pied, the difficulties are nearly insurmountable. It is again difficult to despatch a large force in one fleet ; it is danger­ous to keep it together, and dangerous to allow great inter­vals ; the elements affect the time, connection, and order of the convoy ; an independent and separate service (the navy) influences the primary organization and execution ; debarkation absorbs much invaluable time, particularly that of the artillery, horses, and stores. From these causes, a practice has arisen of fitting out expeditions not sufficiently formidable, with a view of ascertaining the practicability of an object, but which by that very system is often ren­dered impossible ; for the first landing having been effected, the enemy’s attention is no longer divided ; he assembles his means of defence while the second convoy is expected, and the delay becomes decisive of the event. Yet if, in any military operation, the effect of masses simultaneously employed be of consequence, it is in those which com­mence on the sea-shore ; for the troops have not only to debark and act offensively, but also to construct their means of security and retreat in case of failure. If we examine the primary operations of this class, from the wars of King William to the present period, we shall find that, with the exception of such as were favoured by chance or particular circumstances, the success or failure was de­pendent upon one or more of the following maxims, espe­cially as applied to continental expeditions.

1. When an army is directed to make a descent upon an enemy’s coast, with the object of penetrating into the coun­try, a point of debarkation should be selected, where the enemy possesses no local means to arrest the progress, such as a fortified city or a defensible peninsula. If how­ever circumstances compel the descent near or upon such a spot, immediate measures should be taken to mask or capture it, and secure the success of ulterior operations.

2. If the expedition is intended to be confined solely to the coast, the point of debarkation should possess the indis­pensable qualifications of facility of communication with the fleet, security of retreat and reimbarkation. A point pos­sessed of these advantages is a fit spot for a temporary base of operations.

3. An expedition intended to operate ulteriorly should be *ab initio* superior to the probable immediate force of the enemy, so that the success of the landing and march into the country be not problematical.

4. No combinations of invasion should be made depend­ing on the co-operation of corps expected from distant or opposite quarters. It is important to have them collected, as much as possible, on or near one point of embarkation, to proceed from thence in mass to execute the enterprise.

5. In the plan of an expedition, no combinations should be admitted which include two or more lines of operations from separate bases. Armies transported by sea are, from that circumstance, not numerous; division renders them still weaker, and if on one point a misfortune occurs, the other division must reimbark.

6. In colonial and insular expeditions, it is only neces­sary to combine the means in proportion to the strength of the object, and with attention to the season and climate. But on all occasions where the reduction of a fortress is in contemplation, the engineer department should possess an adequate *materiel* as well as the artillery.

All these maxims are in unison with the leading prin­ciples of the art of war, or constitute mere modifications to adapt them to maritime affairs. As examples of the im­portance of the first rule, may be quoted the landing of the emigrants at Quiberon : being confined to a narrow penin­sula, they were immediately blocked in by the enemy. The Helder expedition, though victorious in two battles, could not penetrate beyond the neck of the Haerlemmer Meer, which makes a peninsula of North Holland. At Aboukir, again, a peninsula, similar results would have ensued, but for the circumstance that a communication could be open­ed on the side of Rosetta, which rendered the position cen­tral against the two exterior lines of the enemy, namely, those of Cairo and Alexandria, and enabled the British to carry their mass alternately upon each, and ultimately, with inferior numbers, to reconquer that province.

In the second maxim, the causes are pointed out which allowed the expedition to Cherbourg, in 1758, to reimbark in safety, although no regular precautions insured the mea­sure ; and those which produced the disaster at St Cast, under General Bligh, notwithstanding every precaution. The Ostend expedition had the same defects, though per­haps on this occasion the object was considered of sufficient magnitude to allow a disregard of the consequences.

Inattention to the third had a preponderating influence at the Helder. The first division, having landed, was ob­liged to wait behind the intrenchments of the Zyp for thc arrival of the main body. Meantime the enemy, now cer­tain of the point in danger, collected his means, and ar­ranged the plan of defence. After three battles he was only thrown back upon stronger ground, in a position where he could neither be turned nor attacked in front with pro­bability of success. In Egypt, the expeditionary force was likewise inferior to the enemy, and if the hostile commander had sacrificed the establishments and *Institut* at Cairo, to collect his forces on one line, he could have resisted the invasion with success. The Walcheren expedition, consi­dered in its primary combinations and preparatory mea­sures, was a model ; as also that of the French for the in­vasion of Egypt. Both were wrong in the choice of the point of debarkation ; but the results were different, and, from an unconquerable propensity in man, by the results they have been judged.

The expedition to the Helder again furnishes the proofs of the fourth maxim. Had the two British and the Rus­sian divisions arrived in time to act in mass, within a few hours after the first landing, the enemy could not have ma­