bridges on the Tagus, he had a direct and interior commu­nication on both his lines north and south of the river, while the enemy, being placed on the segment of a circle, had only the precarious connection by the bridge of Alme- ras, which being destroyed, he could not advance from either Andalusia or Salamanca, without immediately placing him­self in the disadvantageous position here described.

7. The configuration of the theatre of war may possess the same importance as that of a frontier ; for, in fact, every theatre of war may be considered as a quadrilateral figure. To elucidate this idea, the scene of operations of the French army from 1757 to 1762, and the operations of Napoleon in 1806, may be cited. In fig. 2, the side AB be­ing enclosed by the North Sea, the side BD by the river Weser, base of the army of Prince Ferdinand ; CD representing the river Maine, base of the French, and AC the Rhine, likewise in possession of the French ; their armies operating of­fensively on the sides AC and CD, had the third AB or North Sea in their fa­vour, and therefore BD was the only side which they were to gain by their manœuvres to have possession of the four sides, and consequently of the base of all the communications of their adversary.

This is more clearly ex­emplified in fig. 3. The French army E, proceeding from the base CD, to gain the position FGH, cuts off the allied army *J* from the side BD, its only communi­cation and base. It would thus be driven into the angle LAM, which is formed near Embden by the line of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea; while the army E could al­ways communicate with CD or the Maine.

The manœuvre of Napoleon on the Saale, in 1806, was combined on the same principles. He moved upon Jena and Naumburg in the position FGH ; and then advancing by Halle and Dessau, he threw the Prussian army J upon the side AB, formed by the sea. The fate which attended that army at Erfurth, Magdeburg, Lübeck, and Prentzlow, is well known. The great art therefore consists in com­bining the marches so as to arrive upon the communica­tions of the enemy without sacrificing one’s own. Now the lines FGH, by means of the prolonged position, and the angle formed towards the extremity of the enemy, always preserves the communication with the base CD. This constitutes the application of the manœuvres of Marengo and Jena.

When the theatre of hostilities is not near the sea, it will be still circumscribed by some great neutral power, which guards the frontier, and encloses one side of the quadrangle. No doubt this barrier is inferior to the sea, but, in a gene­ral view, it must nevertheless be considered as an obstacle, upon which it is dangerous to be driven after a defeat, and advantageous to push an enemy. A state with 200,000 men will not suffer its neutrality to be violated with im­punity ; and if a beaten army ventured so to do, still it would be cut off from its base. But if an inferior power forms the limit of the theatre of war, the square of opera­tions may then be considered as extending over it to the next great neutral power, or the sea.

To give a still more convincing proof of the justness of the preceding ideas, let us examine the scene of the campaign of 1806-7 in Poland. The Baltic and the fron­tier of Austrian Gallicia formed the two sides AB and CD of the above square. It was of great consequence to both par­ties to avoid being driven upon either of these obstacles. The configuration of the frontiers may modify the sides of the square, and convert them into a parallelogram, or a tra- pesius, as in fig. 4.

In this case, the army GH, being in possession of the sides AC and CD, would be still more favourably situat­ed, because the base of the opponent being contracted at BD, would be more difficult to keep open. The front of the base BD having less extent, offers fewer resour­ces for manoeuvring, and affords to the army GH the means of operating with more success; because the direc­tion of the line CD naturally leads upon the communica­tions of the enemy, and because the space to be occupied in order to cut him off is shorter, and therefore more easily held with concentrated forces.

The theatre of war in Prussia and Poland, previously mentioned, was precisely of this figure. The frontiers of Austrian Gallicia, extending to the Narew, formed, by the line of the Vistula, the contracted side BD ; and the man­ner in which Napoleon embraced that line at Pultusk and Eylau was similar to the figure here shown. This opera­tion had however its unfavourable chances ; the first de­pending upon the doubtful trust to be reposed in the neu­trality of Austria, and the second upon the great distance from the base of operations, which exposed the communi­cations of the armies with the Oder to the mercy of the cabinet of Vienna. It depended even then upon Austria (as indeed it had the year before depended on Prussia) to put a stop to these endless invasions. The manœuvre of the French general was good, but the operation of the statesman was only daring. These examples are sufficient to demonstrate that the manner of embracing a theatre of war is amenable to the two following principles.

1. To direct the masses upon the decisive points of the line of operations, that is, upon the centre if the enemy has been so imprudent as to scatter his forces, or upon an ex­tremity if he is in a contiguous line.

2. To make the great effort in the latter case upon that extremity which has its back against an insurmountable obstacle, or which leads upon the communications of the enemy without sacrificing our own.

Defensive operations, in a great measure already exa­mined in the preceding discussions, require, nevertheless, some further remarks. Passive defence offers no security to a state, nor fortresses without an army ; it is confiding in a shield without a sword. Reason and experience alike prove that defensive system to be the best, which embraces thc greatest number of offensive facilities ; for these we re­fer, in particular, to interior and simple lines, and those di­rections of lines which best anticipate or counteract the most effectual offensive ones. But as defensive measures imply inferiority of forces, they must in a considerable degree de­pend upon local means to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy. Rivers and chains of mountains are the natu­ral obstacles ; fortresses, intrenched camps, and well select­ed positions upon the most advantageous lines of defence, the artificial means in a territorial front. Fortresses, with *têtes de pont* upon a river parallel to the frontier, are very advantageous ; but upon a river perpendicular to the fron-