5. A double line of operations becomes still more dan­gerous when its parts are separated by several days’ march.

6. Simple and interior lines, on the contrary, are always most safe ; because they admit the action of the mass of forces against the isolated divisions of the enemy, if he be so imprudent as to venture an action.

7. A double line of operations, however, may be adopted with success, if the forces employed are so much greater, that superior masses can be presented to the opponents on both its parts.

8. Two anterior lines, mutually sustaining each other, and facing two exterior lines at a certain distance, must avoid being compressed into a small area ; for the exterior hostile lines might thereby act simultaneously.

9. Again, they should not operate at too great intervals; for the enemy might have time to crush one of these divi­sions, while it is weakened by detaching to the other, and thus gain a decisive advantage.

10. It being the interest of a commander to divide and isolate the opponent’s forces, his manoeuvring lines should never have the object of drawing the whole hostile forces upon him ; as Tempelhoff boasts Frederick to have done in the campaign of 1760.

By reference to the preceding sketch of the operations in late wars, the value of these rules is everywhere observ­able. When the details in history are examined, such as they are presented by authors acquainted with the art of war, they form a key, which opens an unerring way into all the causes of success and misfortune. Thus, in what has been said on accidental lines of operation, it might have been added, that Napoleon did not know how to avail himself of them, when he was advised to operate by the right bank of the Elbe, and change his direction upon the pivot of Magdeburg, instead of risking thc battle of Leipzig, and suffering, in violation of the eighth rule, the enemy to place him between two fires; nor in Champagne in 1814, when he operated at too great a distance, overlooking the ninth rule, which gave the allies time to force the gates of Paris, thus employing the just system of throwing the mass of their forces upon the most important point. The duke of Wellington’s defensive campaign in Portugal hinged upon a prudent application of the second rule ; and Napoleon, in 1814, could not have resisted so long as he did in France, but by the same system. Although the allies at that moment conducted their operations on the seventh rule, perfectly applicable under the then existing circumstances, yet the vast superiority of internal lines remained evident. But when his eccentric movement placed him out of the sphere of real operations, the allies applied the third rule with perfect success, and effected his fall.

In order to complete the view of territorial and ma- noeuvring lines, it is requisite to consider them as they are affected by thc configuration of frontiers.

1. In order to operate with advantage, there should not be two different armies upon the same frontier ; because,

2. Double lines will always fail, with equal chances, against a single line, as has already been shown.

3. Interior lines resist with advantage against exterior lines, either upon the same or upon two different frontiers. The objection that Pichegru proved successful in 1794 is not valid ; because Prince Coburg did not avail himself of his interior line, but acted by detachments, while he re­mained inactive with his mass, inferior in strength, and un­supported by fortresses on the flanks.

4. When the hostile fortresses are scattered upon a line of great extent, the most advantageous manoeuvring line is upon their centre; as the Russians experienced to their cost in the beginning of the campaign of 1812 : but on all other occasions, the best direction is upon one of the ex­tremities, and from thence on the rear ; as exemplified in 1800 in Italy, in 1805 in Bavaria, and the next year at the sources of the Maine and Saale, &c. When central masses are moved with ability against scattered corps, all other things being equal, they must always be successful, often even without a battle ; as when Moreau, making de­monstrations against the left of Kray, near Huningen, moved rapidly into Switzerland, whereby the greater part of Swabia fell into his hands without an action. The march of the duke of Wellington upon Madrid and Burgos pro­duced the immediate evacuation of the south of Spain ; and the movement of Kutusoff upon Kaluga forced thc French from Moscow and out of Russia.

5. The configuration of a frontier may have important influence on the direction of lines of operation. Central positions, forming salient angles towards the enemy, such as Bohemia forms towards Prussia, Switzerland towards Austria or Saxony, as it was circumstanced in 1813, are the most advantageous ; because they are naturally inte­rior, and lead to the flanks and rear of the opponent’s defensive line. The sides of these salient angles are therefore so important, that all the resources of art should be added to those of nature to render them impregnable. Switzerland and Bohemia are sufficiently proved to pos­sess these natural advantages; but Saxony appears more doubtful, because Napoleon was at length defeated at Leipzig. Yet it was his conviction of these central ad­vantages that made him neglect to change the line of his operations upon the pivot of Magdeburg ; and if we examine the character of the operations, though the allies were nu­merically, and especially in excellent cavalry, superior, we discover that when his defensive manœuvres were confined to a moderate distance from the Elbe, and the ridge of the mountains of Bohemia, no impression could be made upon him ; but his system was solely that of attack, and his im­patience sought the Prussians deep in Silesia, the grand army beyond the defiles of Bohemia, and the northern army in the sands of Berlin, not successively, but all at the same moment. He was thus on all sides inferior, but not dislodged, till, by his own indecision, he allowed the enemy to turn both his flanks simultaneously, and to bring him to action between two fires at Leipzig. We may take occa­sion to revert once more to the double exterior lines of the allies here, and in 1814 in Champagne. When each of the armies operating exteriorly amounts to 120,000 or 150,000 men, they possess a consistency which obviates all need of co-operation ; for, admitting the enemy to be even stronger, there is not a great disparity of force between the parties, which can be deployed and brought into action on the same field of battle : hence the weaker army can decline a bat­tle, and in both these cases, where the allies had great su­periority of cavalry, they could begin and break off a battle at their pleasure ; as they proved at the first battle of Leipzig or Lützen, and at Bautzen.

6. Where no such central position or territorial pro­jection exists, the same effect may be produced by the re­lative direction of the manoeuvring lines, as exemplified in fig. 1. CD, manoeuvring on the right flank of the army AB, and HI moving upon the left flank of FG, form two interior lines, CK and IK. upon the extremities of each of the exterior lines AB and FG, both of which may be de­stroyed by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon them. This combination presents the effect of the French campaigns of 1800 and 1809. It is also the spirit of the duke of Wellington’s defence of Portugal ; for, by his