a similar result would have occurred if the French army had been ably commanded, and exercised in great manœu­vres. At Blenheim, all Eugene’s efforts were unavailing, even when he had gained the flank, until Marlborough’s success decided the victory.

The truth of these observations is so manifest, that it may be applied to an army superior in numbers : 50,000 attacking in this manner an army of 40,000, would still incur all the same risks ; and if the inferior force, after leaving a corps to mask one attack, should take a rapid of­fensive measure, and overtake the enemy in his preparatory dispositions, which would necessarily be calculated upon the principle of finding thc opponent in his position, the heads of his columns might he turned and completely routed. But if the two hostile attacks should have between them some difficult object, a wood or river, they might each in their turn be destroyed. Examples of this kind occurred at Lonato, Castiglione, Abendsberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbon.

When however the attacking army is double the force of the enemy, the principle no longer holds as stated in the cases of Hochkirch and Leipzig ; but, to avoid the danger of divided forces, it is requisite to have the lead, and to conceal it in such a manner that both attacks may com­mence nearly at the same moment. Thus two maxims, in appearance contradictory, are derived from the same prin­ciple.

1. An army intending to attack another of equal or su­perior force cannot insure success but by a concentrated effort upon a single point of a weakened line, which is not in a condition to be timely supported.

2. But when a superior army attacks one much weaker, two or three divisions should be formed, in order to bring all its masses into action against the inferior masses op­posed ; for if the attack were confined to a single point, the whole of the forces could not be brought into line, and the enemy might deploy an equal number ; but it is neces­sary that the whole combinations centre on the same ground, and at the same instant, to produce unity of exe­cution, and avoid partial and successive defeat.

3. As every front of operations and each position of bat­tle contains a decisive point, it is important that the repar­tition of forces insure not only a general superiority over the enemy, but also that a strong reserve be appropriated to support the attack upon that principal point.

These maxims are more especially applicable to battles than to strategical operations ; for with these no necessity demands that corps acting at the distance of several marches from each other should engage exactly at the same hour, and it would be impossible to do so on the same ground. But if the principle is to be enforced differently, it is still of full efficacy. It may appear that in these ideas the main stress of the argument rests upon the local superi­ority of numbers ; but it is nevertheless true, that their com­bination is the chief object; for 30,000 men may be de­feated by half their numbers, if, in the disposition and in the choice of the ground, some vicious arrangement take place, which produces a real disadvantage; such as La Motte experienced from Webb at Wynendael, Chevert from Imhoff at Meer, and the Austrians from Moreau in the defiles of Hohenlinden.

IV. In the strategical movement of a great mass in a combined effort upon one point, it is advisable to keep the forces concentrated within a space approaching to square, so as to have them perfectly disposable ; or, in other words, that the depth of the disposition be nearly equal to the front, enabling the battalions to arrive with promptitude from all quarters towards the point attacked. Extensive fronts militate as much against good principles, as great de­tachments and isolated divisions deprived of the means of being sustained. The inattention of Napoleon and Ney to

this maxim gave Benningsen the advantage at Eylau ; and the care of the allies in 1815, notwithstanding the difficulty of guarding an open frontier, enabled them to concentrate their masses at Waterloo.

V. One of the most efficacious means of applying the above general principles, is to induce the enemy to take contrary measures. By means of small corps of light troops, jealousies may be created for some important points of his communications. If he can be persuaded that they are formidable, he will be tempted to detach strong divisions against them, and, scattering his forces, be disabled from acting with vigour himself, and be exposed to an attack from superior forces. Operations by detachments have never­theless been in fashion. To divide and subdivide, till the main army was reduced to the secondary character of mere observing, was considered as the very summit of strategical science. In the Hanoverian campaigns, the French, with two great armies, acted upon this system ; nor could they ever be undeceived, although Prince Ferdinand, with less than half their force, contrived not only to reconquer the country, but afterwards to keep them constantly at bay, and even to attack them with superior numbers. The Austrians, and the army of the empire, operated similarly in Saxony, and reaped similar fruits. But Mack, trained in the Turkish wars, was the great patron of cordons and scattered posts, with inert positions to sustain them. The Austrians have however little reason to exult in the success of their system. The least mischief which they have de­rived from it was, that they fought on accessory points, while the main armies, reduced in strength, were unable to do more than menace the principal objects of the campaign, wasting their time until they were attacked by superior forces.

Nor are hostile armies destroyed by merely taking posi­tions upon their communications, and remaining inactive within them. Had Napoleon halted upon the Lech in 1805, or on the Saale in 1806, he could neither have pre­vented the escape of Mack by Donauwerth, nor the retreat of the duke of Brunswick to the Elbe. The art of war does not consist in incursions upon communications, but in placing the mass upon them, in order to attack the enemy with decided advantage. Detachments upon the commu­nications of the adversary are only accessories of secondary utility.

VI. When the lead is taken in a decisive movement against the enemy, great importance is attached to an ex­act knowledge of the positions and movements which he may undertake. Spies are then of the utmost consequence, but partisans, thoroughly versed in watching the enemy, are of still greater utility. For this purpose the general should scatter small parties in all directions, and multiply them with as much care as he would show to restrain them in great operations. Some divisions of light cavalry, ex­pressly organized for this service, and not included in the order of battle, are the most efficient. To operate without such precautions is to walk in the dark, and to be exposed to the disastrous consequences which may be produced by a secret march of the enemy. Generally speaking, these measures are too much neglected. The *espionnage* is not sufficiently organized beforehand ; and the officers of light troops have not always the requisite ex­perience to conduct their detachments.

The Cossacks under Platoff, Chernicheff, Tettenborn, &c. in Russia and Poland ; these, with the Prussians under Lutzow, in Germany and France ; and the Guerillas of Mina, the Empecinado, and others, in Spain and Portugal, have shown the immense advantages to be derived from such services. While they were few in number, their real importance was not fully understood ; but when 15,000 or 20,000 of them appeared in the field, especially in a friendly country, they became the most formidable enemy, with re-