tured an effectual plan of defence. But the combinations required easterly winds for the Russians and westerly for the British reinforcements, and both were nevertheless to arrive if possible simultaneously on the same spot. The Egyptian expedition was to be sustained by a corps from India and the Cape, by the Red Sea, which could scarcely by any chance arrive in proper time. At Copenhagen indeed the two divisions from Rugen (an island in the Baltic, where a British corps lay in transports) and from England did arrive without accident ; but the successive divisions sent to the river Plate, to be successively defeat­ed, are a further corroboration.

The fifth maxim is sufficiently obvious. Sir John Moore’s division was off the coast of Portugal when the battle of Vi- miera was fought ; had it sailed conjointly with Sir Arthur Wellesley’s, the result of that battle would have brought the British into Lisbon *without* a convention. If the divi­sion engaged had been defeated, a corps on board of ships could not have rendered the least assistance. In the next campaign, Sir John operated on several lines from Portu­gal, and Sir David Baird from a different base (Corunna), with the view of uniting at the distance of more than 200 miles on a point in possession of a formidable enemy. Such combinations produced their natural consequences; the hard pressed retreat of the army to Corunna ensued ; and, as if another proof were wanting, no sooner were the troops com­pelled to fight a battle, than another division appeared to wit­ness the conflict from the ships, and return to England.

To the deficiency of a proper establishment of sappers and miners, with the *matériel* required to enable the en­gineers to act with effect, many delays and failures may be ascribed. It has necessitated the severe system of bom­bardment, and repeatedly rendered the British arms odious, without thereby insuring success. Carcasses and rockets ruin the defenceless inhabitants, but have no decisive in­fluence upon the defence of a regular fortress.

If we examine the wars in America by the rules of art, we find Lord Amherst operating by the line of Lake Champlain upon Montreal, and Wolfe by the St Lawrence upon Quebec, both successful, and yet two years without connection. Next appear isolated expeditions traversing a vast continent, deficient in numbers, and therefore always inferior to the local militias on the spot, terminating their career in defeat or capture ; or else dispersed along the coast, occupied in landings for trivial purposes, and when reimbarked, leaving the enemy to boast of successful re­sistance. In the Canadas we behold the key of defensive operations left without a fortress. True indeed it is that a fortress does not defend a state, that an army must be looked to for that purpose ; but an army is a frail instrument, and if armies defend nations, fortresses defend armies.

Reflecting on the miscarriages produced by dispersing the forces, it appears that in British military combinations it should be a maxim, never to act offensively on more than one point at a time. This rule, a fundamental principle of the Roman policy in her best days, should have been acted upon in the wars of the Spanish succession, when that ques­tion ought to have been decided in the Netherlands. The consequence of pursuing a multiplicity of offensive combi­nations at the same time, was never better exemplified than in the failures of the simultaneous expeditions to Buenos Ayres, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Rugen. It follows that small expeditions, hovering along hostile coasts, pro­duce no beneficial effects. The local garrisons and militia of the country are generally superior ; and a momentary de­barkation produces in the mind of the enemy, not only na­tional union, but also the ideas of victory. The debarka­tions at St Maio and St Cast, that under Sir James Pulteney

at Corunna, most of those in America, were fraught with risks not counterbalanced by any prospects of real advantage. Those on the east of Spain were of a different character; they had a political object of importance, and served as a diversion which fixed a whole hostile army in that quarter.

It is a general rule, liable indeed to occasional excep­tions, that the operations of the land forces should be con­fined to fixed important points, where the object is not only to land, but to conquer and maintain themselves. There is no instance in the history of the nation where a British mass of forces met with disaster, when that mass acted by itself, or with sufficient preponderance among its allies. From the nature of the sea-line of operations, expeditions, like other military enterprises, must be liable to miscarriage ; but a right use of the forces will at least increase the chances of success. In the selection of the points, much must be left to the circumstances of the case, but their importance should always be in relation to the risk, expense, and time.

As these observations apply to great operations only, it is unnecessary to advert to flying corps, or such expeditions as are merely intended to alarm a coast or distract an ene­my ; because these, in most cases of problematical utility, should be very sparingly resorted to, and, at all events, never consist of more than a few frigates, with troops on board. The geographical extent and insular position of Great Britain afford equal facilities for defence and attack. Defence, however, when passive, is allowed to be the very worst that can be adopted in the military policy of a state ; and when the national superiority at sea is considered, it becomes evident that British operations ought to be offen­sive. With a great number of garrisons stationed in every quarter of the world, the land forces form nowhere a con­siderable body ; those in Britain being scarcely adequate to the local duties, and the relief of such as return from abroad. At the commencement of a war, although the mi­litia is called out, the reinforcements required to place dis­tant garrisons on the war-establishment absorb nearly all the infantry, and leave not only no disposable force, but even no sufficient elements to create new corps in an effi­cient manner. Hence three or four years of war pass in preparations on one side, and in conquests on the other. Millions are spent, and vast sacrifices made, to arrest the progress of the enemy ; humiliating offers are made, which the opponent, blinded by success, has the imprudence to re­ject Then, forced to still greater expense, other cam­paigns follow, to recover what was lost in the first. By a rational system of preparation, wars might be terminated in a short period, or altogether prevented ; and yet long wars, the real cause of the prodigious national debt, are occasioned by an ill-judged prejudice against a standing army, backed by still weaker ideas of economy. Since re­gular armies have been maintained in Europe, the obvious utility of having at least some disposable force to give weight to negotiation, requires scarcely an argument In­stead of three battalions, the only applicable troops in 1792-3, which were sent to Willemstadt, had Great Bri­tain possessed 25,000 disposable troops, the National Con­vention would have paused before it declared war, or this force would immediately have influenced the reconquest of Belgium. Even a year later, such a national force could have averted the consequences of the action of Hooghlede, the retreat from Dunkirk, and the final evacuation of the Netherlands. In the late war, the inability of Great Bri­tain to act from the first with vigour, compelled her to fight twenty-one years, with incalculable waste of blood and trea­sure, merely to restore the balance of power ; and the nation, which at first had only three battalions for service, ended, in 1814, with a mass of more than a million of men in arms.@@1

@@@, According to authentic documents, this mass amounted to 1,116,813, including navy, East India, and local militia force, but exclusively of yeomanry and volunteers.